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Preface
In the ancient redactor’s epilogue to the biblical book of Koheleth, the anony-
mous sage, perhaps feeling challenged or weary by Koheleth’s heterodox views,
observes: רשבתעגיהברהגהלוץקןיאהברהםירפסתושערהזהינבהמהמרתיו “A fur-
ther word: Against them, my son, be warned! The making of many books is
without limit, Andmuch study is awearying of the flesh” (Koheleth 12:12). Read-
ing this text, the 19th century exegete Rabbi Samuel David Luzatto comments,
הדובעהדבכתארוקהלעםגו:ץקןיאהברהםירפסתושע , “The making of many books
is without limit: and also upon the reader the work is heavy.” Far be it from the
editors of this volume to rebel against such a well-known biblical dictum, but
that is preciselywhatwewould like to state. Thework of producing this volume
for our teacher and colleague, Rabbi Professor Joel Roth, טוריבצןבבקעיברה , has
been a simhah shel mitzvah, a joy akin to performing the Torah’s command-
ments. And it is our fervent expectation that the contents of the present vol-
ume, far from being a burden to its many intended readers, will likewise bring
them the joy of consuming the wisdom of so many of Rabbi Roth’s students
and colleagues.We write on behalf of all of this volume’s contributors that the
debt we owe to Rabbi Roth for his years of scholarship, teaching and dedicated
service far outweigh the relatively small tokenof thanks this volume represents.
In his career, Joel Roth has been known as a םימכחדימלת , a scholar and
teacher of Talmud par excellence, and as a master הכלהקסופ , without ques-
tion the preeminent decisor of Jewish law for the Conservative movement
of his generation. His primary works of talmudic scholarship and Jewish law
include his studies and critical edition of the Sefer ha-Mordechai to tractate
Kiddushin (R. Mordechai ben Hillel, a thirteenth century Ashkenazi scholar,
composed a compendium to the earlier, authoritative legal code of R. Yitzhak
Alfasi, Halakhot Rabbati). In the meticulous style and approach of the Talmud
scholarship of his generation, Roth painstakingly and precisely documented all
of the textual variants in themedievalmanuscripts of R.Mordechai benHillel’s
halakhic compendium, and added important notes along theway regarding the
medieval scholar’s own approach to a number of issues of law and in light of
the vast literature of the rishonim (the earliest rabbinic scholars following the
Babylonian geonim).
Rabbi Roth also published The Halachic Process: A Systemic Analysis. This
outstanding work, unique in both its breadth and depth, is an assessment
and analysis of the principles and premises of Jewish legal decision-making
through the ages and the practical application of his findings for contempo-
rary Jewish legal decision-making. In addition to his learned survey pertaining
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to judicial discretion, Roth also discusses factors in legal decision-making such
as the role of custom, newmedical knowledge and the qualifications of author-
ities. Among other topics, Roth discusses two areas that are not often systemi-
cally addressed by contemporary halakhic authorities and are worthy of high-
lighting here. In a chapter entitled “Extralegal Sources within Halakhah,” Roth
examines the impact of social and economic change on decision-making; in
another chapter, “On New Legal Sources within Halakhah,” he considers the
significance of developments in the academic field of Talmud—especially the
discovery of alternate readings of texts in medieval manuscripts and source
critical analyses. In light of Roth’s training and subsequent teaching at The
Jewish Theological Seminary, it should come as no surprise that his method-
ology for deciding halakha would integrate academic methods. Indeed, two
academic fields—medieval halakhic historiography and Talmud criticism—
witnessed tremendous expansion during the last third of the twentieth century
and some of the prime movers, at least in the field of Talmud, were affiliated
with the Seminary. During Roth’s formative years, some of the most important
studies in medieval halakhic historiography fleshed out the degree to which
‘external’ social and economic factors impacted Jewish legal decision-making
at the expense of ‘internal’ processes. At the same time the field of Talmud
scholarship began to mature and significant studies on the manuscript tradi-
tions of the Talmud and the how the Talmud’s sources were reworked over the
ages began to appear. While it is true that Roth doesn’t make extensive use
of the works of these scholars in his own scholarly oeuvre, it is nonetheless
significant that his own approaches developed in tandem with the scholarly
developments identified. It is particularly important to point out Roth’s con-
tributions against the backdrop of the regnant academic approaches since he
integrates both social change and new textual developments from the perspec-
tive of a jurist. In this regard he stands out among many of his colleagues who
preferred primarily to integrate the current impact of social change, as imper-
ative on moral and ethical grounds. Regarding Roth’s use of Talmud criticism,
his suggestions for judicious use of new textual evidence follows in a long line
halakhists—some cited by Roth himself—who implemented legal change on
the basis of textual emendations and variants with great caution. While the
current context does not allow for an extensive evaluation of Joel Roth’s the-
ory of halakhic development—adesideratum for some future study—certainly
the academic study of Jewish law’s development is all the richer due to Roth’s
meticulous treatment, and his seminal study should be required reading for
students of Jewish law.
It has been as a contemporary interpreter and decisor of Jewish Law that
Joel Roth has achieved his most significant renown. Author of dozens of legal
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decisions and articles about the role of Jewish law, particularly in institutions
associated with Conservative Judaism, Rabbi Roth has helped all who sought
his Torah to navigate the problems of integrating the demands of halacha with
the opportunities and conflicts associated with living in liberal society. A life-
time of dedication to teaching Talmud and Halacha at the Jewish Theological
Seminary; longtime chairmanship of the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee on
JewishLawandStandards; anddevoted service as Professor-in-Residence at the
Seminary’s CampRamah in the Berkshires are only themain features of his sto-
ried career. Joel Roth is exemplified by what the rabbis call שפנתוריסמ , literally
“the conveying of the soul,” an expression marking the utter devotion to the
principles of rabbinic Judaism. One cannot footnote the contribution that Joel
Roth has made to untold numbers of correspondents—both in person, and by
mail and telephone—who sought his wisdom about Talmud and Jewish Law, a
devotion that continues to this very day.
In the fabled encounter between Isaac and his son Jacob (Genesis 27:22),
the aged patriarch, who has become blind, recognizes his son by means of the
latter’s voice: בקעילוקלקה , “the voice is the voice of Jacob.” While it must be
admitted that within the context of the biblical narrative, it is a most deceitful
moment, the ancient rabbinic Sages saw in this declaration an opportunity for
midrashic insight: Isaac recognized Jacob, despite his disguise, on account of
the wisdom that his voice typically professed ( םיכחלקדלוקאה , “behold, this is
the voice of a wise man”).1 The book that you are holding, Ha-Kol Kol Yaakov, is
the product of dozens of admirers of Rabbi Joel Roth, colleagues and students,
family and friends. Among these, some have written academic articles, while
others have contributed rabbinic responsa. The volume’s unique list of articles,
including both Talmud scholarship and essays on the practical application of
Jewish law, reflects the unique and integrated voice and vision that Joel Roth
has brought to the American Jewish community. And let us not forget those
whose generosity made the publication of this book possible. All of these peo-
ple recognize Rabbi Roth as a wise man, and have viewed the project of this
volume’s production as recognition of the wisdom with which he has touched
the lives of countless students and colleagues. It is with the greatest of honors
that we devote this volume to him.
Robert A. Harris
Jonathan S. Milgram, editors
1 J. Theodor and Ch. Albeck, Bereshit Rabbawith a Critical Apparatus and Commentary (Jerusa-
lem:Wahrmann Books, 1965), 733.
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It’s an honor for me as the Chancellor of The Jewish Theological Seminary
(JTS)—and a personal pleasure as someone who had been learning from Joel
Roth’s work for many years—to add these words of congratulation on the pub-
lication of this festschrift in his honor.
Scholars and rabbis most likely know Joel for his thoughtful andmeticulous
work on halakha and the philosophy of halakha. I myself have had occasion
to teach chapters from The Halakhic Process, and selections from Joel’s many
essays and responses, in classes on the history of Conservative Judaism. My
selection of his writings for that purpose was due not only to the tremendous
influence that Joel’s work has had inside and beyond the world of Conserva-
tive Judaism, but to the crystal-clear quality of the prose and the forceful and
cogent quality of the argument. Even when one disagrees with Joel Roth, one
cannot but respect the enormous learning that goes into every page, and the
commitment to God and Torah that underlies and drives the work. The work,
like the man, commands attention by virtue of its integrity and gravitas.
Inside JTS, Joel is better known as a superb, dedicated and passionate
teacher. His commitment to his students, as well as to the material he teaches
them, is legendary. That commitment extends far beyond the walls of 3080
Broadway; beyond the many decades of teaching Talmud, codes, and Hebrew
at JTS; and beyond the years that students spend in his classroom. Many thou-
sands of individuals have learned from Joel at the Conservative Yeshiva and
Schechter Institute in Jerusalem, at USY events and Camp Ramah, and at syn-
agogues throughout North America and in Israel. Many rabbis have benefited
from his learning during his years of service on the Committee on Jewish Law
andStandards, including several years as the group’s chair. Joel’s long friendship
with our late colleague Rabbi Neil Gillman of blessed memory, despite differ-
ences in belief and worldview, speaks volumes about his character; I myself
have turned to him for guidancemore than once duringmy tenure as Chancel-
lor, and have always found him both courteous and wise. Again and again I am
told by alumni, unsolicited, that “Rabbi Roth was the best teacher I had at JTS,”
“Rabbi Roth was a model of what it is to be a teacher,” “Rabbi Roth will always
be my teacher.”
I join all our colleagues at JTS in kvelling at Joel’s achievement and wishing
himmany more years of teaching and learning Torah.
Arnold Eisen
Chancellor
The Jewish Theological Seminary
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We who were privileged to be students of Rabbi Joel Roth view his classes
to have been highlights of our Seminary Rabbinic studies. Many of us came to
JTS with limited girsa d’yankuta, without extensive early-life Talmudic educa-
tion. Joel’s considerable pedagogic skills enabled us to penetrate the pages of
Talmud, opening for us a world that otherwise would have been obscure and
intimidating. His reverence for his teachers, many of the giants of twentieth-
century rabbinic scholarship, combined with his contemporary approach to
education taught us that it was not only possible but also essential that old and
newbebridged aswe, his students, in our own careers, would seek to draw from
the past in order to help shape a stronger spiritual future.
It was not by accident that Rabbi Roth, for somany of us, would be our turn-
to authoritywhenwewould face a halakhic challenge,whenwewould be asked
a question that we, on our own, could not answer. We would call Joel not only
because, invariably, hewould know the answer, but also because hewas sowel-
coming of our questions, so gracious with his time when we needed him. Our
professional staff, our leadership, and our members at large often sought his
views on matters of policy and practice, which, again, he would offer willingly
and in his ever helpful and generous fashion.
The Rabbinical Assembly was enriched by Joel’s regular participation in our
conventions, in our Yimei Iyyun, where his sessions were well-attended and
enthusiastically received. Our rabbis appreciated not only his command of the
sources, but themany eytzot tovot, the pearls of advice hewould offer, grounded
in a deep understanding of the diverse rabbinic environments in which we
serve.
Rabbi Joel Roth, for decades, was a pillar of the Committee on Jewish Lawand
Standards of the Conservative Movement, both as its chair and as a key partic-
ipant. He would argue strenuously for his positions, never hesitating to take a
strong stand even when his view would not be popular, for his positions were
grounded in consistency and the solid halakhic process to which he was so
deeply committed.
Always a deeply proud Conservative Jew, Joel Roth, by word and example,
has reminded us that the center of the Jewish religious world, even though not
always easy to inhabit, is the place where we, as rabbis, as educators, as com-
mitted servants of the Jewish people need to be.
We, the students, the colleagues of Rabbi Joel Roth, forever will be grateful
for his teaching, his guidance, his friendship, and his love of Torah, tradition





Rabbi Joel Roth has served as JTS’s halachic advisor to the National Ramah
Commission and Ramah camps for decades. He began his Ramah career as a
camper and staff member at CampRamah inWisconsin in the 1950s and 1960s.
He served as professor in residence first at Camp Ramah in the Poconos, and
then at Camp Ramah in the Berkshires for more than twenty years.
As a new lawyer working in a New York City firm in 1985, I had a desire to
study more Jewish text and consider a career as a rabbi. Rabbi Roth’s kindness
and flexibility were key tomy decision to leavemy legal practice and enroll full
time at JTS; I know many other colleagues with similar stories. Joel’s warmth,
combined with his fervent desire to have more young men and women study
to become rabbis, no doubt contributed to a much stronger generation of pas-
sionate and well-educated Conservative rabbinic leadership.
Learning with Joel was challenging and rewarding. His amazing ability to
clearly explain a text or a concept helped so many of us not only succeed, but
also to develop a deep love for Talmud, Midrash, and halachic literature. And
his honesty about the challenges facing those of us who took halacha seri-
ously was heartfelt and real. For hundreds of us who call him Rav, Joel has
spent decades answering our questions about Jewish law, Jewish life, and Jew-
ish thought, up to this day.
At Camp Ramah in Canada in the 1990’s, Joel supported our camp commu-
nitywhenever a difficult question arose. Nomatterwhere Joel was in theworld,
he provided timely and sensitive answers to questions about the reliability of a
hechsher, the constructionof an eruv, or the consequences of a kashrutmistake
in our busy camp kitchen.
And Joel’s mentoring and guidance for Ramah continues to this day, even
beyond the basic questions and concerns. He has been creative and thoughtful
at helpingRamahdirectors think throughmoredifficult andunique challenges,
such as whether we could allow children to swim on Tisha B’Av when temper-
atures rose above 100 degrees, whether a young person with verbal disabilities
could lead us in prayer, or the limits of pikuach nefesh when responding to a
medical emergency on Shabbat.
Joel has been a trusted colleague and friend to the professionals at the
NationalRamahCommission,making it easier for us tohelp everyRamahcamp
face challenges in Jewish law. No question is too mundane, and no challenge is
too difficult. Truly, with Joel on our side, we not only know we will get a clear
and timely response to all our inquiries, but we can also be assured that Ramah
continues to be a place where halacha is observed and respected.
Despite his long time association with Camp Ramah in the Berkshires, Joel’s
love of and support for Ramah has known no geographical boundaries. Only
recently, I heard from Rabbi Eliav Bock, executive director of Ramah in the
Rockies, who wrote:
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From the founding of Ramah in the Rockies in 2010, Rabbi Roth has been
a resource, teacher, and cheerleader for all that we are doing in Colorado.
The first issue Rabbi Roth helped us with was figuring out how to create
an eruv on a ranch with nearly two miles of fence line in rugged terrain.
As we have grown, he has helped us think through the type of supervi-
sion needed in our mainly vegetarian kitchen and issues stemming from
washing so many leafy vegetables, and how to create an appropriate and
safe atmosphere at 8,000 feet onTisha B’Avwhenmany campers have not
yet acclimatized to the elevation. Rabbi Roth is always only an email or
phone call away.
Rabbi Ethan Linden, executive director of Camp Ramah in the Berkshires,
echoed those expressions, and has added the following memories:
I remember sitting in a Hebrew class with Rabbi Roth at JTS in the sum-
mer of 2000. He told a story about being asked a question about a fire
that broke out on Shabbat in the woods at a Ramah camp. I remem-
ber very distinctly thinking, “Why would a summer camp need a posek
to answer halachic questions? How many could possible come up?” Not
for the last time, my assumption about Ramah camping was completely
wrong. I have been the asker now inmore situations that I can count, both
as a pulpit rabbi and now as a Ramah director. Rabbi Roth is unfailingly
thoughtful, direct, and helpful. He never judges the question or the ques-
tioner. He is the ne plus ultra of a posek: wise, careful, bold when needed,
and always, always compassionate. As a student and a Ramah director, I
am deeply indebted to him.
The sentiments these two directors have shared speak for all of the Camp
Ramah family whose lives have been touched by Joel’s service to the entire
Ramah movement, and the Torah that he has taught us all. Joel continues to
be one of great rabbinic leaders of our generation. On behalf of generations of
Ramah directors, staff and campers, I take great pleasure in thanking him for
his deep love for and dedicated service to Camp Ramah.
Rabbi Mitchell Cohen
Director of the National Ramah Commission
To Our Father
Ariel Ilan Roth, on behalf of the Roth Children
My father was born onMay 15, 1940. Joel Roth came of age during the height of
American Jewry’s expansionist phase. The completion of the greatmigration of
Europe’s Jews to the United States, which had started in the late 19th century,
was nearly three decades past by the time of my father’s youth. The immigrant
parents that built communal associations, Federations, Free Loan societies,
synagogues, and camps were now able to watch their children—including my
father and his two brothers—enmesh themselves in the institutions that they
and their peers had built.
Joel Roth was born to immigrant parents, with his father having come to the
US about 1935 from Czechoslovakia. Joel’s mother, Esther, was born in Hungary
and immigrated with her parents to the United States as a child. Esther, stout
of build and clad eternally in a dress and thick heels with hair that seemed
immovable evenby gale forcewinds, spoke anunaccentedEnglish. Joel’s father,
a journeyman laborer and machinist, spoke an English that, while clear, was
heavily accented, and never quite assimilated the letter “W.” Esther was pri-
marily a homemaker, and made sure that each weekday dinner was a certified
multi-course repast that always included soup.
Within the family lore, it is unclear whether the relationship between Joel’s
parents was a romance or an immigration scheme, but whatever its initial
impetus, the fact that Herschel and Esther Roth built a strong family is inar-
guable. Married for well over 50 years, the Roths had three sons. Sheldon, a
bookkeeping accountant by training was born in ’37, Joel in ’40, and Mark, a
pediatrician, in ’44. The early years of the marriage were very difficult finan-
cially and Joel’s father had to leave hisMichigan home to seek out work in Ohio
leaving Esther and the kids behind. By the time the war ended and with the
American economy roaring, Herschel never had to leave the family in search of
wages again.
No mention of Joel’s upbringing would be complete without acknowledging
the significant role played by his Aunt Helen and Uncle BenWeiss. More pros-
perous and of greater social standing than Joel’s own parents, Aunt Helen and
Uncle Ben, along with their children Calvin and Danny, shared a duplex with
the Roths for much of my father’s childhood. TheWeisses took a special inter-
est in Joel. When money for special activities was lacking within the nuclear
Roth family, Uncle Ben and Aunt Helenmade sure that Joel had opportunities,
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for example financing his summers at Camp Ramah, or even having him join
their family’s vacations,whichbroadenedhis exposure andworldliness beyond
Detroit. In later years, when my father’s rabbinic prominence was well estab-
lished and his bold (if controversial) responsa were changing the face of Con-
servative Judaism in the United States, Uncle Ben’s pride in having made the
introductions that set Joel on the path to the Jewish Theological Seminary was
stratospheric.
The Roth familywas, likemanyConservative Jews,more flexible in their reli-
gious observance than Joel was comfortable with, even in his youth but very
committed to their synagogue community and the institutions of the Conser-
vative movement. Joel’s mother, for example, served for a time as president of
the Michigan Branch of theWomen’s League for Conservative Judaism.
Joel’s journey in Jewish learning evolved along two paths. The first, more con-
ventional path, came from Joel’s enrollment in the United Hebrew Schools of
Detroit. In contrast to the way we think of Hebrew School in our own times,
mid-century Detroit Hebrew schools were a serious affair, with meetings three
times a week and a curricular rigor that rivals today’s day schools. The second
path, more unique to Joel, was his supplemental Jewish education that came
from a private tutoring relationship with an Orthodox rabbi, Isaac Paneth, that
lasted from just before Joel’s Bar Mitzvah and up till the time that Joel left for
Rabbinical school a decade later. It was under Rabbi Paneth’s tutelage that Joel
was initiated into the world of Talmud, which was not a part of the regular
Hebrew School program of study. Reflecting on Joel’s career now, it seems safe
to conclude that Rabbi Paneth may have been the most pivotal figure in chart-
ing Joel’s future course, given that he chose a life dedicated to the study of
Talmud. Rabbi Paneth must have been a true master teacher. Kindling a love
of Talmud so powerful that it burns no less now than it did more than sixty
years ago is all the proof I need of his astounding talent. My father’s respect for
Rabbi Paneth is attested tobyhis continuedmarkingof Rabbi Paneth’s yahrzeit,
even today. In understanding the transformative impact of this decade long
relationship betweenmy father and the man who introduced him to Talmud, I
have come to understand and appreciate why the Jewish tradition elevates the
respect, awe and duty owed to our teachers to parity with and sometimes even
superiority over, the duties owed our parents. I feel great pride in the number of
former students, now rabbis, who have shownmy father respect over the years
even as their own careers and status bloomed.
Finally, Joel’s Jewish involvementwould never have developed as it didwith-
out many summers spent in Camp Ramah in Wisconsin. Joel was exposed to
exciting and youthful leaders of Conservative Judaism through that experience
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and his decision to attend rabbinical school at JTS was the result of those inter-
actions. Joel’s enthusiasm for Ramah did not end in twenties. In later years Joel
served as Professor in Residence at Ramah Berkshires for more than twenty
years and made sure all three of his children were campers as well. Even today
Joel continues to serve on the National Ramah Commission.
During my father’s childhood, he was also a talented violinist, and the story
I heard from my uncle Sheldon was that Joel’s playing was so advanced that
his neighborhood teacher told my grandparents that Joel required a more
advanced teacher, and directed them to a member of the Detroit Symphony
to take over the duties. Siblings and friends from the time also recount Joel’s
prowess on the baseball diamond. Like nearly all American Jews at the time,
my father attended public schools and, based on the inscriptions I found in an
old yearbook, Joel seems to have been quite popular. The pledges of life-long
friendship promised in the yearbook did not last. I never met a single child-
hood friend of my father’s.
Joel attended college at Detroit’sWayne State University as a commuter and
majored in psychology. During these years, he remained active in shul and dili-
gent in his personal learning with Rabbi Paneth. As a young adult, Joel also
taught at United Hebrew Schools, and was a counselor at Camp Ramah inWis-
consin. Joel’s desire to enter the rabbinate was never in doubt and as far as
I know, he never entertained another career. After graduation from college,
Joel moved to New York to attend the Jewish Theological Seminary, where he
soared throughhis rabbinic studies, as part of theTalmudprogram—aresearch
track of the rabbinical school that existed prior to the creation of a dedicated
graduate school. Joel was ordained in 1968 and transitioned immediately to
becoming a member of the faculty. To this date, Joel has not left the JTS fac-
ulty. Over the years, he earned a PhD in Talmud and indeed never took a pulpit
except for the High Holidays in his home congregation in Teaneck.
In 1965, while still in rabbinical school, Joel married Barbara Kramer. Barbara,
herself a Detroiter and Camp Ramah alumna, a few years younger than Joel.
The Kramers were not members of B’nai Moshe, but rather of Shaare Tzedek.
Though it is humorously quaint by the light of today’s Jewish communal chal-
lenges, in the 60’s, being members of different synagogues, even within the
samemovement, was perceived as a semi-serious culture clash and their union
constituted a rare and bold relationship.
Newly married, my parents initially lived in Highland Park, New Jersey, not
far from the Rutgers campus where Barbara was pursuing a doctorate in Polit-
ical Science. It was during their Highland Park years that their eldest child,
Akiva, was born in 1971, with my birth following four years later.While in High-
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land Park, my parents were active in the Highland Park Temple, whose rabbi,
the late Yaakov Hilsenrath, was a Conservative rabbi of Haredi extraction. I
mention this because it is important for readers to know that the version of the
rabbinate of the Conservative movement into which my father was inducted
was built by thosewho came to it from childhoods of both philosophical ortho-
doxy and strict religious observance. Almost all of them came to Conservative
Judaism not because of the strictures of religious practice in Orthodoxy, but as
intellectual rebels. Indeed, the wedge betweenmy father’s teachers and Ortho-
doxy, and I would argue between Joel himself and Orthodoxy, remains not one
of praxis but of the legitimacy and validity of modern lines of inquiry into tra-
ditional texts. As the years have passed and fewer Conservative rabbis come
to the movement with an Orthodox praxis that is paired with novel modes of
textual scholarship, the vibe of the Conservative movement has changed sig-
nificantly. I have come to observe as a partial consequence of this shift, that
practice trumps philosophy nearly all the time. This explains why in in his later
years, Joel tends to attend Orthodox synagogues, where people observe Jewish
practice as he does, even as he remains deeply committed to the intellectual
underpinnings of textual analysis and halachic modes of jurisprudence that
he learned from Finkelstein, Lieberman, Dimitrovsky and others.
By the time Joel and Barbara’s youngest, Tamarwas born in 1980, the familywas
already living in Teaneck where they would make their home for nearly three
decades. Our familywas active in theTeaneck JewishCenterwhere, for the next
twenty years, my father would attend shul each Shabbat, sitting towards the
back and handing out a candy to any child who showed the good manners to
shake his hand and say Shabbat Shalom. Among the exceedingly rare Shabba-
tot that my father missed of his own volition was that of Tamar’s Bat Mitzvah.
The Teaneck Jewish Center did not allow women to read from the Torah and
so, my folks rented a ballroom at a local hotel, borrowed a Torah and for that
one Shabbat, led a renegade minyan so that my sister could layn.
Within a fewyears of arriving inTeaneck, RabbiDavidFeldman tookover the
pulpit of our shul. The Feldmans, with three children nearly identical in ages
to the three Roth children, moved in just two houses down, and the families
became very close. In the mid-80’s, the block received another set of arrivals,
Rabbi Stanley and Helen Bramnick. Rabbi Bramnick, another of the Conserva-
tive Jews whose origins lay as a Haredi in Brooklyn, had held a pulpit in nearby
Fair Lawn for decades but was a firm believer that a retired rabbi should get out
of town when a new rabbi arrives.
Joel hasmany friendships that have originated in his work and, as onewould
expect given that we are talking about more than a half century of time spent
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together, these friendships have come to define his life. The very deepest of
these include Rabbi Stephen andDr. Anne Lerner, and RabbiMayer and Renah
Rabinowitz. Both the Lerners and the Rabinowitzs also chose to live in Tea-
neck, have children of similar ages, and all three families watched each other
grow up and grow old, celebrating the joys and supporting each other during
challenging times.
The friendshipwith Rabbi Bramnick, though,was unique for Joel in his adult
life. In Stanley, Joel found what I can only define as a “pal.” Not that they sat
around drinking beers and watching football … I have no direct evidence of
my father having ever done either of those things. Nonetheless, Joel and Stan-
ley were buddies. They would pick each other up on the way to shul literally
three times each Shabbat (well, technically, once before and twice on). They sat
next to each other in shul for decades, parting only when the arrival of spouses
made it a marital imperative to signal that they preferred to sit next to their
wives. They grumbled about the length of the service and about Rabbi Feld-
man’s amusingly eccentric stage presence. Rabbis Bramnick and Roth rarely
grumbled about the sermon though, since in a slight breach of decorum, my
recollection is that they brought articles to read at that precise time. If on any
given Shabbat Helen or Barbara chose not to go, neither man was quite up to
explaining to his wife what Rabbi Feldman had spoken about, save for in the
most general terms.
In both rabbis Bramnick and Feldman, Joel found friends and colleagues
who shared his general philosophy on tradition and change in Conservative
Judaism. Though Feldman for sure felt that Joel’s decision on the ordination
of women as rabbis was a bad idea and I suspect that Stanley was not wild
about it either, Joel had confidence that theywere authentic partners in shoring
up the erosion to the process of halachic decision making that troubled Joel
as it emerged in the later 1980’s and early 1990’s. Joel used his authority as
the chairman of the Conservative Movement’s Committee on Jewish Law and
Standards (“the Law Committee”),1 to appoint both Feldman and Bramnick
to the committee, and in so doing, ensuring both a regular ride to the meet-
ings and two reliably small-c conservative votes on important matters of the
day.
Two other friendships, “the Robbies,” both former students, merit special men-
tion. Robbie Roth, a student of Joel’s from Hebrew School days, is a fellow
1 The committee charged with definitive adjudication of what is permitted and forbidden in
Jewish law for the movement.
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Detroiter and one of the only non-family people with whom he maintains a
close friendship from before his move to New York. There are no former stu-
dents with whom Joel shares a friendship like Robbie Harris. Joel met Robbie
while Robbie was still an undergraduate. Now a faculty peer, Robbie has been
Joel’s friend and confidant for over 40 years.
That Joel is an excellent teacher is a fact that literally thousands of students can
and will attest to. Joel teaches Talmud and codes with excitement and enthusi-
asm, and brings clarity to the complex textual obscurities inherent in rabbinic
literature. He does this bothwhen teaching to lay leaderswho lack the requisite
vocabulary and to advanced students whom he leads on journeys that start on
the page of Talmud but travel deep into the early and later rabbinic literatures
which add textures of complexity to the already complex Talmudic material.
I have already mentioned in these pages that from the moment he walked
in the doors of JTS, he was recognized as a serious Talmud and legal reasoning
talent. Mentored by Finkelstein and Lieberman, he rose to deanship of the rab-
binical school at a very young age and was appointed to the Law Committee
at a point of similar youth. Writing about Joel’s tenure on the Law Commit-
tee, which was a key part of his rabbinic career, is perhaps the most difficult
part of this biographic assignment. Despite the festive purpose of the volume
to which this essay is contributed, it would be incomplete if I did not discuss
the two pivot points of Joel’s career associated with his time on the Law Com-
mittee that both cost him dearly.
The first was his authorship of the responsum that made it possible for women
to be ordained as rabbis in the Conservative movement. The responsum (writ-
ten for the JTS faculty), nearly 100 pages in length, is a complex argument
that established a mechanism by which women and men could achieve a
legal equality of obligation for the performance of certain commandments
(mitzvot). That men and women be under the same legal obligation for the
performance of mitzvot is the hinge on which the idea of women as rabbinic
leaders turns, because of the Jewish legal norm that only those people that are
similarly obligated for the performance of a commandment may perform that
commandment on each other’s behalf.
Tobe transparently clear about theboldness of Joel’s argument and tounder-
stand its consequences, the reader must remember that the claim that women
do not have the same obligation for the performance of the requisite types of
commandment is stated both explicitly and unambiguously in the Mishnah
and had never been challenged by rabbinic authorities whose commitment to
halacha was the paramount factor in their reasoning.
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What made Joel’s essay so pathbreaking was that he did not come to the
question of the ordination of women as rabbis from a sociological perspec-
tive—that is, from the idea that the inclusion of women was simply an idea
whose time had come—but rather as an exclusively legal question. There is
no doubt in my mind that although Joel, on a personal level, wanted to see
women ordained, he would have argued otherwise if he did not find themech-
anism for establishing the equality of obligation within the norms of halachic
decision-making that he inherited from nearly two thousand years of Jewish
legal reasoning.
During the early 1980’s Joel was widely celebrated for this responsum and it
opened the doors to a multitude of invitations to speak at synagogues around
the United States. It was a particular joy of minewhenmy father tookme along
on these speaking trips. I felt such pride sitting in a shul in some exotic locale
(Cincinnati!) and watching my father speak to congregations about the Jewish
legal system. The responsum on the ordination of women elevated his stature
as a jurist, and for the coming decade, our phone would ring off the hook with
rabbis near and far looking for immediate adjudication on their pressing legal
questions. Many of them asked the same questions and so we, his children,
learned the answers ourselves. Those were heady days, they were the bulk of
our childhood years, and they gave us a sense of pride in our father that has
never diminished.
The darker side of those days is that in his decision on the ordination of
women, Joel took a step of which his teachers, those transmitters of Torah who
had ordained and groomed him, whom he revered and whose legacy he felt
charged to keep, did not approve. Finkelstein, Weiss-Halivni and most likely
Lieberman as well, felt that Joel was wrong and, if not wrong, presumptuous.
To their minds, the decision probably caused permanent damage to the move-
ment that they had entrusted him to protect.
In the end, the ordination of women as rabbis did not work out in the way
Joel had imagined. Joel had expected that the movement would maintain a
pluralistic approach to the question, and that there would be minyanim that
were constituted of men and women together as well as those whose quorum
was exclusively male. In practice, that proved untenable, since the rejection
of women by the male-only quora did not feel like a non-judgmental position.
Rather, it felt like an outright rejection of the personhood of women. In time,
the institutions of the Conservative movement—synagogues, camps and the
like—wouldmove to exclusively egalitarian prayer environments, and the plu-
ralism that Joel anticipated withered rather quickly. The mechanism that Joel
had found for equalizing the obligation of men and women was idiosyncratic
and complex and it proved to be only a transitional moment. Within short
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order, themechanism for equal obligation was imposed onwomen rather than
being a choice for women, which facilitated the movement’s consolidation as
exclusively egalitarian.
If the decision to ordain women as rabbis cost Joel his teachers, the sec-
ond decision for which he will be remembered cost him many of his students,
eroded some of his stature and very unfairly exposed him to ridicule and
calumny.
Nearly a decade after the ordination of womenwas resolved, the question of
the ordination of LGBTQ people became a pressing concern of the Conserva-
tive moment. Joel, at the time, was still chairman of the Law Committee, and
undertook towrite a responsumon the subject himself. I remember this period
with vivid clarity, having been nearly an adult while this took place. For over a
year, my father studied about homosexuality to make sure that he understood
all aspects of the subject on which he was being tasked to adjudicate. In later
years, criticswould assume that Joelwas a homophobe andneverwanted to see
queerpeople in the rabbinate.That is absolutely false and I consider it a slander.
The question about LGBTQ rabbis was never a question of how Joel felt about
homosexuality and certainly not about queer people. Though his critics don’t
knowhimwell enough to see it, Joel is not uncomfortablewith either homosex-
uality or with LGBTQ people. I have seen him demonstrate his love and support
for queer people in our family time and again. I have seen him attendweddings
and dance in celebration of the marriages of queer children of his friends. The
question was always only whether Joel could find amechanism, using the tools
of the halachic process, to legitimate sexual practices that, on their surface, are
either forbidden by Torah or by long standing rabbinic decree.
The precise details of his responsum are, thankfully, not under my charge
to write about. As readers will know, in the end, the Law Committee did adopt
Joel’s responsum, which continued to exclude queer people from entering the
rabbinate. At the same time, the movement also adopted other, more lenient
positions. Both the restrictive and lenient positions were considered official
responsa, but in practice, as with the ordination of women, the more permis-
sive stance became the exclusive norm. In this case too, adhering to the more
restrictive opinion by some members of the community while the rest of the
community is guided by themore open position results in a perceived rejection
of personhood that is not compatible with community cohesion.
On a personal level, our family again felt the effects of this decision deeply.
Joel was vilified bymany of his students for being anti-gay, and his prominence
in the movement fell remarkably. Because Joel felt that the more lenient posi-
tions onhomosexualitywere drivenby compassion (whichhe shared) butwere
not reasonablywithin the guide-rails of halachic decisionmaking, Joel resigned
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from the Law Committee, which was the right thing to do, but also took away
a platform of authority from which he felt he was doing much good. Speaking
invitations became fewer and farther between, and rabbis more aligned with
the social trajectory of the movement found themselves in higher demand.
As a son, I feel like this period and its aftermath were cataclysmically unjust
to my father and demonstrate a fickle and uncharitable spirit by many in the
Conservative movement. The notion that Joel was a committed liberal when
it came to the ordination of women and a hidebound homophobe when it
came to homosexuality, defies all evidence that social and political attitudes
towards feminism and queer rights covary. And indeed, they covary with Joel
as well. Joel is equally committed in a secular legal framework, including the US
Constitutional system, to the full equality of rights between men and women
and, in the case of queer people, the full inclusion of rights, including mar-
riage equality. Joel holds this position because for him, it is all about the norms
of the systems of jurisprudence. If the reasoning process of the system can be
shown to accommodate a position that he desires to see socially, that is a relief.
However, when the legal system cannot accommodate such a position, then he
accepts that it cannot, despite the fact that emotionally and ideologically he
wishes it would.
I understand that people who feel rejected by Joel’s legal positions cannot
see that his decision on women and his decision on homosexuality are driven
by an identical legal process. As his son, I am anguished by my knowledge of
his being vilified for an alleged evil in his heart that he does not bear.
Writing these words on behalf of all his children, I would share with you that
Joel was, is and will remain, an excellent father and role model. At a time when
few fathers participated in the mundanities of child raising, taking kids to the
doctor, to music lessons, dropping off forgotten school assignments, Joel did
these things and in so doing demonstrated not just what equality in marriage
looked like but also showing me especially, how a father ought to behave. My
father also did the things that most fathers do; he taught us to ride bikes, to
play baseball and to play card games on long shabbat afternoons. He taught us
to anticipate the joy of Shabbat by shopping for special treats in advance. Joel
taught us that a hard-boiled egg and a chocolate donut were the exact right
nutrients to eat before shul on Shabbat, sustaining energy for davening and
lasting till kiddush time, and that nothing caps off Shabbat dinner like a bowl
of pretzels, coffee with parve cream, and a Jewish newspaper. Having only ever
watched my father lead a Seder, I never understood when friends would com-
plain that Seders were too long, since at ours it was always an open question
whether the intellectual feastwould surpass the victual feast itself or vice versa.
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I want to end though, with perhaps the singlemost important and complex les-
son that I learned frommy father:To respect the autonomyof your children and
in doing so, to de-couple parental love from possible disappointment in your
children’s choices. Some of Joel’s children have made lifestyle choices in rela-
tion to Jewish practice that are far from what Joel wants and certainly deviate
fromwhat he imagined for themwhen hewas raising them. It is not easy to see
your children reject—even if they do so respectfully—the lifestyle of religious
observance that is so valuable to you that you have shaped everything—family,
career and even recreation—around it. In many families, maybe even most,
when children live so differently from parents, there is emotional distance,
tears, and tension. Not so with Joel and his children. My father gave us all the
tools to study text, to be culturally fluent in observant Judaism, and live aTorah-
centered lifestyle. But it seemswhat he gave usmorewas the freedom to choose
to do those things, or to not, and not let that choice impact one iota on his love
and support. We have seen too many families where that is not true and are
grateful to our father that ours is the exception.
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chapter 1
Halakhah, Theology and Psychology: The Case of




Our sages famously say, תואורויניעשהמאלאןיידלןיא , “a judge should rule solely
in accordancewithwhat is before him”.1 Talmudic sources invoke this principle
in order to limit the realm of a judge’s responsibility and authority,2 directing
judges to issue rulings based on empirical evidence rather than speculation.3
There are instances, however, in which the Talmud authorizes and encourages
a judge to transcend normative legal protocols. In monetary cases, the Talmud
endorses the use of judicial discretion if one is inclined to believe testimony or
evidence that is not technically admissible.4 Similarly, in criminal cases, judges
are advised to recuse themselves from cases in which they would be forced to
issue a ruling based on testimony or stipulations that they believe to be false
though they cannot prove this.5
It is noteworthy that the originally restrictive principle of ןיידלןיא was inter-
preted expansively in post-Talmudic halakhic discourse. As such it served as
a justification for and crystallization of an emerging consensus: namely, that
1 This statement appears three times in the Bavli; its import varies according to context. Its use
in b. Sanh. 6a comes closest to the sense in which I am interpreting it. See Maimonides’ for-
mulation of the passage in Sanhedrin in his halakhic code Mishneh Torah (henceforth: MT),
Laws of the Sanhedrin, 23:9.
2 See b. Sanh. 6a.
3 b. B. Bat. 131a and b. Nid. 20a.
4 See b. Ketub. 85a. In Maimonides’ formulation of this legal principle in MT, loc. cit., 24:1 he
states, “The matter is placed in the hands of the judge in accordance with what he sees as
being the appropriate judgment.”
5 MT, loc. cit., 24:3.
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in fact poseqim have the right—and, at times, obligation—to use judicial dis-
cretion to reach rulings at variance with black-letter law. In this reading, the
“seeing” in question is insight rather than knowledge. According to this read-
ing the principle of ןיידלןיא should then be translated as “a judge should rule in
accordance with his perceptions.”6
This principle, in its post-Talmudic sense, became relevant not only in crim-
inal and civil cases but in other areas of halakhah aswell. In particular, a skilled
poseq was expected to discern larger, often unspoken, issues underlying the
question being asked. To use therapeutic language, one needed to go beyond
the presenting problem to identify and address the deeper one. This skill has
proven indispensable to poseqim throughout the ages. It is still recognized as
being crucial to issuing rulings that are equitable and compassionate as well as
firmly grounded in rabbinic sources.
The great scholar and sageMaimonides (1138–1204)was particularly adept at
perceiving the true intentions and deeper concerns of litigants and petitioners
in cases that either came before him directly or were referred to him. Conse-
quently, he was able to combine insight with adjudicatory virtuosity to arrive
at rulings that were both halakhicly rigorous and humane.7
I wish to analyze a Maimonidean responsum8 that demonstrates acuity in
discerning and addressing the unstated concerns of the questioner. The ques-
tion, addressed to him by a convert named Obadiah, is whether or not, as
someone not born a Jew, he should use phrases like “the God of our ances-
tors” in his prayers—a question that, as we shall see, was discussed inTalmudic
sources.
6 See, for example, the following statement by Maimonides’ son Abraham in his responsa
(No. 97): “I say that a judge who rules only in accordance with what is already on record is
frail and feeble. This approach is a rejection of the rabbinic dictum, ‘A judge rules only in
accordance with what is before him.’ And it must not be so. Rather, although the fundamen-
tal legal principles have been codified, a judge or jurist must weigh them in accordance with
each case as it comes before him, to draw an analogy between one case and another, and to
extract specific rulings from the fundamental laws.” See also the following footnote.
7 In one of his responsa, Maimonides cites the principle of ןיידלןיא as a basis for limiting the
applicability of a Talmudic ruling despite the absence of such a qualification in the Talmud.
In doing so he undermines the claim of an unscrupulous litigant, thereby ensuring an equi-
table verdict; see Joshua Blau, ed. and trans.,Maimonides’ Responsa [Heb.], 3 vols. (Jerusalem:
Ḥevrat Meqiṣe Nirdamim, 1961), No. 365 (2:639–641). The numerical designations and pagi-
nation accompanying subsequent mention of specific Maimonidean responsa refer to Blau’s
edition.
8 No. 293 (2:548–550); Isaac Shilat, ed. and trans., Maimonides’ Epistles [Heb.], 2 vols. (Jerusa-
lem: Ma’aliyot Press, 1988), 1:233–235.
halakhah, theology and psychology 3
As has been noted by others,9 it seems likely that this query reflected a
broader concern on Obadiah’s part about whether he could claim to be as
fully and unquestionably Jewish as a born Jew. Anxiety and uncertainty about
this question would be understandable, given that Rabbinic Judaism mani-
fests some ambivalence toward proselytes, both throughnegative characteriza-
tions10 and throughhalakhic rulings that seemingly impute an inferior status to
converts.11 Moreover, we know of another query from the self-same Obadiah12
in which, having been told by his teacher that Islamwas an idolatrous religion,
he seeksMaimonides’ view on thematter. The fact that, in his teacher’s view, he
had formerly been an idolater could have only contributed to a sense of inferi-
ority.13
This responsum has been studied by numerous scholars from various per-
spectives.14 My focus will be an analysis of the stratagems and techniques that
Maimonides uses to address Obadiah’s fears. A translation of the responsum
9 See, for example, James A. Diamond, Converts, Heretics, and Lepers (Notre Dame: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 11–31.
10 Such as the dictum, “proselytes are as injurious to Israel as a scab” (b. Qidd. 70b and par-
allels). The Bavli reports this teaching in the name of the Amora R. Ḥelbo; in Kallah Rab.
2:4 it is cited as a Tannaitic tradition.
11 See, for example, y. Qidd. 3:12, 64c, b. Qidd. 72b–73a and ShulḥanArukh, Even ha-Ezer 4:22.
12 No. 448 (2:725–728; Shilat, 1:238–241). We know of one other Maimonidean responsum
addressed to a proselyte named Obadiah; see No. 436 (2:714–716; Shilat, 1:236–238).
In the superscription and section 1 of the responsum under discussion reference is
made to multiple queries on the part of Obadiah (but see n. 17 below). Using the associa-
tive principle, the three responsa addressed to a convert named Obadiah can be linked to
each other. Both 293 (A) and 448 (B) address matters pertaining to the status of converts.
In both 448 (B) and 436 (C) the inquirer Obadiah mentions his teacher, who in no uncer-
tain terms “corrects” him. A is related to B, and B is related to C; hence it follows that A
and C are related as well, and that all three responsa are addressed to a single individual.
13 It should be noted that making statements denigrating the former status of a convert is
specifically forbidden; see b. B. Meṣ. 58b.
14 See Lawrence Kaplan, “Maimonides on the Singularity of the Jewish People,” Daat 15
(1979): English section, v–xxvii; Isidore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides
(Mishneh Torah) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 485–486; Menachem Kell-
ner, Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991), 49–57,
esp. 50–51, 53; Menachem Lorberbaum, “Maimonides’ Letter to Ovadyah: An Analysis,”
S’vara 3, no. 1 (1993): 57–66; James A. Diamond, “Maimonides and the Convert: A Juridical
and Philosophical Embrace of the Outsider,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11, no. 2
(2003):125–146; idem, Converts, Heretics, and Lepers (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2007), 11–31; Moshe Halbertal, Maimonides: Life and Thought, trans. Joel Lin-
sider (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 208–216, esp. 215–216. I have not seen
Philip Matoff Posner, “Maimonides’ “t’shuva” to Ovadyah the Proselyte,” CCAR Journal 60,
no. 3 (2013): 185–202.
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from the Hebrew15 follows;16 I have divided it into numbered sections to which
I will refer inmy commentary and analysis by citing section numbers in paren-
theses where relevant.
[Superscription:] The following are inquiries addressed to our master,
Rabbi Moses of blessed memory, by Obadiah the righteous proselyte and
his responses:17
1. Thus said Moses the son of Rabbi Maimon of Spain—maymention
of this righteous man bring blessing—who was among those exiled
from Jerusalem:
2. Wehave received18 the inquiries of our teacher andmasterObadiah,
the wise and discerning proselyte, may the Lord reward him for his
deeds, and may he receive full recompense from the Lord, the God
of Israel, under whose wings he has sought shelter.19
3. You have inquired concerning the [the wording you should use for
the following] blessings and prayerswhen you recite them in private
15 All the versions of this responsum presently available to us are in Hebrew. Maimonides
often wrote his responsa in Judeo-Arabic, and some responsa that were previously known
in a Hebrew version we now know were written originally in Judeo-Arabic. See the first
page of Blau’s introduction in volume 1 of Maimonides’ Responsa (the introduction is not
paginated).
16 A number of English translations are available. See Nahum N. Glatzer, ed., The Judaic
Tradition, rev. ed. (Springfield, NJ: Behrman House, 1969), 395–396; Isadore Twersky, A
Maimonides Reader (NewYork: BehrmanHouse, 1972), 475–476; Menachem Lorberbaum,
“Maimonides’ Letter,” 64–66; Diamond, Converts, 12–14; Levi Cooper, “From the Classics:
‘God of our Ancestors’: Biological Ancestry and Spiritual Roots in the Prayers of Converts,”
Building Jewish Identity 7, no. 2 (Winter 2009), https://www.lookstein.org/journal/classics
‑god‑ancestors‑biological‑ancestry‑spiritual‑roots‑prayers‑converts/. Only Lorberbaum
translates the responsum in its entirety. The translation provided here is my own; it is
basedmainly on the version of the responsum published by Blau. I will occasionallymen-
tion and discuss variants mentioned in Blau’s and Shilat’s notes.
17 Somemanuscripts: “This is a response to an inquiry sent from the Land of Israel by a righ-
teous proselyte to which the gaon our master Moses of blessed memory responded”; see
Blau, 2:548, n.1.
18 ונילאועיגה . Presumably Maimonides is using the royal “we” here; cf. n. 40 below. Shilat,
1:233 n. 2, mentions the variant ילא .
19 Maimonides cites Ruth 2:12 but in the third person rather than the second person of the
original verse. Beginning with the rabbinic period the image of entering under the wings
of the Divine Presence is used as a metaphor for formal conversion to Judaism. See, for
example, b. Šabb. 31a. Maimonides uses this metaphor for conversion throughout MT; see
Laws of Character Traits 6:4; Laws of Forbidden Relations 13:4; Laws of Kings and their
Wars 8:5. See also his Sefer Ha-Mitsvot, Negative Commandments, Commandment 252.
Maimonidesuses this expression several times in this responsum; see sections 2, 5, 9 and 11.
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orwith the congregation [given that you are a proselyte]: Should you
say “Our God and God of our ancestors”,20 “The One who has sanc-
tified us through His commandments and commanded us,”21 “The
One who has distinguished us,”22 “The One who has chosen us,”23
“[the land] that You gave as an inheritance to our ancestors,”24 “You
who brought us forth from the land of Egypt,”25 “The One who per-
formed miracles for our ancestors,”26 and other such phrases.
4. You should27 say all this in the prescribed fashion. Change noth-
ing; rather, it is appropriate that you recite the blessings and prayers
20 The reference here is to the opening words of the Amidah, יקולאווניקולא׳ההתאךורב
וניתובא , “Blessed are You, Lord, our God and the God of our ancestors.”
21 ונוצוויתוצמבונשדקרשא , the opening formula of all blessings recited prior to the fulfill-
ment of a commandment. Compare the phrase in the Kiddush recited on Friday night,
ונבהצרוויתוצמבונשדקרשא , “who has sanctified us with His commandments and has
favored us.”
22 ונלידבהרשא . Shilat, 1:233 n. 6, observes that this phrase does not appear in any liturgi-
cal tradition presently known to us. An almost identical phrase, םיעותהןמונלידבהו , is
found in the so-called ארדיסדהשודק (see b. Soṭah 49a), versions of which appear in the
daily morning prayers, the afternoon Shabbat service, the evening service at Shabbat’s
conclusion, and after the reading of the Book of Esther on Purim Eve and the Book of
Lamentations on the eve of Tisha Be-Av. Shilat, loc. cit., states that this phrase appears
in Maimonides’ version of this prayer as recorded in his Seder Tefillot Kol Ha-Shanah,
which is appended to the second book of MT, Sefer Ahavah. This is indeed the reading in
the standard printed editions of MT. However, Shabbetai Frankel’s edition and the Oxford
manuscript of Seder Tefillot published by Daniel Goldschmidt (Meḥqerei Tefillah u-Fiyyut
[Jerusalem:Magnes Press, 1980], 205) both have not ונלידבהו but ונלידבהש , which is iden-
tical in meaning to ונלידבהרשא .
This phrase echoes Lev 20:26: “For I have singled you out )םכתאלידבאו( from among
all the nations to be mine.” The Havdalah ceremony at the conclusion of Shabbat is cen-
tered on this theme.
23 ונברחברשא . This phrase appears in various forms in the initial blessing recited by one
being called to the Torah, the evening Kiddush for festivals, the festival Amidot, the bless-
ing before the morning Shema, and elsewhere.
24 וניתובאתאתלחנהש . This phrase appears in Birkat ha-Mazon and the שלשןיעמהכרב .
Many liturgical traditions have וניתובאלתלחנהש . Maimonides’ Seder Tefillot has the
wording וניתובאתאתלחנהיכ .
25 םירצמץראמונתאצוהש ; cf. Deut 9:28. This phrase appears in Birkat ha-Mazon and, with
variations, elsewhere in the liturgy. In Exodus and Deuteronomy this phrase appears in
the third person; see, for example, Exod 13:16.
26 וניתובאלםיסנהשעש . This phrase is to be found in the blessing accompanying the light-
ing of the Hannukah lights and the reading of the Megillah and is found in variant forms
elsewhere in the liturgy.
27 ךלשי . Although this phrase sometimes means “you may” or “you can,” the conclusion of
the sentence makes it clear that Maimonides is speaking prescriptively.
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just as they are recited by those born as Jews,28 both when you are
engaged in private prayer and when you are serving as the prayer
leader.29
5. The basis for this is that Abraham our Father taught the masses,30
enlightened them, and made known to them doctrinal truth [i.e.
monotheism] and [the fact of] God’s unity. He rejected idolatry and
abolished its practices, and he gathered many under the wings of
the Divine Presence.31 He provided themwith instruction and guid-
ance. He charged his descendants and subsequent “members of his
household”32 with keeping theways of the Lord forever, as Scripture
states, “For I have singled him out, that he may instruct his children
and his posterity33 to keep theway of the Lord [by doingwhat is just
and right].”34
28 לארשימחרזאלכ . חרזא and רג often appear conjunctively in verses indicating restrictions
or obligations that apply equally to both; see Exod 12:49; Lev 16:29 and 18:26 (see also 17:9–
13, 20:2 and 22:18); Num 15:15–16, 26, 29–30 and 19:10. In Lev 19:34 the conjunction of these
terms is used to emphasize that the obligations to deal fairly and kindly with sojourners
and to do so with Israelites are equally binding.
29 See n. 54 below.
30 םעהלכ . Maimonides generally uses this phrase to refer to Jews. He uses this phrase in
the broader sense only in connection with Abraham’s proselytizing mission, here and
in MT, Laws of Idolatry 1:2–3. Cf. MT, Laws of Repentance 9:2 (concerning the Messiah):
“Therefore he will teach the masses )םעהלכ( and instruct them in God’s ways, and all the
nations will come to hear his words.” Presumably םעהלכ refers there to the Jewish people
as opposed to “all the nations.”
31 As mentioned above, in rabbinic sources this phrase refers to conversion. This sense of
the phrase would seem to constitute an anachronism in the present context. See the dis-
cussion of this problem below.
32 ותיבינב . I have translated the phrase literally but with quotation marks for the follow-
ing reason. Maimonides is alluding to Gen 18:19, which he cites immediately afterwards,
in which God speaks of Abraham as instructing וירחאותיבווינב to “keep the ways of the
Lord etc.” In context the phrase וירחאותיבווינב seems to mean, as the New JPS transla-
tion has it, “his children and his posterity.” In rabbinic literature ותיבינב refers to one’s
household, sometimes specifically in the familial sense and sometimes more inclusively,
referring to other household members as well. Maimonides, however, understands ותיב
in Gen 18:19 as referring to Abraham’s disciples and those of subsequent generations who
adhere to his teachings, as he makes clear in section 6 below and in MT, Laws concerning
Idolatry 1:3,which I cite further on.Cf.Maimonides’ remarks inResponsum164 (2:313–314):
“Only thosewho adopt one’s religion are considered one’s household, as is said concerning
the members of Abraham’s household. They were the ones who embraced his views and
adopted his faith. One’s slaves and workers who are deniers are not considered members
of one’s household.”
33 ותיבו ; see the previous note.
34 Gen 18:19.
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6. Therefore, throughout the generations, whoever converts to Ju-
daism andwhoever35 confesses the unity of theDivineName, as it is
prescribed in the Torah, is counted among the disciples of Abraham
our Father, peace be upon him. They are all members of Abraham’s
household,36 and he it is who brought them back to the good.37
7. Just as he restored his contemporaries [to the true faith] through his
oral instruction and his teachings, he [prospectively] brought future
generations [to true faith] through the testament he left to his chil-
dren and household after him. Thus, Abraham our Father, peace be
upon him, is the father to those of his descendants who are worthy
in that they follow in his ways, as well as the father of his disciples
and of all those38 who become proselytes.
8. Therefore, you shall pray, “Our God and God of our ancestors,” be-
cause Abraham, peace be upon him, is your [spiritual] father. And
you shall pray, “[the land that] You have given as an inheritance
to our ancestors,” for the land was given to Abraham [and conse-
quently to you as well], as it is said, “Up, walk around the land,
through its length and its breadth; for I will give it to you.”39
9. However, as to the words, “You who brought us forth from the land
of Egypt” or “Youwhoperformedmiracles for our ancestors”—these
you may change, if you wish, and say, “You who brought forth Israel
from the land of Egypt” and “Youwhoperformedmiracles for Israel.”
If, however, you do not change them, no harm has been done. As a
consequence of your having come under the wings of the Divine
Presence and having attached yourself to Him, there is no distinc-
tion between us and you,40 and all miracles performed for us have
35 See n. 88.
36 םלוכםהותיבינבו ; see n. 32.
37 Maimonides’ talk of return and restoration in this and the following section is based on
his reconstruction of the origins of idolatry in MT, Laws concerning Idolatry, 1:1–2. In his
telling, Adam and his descendants had full and true knowledge of God until the genera-
tion of Enosh, at which point the masses were gradually led astray through the adoration
and eventual worship of heavenly bodies such as the sun and the moon. Abraham redis-
covered the truth that had been forgotten and restored this knowledge to his adherents.
38 See n. 88.
39 Gen 13:17.
40 ךניבווניניבשרפהןאכןיא . See n. 18 above. Here it seems likely that, rather than being a
self-referential use of the royal “we”, “us” refers to native-born Jews. This is certainly true
of the “us” in the first sentence in section 10: “For the Torah has been given to us and to the
proselytes.”
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been performed, as it were,41 for both us and you. Thus is it said in
the Book of Isaiah, “Let not the foreigner say, who has attached him-
self to the Lord, ‘The Lord will keep me apart from His people’.”42
There is no difference whatsoever between you and us.
10. You shall certainly say the blessing, “Who has chosen us,” “Who has
given us,” “Who has given to us as an inheritance,”43 and “Who has
distinguished us”, for the Creator, may He be extolled, has indeed
chosen you, set you apart from the nations and given you the Torah.
For the Torah [has been given] both to us and to proselytes, as it is
said, “One law shall there be both for you of the congregation, and
also for the stranger that sojourns with you, a law forever in your
generations; as you are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord.”44
11. Know that those of our ancestors who left Egypt were mostly idol-
aters; they had mingled with the Egyptians and followed their prac-
tices, until the Blessed Holy One sent Moses our Teacher, the su-
41 ולאכ . Shilat, 1:234, in his note to line 15, notes the variant ולאב ; these two words are of
course virtually indistinguishable orthographically. It may be that according to this read-
ing the phrase ושענךלוונלולאבושענשםיסנהלכו should be translated as “and all themir-
acles performed for themwere [also] performed [both] for us and for you,” the antecedent
of “them” being the Israelites who experienced these miracles personally. Thus, the use of
ולאב , literally “to them”, in connection with those past generations who lived in an age
of miracles and ונל , “for us”, for later generations who did not. Indeed, given that miracles
are not supra-temporal concepts like chosenness and covenant but rather events that take
place in real time, subsequent generations can claim that the miracles were performed in
their behalf only in the broader sense. It is this fact that lies behind the insistence in the
ונייהםידבע passage in theHaggadah that althoughweourselveswere never slaves in Egypt
we are ultimately the beneficiaries of the liberation from bondage long ago. If ולאב is the
correct reading and my interpretation an accurate one Maimonides is not, as the read-
ing ולאכ would suggest, implicitly acknowledging the weakness of his case in the very
moment in which he presents it. On the contrary, he ismaking the rather persuasive argu-
ment that native-born Jews are nomore entitled to speak of themiracles of the past being
done to or for them than are proselytes.
42 Isa 56:3.
43 ונליחנהרשא . I could not find this phrase anywhere else in Maimonides’ writings, includ-
ing his Seder Tefillot. In MT, Laws of Shabbat 29:2, Maimonides records the liturgical
formula for the Friday night Kiddush as including the phrase, “who )רשא( sanctified us
with His commands and favored us and who granted us as our inheritance )ונליחנה( His
holy Sabbath with love and favor.” Perhaps Maimonides has that phrase in mind and is
citing it elliptically, ונליחנה…רשא . However, the context suggests that the inheritance in
question is the Torah rather than Shabbat. This phrase does not appear in Shilat’s recen-
sion; see Shilat, 1:234, line 18.
44 Num 15:15.
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preme prophet, and45 separated us from the nations and brought us
under the wings of the Divine Presence, us and all proselytes, and
gave to all of us one Law.
12. Donot consider your status as inferior.Whilewearedescended from
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, yours is a direct relationship with Him
through whose word the world was created. This is made explicit
in [the Book of] Isaiah: “One shall say, I am the Lord’s, and another
shall call himself by the name of Jacob.”46
13. And there is support in tractate Bikkurim for all that we have told
you regarding [how you should recite the] blessings, namely that
you should not deviate [from the accepted liturgical forms]. The
mishnah there states:47 A proselyte is obligated to bring first fruits to
the Temple but does not recite the requisite declaration48 because
he is disqualified from reciting the verse “[the land] that the Lord
swore to our fathers to assign us.”49 Andwhen he prays in private he
recites [in the first blessing of the Amidah] “our God and the God
of Israel’s ancestors.” And when he prays in public he recites, “our
God and the God of your ancestors.”50 This is the view stated anony-
mously in the mishnah. It is R. Meir’s view,51 and the halakhah is
not in accordance with his position but rather in accordance with
what is explained in the JerusalemTalmud.52 It is stated there: It was
taught in the name of R. Judah that a proselyte himself offers first
fruits and recites the declaration.Why is this so? [Because Scripture
states]: “I have made you the father of a multitude of nations”;53 in
the past you were the father of Aram; from now forward you will be
the father to all of humankind. R. Joshua b. Levi says: The halakhah
is in accordance with R. Judah. A case came before R. Abbahu and
he ruled in accordance with R. Judah.54
45 It is not clear in this and the following phrases whether the subject is God orMoses. If the
latter is the case a more accurate translation would be “and he [i.e. Moses] separated etc.”
46 Isa 44:5.
47 m. Bik. 1:4.
48 Deut 26:3, 5–10.
49 Deut 26:3.
50 In Blau (2:550): וניתובאיקולאווניקולא . This is clearly the result of a scribal error; see n. 12
there.
51 See further on.
52 y. Bik. 1:4, 64a.
53 Gen 17:4.
54 Note that R. Judah and R. Joshua b. Levi address only the issue of the first fruits declara-
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14. Observe—it has beenmade clear to you that one should recite “that
the Lord swore to our fathers to assign us,”55 and that Abraham is
the father to you, to us, and to all the righteous [who] follow in his
ways. The same is true of the other blessings and prayers; you should
change nothing.
[Postscript:] Thus wrote Moses son of Maimon of blessed memory.
On its face,Obadiah’s inquiry concerns amatter of halakhah andnothingmore,
forwhich a straightforwardhalakhic responsewould suffice. However, from the
content and structure of his response it appears that Maimonides understood
Obadiah’s inquiry to be fundamentally an ontological one: is a proselyte as fully
Jewish as one who is born a Jew? To use a helpful distinction formulated by
Ethan Tucker, Obadiah is apparently seeking confirmation that his halakhic
status as a Jew is in absolute accordance with his unconditional embrace of
Jewish identity in all its fullness. With this in mind, Maimonides crafts the
structure and content of his response with an eye towards reassuring Obadiah
tion and not that of the appropriate liturgical formula for converts. However, as a number
of commentators point out (see, for example, the commentary of the 15th–16th-century
sage R. David ibn Zimra, known as Radbaz, to MT, Laws of First Fruits 4:3), first fruits were
no longer being brought in the days of R. Abbahu, a third-generation Palestinian Amora,
who was being consulted on a matter of practical halakhah. It therefore follows that he
was ruling on the liturgical issue.
Maimonides rules in accordancewithR. Judah regarding thedeclarationquestionboth
in his Mishnah commentary ad. loc. and in MT Laws of First Fruits loc. cit. To the best
of my knowledge, his only mention of the prayer issue is in the responsum under discus-
sion. R. Yosef Kafih (Yosef Kafih, ed. and trans.,Maimonides’MishnahCommentary [Heb.],
3 vols. [Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1963], 1:263 n. 13) points out that the section of
Maimonides’Mishnah commentary containinghis ruling and the citationof y. Bik. ismiss-
ing from the first recension. He speculates that this passage was added after Maimonides
wrote his response to Obadiah.
Medieval Ashkenazic authorities debated both the meaning of the Yerushalmi and
whether in fact a convert was permitted to use the same language in his prayers and bless-
ings as born Jews. In some communities the adoption of the prohibitive view led to the
practice of prohibiting converts from serving as prayer leaders or leading a zimmun before
Birkat ha-Mazon; see Tosafot’s commentary on b. B. Bat. 81a s.v. יטועמל , and Mordechai’s
commentary on b. Meg., par. 786. However, the consensus was to adopt the affirmative
view and consequently to allow converts to lead both.
For a summary of the interpretational issues and views regarding the passage in y. Bik.,
see Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshuṭah, 10 vols., 3rd ed. (Jerusalem: Jewish Theological
Seminary, 2001), 2:823–825. A survey of rulings on the prayer issue can be found in Mena-
hem Mendel Kasher, ed., Talmudic Encyclopedia [Heb.], 40 vols. so far (Jerusalem: Yad
Harav Herzog, 1947–), s.v. רג (6:258–259).
55 Deut 26:3.
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and validating his status as a Jew to the fullest extent possible. In addition to
ruling on the halakhic question and citing Talmudic sources to buttress his
decision, Maimonides provides a theological rationale for his ruling and mar-
shals scriptural verses to offer Obadiah support and encouragement.
Let us now consider the structural, rhetorical, and substantive strategies
used by Maimonides in the service of his project:
1. A nuancedwording and ordering of his rulings and the relevant Talmudic
sources (4, 8–10,13–14).
2. A restatement of Maimonides’ description of Abraham’smission inMish-
neh Torah, Laws concerning Idolatry ch. 1, adapted in order to serve as
confirmation of Obadiah’s full status as a Jew (5–7, 11).
3. Homilies that augment his halakhic and theological arguments in an
effort to compensate for and/or divert attention from their flaws (9, 12).
Although there is some overlap, one can say that the first strategy focuses on
law, the second on theology, and the third on psychology.
Law
A glance at the rabbinic sources cited by Maimonides (13) makes it clear that
there was hardly unanimity about whether a convert should recite the first
fruits declaration and use the same liturgical language recited by native Jews.
The anonymous mishnah cited by Maimonides excludes a convert from doing
either. Moreover, an Amoraic comment in the Bavli56 seems to assume that the
mishnah’s view is dispositive. It is only in theYerushalmi that we encounter the
inclusive view of R. Judah with regard to the declaration, which by implication
constitutes an inclusive view regarding the liturgical question as well.57 Given
the consensus among Maimonides’ predecessors and contemporaries that the
view of the Yerushalmi should be adopted only when not in conflict with the
Bavli or when serving as an explanation or clarification of a statement in the
Bavli,58 one would have expected Maimonides to rule in accordance with the
Mishnah.
56 b. Mak. 19a. In the midst of a discussion of whether the first fruits declaration is indis-
pensable to the fulfillment of the mitsvah of bringing first fruits R. Ashi, the fifth-century
Babylonian Amora, cites the fact that a proselyte does not recite the declaration as evi-
dence that it is not.
57 It should be noted that a number of Amoraim cited in the Yerushalmi passage clearly
assume the view of the Mishnah to be dispositive. Moreover, the Tosefta records R. Judah
as exempting converts from the first fruits declaration (t. Bik. 1:2).
58 SeeMenachemElon, Jewish Law:History, Sources, Principles, trans. Bernard Auerbach and
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It is true that Maimonides himself sometimes ruled in accordance with
the Yerushalmi against the Bavli.59 However, assuming that Obadiah was suf-
ficiently learned60 to know that, when adjudicating between the views of
the Bavli and the Yerushalmi, poseqim—including Maimonides—generally
followed the Bavli, he would likely see a ruling based on a passage in the
Yerushalmi contravening an anonymous mishnah as being less than robust.
Even if Obadiah was not aware of this principle, he might well have been trou-
bled by the very fact that the right of converts to recite the established liturgical
formulaewas amatter of debate. It seems likely thatObadiahwas already aware
of this; presumably, it was this knowledge that led him to seek Maimonides’
counsel. It may even be that he had already been told by his teacher or some-
one else not to use standard liturgical language.
Maimonides’ formulation of his ruling and his presentation of the Talmu-
dic sources suggest an intent tominimize any negative implications that either
might occasion. He begins by affirming unconditionally Obadiah’s right to use
the standard liturgical formulas (4), giving no indication that in fact in some
instances it might be appropriate for Obadiah to recite a different version of
the liturgy; this he saves for later (9). A presentation of the Talmudic sources,
which indicate that the inclusive view championed by Maimonides was far
from unanimous, is left until the very end of the responsum (13). Maimonides
makes no mention at all of the passage in the Bavli that implies the restrictive
view.61 Moreover, he makes no reference to the discussion in the Yerushalmi
Melvin J. Sykes, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1194), 3:1097–1098 and
especially n. 68 on p. 1098.
59 For a discussion of Maimonides’ occasional practice of adopting the Yerushalmi’s ruling
rather than the Bavli’s, and a debate as to whether his view on this question shifted over
time, see Michael Guttmann, “The Decisions of Maimonides in his Commentary on the
Mishna,”HUCA 2 (1925): 230–231; AharonAdler, “Maimonides’ Stance toward the Jerusalem
Talmud” [Heb.], inMemorialVolume forR. JosephbenDavidKafiḥ [Heb.], ed.Henil Seri and
Zohar Amar (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan Press, 2001), 202–235; Dror Fixler, “Maimonides’ Stance
toward the Jerusalem Talmud as Reflected by His Commentary to Tractate Pe’ah” [Heb.],
Netuʿim 16 (2010): 95–109.
60 Maimonides addressesObadiah as “our teacher andmasterObadiah, thewise and learned
proselyte” (2). Maimonides’ inclusion of the Talmudic material in his responsum suggests
both that Obadiah would be interested in the Talmudic basis for Maimonides’ ruling and
that he would be capable of understanding it.
61 The 17th–18th-century sage R. Judah Rosanes, in his commentary to MT, Mishneh la-
Melekh, challengesMaimonides’ ruling based on the passage inMakkot. Interestingly, the
13th-century Provencal commentator Menahem ha-Meiri, in his commentary to b. Mak.
19a (Bet Ha-Beḥirah almasseketMakkot, s.v. רגה ), cites almost verbatimMaimonides’ rul-
ing without addressing the Bavli’s statement to the contrary.
It may be that Maimonides ignores the passage in the Bavli because of his tendency
to minimize the juridical relevance of Talmudic statements appearing in the context of
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preceding the section he quotes in which the restrictive view is assumed to be
normative, nor to the Tosefta that records R. Judah’s view as being restrictive.62
On the other hand, he seeks to vitiate the authority of themishnah by identify-
ing it as the view of a single Tanna, R. Meir, rather than the majority view. This
last claim is not without foundation,63 but is not explicit in the Yerushalmi.
After presenting the mishnah and the Yerushalmi, Maimonides concludes by
reaffirming his inclusive ruling (14).
Theology
Maimonides’ second strategy was to treat Obadiah’s halakhic question as re-
flecting an ontological one: was Obadiah entitled to view himself as being as
fully Jewish as his fellow Jews? Maimonides answers this question in the affir-
mative by framing Jewish identity theologically rather than ethno-historically.
He does so in four different ways.
Abrahamic Discipleship
According to a midrashic tradition, Abraham and Sarah proselytized among
the inhabitants of Ḥaran64 and beyond.65 It is presumably this tradition that
underlies R. Judah’s citation of Genesis 17:4, in which God promises Abraham,
“you shall be the father of a multitude of nations,” as the basis for his view
that converts recite the first fruits declaration.66 He apparently understands
the “multitude of nations” as being specifically those among the nations who
argumentation rather than as explicit rulings. A discussion of this question is beyond the
scope of this article.
62 t. Bik. 1:2.
63 The third-century Amora R. Yohanan attributes anonymous statements in the Mishnah
to R. Meir (b. Sanh. 86a)—though he may be referring to the formulation rather than the
content of these rulings. Based in part on this tradition, the Bavli, when finding a teaching
of a named Tanna in conflict with the Mishnah, often resolves the conflict by attributing
the mishnah to R. Meir. In doing so the Bavli weakens the mishnah’s authority because
it is no longer seen as representing a Tannaitic consensus. At times such attribution is
used explicitly as a basis for taking issue with an anonymous Tannaitic teaching. See, for
example, b. Beṣah 31b. Maimonides uses this strategy here to lessen the authority of the
mishnah in Bikkurim by attributing it to an individual, R. Meir—justifiably so, given the
Yerushalmi’s attestation of R. Judah’s dissenting view.
64 Gen. Rab. 39:14 and elsewhere.
65 See Gen. Rab. 39:8.
66 y. Bik. 1:4, 64a.
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become proselytes.67 God’s promise to grant the land of Canaan to Abraham’s
descendants as their inheritance68 would therefore apply to any and all of his
progeny, including his spiritual progeny among the nations, i.e., proselytes.
Consequently, in opposition to theMishnah’s view, R. Judah sawno reasonwhy
a convert could not recite the first fruits declaration with its statement that “I
have entered the land that the Lord swore to our fathers to assign us.”69
This understanding of R. Judah’s rationale is reflected in Maimonides’ for-
mulation of R. Judah’s view in MT:70 “A proselyte brings the first fruits and
recites the declaration, for it was said to Abraham, ‘I have made you the father
of a multitude of nations.’71 Thus, Abraham is the father to all of the world’s
inhabitants who enter under the wings of the Divine Presence. And it was to
Abraham that the promise was initially made that his children would inherit
the land.”72
R. Judah presumably sees Abraham’s role as a father to “[those] who enter
under the wings of the Divine Presence,” i.e., proselytes,73 as secondary to
his identity as the progenitor of the people of Israel. Proselytes are, in effect,
Abraham’s adoptive progeny who are absorbed into his biological family. Mai-
monides, on the other hand, portrays converts not as auxiliary members of
Abraham’s clan but rather as constituent elements of an Abrahamic faith com-
munity (5–7). This portrayal is a corollary of Maimonides’ depiction of Abra-
ham as proselytizer rather than patriarch. A striking consequence is that Abra-
ham is described as father only to those of his descendants “who are worthy
in that they follow in his ways,” rather than to all of his progeny (7). In other
words, biological descent is an insufficient basis for claiming Abraham as one’s
father if one does not also share his commitment to monotheism.74
67 Cf. Gen. Rab. 49:2, where God’s decision to inform Abraham of Sodom’s impending doom
(Gen 18:17) is explained as being a consequence of his having been designated the father




70 Laws of First Fruits 4:3.
71 Gen 17:4.
72 Maimonides draws upon R. Judah’s argument when discussing the formula “[the land
that] You have given as an inheritance to our ancestors” in section 8 of the responsum.
He cites God’s promise of the land to Abraham in Gen 13:17 (rather than Deut 26:3, the
verse he cites in MT loc. cit.) and argues that it extends to Abraham’s followers, among
them converts, as well.
73 See n. 19 above.
74 See n. 32 above.
halakhah, theology and psychology 15
Maimonides’ characterization of Abraham in this responsum is consistent
with the portrayal in MT:75
[Abraham] began publicly declaring and informing the entire world that
there is but one God in the Universe and that it is proper to worship
Him [exclusively]. He continued to preach and to gather themasses, trav-
eling from city to city and from kingdom to kingdom, until he reached
Canaanwhere he proclaimed [the existence of theOneGod], as Scripture
states, “And he proclaimed the name of God, Master of the Universe.”76
When the masses crowded around him seeking to understand his words
he instructedeachof themuntil he returnedhim to thepathof truth, until
thousands and tens of thousands gathered around him—these are those
referred to as the members of Abraham’s household.77 He implanted this
fundamental principle in their hearts and composed books [concerning
the true faith], and imparted these teachings to Isaac. Isaac also estab-
lished himself as a teacher and instructor [of the masses]. He also taught
Jacob and appointed him as a teacher.
Both in MT and in his response to Obadiah, Maimonides foregrounds themotif
of Abraham as disseminator of monotheistic doctrine, one which is absent
from the biblical narrative. At the same time, he ignores the themes of land
and progeny that are central to that narrative. By doing so, Maimonides is able
to present Abraham as having been tasked with—or, more accurately, having
taken upon himself—a universal mission, and therefore a broadly inclusive
one, from the moment that God became known to him. Once Judaism, at least
in its origins, is defined as a voluntary community of individuals united by their
theological convictions rather than their ethnic origins, there is no reason to
view a convert as any less Jewish than one who is born a Jew.
Converts asMembers of Two Communities
However, one aspect of Maimonides’ account in the responsum is problem-
atic. If Abraham’s mission was only to teach humanity about the God of the
Universe and his Oneness, what need would there be for a (former) Muslim
like Obadiah78 to convert to Judaism in order to become his disciple?79 This
75 Laws concerning Idolatry 1:3.
76 Gen 21:33. Maimonides recasts the verse’s description of Abraham’s personal call to God
as a record of a public proclamation meant to bring the masses to the true faith.
77 See n. 32 above.
78 See Blau, 2:548 n.1.
79 It is true that the midrash (nn. 64 and 65) speaks of Abraham and Sarah actually conver-
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difficulty is only intensified by Maimonides’ statement elsewhere in MT,80 and
the reassurance he offers Obadiah in another responsum,81 that Islam is not an
idolatrous religion.82
To understandMaimonides’ intent, we need to compare his words herewith
the continuation of the MT narrative, which follows:
[Jacob] taught others and fortified [the beliefs] of all those who gath-
ered around him. He also taught all of his children. He chose Levi and
appointed him as the leader. He established him [as the head of] the
academy to teach [members of Jacob’s clan] the way of the Lord and to
observe Abraham’s directive.
[Jacob] commanded his sons that the leadership should not depart
from the descendants of Levi, so that the teachings would not be for-
gotten. This [movement] proceeded and gathered strength among the
descendants of Jacob and those who joined them, until there arose a
nation on the face of the globe that knew God.
When the people of Israel extended their stay in Egypt, however, they
learned from [the Egyptians’] deeds and began worshiping the stars as
they did, with the exception of the tribe of Levi, who clung to the direc-
tive of the patriarchs [to worship the One God]. The tribe of Levi never
served false gods.
Within a short time, the fundamental principle that Abraham had
implanted [in the hearts of his followers] would have been uprooted, and
the descendants of Jacob would have returned to straying after human-
kind’s false beliefs. Because of God’s love for us, and touphold thepromise
Hemade toAbraham, our patriarch,He designatedMoses, ourTeacher, as
the master of all prophets, and sent him [to redeem the people of Israel].
After Moses, our Teacher, prophesied, and God chose Israel as His inheri-
ting, תרייגמ\רייגמ , their followers. In general, rabbinic sources, do not speak of Abraham
having gentile followers who accepted monotheism. This notion originates with Mai-
monides.
It is worth noting here the Quranic teaching that there is no need to be a Christian or
a Jew but only, and most crucially, to become a follower of Abraham by rejecting idolatry
(Sura 2, v. 135).
80 Laws of Forbidden Foods 11:7.
81 No. 448 (see n. 12).
82 Indeed, Kaplan, “Singularity,” xx n. 28, notes that, given that Maimonides regarded Mus-
lims as orthodoxmonotheists, it would follow fromMaimonides’ description of the Abra-
hamic community in this responsum that he would regard Muslims as members of that
community as well.
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tance, He83 crowned themwith the commandments and instructed them
in theways of divine service, [and(?)] the laws concerning idolatry and all
those who stray after it.
We84 can see that Maimonides speaks here of two separate faith communities
(in addition to what Lawrence Kaplan calls the ethnic-historical community of
Israel, which will be discussed further on). The first, described at the beginning
of the MT narrative, consists of Abraham and his disciples, at the core of which
are his descendants, who take up his role as teacher and instructor. This com-
munity is unable to sustain itself. As Kaplan notes,85 apparently at some point
the community of discipleswhowerenotmembers of Abraham’s family ceased
to exist; in any case, they disappear fromMaimonides’ narrative. All that is left
of the original community is Abraham’s descendants, and during their sojourn
in Egyptmost of them fall prey to the idolatrousways of the Egyptians. It is only
through the persistent embrace of the true faith by the Levites, Moses’ prophe-
cies, the Exodus from Egypt and the Revelation at Sinai that Israel as a whole is
restored to the true faith.
In his responsum, on the other hand, Maimonides speaks of the Abrahamic
community and the people of Israel synchronically aswell as diachronically. As
Kaplan suggests, Maimonides seems to be speaking of three communities: “1)
the Abrahamic community; 2) the people Israel, as an ethnic-historical com-
munity, grounded in historical experience and the memory of the exile and
the redemption from Egypt; and 3) the people Israel as the spiritual-political,
Mosaic community, distinguished from all other peoples by virtue of receiving
the divine Mosaic law.”86 Maimonides delineates and discusses each commu-
nity separately—the first in detail in sections 5–7, the second in section 9, and
the third in section 11. In sections 6 and 7, however, he conflates the first and
the third (and in a sense the second as well, through mention of Abraham’s
descendants) designating converts, who have chosen to join the third com-
munity, as members of the first community as well: “Therefore, throughout
the generations whoever converts to Judaism and whoever confesses the unity
of the Divine Name,87 as it is prescribed in the Torah, is counted among the
83 I understand the antecedent to be God, though it is not impossible that it is Moses.
84 As will be evident from my notes, the remarks that follow draw heavily upon Lawrence
Kaplan’s analysis of the passages in MT and Maimonides’ responsum. See in particular
Kaplan, “Singularity,” xiii–xxi.
85 “Singularity,” xix.
86 “Singularity”, xx n. 29.
87 See the following note.
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disciples of Abraham our Father, peace be upon him” (6). Converts like Oba-
diah are members of the first community, but not its only members.88
Further on, Maimonides emphasizes Obadiah’s status as a member of the
third community as well. Through his acceptance of the Torah he becomes as
fully a member of this community as were the Israelites who were present at
Sinai and their descendants. Although it was the ethnic-historical people of
Israel who received the Torah, they were able to enter—or, rather, become—
the third community only through the process of conversion.
This emerges from section 11 of the responsum, where Maimonides says
that God “brought us [= ethnic-historical Israel] under the wings of the Divine
Presence, us and all proselytes, and gave to all of us one Law.” Maimonides is
alluding here to a rabbinic tradition that the Israelites who left Egypt had to
undergo a conversion process before they were fit to receive the Torah. In sup-
port of this assertion Maimonides cites Numbers 15:15: “One law shall there be
both for you of the congregation, and also for the stranger that sojourns with
you, there shall be one law for you and for the ger, a law forever in your genera-
tions; as you are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord.” In its biblical context
88 Kaplan, “Singularity,” xix n. 26, observes that this point is obscured in Glatzer’s and Twer-
sky’s translations of a phrase in the passage cited above; I have translated it as “thus,
whoever converts to Judaism and whoever confesses the unity of the Divine Name [… is
counted among the disciples of Abraham].” Glatzer translates this passage as “thus hewho
becomes a proselyte and confesses the oneness of God.” Twersky’s translation is “whoever
adopts Judaism and confesses the unity of the divine name.” Both of these translations
ignore the word לכו , inaccurately conveying the idea that for Maimonides only those who
convert are counted among those who confess the divine name.
Much more disturbing is the fate that a subsequent sentence suffers at the hands
of Shilat. In Blau’s edition (2:549) the line reads: “It emerges that Abraham … is the
father of his disciples and [of] all those who become proselytes )רייגתישרגלכו( .” In
Shilat’s edition (1:234, l. 8) the text reads רייגתישרגלכםהו , which translates as “they
being all those who become proselytes”; that is to say, only proselytes, and not gentile
monotheists, are viewed as Abraham’s disciples. In his introduction Shilat states that
although for each text he follows faithfully the manuscript he considers most preferable,
״רתויבחבושמה״ , his notes mention those textual variants that are substantively signifi-
cant, ״ןושלהתניחבמםייתועמשמ״ (1:12). Blau’s version conveys a very different meaning
from Shilat’s, yet it is not mentioned in Shilat’s notes. Menachem Kellner cites this as
an example of what he claims is Shilat’s tendency to minimize the universalist aspects
of Maimonides’ theological views. See Menachem Kellner, “Farteitcht un Farbessert (On
“Correcting” Maimonides),” in Meorot: A Forum of Modern Orthodox Discourse 6, no. 2
(Marḥeshvan 5768/2007): 9–11 and esp. n. 26.
Ironically, Kellner himself blunts the universalist thrust of the phrase discussed at the
beginning of this footnote, albeit inadvertently. Despite the fact that Shilat’s version of the
passage discussed at the beginning of this footnote includes the word לכו , Kellner (p. 10)
mistranslates this word exactly as Twersky does.
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“law” refers to the regulations concerning voluntary sacrifices, and ger refers to
a sojourner, a resident alien. It permits resident aliens to bring voluntary sac-
rifices while requiring that they be offered in accordance with the strictures
prescribed previously (vv. 1–11) for Israelites.
The rabbis do not read the verse in thisway.They understand ger asmeaning
“proselyte”—clearly not the original meaning of the word since the institution
of conversion did not exist in biblical times. According to the Talmud, the laws
in question are the rituals required for conversion: immersion, circumcision for
males, and, in Temple times, a sacrifice. The rabbis assume that the Israelites
underwent this conversionary process in preparation for receiving the Torah.
The statement “as are you so shall the ger”—that is, a proselyte—“be before the
Lord” means, therefore: “Just as your ancestors entered the covenant by means
of circumcision, immersion, and sacrificial offerings, so too, converts shall enter
the covenant bymeans of circumcision, immersion, and sacrificial offerings.”89
By retrojecting the institution of conversion the sages provide it with biblical
support and normative status.
Maimonides, while essentially adopting the rabbinic reading of Numbers
15:15, expands and reshapes it considerably. First, he interprets “law” as refer-
ring to the entire corpus of biblical commandments. Second, he seems to read
“it shall be a law for all time” as meaning that at the moment of Revelation,
the Torah was given not only to those present and their descendants but also,
prospectively, to any and all who would later choose to enter the covenant. In
effect, a convert is seen as accepting the Torah given to him in potentia at Sinai
rather than embracing it unilaterally.
We can now make sense of Maimonides’ historical-theological narrative as
it appears in the responsum and its relevance to Obadiah’s status as a Jew.
Obadiah would not have needed to convert had he wished only to join the
Abrahamic community of monotheists. Nonetheless, his conversion entailed
the acceptance of Abrahamic theology, and as such, Maimonides points out,
Obadiahwas qualified to use formulae referring to Abrahamand the patriarchs
as his ancestors.90 However, Obadiah was not content to be solely a member
of the Abrahamic community. His conversion was motivated by a desire to
89 b. Ker. 9a.
90 The fact remains thatMaimonides’ description of Abraham’s proselytizing as “gather[ing]
many under the wings of the Divine Presence” (5) does not sit well with his use of this
phrase elsewhere. In all other instances it refers to conversion proper, not simply accept-
ing the belief in the One God and His unity; see n. 20. Perhaps Maimonides is speaking
prospectively; it is due toAbraham that all thosewho convert are brought under thewings
of the Divine Presence.
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join the third community as well. This community was initially the product
of communal conversion and was based on a covenantal acceptance of the
Torah in addition to a commitment to monotheistic belief. As a consequence
of becoming a proselyte Obadiah simultaneously entered into the Abrahamic
community and the covenant betweenGod and Israel. Maimonides posits that
Obadiah’s participation in that covenant is relevant with regard to the other
liturgical phrases about which he inquired.
It may be that Maimonides’ linking of converts with the original Abra-
hamic community may serve a purpose beyond justifying the use of formu-
lae mentioning the patriarchs. In Maimonides’ view, a convert connects him-
self trans-historically to the faith community that preceded the formation of
the covenantal community at Sinai. Thus, a convert can be seen as a disciple
of Abraham who adhered to his teachings even after Abraham’s other disci-
ples had lapsed into idolatry. In the act of conversion, he arrives at Sinai, as
it were, as a spiritual member of the Levitic community, those who held fast
to monotheistic beliefs while their fellow Israelites strayed after foreign gods.
Obadiah is not, therefore, a latecomer to the Sinaitic covenant, but, on the con-
trary, a faithful member of the first community who now joins the third. This
depiction of the convert is particularly compelling in Obadiah’s case given that
Maimonides regarded him as having been a monotheist while still a Muslim.
Proselytes asMembers of the Chosen People
In sections 10 and 11 Maimonides addresses the question of whether Oba-
diah could recite formulae referring to Israel’s election and the Revelation at
Sinai. These phrases present two different challenges. In the case of election, it
was ethnic-historical Israel that God separated from the other nations because
of a promise made to Abraham concerning his progeny. Maimonides himself
acknowledges this in the passage in MT passage quoted above: “Because of
God’s love for us, and to uphold the promiseHemade toAbraham…[He] chose
Israel as His inheritance.” The Revelation at Sinai was, leaving aside its per-
petual significance, also an historical event involving ethnic-historical Israel.
Moreover, election and revelation were intertwined; it was God’s election of
Israel that led to the Torah being given to them exclusively. Obadiah could not
claim ethnic ties to the nation that was chosen to be God’s people and that
stood at Sinai.
Maimonides’ response to these challenges is to frame both Israel’s election
and the Sinaitic covenant as a consequence of their status, as noted above,
as the sole continuators of the Abrahamic faith community. The fact that the
Israelite nation, even asmost of itsmembers fell away frommonotheistic belief
and worship during their sojourn in Egypt, contained within it the last rem-
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nant of Abraham’s faith community, the Levites, was thus a crucial factor in
God’s election of the Israelite nation. Moreover, in order to become to be God’s
chosen people, the nation as a whole had to return to belief in the One God.
Consequently, they had to be separated from the Egyptians, who had led them
astray, and be given theTorah. The commandments contained in theTorah are,
asMaimonides explains in hisGuide of the Perplexed, a means of insuring “that
every [Jew] … achieves his first perfection, [meaning] the soundness of beliefs
and … correct opinions through which ultimate perfection is achieved.”91
Like the Israelites, Obadiah, argues Maimonides, had undergone a process
of separation that, like the God’s liberation of the Israelites, was theologically
motivated. Obadiah had separated himself from Islam and, as a consequence,
no doubt had to severmany if not all familial and communal ties. In sections 10
and 11 Maimonides equates Obadiah’s act of withdrawal from his faith and his
people with the Exodus from Egypt, the beginning of Israel’s process of separa-
tion. Like the people of Israel, then, Obadiah undergoes separation as a prelude
to conversion.
It is striking thatMaimonides describes Obadiah as having been chosen and
separated “from the nations” by God (11). In doing so he seems to ignore if not
deny the reality that Obadiah’s conversionwas the consequence of a conscious
and volitional decision on his part, a fact that Maimonides actually highlights
in his description elsewhere of Obadiah’s spiritual journey.92 Apparently, just
as Maimonides sees Obadiah’s conversion as the acceptance of a pre-existent
offer of the Torah at Sinai to all future converts, he sees Obadiah’s decision to
separate himself from his past as accepting a destiny divinely preordained for
him and his fellow proselytes.
Homiletics: Articulating the Heart of the Problem and Engaging
Obadiah’s Heart
Maimonides turns to homiletics twice. The first instance is after he has dealt
with the difficult question of whether Obadiah may recite “You who have
brought us out of the land of Egypt” and “Youwho have performedmiracles for
our ancestors” (9). These formulae would seem inappropriate for someone not
a descendant of the Israelites who experienced God’s wonderous and redemp-
91 Book III, Chapter 27.The translation is taken fromMaimonides,TheGuideof thePerplexed,
trans. with an introduction and notes by Shlomo Pines with an introductory essay by Leo
Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 511.
92 Responsum 448 (2:728; Shilat, 1:241, lines 5–6). I discuss this passage further on.
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tive presence in Egypt and beyond. Consequently, Maimonides concedes that
it would be reasonable for Obadiah not to include these formulae in his prayers
and blessings (9). Not willing to let this ruling stand uncontested, however,
Maimonides immediately shifts from acceptance to approval of Obadiah’s use
of the standard liturgical formulae, positing that one who joins the people of
Israel has the right to claim its sacred history as his own.
The fact remains that even this temporary admission represents a chink in
the protective armor with which Maimonides has clothed Obadiah’s Jewish
status. It is perhaps awareness of this that impels Maimonides specifically at
this point to articulate on Obadiah’s behalf, as it were, his presumed, albeit
unstated, anxiety about his authenticity as a Jew.To do soMaimonides employs
a verse that gives voice to the fears of a foreigner seeking to associate himself
not only with the God of Israel but with His people as well: “Let not the for-
eigner who has attached himself to the Lord say, ‘The Lord will keep me apart
from His people’.”93
The use of this verse is particularly apt in at least four respects. First, the
term that I have translated as “foreigner” is רכנהןב . The basis for the foreigner’s
potential disqualification is genealogical; he is of foreign, non-Israelite stock—
as is Obadiah. Second, the verse describes a tension between the foreigner’s
unqualified attachment to the God of Israel on the one hand and his uncer-
tainty about his bondwith God’s people on the other—which is precisely Oba-
diah’s predicament. Third, the concern of the foreigner, translated as “the Lord
will keep me apart,” is ינלידבילדבה . The verb bdl is used in the liturgical for-
mula “who has distinguished us,” one of the formulae about which Obadiah
inquired.94 Fourth, as James Diamond has so brilliantly noted,95 God responds
to the foreigner’s fear of being kept apart, of being an “outsider,” with the
promise that “My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples.”96 Oba-
diah’s inquiry touches upon the question of his place in God’s house of prayer,
the synagogue, especially as it concerns his fitness to serve as prayer leader.
Maimonides turns to homiletics a second time after having addressed indi-
vidually each of the liturgical formulae under consideration; perhaps he hopes
that his rhetorical skills will compensate for whatever might be the limitations
of his halakhic and theological arguments. Once again, he articulatesObadiah’s
fear: “Do not consider your origin as inferior,” before concluding his theolog-
93 Isa 56:3.
94 See sections 3 and 10.
95 Diamond, “Converts,” 9–10.
96 Isa 56:7. The language and content of Isa 56:3, 7–9 clearly indicate a polemical engagement
with the views expressed in Ezek 44:7–11 and Neh 9:2.
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ical exposition with a homiletical tour de force that brilliantly and radically
marginalizes and transcends the issues of land, shared historical experience,
and peoplehood:
While we descend from Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, yours is a direct rela-
tionship with Him through whose word the world was created. This is
made explicit in [the Book of] Isaiah: “One shall say, I am the Lord’s, and
another shall call himself by the name of Jacob” (12).
It is precisely the absence of a biological connection with the people of Israel
that renders Obadiah’s spiritual journey a reenactment of Abraham’s—an
experience foreclosed to native-born Jews. As Maimonides says in another
responsum addressed to Obadiah—borrowing from the language of Genesis
12:1—he is “a disciple of Abraham who left his family and his native land to
become a follower of God.”97 Maimonides’ language in that responsum is sug-
gestively ambiguous. Who is it who left home and family, ותדלומוויתובאחינהש ,
in a quest to follow God: Obadiah or Abraham? The answer, of course, is that
both did, and presumablyMaimonides is intentionallymerging his description
of Obadiah’s journey with that of Abraham’s quest, as he does here less explic-
itly.98
The Issue of Discrepancies
In sum, it may be said that this responsum constitutes a serendipitous instance
of Maimonides’ sincerely held view of Judaism being perfectly suited to pro-
vide support and validation to his petitioner. Thus, while Maimonides may use
the strategies outlined above in framing his response, at no point does he sac-
rifice his integrity as theologian and halakhist to arrive at his conclusion. In
this instance Maimonides would seem not to be vulnerable to the charge lev-
eled by Haym Soloveitchik against his Iggeret ha-Shemad in which, according
97 See n. 92.
98 Compare JamesDiamond’s slightly different analysis in “Converts,” 17–18. Diamond thinks
thatwhat sets apart the convert is the certainty that hismotives for accepting the covenant
andwalking in God’s ways are pure, as were Abraham’s. I find this explanation unconvinc-
ing for reasons that Iwill not enumeratehere.Myunderstanding is thatMaimonideshas in
mind the willingness of Abraham and Obadiah to adhere to faith in the One God though
it meant leaving hearth and home and defying the beliefs and practices of one’s native
culture.
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to Soloveitchik, Maimonides plays fast and loose with the use and interpreta-
tion of rabbinic sources as well as with halakhic methodology.99
There is one respect in which Maimonides could be said to be oversimpli-
fying, or even misrepresenting, the Jewish status of a convert. His reassuring
words to Obadiah, “There is no difference whatsoever between you and us”
(9), ring false. As mentioned above, there are numerous instances in which
halakhah assigns converts an inferior status, be it the inability to serve as a
judge for ḥalitzah,100 or that they are placed in a separate genealogical category
and are therefore allowed to marry mamzerim, who are forbidden to native-
born Israelites.101 Second, while Maimonides concludes here and in MT that
converts are to recite the declaration accompanying the bringing of the first
fruits to the Temple, he also rules in MT102 that converts are not to recite the
declaration concerning tithes, because they have no inheritance in the Land
of Israel—precisely the same argumentmade in theMishnah for a convert not
reciting the declaration over the first fruits.103Third,Maimonides himself notes
that it is questionable whether Obadiah could in some sense regard himself as
a member of the ethnic-historical nation of Israel, with possible halakhic con-
sequences.
To respond to the second objection, we must consider Maimonides’ phi-
losophy of halakhah. As Jose Faur104 points out, Maimonides posits that the
particulars of halakhah are not always in accord with the canons of logic; the
authority of Ḥazal as the tradents and interpreters of Torah obligates us to
99 See Haym Soloveitchik, “Maimonides’ ‘Iggeret ha-Shemad’: Law and Rhetoric,” in Rabbi
Joseph H. Lookstein Memorial Volume, ed. L. Landman (New York: Ktav Publishing House,
1980), 281–319; and David Hartman’s initial dissent in Abraham Halkin and David Hart-
man,Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Soci-
ety, 1985), 46–83. For an analysis of the dispute between Soloveitchik and Hartman’s dis-
sent, see Yair Lorberbaum and Haim Shapira, “Maimonides’ Epistle on Martyrdom in the
Light of Legal Philosophy,”Diné Israel 25 (2008): 123–169. A bibliography of Soloveitchik’s
and Hartman’s writings on this subject can be found there on p. 124 n. 1. Herbert Davidson
adduces the problematic halakhic methodology and reasoning evinced by the epistle’s
author as evidence that he is not in fact Maimonides; see Davidson, Moses Maimonides:
The Man and His Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 501–509 and especially
508.
100 See MT, Laws of Levirate Marriage 4:5.
101 See MT, Laws of Forbidden Relations 15:7.
102 MT, Laws of the Second Tithe 11:17.
103 Commentaries there (Laws of the Second Tithe, loc. cit.) note this contradiction and
attempt to resolve it.
104 Jose Faur, Studies of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah [Heb.] (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook,
1978), 142–147.
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follow their rulings nonetheless. The apparent logical inconsistency of Mai-
monides allowing and obligating proselytes to recite themiqra bikkurim on the
one hand and excluding them from vidui ma‘aserot should not, therefore, be
regarded as problematic.
Nonetheless, the question remains: How can Maimonides claim equal Jew-
ish status for Obadiah in the face of a number of halakhot suggesting a dimin-
ished status for proselytes? I would like to suggest an admittedly specula-
tive answer that draws upon both the content and structure of Maimonides’
response to Obadiah.
Maimonides’ segregation of the halakhic material from his theological re-
flections might reflect a view that the nature of Jewish identity transcends and
is separate from matters of halakhah. Specifically, Maimonides could be seen
as implying that while his ruling on the question was consistent with his char-
acterization of Obadiah’s Jewish status, that status was in no way contingent
upon that ruling. In Maimonides’ view, the covenantal community created at
Sinai was rooted in the non-ethnic Abrahamic faith community, and the transi-
tion from a theologically-based community to one based on divine command-
ments was accomplished through a community-wide conversionary process.
It is true that God chose a particular nation to become His covenantal part-
ners, butMaimonides regards the ethnicity of Israel as a reason for having been
chosen rather than an essential definitional element of that chosenness. There-
fore, anyone willing to adhere to Abrahamic monotheism and to undergo the
conversionary process vital to joining the covenantal community is to be con-
sidered the equal of native-born Jews.
This may be part of what motivated Maimonides’ placing his exposition of
the Talmudic sources at the end of the responsum. I suggested above that the
positioning of the Talmudic material at the end of the responsum may have
been motivated in part to downplay its significance, thereby forestalling the
possibility that it would lead Obadiah to question both Maimonides’ assur-
ances in general and his ruling in particular. What I am arguing now is that
ideological convictions as well as strategic considerations guided his segrega-
tion and placement of the halakhic material.
∵
The writing of a responsum presents many challenges to the poseq. He or she
must identify the relevantTalmudicmaterial and analyze it in light of the inter-
pretations of earlier commentaries. Previous responsa addressing the same or
related issues must also be considered. However, these are not the only factors
that come into play. Consciously or otherwise, his or her views on matters of
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theology, social policy, gender roles—to name but a few—may determine his
or her ruling or at least someof its particulars. In addition, aposeq is responding
to a particular petitioner or petitioners: an individual, two or more disputants,
perhaps a community. To be effective poseqim they must take their audience
into account. Part of doing so is to intuit when there are significant psycholog-
ical, social, or political factors that have not been spelled out in the question.
We have seen howMaimonides, both because of his own theological convic-
tions and through a sensitivity to his questioner, wrote a response that exhibits,
both in style and substance, halakhic and theological sophistication and cre-
ativity as well as psychological acuity. This last aspect of pesaq, which can be
found in responsa throughout the ages, has not been given the attention it
deserves. It ismy intention to address this issue further in the future, and I hope
that this article will inspire others to do the same.
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chapter 2
Providing References for Schools or Jobs
Elliot N. Dorff andMarc Gary
In Honor of Rabbi Joel Roth
Joel Roth was my junior counselor at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin when I was
fifteen years old. Ever since then, he and I have followed remarkably similar
paths in our lives. Both of us became Conservative rabbis and academics, both
of us have devoted our lives to teaching rabbinical students, and both of us
have served as Chair of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, for which
we jointly wrote a rabbinic ruling prohibiting the shackling and hoisting of
animals destined for kosher slaughter. Both of us take a strong interest in our
students while they sit in our classrooms and long after. We chose to focus on
different areas of Jewish studies in our scholarship—he in Rabbinics, and I in
philosophy—andwedonot always agree on specific halakhic issues, forwe are,
after all, both Jews and rabbis in the deepest argumentativemode of the Jewish
tradition as we search to identify and actualize God’s will, wisdom, goodness,
and truth. The proverbial Martian coming to Earth, however, would be hard-
pressed to distinguish us among all the other people of this planet because our
similarities far outweigh our differences. To be like Rabbi Roth in all these ways
I take as a mark of a life well lived, for Rabbi Roth has modeled for two genera-
tions what it shouldmean to be a teacher, a rabbi, and a Jew. I treasure his deep
learning and analyticmind, his remarkable teaching ability, his devotion to the
Jewish tradition, his dedication to his students, and, most of all, his friendship.
Elliot N. Dorff
I first heard Rabbi Joel Roth teach at a United Synagogue Youth convention
in Ventnor, New Jersey in the late 1960’s. The theme was “Prayer,” and now—
fifty years later—I can still remember the heart of his lesson: like teenagers,
the rabbis of the Talmud also had a difficult time concentrating on prayer;
they too were distracted by extraneous phenomena, in their case birds flying
overhead. The fact that a half-century later I can vividly recall Rabbi Roth’s
lecture is not only a testament to his brilliance, his presentational skills, his
wit, and his deep learning. It also reflects a hallmark of Rabbi Roth’s pedagogy:
the desire to demonstrate the continued vitality of the foundational, sacred
texts that he has so admirablymastered. Ever since that first United Synagogue
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Youth lesson, I have been privileged to continue to learn from Rabbi Roth,
including the fifteen years or so that he and I overlapped as members of the
Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, and most recently as Executive Vice
Chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary, where Rabbi Roth serves as an
esteemed member of our Rabbinics faculty. During these many years we have
had disagreements over halakhah and policy, but his erudition and commit-
ment to bringing authentic and sophisticated Torah learning to the broader
Jewish community, both inside the walls of the Jewish Theological Seminary
and beyond, have earned my respect and admiration and the gratitude of gen-
erations of his students.
Marc Gary
Sheilah
What norms govern giving oral or written references for schools or jobs?1
Teshuvah
At first blush, the answer to this question seems obvious: just tell the truth.
After all, theTorah itself demands thatwe קָחְרִּתרֶקֶׁש־רַבְּדִמ , “Keep far from false-
hood.”2TheprophetZechariahurges, ּוהֵעֵר־תֶאׁשיִאתֶמֱאּורְּבַּד , “Speak truth toone
another,” and ּובָהֱאםֹולָּׁשַהְותֶמֱאָהְו , “Love truth and peace.”3 In the Talmud, R.
Ḥanina declares, תמאאוה־ךורבשודקהלשומתוח:אנינחיבררמא , “The seal of the
Holy Blessed One is truth”4—and we, after all, are supposed to emulate God.
So why is there any question here?
There are two reasons why this is a question worth considering. First, al-
though the Jewish tradition does indeed value truth greatly, it also bids us
respect the honor of all God’s creatures (kevod haberiyyot),5 and an important
way in which it instructs us to do that is through how we talk to and how we
speak about other human beings. In other words, in this area of life, as in most
1 This responsum addresses an issue that has some parallels with the responsum on whistle-
blowing by Rabbi Barry Leff, to which readers are referred: “Whistleblowing: The Require-
ment to Report Employer Wrongdoing,” http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/fil
es/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20052010/leff_whistleblowing.pdf.
2 Exod 23:7.
3 Zech 8:16, 19.
4 b. Šabb. 55a; b. Yoma 69b; b. Sanh. 64a.
5 b. Ber. 19b; b. Šabb. 81b, 94b; b. ʿErub. 41b; b. Meg. 3b; b. Menaḥ. 37b.
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others, it recognizes that truth is not an absolute value but rather one thatmust
be balanced with another value, in this case that of kevod haberiyyot. Exactly
how to do that is the topic of this responsum.
Second, Jews are also governed by the laws of the nations in which they live,
and so this is a topic where they must consider not only what their religious
tradition tells them to do, but also the civil laws and moral norms that gov-
ern this area of life. They must then integrate the instructions and guidelines
they receive fromboth legal andmoral systems. This responsumwill use Amer-
ican law as its example of civil law because the question arose in that context.
Jews living in Israel and other countries can and should adopt what is said here
about American law to the laws of the nation in which they live and make the
changes necessary to our conclusions, but the principles of Jewish law delin-
eated in this responsum apply to Jews worldwide.
Finally, this responsum, as a responsum in Jewish law, applies directly to
Jewish employees and owners of a company and the employees, administra-
tion, and lay leaders of Jewish nonprofit organizations. Jews, however, function
in a largely non-Jewish world, and so it will also address the question of Jews
working for a non-Jewish company or agency.6 In both contexts this responsum
6 Traditional Jewish law distinguishes in a number of areas of the law, especially commercial
law, between what Jews owe other Jews in contrast to what Jews owe non-Jews. Sometimes
this distinctionwas simply amanifestationof what itmeans tobepart of the community,with
its incumbent duties as well as rights, as against being outside the community, verymuch like
the distinction between citizens and aliens in duties and rights withinmanymodern nations.
So, for example, even though the Rabbis declared (t. Giṭ. 3:18; b. Giṭ. 61a) that Jews must care
for the poor (and the sick and mourners) of other nations “for the sake of peace,” and that
obligations for the sake of peace have Pentateuchal authority (b. Giṭ. 59b), they also declared
that a Jew’s duties are to follow the form of concentric circles, with caring for oneself first,
then one’s family, then one’s local community, then the larger Jewish community, and only
then the non-Jewish poor (Mekhilta Mishpatim 19 on Exod 22:24; Sifre Deuteronomy 116 on
Deut 15:7; b. B. Meṣ. 71a; b. Ned. 80b; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 7:13; Shulḥan
Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 251:3). Sometimes, though, this distinction was a response to the persecu-
tion and legal discrimination that Jews faced. At the same time, the Torah demands that with
respect to aliens living among Israelites םֶכְּתִארָּגַהרֵּגַלְוםֶכָלהֶיְהִידָחֶאטָּפְׁשִמּותַחַאהָרֹוּת , “The
same ritual and the same rule shall apply to you and to the stranger who resides among you”
(Num 15:16), on the basis of which the Rabbis maintained that חרזאלרגההושהובותכהאב
הרותבשתוצמלכב , “The Torah equated the Israelite and the stranger with regard to all the
commandments of the Torah” (Sifre Numbers 109 [ed. Horowitz, p. 113]). This, of course, was
with regard to the resident alien and not to other non-Jews. In our day, however, when the
vast majority of the world’s Jews live either in Israel side by side with non-Jewish citizens, or
inWestern liberal democracies outside of Israel, where Jews and non-Jews are equal citizens,
this thrust in the Torah and Rabbinic literature toward equal treatment should clearly apply.
In this responsum, therefore, the distinction between Jews working for other Jews as
against Jews working for non-Jewish companies is not based on rabbinic or medieval re-
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addresses when Jews must live up to the standard of Jewish law on this issue,
even at the cost of their jobs or of losing in the competitive race of business,
and when they need not.
As we will develop below, the question at hand is both what duty does an
evaluator have to tell the truth—and to whom and how much—and, con-
versely, what permission does an evaluator have to tell the truth—and towhom
and how much—despite the real danger of slandering the candidate for the
school or job? Further, what are the grounds for establishing that duty and that
permission? That is, what laws and values in the Jewish tradition require us
to tell the truth—and to what extent—and what laws and values in the Jewish
traditionpermit us todo sodespite the fact that becausenobody is perfect, eval-
uations will inevitably involve saying negative things about the person being
evaluated?7
The Power of Words
On YomKippur (the Day of Atonement)—the holiest day of the Jewish year—
at each of the five services of the day, Jews recite a long litany of sins for which
we askGod’s forgiveness. A large proportion of that list involves sinswe commit
through speaking. Clearly, then, the Jewish tradition takes the ethics of speak-
ing very seriously. In fact, theRabbis of theTalmudnote that if one embarrasses
someone else in public, the victim’s face often turns white. They compare that
to the pale face of the dead so as to say that embarrassing a person is akin to
killing him or her:
־.םימדךפושוליאכםיברבוריבחינפןיבלמהלכ:קחצירבןמחנברדהימקאנתינת
.ארווחיתאואקמוסליזאדהילאניזחד,תרמאאקריפש:הילרמא
sponses to prejudice, for in modernWestern countries Jews are thankfully treated in the law
as equals with all other citizens. The distinction is rather due to the fact that Jews working for
non-Jewish companies are bound by the policies of those companies, and, with a few excep-
tions noted later in this responsum, must and may abide by those policies in order to keep
their jobs. In contrast, Jewsworking for Jewish companies or nonprofit agencies have an addi-
tional Jewish duty to abide by Jewish law, and this responsum spells out what that requires
for both employers and employees in the matter of providing references. (We would like to
thank Mr. Jerry Abeles for raising the issue of Jews working for non-Jews in responding to an
earlier draft of this responsum, and Rabbi David Booth for alerting us to the misconception
that readers may have in our making any distinction between the norms that affect Jews in
working for Jews in contrast to non-Jews.)
7 We would like to thank Rabbi Elie Spitz for suggesting that we alert readers to these two ele-
ments of our question early on in our responsum.
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Someone taught before R. Naḥman b. Isaac: If a man put his neighbor to
shame, it is as if he shed blood. R. Naḥman said to him: Well have you
spoken, for we see how the red disappears [in the victim’s face] and the
pallor comes.8
In fact, they go further: such a remark, also “kills” both the speaker and the
listener. The Rabbis therefore call slander “the third tongue” (lishan telitae)
because “it slays three people: the speaker, the listener, and the one spoken
about.” ורמואלוולבקמלוורפסמלגרוה,יאתילתליטקיאתילתןושל .9 Not only do speech






R.Manah derived themall from reasoning about a verse (Deut 32:47): “For
this is not a trifling thing for you,” this is study of the Torah; “it is your very
life,” this is honoring one’s father and mother; “through it you shall long
endure,” this refers to acts of loving kindness; “on the land,” this is bring-
ing peace between one person and another. In contrast to these virtues,
there are four great sins for which a person is punished in this world, and
their capital, or stock, remains in the formof punishment dealt out to him
or her in the world to come. These four are idolatry, incest, murder, and
slander, the last of which is as bad as all the other three put together.10
As the Book of Proverbs succinctly put it, ןֹוׁשָל־דַיְּבםיִּיַחְותֶוָמ , “Death and life are
in the hands of the tongue.”11
Words obviously are not altogether a bad thing; like all our other faculties,
the moral quality of our speech depends on how we use it. The following rab-
binic story makes this point eloquently:
ילןיבזקופל״אןשילהילןבזקפנאקושןמאבטודצילןיבזקופהידבעיבטלג״בשרא
ןבזתאאבטודצךלרמאאנאדכדןידוהמל״אןשילהילןבזקפנאקושןמאשיבודצ
8 b. B. Meṣ. 58b.
9 b. ʿArak. 15b.
10 y. Pe’ah 1:1 [15d].
11 Prov 18:21.
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דכאתשיבהנימואתבטהנימל״אןשילילןבזתאאשיבודצךלרמאאנאדכוןשיליל
הינימשיבתילשיבדכוהינימהבטתילבטהוה
R. Shimonb. Gamliel said to his servantTabbai: “Go to themarket and buy
me good food.” He went out and brought back a tongue. He told him: “Go
out and bring me bad food from the market.” He went out and brought
him a tongue. He then asked him: “Why is it that when I said ‘good food’
you brought me a tongue, and when I said ‘bad food’ you also brought me
a tongue?” He replied: “It is the source of good and evil. When it is good,
it cannot be surpassed; when it is evil, then there is nothing worse.”12
TheMisuse of Words
Wehumanbeings have beenquite creative in developingways tomisusewords,
and, as the Yom Kippur liturgy reminds us, we therefore have to be especially
careful in howwe speak about others and to other people. Moreover, as people
created in the image of God, we must have respect for ourselves as well; when
we abuse our power to speak, we besmirch ourselves as well as the people to or
about whom we are speaking.
In the context of creating references for schools or jobs, the Rabbis’ norms ban-
ning the following forms of speech are relevant.
Lies (sheker)
Telling lies—that is, knowingly and intentionally telling someone something
that you know to be false—undermines people’s trust in one another. Indeed,
at the extreme—that is, if everyone lied so often that one could never assume
that the next person was telling the truth—social cooperation, commerce,
friendships, and family relations would become impossible. We would all be
living in a terrifying world. It is not surprising, then, that the Torah specifically
prohibits lying: אְוָׁשעַמֵׁשאָּׂשִתֹאל “You must not carry false rumors (literally,
‘worthless words to be heard’)” … קָחְרִּתרֶקֶׁש־רַבְּדִמ “Keep far from falsehood
(sheker),”13 and ֹותיִמֲעַּבׁשיִאּורְּקַׁשְת־ֹאלְוּוׁשֲחַכְת־ֹאלְוּובֹנְגִּתֹאל “You shall not steal;
you shall not deal deceitfully nor lie to one another.”14
12 Lev. Rab. 33:1.
13 Exod 23:1, 7.
14 Lev 19:11.
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The Rabbis understood the social consequences of lying:
.ולןיעמושןיא־תמארמאוליפאש,יאדבלשושנועךכ
This is thepenalty for the liar: evenwhenhe tells the truth, noonebelieves
him.15
They also condemned it as a form of theft, indeed theworst form of theft: העבש
תוירבהתעדבנוגןלוכבשןושארהןהןיבנג “There are seven types of thieves. The per-
son who steals a person’s thought [i.e., deception] is the worst of them.”16
Why did the Rabbis think of lying as the worst form of theft?Why is it worse
than stealingmoneyor property fromaperson?Oneanswer is that even though
people who have been robbed often feel personally violated, in the end it is
one’s property that the thief has encroached upon, not one’s person. Often the
thief does not even know the person from whom he or she has stolen. Decep-
tion, though, is immediately and directly personal: the liar knows you and did
not think enough of you to tell you the truth, and so you rightly feel dishon-
ored and molested. We will see below how the Rabbis make the same kind of
distinction between property and person with regard to slander.
Of course, sometimes one tells a falsehood without knowing that one is doing
so and without intending to do so. In such cases, the level of moral culpability
is much less; one has simply made a mistake. Nevertheless, the Rabbis warn us
against our very human desire to be seen as someone who knows everything,
for that may lead us to give people false information: רמולךנושלדמל:רמרמאד
זחאתוהדבתתאמש,עדוייניא “Mar said: Teach your tongue to say ‘I do not know,’
lest you invent something and be trapped.”17 Similarly, the Jerusalem Talmud
reports a letter of recommendation that praises someone specifically for admit-






15 b. Sanh. 89b.
16 t. B. Qam. 7:3.
17 b. Ber. 4a.
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R. Ḥiyya b. Abba came to R. Eleazar. He said to him: “Win the favor of
R. Yudan, the patriarch, so that he will write on my behalf a letter of rec-
ommendation, because I am going abroad to make a living.” He won his
approval, and he wrote him as follows: “Lo, we send you a great man as
our messenger. He is our agent and is in our status until he comes back to
us.” R. Ḥezekiah, R. Dosetai, R. Abba b. Zamina, and some present tell the
tale in the name of R. Dosetai the Elder: Thus did he write for him: “Lo,
we send you a great man, who is not ashamed to say, ‘I have not heard the
answer to your question.’ ”18
“I do not know” is a really important sentence to make part of one’s common
speech patterns, for then the hearer knows that the provider of the reference is
being careful in asserting only what s/he really knows. “I do not know, but I sus-
pect something negative,” though, is a flat violation of the prohibition against
slurs (lashon hara). On the other hand, “I do not know, but I suspect some-
thing positive” indicates exactly how much you yourself trust what you say if
you then venture a guess and then explain the basis for your assertion. Under
those circumstances nobody is deceived. The hearer may just accept the guess
or suggest one of his or her own if thematter does notmean verymuch to either
person. On the other hand, if the hearer or the recipient of a letter of evalua-
tion really needs to know the answer for some practical or personal purpose,
the speaker has put him or her on notice that even though the speaker orwriter
thinks that the answer is X, the hearer or recipient will have to go elsewhere to
find out conclusively. That is, by saying “I do not know,” the speaker or writer
has transferred responsibility for discovering the answer back to the hearer or
recipient of a reference letter.
Does such an admission, though, undermine our own self-respect and the
honor that others will give us? Not really, for in our heart of hearts we realize
that none of us is all-knowing, as the Jewish tradition believesGod to be. There-
fore, one should not be embarrassed to admit not knowing something. Even if
the question is in the hearer’s or recipient’s area of expertise, that person will
appreciate an honest admission of a lack of knowledge—especially if the one
asked thengoes to the trouble to find the answer if one is known.Honesty about
what one knows and does not know about relevant, work-related factors that
affect the person’s candidacy is always the best policy so that one can avoid
telling even unintended falsehoods and thus be trusted.
18 y. Ned. 10:11, 35b; see also y. Ḥag. 1:8, 77a. We would like to thank Rabbi Daniel Nevins for
directing us to this source.
36 dorff and gary
Slurs (lashon hara) and Slander (motzi shem ra)
While saying false, negative things about a person (slander, motzi shem ra) is
obviously problematic as a formof lies intended to defame and hurt the person
being described, in most situations Jewish law also prohibits negative com-
ments that are true (slurs, lashonhara). It evenprohibits comments that arenot
themselves defamatory but imply negative things about someone (avak lashon
hara, “the dust of saying bad things” or “the dust of slurs”). Maimonides defines





















There is a sin much greater than this [that is, greater than telling tales
about someone else], and it is included in this negative prohibition,
namely, slurs (literally, “talk about the bad,” lashon hara). That is someone
who talks negatively about someone else, even if he speaks the truth. But
one who [additionally] tells lies is called “one who spreads a bad name”
(motzi shemra) about someone else. Onewho engages in such slander sits
and says: “So-and-so did this,” “So-and-so were his ancestors,” “So-and-so I
heard about him,” all of which are [false and] defamatory. For such a per-
son Scripture says, “May the Lord cut off all flattering lips, every tongue
that speaks arrogance.” (Ps 12:4)
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The Sages said: “For three sins, a person is punished in this world,
and he has no place in the World to Come: idolatry, incest/adultery, and
murder—and slander is like all of them combined.”19 …
There are alsowords that are “thedust of slurs” (avak lashonhara).How
so? If A says to B, “Who would have ever thought that C would be as he
is now?” Or A says, “Don’t ask about C; I don’t want to tell you what hap-
pened,” and similar talk. Also, anyone who compliments a person in front
of his enemies speaks the dust of slander, for that [positive talk]will cause
his enemies to speak negatively of him. About such speech Solomon said:
“He who greets his fellow loudly early in the morning shall have it reck-
oned to him as a curse,”20 for from his compliment comes defamation.
Similarly, one who slurs another through a joke or frivolity, that is to say,
he does not speak in hatred [but nevertheless insults a person engages
in the dust of slander]. This is what Solomon in his wisdom said: “Like a
madman scattering deadly firebrands, arrows, is one who cheats his fel-
low and says, ‘I was only joking.’ ”21 Similarly, someonewho slurs someone
throughdeceit, as, for example, he speaks innocently as if he didnot know
thatwhat hewas sayingwas a slur, andwhenpeople protest, he says, “I did
not know that this is a slur or that So-and-So did that” [when he in fact
does know the defamatory character of what he was saying is a person
who engages in the dust of slurs.] …
All these are people who slur others. It is forbidden to live in their
neighborhood, and even more to sit with them and listen to them.22
Spreading false, negative comments about people—that is, slandering them—
clearly attacks their integrity and reputation, and that is, as Maimonides says,
akin to murder. But even slurs—that is, true but negative comments about
someone (lashonhara)—canbenothing less than lethal. Oliver Sipple is awoe-
ful case of this. Sipple, an ex-Marinewho saved the life of PresidentGerald Ford
by deflecting the gun directed at him by Sara Jane Moore, became an instant
national hero. Despite his request to reporters of “don’t publish anything about
me,” many noted in their articles that Sipple was active in the gay community.
This led to rejection by his parents, who had not known about that aspect of
his life—even to the point of his father telling him that he was not welcome at
19 y. Pe’ah 1:1, 15a.
20 Prov 27:14.
21 Prov 26:18–19.
22 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Character Traits (De’ot) 7:2, 3, 4, 6.
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the funeral of hismother—which, in turn, led Sipple to drink heavily and to die
alone at age 47. The reporter who first publicized Sipple’s homosexuality made
this postmortem comment: “If I had to do it over again, I wouldn’t.”23
Note that this case illustrates that what constitutes negative information
depends largely on how the hearers will respond to it. After all, being gay is
not in and of itself a bad thing; for many young people now, it is simply a fact
of life, like the fact that some people have blue eyes and some have brown eyes.
At the time, though, Sipple knew that his parents would think ill of him if they
knew that he was gay, and that was all that mattered.
The prohibition of uttering negative speech applies all the more so if every-
one knows that what the person is saying is negative, for then there is a clear
intention to defame a person.Wemay not defame a person, for we are required





BenAzai said: “This is the record of Adam’s line. [WhenGod createdman,
He made him in the likeness of God; male and female He created them]”
(Gen 5:1–2). This is a great principle in theTorah. R. Akiba said: “Love your
neighbor as yourself” (Lev 19:18), this is a great principle of the Torah, for
one should not say that since I have been shamed, let my fellow person
be shamed with me, since I have been disgraced, let my fellow person be
disgraced with me. R. Tanḥuma said: If you did so, know whom you are
shaming, for “God made him [the human being] in the likeness of God”
(Gen 5:1).24
.ךלשכךילעביבחךרבחדובכיהירמוארזעילאיבר
R. Eliezer said: Cherish your fellow human’s honor as your own.25
23 Stephen Bates, If No News, Send Rumors: Anecdotes of American Journalism (New York:
Henry Holt, 1989), 142–143.
24 Gen. Rab. 24:7.
25 m. ʾAbot 2:15 (2:10 in some editions).
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.הרותבשהשעתאל]תא[החודשתוירבהדובכלודג:עמשאת
So great is human dignity that it supersedes a negative commandment of
the Torah.26
The respect demanded by the Jewish tradition for each and every human being
does not mean that we must accept everything that anyone does. After all, the
Torah is filled with laws that categorize certain forms of human behavior as
prohibited and others as required, and if Jews fail to abide by those laws, the
Torah demands this:
:אְטֵחויָלָעאָּׂשִת־ֹאלְוָךֶתיִמֲע־תֶאַחיִכֹוּתַחֵכֹוהָךֶבָבְלִּבָךיִחָא־תֶאאָֹנְשִת־ֹאל
Do not hate your brother in your heart. Reprove your kinsman,
and bear no guilt because of him.27
But that reproof must be given inprivate so as not todisgrace theperson inpub-
lic, and must be done constructively and with respect for the ultimate human
dignity inherent in each of us. The Torah applies this even to someone who is
to be flogged for violating a negative commandment:
:ָךיֶניֵעְלָךיִחָאהָלְקִנְוהָּבַרהָּכַמהֶּלֵא־לַעֹוֹתּכַהְלףיִֹסי־ןֶּפףיִֹסיֹאלּוּנֶּכַיםיִעָּבְרַא
He may be given forty lashes, but not more, lest being flogged further, to
excess, your brother is degraded before your eyes.28
Certainly, then, in everyday speech wemust respect the dignity of each person
by avoiding defamatory speech, even if the negative information is true and all
the more so if it is false.
This has several important implications forwriting letters of reference. First,
one should decline to write a letter of reference when the job description or
school program for which the person is applying is not clear, for then one will
likely be saying things about the candidate that are irrelevant (and thus for-
bidden rekhilut, gossip) and possibly negative (lashon hara), even when not
intending to do so. An exception to this rule occurs in those circumstances
26 b. Ber. 19b.
27 Lev 19:17.
28 Deut 25:3.
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when the applicant is applying for a variety of different university programs
or jobs and requests a general letter attesting to the applicant’s academic or
professional qualifications.29
Second, as we shall develop more fully below, even negative comments
about a person must not be general slurs against the person, such as “He is
lazy,” or “She is irresponsible.” Instead, negative evaluations of the personmust
be justified by reference to specific, relevant things the person did or failed to
do that demonstrate the negative evaluation.
When, though, may one say something negative about someone else? In-
deed, when should one do so?
One may share negative information with someone else—and one should
do so—when ignorance of this information is likely to harm the recipient of
the reference. This is in contrast to the many circumstances in which nega-
tive speech about a person serves no practical purpose for the listener but is
just intended to diminish that person’s honor. These are the kinds of lies, slurs,
and slander that the Torah and later Jewish legal literature have prohibited, as
discussed above. Although the rules about speech begin in the Torah and are
developed further in the Talmudim and by medieval authorities, Maimonides
in particular. Rabbi Israel Meir HaKohen Kagan (Poland, 1838–1933) arguably
wrote the most extensive halakhic treatment of the Jewish laws of speech in
the book by which he is often known, “Ḥafetz Ḥayyim,” the title of which is
based on Psalm 34:12–15. Therein he defines when lashon hara is permissible
and even mandatory:
6:2. There is of course a distinction between hearing and accepting, be-
cause in the case of listening there is no prohibition unless the informa-
tion has no future relevance to the listener. If, however, the information—
should it be true—does have relevance to the listener, for example if the
listener realizes at the outset that the speaker wants to show through his
story that the subject is untrustworthy or some other such trait, and the
listener is considering a business dealing or partnership with the subject,
or arranging amarriage for him or any similar involvement, it is permissi-
ble to listen in order to explore the information and protect himself. The
listener’s desire to hear the information must not be to listen to the dis-
paragement of his friend, but rather to protect himself so that he will not
sustain damage or end up in a dispute, or any other sort of misfortune.
29 Wewould like to thank Rabbi Amy Levin for calling our attention to this aspect of provid-
ing recommendations.
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It is also a principle that if the listener will not benefit by hearing the
information, but through his listening good can come to others, it is per-
missible. For example, if he listens to the information so that he can later
verify it and then rebuke the individual in question such that perhaps
through [his involvement] the sinner will repent, or he will return stolen
goods to their owner, or hewill appease the person he incensed, or similar
rectifications, his listening would be permissible, as explained above ….
6:3. Let this not be a surprise to the reader that he should say: “How
can we possibly satisfy the expectations of Heaven, for you have defined
[the parameters of the law such that] even listening to the disparagement
of one’s fellow is forbidden, yet what if the information is relevant to me,
with regard to my business or for other reasons?”
The answer is: one who wants to satisfy his obligations with regard to
listening [to Lashon Hara] should conduct himself as follows: if some-
one were to approach him and should want to talk about another, and he
understands that the speaker wants to speak negatively about the other
person, he should ask the speaker, “Will the information that you want
to tell me have future relevance to me, or will I thereby be able to rectify
a situation by rebuking the offending individual, or some other positive
outcome (as discussed above in paragraph 2)?” If the speaker replies that
it does have future relevance or that he could correct a situation as dis-
cussed above, it is permissible to listen to the information.30
In two other places, Rabbi Kagan creates a list of the conditions under which
one has a duty to give negative information about a person to another potential
mate, business partner, or employee (and presumably the same would apply
to a potential student). Although the lists are somewhat different, they both
include the following conditions for revealing such information: (1) only if the
problem is serious; (2) only if person providing the reference does not exag-
gerate the nature or extent of the problem; (3) only if the sole motivation for
revealing the information is to prevent harm to the person to whom it is sup-
plied and not from animosity for the person named and discussed; (4) only if
there is no way to protect the potential victim without engaging in a slur or
gossip; and (5) only if there are reasonable grounds to presume that the infor-
mation divulged will be a determining factor in making the decision.31
30 Ḥafetz Ḥayyim, Laws of Slurs (Lashon Hara) 6:2–3, available at http://torah.org/learning/
halashon/chapter6.html (accessed 9/3/12).
31 ḤafetzḤayyim, Laws of Slurs (LashonHara) 10; Laws of Gossip (Rekhilut) 9. Both are avail-
able at http://torah.org/learning/halashon/rchapter9.html (accessed 9/3/12).
42 dorff and gary
Although Rabbi Kagan’s book is often cited in articulating Jewish laws about
speech, one can plausibly interpret it as a book of moral education, musar,
rather than one aiming to specify the law. In that case, one might understand
these norms as moral ones but not legal ones.32 The Torah and the Talmudim,
however, include several legal bases for overriding theTorah’s bans on slurs and
gossip, and it is more likely that Rabbi Kagan intended to lay down legal norms
as well as moral ones. Whether he did or not, it is appropriate for us to inter-
pret these norms as demanded by Jewish law as well as Jewishmoral concerns.
Specifically, these three legal sources are relevant to what he says: Leviticus
19:14, ֹלׁשְכִמןֵּתִתֹאלרֵּוִעיֵנְפִלְו , “Before a blind person do not put an obstacle,”
which the Rabbis apply not only to a physically-blind person, but also to one
who lacks important information that could likely harm him or her;33 Leviti-
cus 19:16, ָךֶעֵרםַּד־לַעדֹמֲעַתֹאל , “Do not stand idly by the blood of your brother,”
which the Babylonian Talmud interprets to require that we seek to rescue peo-
ple who are in harm’s way,34 and which the Rabbis in the Sifra, Maimonides,
Rashbam,Tosafot, andSeferHaHinukhapply tomonetaryharmaswell as phys-
ical harm;35 and the Babylonian Talmud’s law of the pursuer (rodef ), where a
third party must intervene, even lethally, to protect an innocent third party.36
Thus it is not surprising that in the twentieth century, Rabbis Eliezer Walden-
berg, J. David Bleich, and Aaron Levine, among others, adopted Rabbi Kagan’s
32 We would like to thank Rabbi Elie Spitz for pointing this possibility out to us. Of course,
if one sees moral norms as integrally related with Jewish law, then even if Rabbi Kagan
had originally intended to articulate only moral norms, it would nevertheless be appro-
priate for later writers to use his analysis in their legal rulings, as indeed happened, as
explained below. For a discussion of the relationship between Jewish law and morals, see
Elliot N. Dorff, For the Love of God and People: A Philosophy of Jewish Law (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society, 2007), ch. 6.
33 Sifra, Qedoshim 3:14 on Lev 19:14; b. Ned. 62b. They also apply this verse to prohibit tempt-
ing those who are morally blind—that is, prone to violate a moral norm or a command-
ment: B. Moʿed Qaṭ. 17a; b. B. Metṣ. 75b; b. ʿAbod. Zar. 6b.
34 b. Sanh. 73a.
35 Sifra,Qedoshim4:8 onLev 19:16;Maimonides, SeferHaMitzvot #297; RashbamandTosafot
on b. B. Bat. 39b; Sefer HaHinukh #237.
36 b. Sanh. 72b; see also ibid., 57a, where R. Yonatan b. Sha’ul asserts that the least damage
must be done to accomplish the rescue, and the rescuer is liable if she/he injures the pur-
suer more than necessary. The duty to rescue is much stronger and broader in Jewish law
than in American law, where it exists only in ten states, and in them the failure to inter-
vene is punished only under limited conditions and leniently. All the other states follow
the common law, according to which anyone ignoring someone in distress is not liable for
anything. For a summary of the states that have legislated a duty to rescue, and what that
duty is, see http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty‑to‑rescuereport‑statutes/ (accessed
January 19, 2014).
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line of reasoning in their own legal rulings and used these three sources of
justification for determining when revealing negative information about a per-
son is legally permissible and, further, when the extent of the potential danger
to a third party makes disclosure of the negative information actually manda-
tory.37
So, for example, if A has asked you to write a letter of recommendation for
him or her to be sent to B, a potential employer, you have a duty to B to be
honest about A’s qualifications for the job as you see these qualifications. Pre-
sumably A would not ask you to write a letter of reference unless A thinks that
you will be generally positive, but even if that is true, you should share with B
whichever of A’s weaknesses you anticipate will affect A’s performance at that
job. You should also be sure to indicate where you have no grounds for assess-
ment about how A would function in specific aspects of the job so that B will
not think that by omitting those areas you want to indicate that you evaluate
A negatively in those respects. If you really do not think that A is qualified, it
would not only be kind on your part to tell that to A candidly, but also a duty
of yours to refuse to provide the reference because of the prohibition of utter-
ing true but negative facts about a person (slurs, lashon hara), and then Amay
reconsider applying for the job or ask someone else to write on his/her behalf.
As discussed below, however, even in the absence of writing a letter for A, if
the employer contacts you about A, youmust answer the employer’s questions
about A’s qualifications for the job truthfully, but, in accord with the prohibi-
tion on slurs, you should not volunteer negative information about an aspect
of the person’s candidacy that was not directly asked, except if the candidate
poses significant danger to the school or job. The same would apply to letters
of recommendation for schools.
Jewish law also places demands on the recipient of a reference. Normally
potential employers and schools are wary of extreme praise of a candidate.
Some recommendation forms for schools actually instructwriters to avoid gen-
eral praise and to list specific weaknesses as well as strengths. That is not only
a good practice, but one that invokes Jewish duties. As part of one’s duty to
protect both oneself and the welfare of the institution considering the appli-
cant, recipients of a positive but very general reference should seek further
37 Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer 13:81; J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems
(New York: Ktav and Yeshiva, 1983), 2:74–80, esp. 76; Aaron Levine, Case Studies in Jewish
Business Ethics (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav; NewYork: Yeshiva, 2000), 280–320, where he discusses
the legal and ethical issues in student evaluations and employment appraisal systems,
which involve many of the same issues of slurs and gossip. We thank Professor Steven
Resnicoff of DePaul University College of Law for suggesting these sources.
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information from the recommender, including specific examples that support
the positive recommendation and a list of any weaknesses relevant to the aca-
demic program or job.
Jewish law instructs recipients to be wary of negative information too. On
the one hand, the recipient of negative information may and indeed should
take such information into account and not dismiss it out of hand as prohib-
ited slurs (lashon hara). This is justified by b. Nid. 61a, where theTalmud indicts
Gedalyah b. Aḥikam, governor of Israel after the destruction of the First Tem-
ple, for not taking seriously the warnings of Yoḥanan b. Karaḥ that opposition
leader Yishma’el ben Netanyah was planning to attack him. One has, in other
words, a duty to protect both one’s person and one’s assets—and thus should
listen to plausible threats to either.
On the other hand, the laws that we have been discussing that prohibit
uttering lies and even saying truthful but negative things about people require
restraint on the part of the hearer in listening to such accusations and pro-
hibit evenmore strongly encouraging such negative talk about the personwith
follow-up questions. This is especially important in our day, when the internet
is filled with outright lies as well as truthful, but negative information about
people. Thus Rabbi Kagan says this:
[Although he is permitted to listen to it,] the listener should not believe
the informationwhenhehears it; rather, he shouldonly suspect [its verac-
ity] until he investigates the matter.
However, if the listener understands from the speaker’s response that
there is no purpose in what he says, or he detects that the information is
merely words of spite and hatred, such that the speaker wickedly ascribes
false accusations to the subject and defames him out of sheer hatred, lis-
tening is prohibited ….
With regard to any of these exceptions that we have discussed with
regard to listening [to Lashon Hara] one should take great care not to
definitively believe itwhen it is heard, but only to suspect its veracity. [The
listener should follow this guideline carefully] so that he is not also caught
in the snare of the sin of accepting Lashon Hara.38
Such suspicion of negative reports about an applicant is especially important
in two circumstances: (1) when the applicant does not knowwho is being asked
for a reference, and (2) when the applicant knows the source of a reference but
38 Ḥafetz Ḥayyim, Laws of Slurs (Lashon Hara), 6:3.
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is not allowed to see the evaluation. In both cases, the applicant cannot explain
or defend him/herself with regard to the negative information reported. Recip-
ients should be especially suspicious of general assessments of the applicant
(negative or positive) and should depend instead on specific examples of what
the applicant did or did not do in circumstances relevant to the job or school
for which she/he is applying.
Note that here the Jewish tradition demands more honesty than what cur-
rently happens under American law, where many employers are reticent to
share negative information—and sometimes even positive information—
about a former employee lest they be sued. Similarly, teachers will write hon-
estly about a former student—or agree to write at all—only if the student
waives his or her rights under the Buckley Amendment to see the letter of rec-
ommendation. Jewish law requires peoplewhohave been asked about a person
applying for a job or for acceptance to a school to be honest and forthcoming
about both the positive and negative things they know because such informa-
tion has practical implications for the potential employer or school. To refuse
to do that, or to lie in favor of the person, ultimately harms the third party, and
that we may not do.39
At the same time, another Jewish value comes into play here. We are, after
all, required to help those in need,40 and, as Maimonides’ famous ladder of
tzedakah asserts,41 the highest form of doing that is employing that person
or, by extension, educating the person to be able to succeed at a job. Thus, if
the candidate has some negative qualities vis-à-vis the school or job for which
she/he is applying, but they do not rise to the level of completely disqualify-
ing the person or making it dangerous for the school to admit him/her or for
the employer to hire her/him, then the evaluator can and should say, if it is
true, that the person will benefit from the kind of support that the school or
employer can give him/her in carrying out the required tasks. Many schools
39 Another kind of situation in which a person should say something negative about some-
one else is if that person is doing something wrong. That is precisely the case where the
Torah demands that we reprove someone. In the extreme, where the person is misleading
people into worshiping other gods, the Torah demands that even the closest of relatives
shun the person and contribute to the person’s death (Deut 13:7–12). This is not directly
relevant, though, to our topic in this responsum.
40 Among the many verses in the Torah that require that we assist others in attaining the
basic necessities of life, see, for example, Lev 19:9–10 and Lev 25 and Deut 15 generally. For
a discussion of this obligation, see Elliot N. Dorff,TheWay intoTikkunOlam (Repairing the
World) (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2005), ch. 5.
41 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 10:7–14.
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now offer such support to students with special needs, and, in part because
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, more and more employers are mak-
ing accommodations for some forms of disability as well. So evaluators should
definitely identify whatever negative qualities will affect the job or academic
performance of the candidate, but they should also note when specific forms
of support can enable him/her to succeed in the school or job for which s/he is
applying.42
Oppressive Speech (ona’at devarim)
Aside from lies and slander, which onemight have guessedwould be banned in
Jewish law, and aside from telling tales, negative truths, and even the “dust” of
such language, about which readers might not have thought previously, Jewish
law bans another form of speech that it calls “oppressive.” The foundation for
this prohibition is two verses in the Torah that assert that we must not wrong
one another: ויִחָא־תֶאׁשיִאּונֹוּת־לַאָךֶתיִמֲעדַּיִמהֹנָקֹואָךֶתיִמֲעַלרָּכְמִמּורְּכְמִת־יִכְו , “When
you sell property to your neighbor, or buy any from your neighbor, you shall
not wrong one another” (Lev 25:14); and ֹותיִמֲע־תֶאׁשיִאּונֹותֹאלְו , “Do not wrong
one another” (Lev 25:17). The Rabbis, following the interpretive principle that
nothing in the Torah is superfluous or redundant, determine that the first verse
applies towronging one another inmaterial goods, as the context suggests, and
the second,which actually ends the same section aboutbuying and selling, nev-





Our Rabbis taught: “Do not wrong one another” (Lev 25:17). Scripture
refers to verbalwrongs.—You say verbalwrongs, but perhaps that is not so
but rather monetary wrongs is meant?—When Scripture says: “You shall
not wrong one another” (Lev 25:14), monetary wrongs are already dealt
with. Then to what can I refer, “Do not wrong one another?” (Lev 25:17).
To verbal wrongs.43
42 Wewould like to thank Rabbi SusanGrossman for pointing out this aspect of the situation
to us.
43 b. B. Meṣ. 58b.
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Just as there is wronging others in buying and selling, so too there is
wronging others done by words. [So, for example,] one must not ask
another: “What is the price of this article?” if he has no intention of buy-
ing. If a person repented [of his sin], onemust not say to him: “Remember
your former deeds.” If a person is a child of converts, one must not say to
him: “Remember the deeds of your ancestors,” because it is written [in
the Torah], “You shall neither wrong a stranger nor oppress him” (Exod.
22:20).44
The Mishnah’s second example is what is relevant to our question. The Jew-
ish tradition demands quite a lot of someone who has harmed another per-
son in requiring the wrongdoer to complete the process of return (teshuvah)
described in Jewish sources. That process includes acknowledgment of one’s
wrongdoing, remorse expressed in words to the harmed party, compensation
to the victim to the extent that that is possible, and ultimately better behavior
when the same kind of situation arises again.45 Once a person has completed
the process of teshuvah, however, thismishnah demands that people in society
not even mention the person’s former troubles with the law, for that would be
to engage in oppressive speech.Why? Because one thereby labels the person by
his or her former offense, undermines and distrusts the process of return, and
denies the person the possibility of righting his or her former wrong and taking
on a new, better identity—writing a new personal script, as it were. This mish-
nah thus starkly contrasts with the practice in many American states, where
former convicts have to list their convictions on any job application, are ineli-
gible to apply for any government job, and, in some states, lose the right to vote.
44 m. B. Meṣ. 4:10, 58b.
45 MishnehTorah, Laws of Repentance (Hilkhot Teshuvah), chs. 1–2. For an exposition of this
process, see Elliot N. Dorff, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself: A Jewish Approach to Modern
Personal Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003), ch. 6. For a discussion of
how these norms might apply to one community forgiving another for past or present
wrongs (the case discussed is Catholics asking Jews for forgiveness for what the Catholic
Church did and failed to do during the Holocaust), see Elliot N. Dorff, To Do the Right
and theGood: A Jewish Approach toModern Social Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication
Society, 2002), ch. 8.
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Similar to what we saw earlier with regard to negative but true speech, how-
ever, there is an exception to this rule. If the person applies for a job that entails
dealing with situations similar to the one in which he or she committed the
offense and thus would tempt him or her to do the same thing again, peo-
ple who know of the person’s past may describe the offense, and potential
employers may refuse to take the chance of exposing the person to the same
temptations again. In fact, such people have a duty to take these steps to pro-
tect other people and even the applicant, for the Rabbis interpret the principle
of lifnei iveir (before the blind), that is, “Do not place a stumbling block before
the blind” (Lev 19:14), to include not only those who are physically blind, but
those who are morally blind as well.46 So, for example, people may and should
tell potential employers in a school, camp, or youth group that they should
not hire a given person because he or she has abused children in the past.47
For that matter, someone with a history of child abuse should not apply for
such a position because the principle of lifnei iveir applies to each individual
Jew and not only to employers. Similarly, someone with a record of embezzle-
ment shouldnot seek, and shouldnot behired, towork in a company’s financial
office. In general, then, people should not put themselves or others in positions
where they will be sorely tempted to do something wrong, and if they do, it is
the responsibility of potential employers to deny them such jobs.
This category of forbidden language has another important implication
for our question. How much personal information may/should the evaluator
reveal about the applicant? American law forbids asking about personal mat-
ters in job or school interviews or in the materials submitted as part of an
application to a school or job with one exception—namely, applicants to reli-
gious institutions may be asked questions relevant to the religious purposes of
the institution.48 Thus a religious institutionmay ask about a person’s religious
46 b. Pesaḥ. 22b; b. Moʿed Qaṭ. 17a; b. B. Meṣ. 75b. See also n. 33 above.
47 So b. Pesaḥ. 22b; b. Moʿed Qaṭ. 17a; b. B. Meṣ. 75b. So Elliot Dorff ruled in his respon-
sum for the CJLS, “Family Violence,” http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/
files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19912000/dorff_violence.pdf (accessed 9/3/12), reprinted
in Dorff, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself, 155–206.
48 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 prohibits, among other things, religious dis-
crimination in employment and therefore, as a general matter, employers are advised
not to question applicants about their religious beliefs or practices. Section 702(a) of
Title VII, however, creates an exception for religious corporations, religious associations,
and religiously-affiliated educational institutions with respect to the employment of indi-
viduals of a particular religion to performwork connectedwith the organizations’ or insti-
tutions’ activities. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a). See also Section 703(e)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-2(e)(2) (“It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college,
university or educational institution … to hire employees of a particular religion if such
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beliefs and actions in a way that secular institutions may not. As a result, this
question becomes especially difficult with regard to references for Jewish insti-
tutions: When may or should personal information be revealed, and of what
type; and when, on the other hand, does revealing such information violate
the ban on oppressive speech, similar to the examples in the Mishnah of ask-
ing about a person’s former misdeeds or his or her ancestors?49 It is easiest to
justify revealing actions for which the person has been convicted in a court
of law—sexual abuse, for example—but Jewish institutionsmight legitimately
want to know personal information beyond violations of the law, as, for exam-
ple, that the candidatemarried a non-Jew, believes that Jesus is theMessiah, or
eats non-kosher foods.
Here again the pragmatic test suggested by the Ḥafetz Ḥayyim and by Amer-
ican law seems appropriate—namely, people should be asked only about that
personal information that is relevant to the job or school for which she/he is
applying. So, for example, it is both fair and proper to ask about a person’s reli-
gious practices and beliefs—and even the religious identity of the candidate’s
spouse—if the candidate is applying to rabbinical school or for a job to become
a teacher or youth leader at a synagogue, but not if the person is applying to be
a secretary, custodian, or accountant for the synagogue.
… institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled
or managed by a particular religion or … if the curriculum of such school … is directed
toward the propagation of a particular religion.”
In addition, under First Amendment principles, courts have held that clergy mem-
bers cannot bring claims under the federal employment discrimination laws, including
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act and the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, because “the relationship between an organized church and
its ministers is its lifeblood.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–560 (5th Cir.
1972). This “ministerial exception” to the federal anti-discrimination laws ensures that
the government will not impede the free exercise of religion and become impermissi-
bly entangled in religious authority. Thus, courts will not ordinarily consider whether a
church or synagogue’s employment decisions concerning its clergy were based on dis-
criminatory grounds. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 2008) (Title VII
race discrimination claim by African-American priest was barred by ministerial excep-
tion); Petruska v. GannonUniv., 462 F.3d 294 (3rd Cir. 2006) (ministerial exception bars sex
discrimination claim by female Catholic chaplain against school, alleging that she was
forced out as chaplain after she advocated on behalf of alleged victims of sexual harass-
ment).
49 We would like to thank Rabbis Susan Grossman and Jonathan Lubliner for bringing this
issue to our attention.
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Revealing Positive or Negative Bias50
Part of telling the truth about a candidate involves telling the truth about the
evaluator too. For example, if the evaluator is a relative of the candidate, she/he
must disclose that. Similarly, if the candidate owes the evaluator money, the
evaluator must disclose that as well.
The Mishnah makes relatives ineligible to serve as witnesses, and, by exten-
sion, judges, and that injunction is referenced in later Jewish law as well.51 In
addition, any party who has a vested interest in the case, whether on the side of
the plaintiff or defendant, may not testify in court.52 In the case of writing an
evaluation, the evaluator is indeed making a judgment about a person, and he
or she may indeed have a positive or negative bias toward the candidate. The
evaluator’s opinion, however, is usually only one of several that are procured by
the school or employer, and so no evaluator alone has the authority to deter-
mine the outcome. Furthermore, as serious as it may be for a person’s life to
get or be denied a job or a place in a school, that is not a legal penalty. So even
though relatives and those with a vested interest are ineligible to serve in the
legal capacities of either judge or witness, theymay serve as evaluators, as long
as they disclose this fact to the potential employer or school.
Rationales for Fudging the Truth or Outright Lying: Tact, Peace, or
Hope
The Jewish tradition values truth very highly, not only for the practical reason
that social relations depend upon being able to trust what others say, but also
because God demands it and is even the paradigm of truth-telling: “The seal
of God is truth”;53 “God hates the person who says one thing with his mouth
and another with his mind.”54 As a result, the general Jewishmaxim is that one
should tell the truth: “R. Jose ben Judah said: Let your ‘yes’ be yes and your ‘no’
be no.”55
Rabbinic literature, though, describes some exceptions.
50 We would like to thank Mr. Jerry Abeles for bringing this issue to our attention.
51 m. Sanh. 3:4; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Evidence 13.
52 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Evidence 15:1.
53 See n. 4 above.
54 b. Pesaḥ. 113b (cf. b. Soṭah 42a, b); b. B. Meṣ. 49a.
55 b. B. Meṣ. 49a.
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Tact
When there is no practical purpose requiring the truth and those hearing it
will only have their feelings hurt, the Rabbis tell us to choose tact over truth,
especially when the truth is a matter of judgment in the first place. The follow-
ing excerpt is very problematic in its sexism—it assumes that only brides, not
grooms, are to be evaluated for their looks, and worse: evaluating the beauty
of brides is juxtaposed with evaluating something someone has bought in the
market, thus making a bride seem like an object that the groom has bought.
This is clearly a product of the historical context in which it was written, and
in modern times we clearly disavow these attitudes. That said, the Rabbis in
this source are clearly struggling with balancing truth with tact, and the School
of Hillel, which determines the later law on this, prefers tact over truth when
someone’s feelings, self-esteem, and joy will be hurt, and there is no practi-







What words must be used when dancing before the bride? The School of
Hillel said: “Say, ‘O bride, beautiful and gracious.’ ” The School of Shammai
said: “If she is lame or blind, is one to say, ‘O bride, beautiful and gracious’?
Does it not say in the Torah, ‘Keep far from lying?’ ” (Exod 23:7). The Hil-
lelites said: “Then, if someonemakes a bad purchase in themarket, is one
to commend it or run it down? Surely one should commend it.” Hence
the Sages say: “Always make your disposition sympathetic to that of your
neighbor.”56
Peace
A second exception to the requirement to tell the truth is when one is engaged
in an effort to bring peace. The Rabbis deduce this exception from the very
words of God, who changed Sarah’s words to say that she was worried that she
was too old to have children rather than that Abraham was too old; from the
56 b. Ketub. 16b–17a.
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lie Joseph’s brothers told Joseph after Jacob’s death to try to attain his forgive-
ness and peace among the brothers; and from God’s advice to Samuel to lie to
Saul that he was coming to bring a sacrifice even though his real purpose was
to tell him that God had decided to wrest the throne from him and give it to
David.57 The ultimate principle, then, is that “all lies are forbidden unless they
are spoken for the sake of making peace.”58
Clearly, there are some important limits to this. Lies have a way of being
discovered, and so lying even in the interests of making peace may not only
fail to work, but may make both parties angry at the peacemaker. Moreover,
lies cannot cover up realities; if the parties really hate each other, no false
reports will magically make things right. On the contrary, both parties, upon
finding out about the false report, may now not only be reconfirmed in their
animosity toward each other, but now also distrust the reporter who was try-
ing to make peace. Peace, it if is to be had, must rest on stronger founda-
tions than lies, so one must take these biblical precedents with the prover-
bial grain of salt. One surely can and should omit nasty comments if one is
trying to make peace; one can speak of each party’s benign, broader inten-
tions; and one can even interpret remarks made by one party about the other
more positively than the speaker probably meant them; but actually changing
what someone said is asking for trouble, even if it is in the name of making
peace.
Hope
Finally, rabbinic literature records some Rabbis who condone and even de-
mand that those visiting very sick people lie to them about the seriousness of
their disease so as to help them retain hope for recovery. Those who take this
position base themselves on the biblical stories of Elisha’s lie to the emissary
of Ben-Hadad, King of Aram (2Kgs 8:8–10, 14), and the change of fate of King
Hezekiah (Isa 38:1–7; also 2Kgs 20:1–7; Ecclesiastes Rabbah on Eccl 5:6), for in
both cases the patient recovers despite predictions of their demise. The Rab-
bis extend the concern aboutmaintaining hope and the determination to fight
illness to patients hearing about others’ death:
.וילעותעדףרטתאמש,תמשותואןיעידומןיא־תמולתמשהלוח:ןנברונת
57 Sarah:Gen. Rab. 48:18, basedonGen 18:11–14. Joseph’s brothers andGod’s advice to Samuel:
b. Yebam. 65a, based on Gen 50:16–17 and 1Sam 16:2.
58 Baraita Perek HaShalom.
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Our Rabbis taught: If the close relative of a sick person dies, we do
not inform the sick person lest he be emotionally overwhelmed (tittaref
da‘ato).59
These sources elevate the value of retaining hope for recovery over truth, both
because one never really knows whether the patient will get better or worse,
and also to avoid depriving the patient of hope. Despite the wise warning in
these sources about negative prognoses, in modern times, when the advances
in medicine may give patients and their families unrealistic hope for recovery,
we should not exaggerate what medicine can do either. Rather, one should be
truthful with patients so that they do not lose trust inwhat their physicians and
family are telling them, for deceiving patients about their diagnosis or progno-
siswill surely produce a feeling of betrayal and abandonment.One shouldpoint
outwhat the patient can realistically hope for andhelp the patient realize those
hopes, if possible—hopes, for example, of reducing pain through more or dif-
ferentmedication, of reconcilingwith someone before death, or completing an
ethical will. Pretending that the patient’s physical condition is not as bad as it
is, however, or that the prognosis is something other than what it is, ultimately
serves neither the patient nor the value of truth.60
This concern for fostering hope—but only realistic hope—applies to pro-
viding references as well. In doing so one may indicate how a person may
overcome deficiencies in their qualifications with appropriate help, and one
should do so when there are reasonable grounds to believe that specific inter-
ventionswill indeed resolve particular problems in the person’s candidacy. The
recommender, though, should not suggest that such interventions will work
when she/he does not have realistic grounds to believe that that hope can be
realized.
Providing a Reference for Someone You Do Not KnowWell
How well do you need to know a person to provide a reference without mis-
leading the recipient? Our knowledge of everyone, including those whom we
think we know well, is always incomplete. The remedy for that is to indicate
59 b. Moʿed Qaṭ. 26b; see Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 338:1.
60 For more on how this concern applies to the prognosis that physicians offer patients and
how they offer it, as well as what visitors say to patients, see Elliot N. Dorff, Matters of Life
and Death: A Jewish Approach toModernMedical Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication
Society, 1998), ch. 10; and Dorff, TheWay into Tikkun Olam, 93–98.
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clearly howwe know the applicant and for how long and then to indicate what
we do not know about the applicant that is probably relevant to his or her
candidacy for the school or job. That general rule suffices for most cases, for
following it provides the truth about both what one knows and what one does
not know. As indicated earlier, one should also state that what one does not
know is not necessarily a negative evaluation of the candidate in that aspect of
the qualifications for the school or job; it is simply a lack of knowledge on the
recommender’s part.
Once in a while, though, one is asked to provide a letter of reference for
someone one does not know well. For example, one may be the candidate’s
employer but not his or her immediate supervisor or the principal of a school
but not the student’s teacher.Under those circumstances, one shoulddecline to
provide the reference altogether or indicate in the reference the limited knowl-
edge one has about the applicant.
In a fascinating responsum, R. Menasheh Klein, one of the authors of res-
ponsa during the Holocaust and the author of Mishneh Halakhot, applies this
rule even to someone asking for a letter affirming that he is indeed poor and
that others should therefore give him food or money. Even though, as the
author points out, we generally have a rule thatwe should provide a day’sworth
of food to those who ask for it with no questions asked, if you affirm in a letter
that this person is poor and you do not know that he is, your letter in the case
that the person is not really poor is both deceiving potential donors and aiding
the beggar to steal from them.61 So even in such a case, where we have a spe-
cial duty to a class of people, we must be sure that what we say is accurate and
limited to what we know about the applicant.
Summary of the Jewish Side of this Issue
How, if at all, do these factors that mitigate the duty to tell the truth affect
someone giving a reference? They inform theway one tells the truth but do not
justify distorting the truth. So, one may and should express any reservations
about the candidacy of the person being evaluated in respectful and even tact-
ful terms, but ultimately the evaluatormust tell the truth about the candidate’s
weaknesses for the school or job in question as well as his or her strengths.
Peace, although a very important value of our tradition, is not really relevant
here because although negative comments about the candidate will probably
61 Mishneh Halakhot 12:145.
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upset the candidate if he or she ever comes to know them, the failure to com-
municate themwill definitely upset the recipient of the reference if the person
is admitted or hired based on the incomplete reference and then later demon-
strates that she or he is not fit for the school or job. Hope is also an important
part of our tradition, but it must be realistic. Thus although one can always
hope that people overcome their weaknesses and one may even suggest to the
school or employer the kind of support that would help the candidate do that,
failing to note a person’s weaknesses for a school or job out of hope that the
person will in the future be able to overcome her/his weaknesses is not appro-
priate in a reference. None of the exceptions to the tradition’s mandate to tell
the truth, then, excuse an evaluator from telling the truth, although they do
inform how that should be done.
Furthermore, the three factors that we have been discussing—tact, peace,
and hope—establish limits to the duty to tell the truth, and they thereby
express a reticence to communicate negative facts about a person even if true
and even if they are potentially harmful to the recipient. Thus they reason-
ably establish a middle ground.62 That is, one must clearly not tell lies about
a person. One must also avoid communicating impressions, whether positive
or negative, that are unsubstantiated by facts that can be and are delineated.
Onemust also refuse altogether to respond to a request for an evaluation if the
job description or school program is not clear, for then one will likely be saying
things about the person that are irrelevant and possibly even utter forbidden
slurs unless the candidate is applying to multiple schools or jobs and specifi-
cally asks for a general letter of reference. At the same time, one is required to
tell relevant truths about the candidate because none of the excuses to avoid
doing so directly applies.
These three factors that limit truth telling in the Jewish tradition and the
general values and laws guiding our speech described above, however, indicate
that the evaluator is not necessarily obligated to tell the whole truth. Instead,
one should be guided by the questions being asked. When first asked for a ref-
erence, onemight say to the school or employer: “What do you want to know?”
and respond only to those questions. The one exception to this approach—and
it is an important one—is if there is something about the candidate that would
make him or her dangerous in the school or job for which she or he is applying,
for then one has a duty to warn the questioner about that danger based on Lev
19:16, ָךֶעֵרםַּד־לַעדֹמֲעַתֹאל “Do not stand idly by the blood of your brother.” Short
62 We would like to thank Rabbi Daniel Nevins for pointing out the need to find this middle
ground in providing evaluations.
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of that, however, one has no duty to reveal everything that one knows about
the person, positive or negative. Similarly, if one is not listed by the candidate
as a potential evaluator but one nevertheless finds out that the candidate is
applying for the school or job, one does not have either the right or the duty
to contact the school or employer to provide an evaluation of the candidate,
especially a negative one, unless the candidate will pose a significant danger
to the school or job.63 This middle ground—telling the truth but not revealing
everything unless some characteristic or past action of the candidate poses a
significant danger—is, on one hand, a recognition of the great value that the
Torah itself and the rest of the Jewish tradition place on both telling the truth
and protecting people from harm and, on the other hand, a reflection of the
reluctance that Jewish sources express about saying anything negative about a
person and also an acknowledgement that past actions many years ago do not
always predict current or future behavior.
In providing references one should also state clearly what one does not
know. Sometimes, though, “no comment” with regard to a person’s perfor-
mance is taken to be a negative reaction because the listener thinks that the
recommender is trying to hide something, and sowhen the recommender does
not know something about the candidate, he or she should also clearly state
that his or her lack of knowledge about some aspect of a person’s candidacy is
not intended to be anegative reflection on the candidate, but rather just a state-
ment of the limits of the recommender’s knowledge about that person. The
recommendermight even suggest that the questioner ask someone else who is
likely to knowmore about the candidate’s performance in the area in question.
The result of these considerations, then, is that the overarching demand of
Jewish law to tell the truth applies to references. Especially because references
inevitably involve evaluations about which people working with the candidate
can legitimately disagree, one must support one’s evaluation with concrete
examples of the candidate’s past actions that lead one to evaluate the person in
theway she/hedoes so that the evaluation can, asmuchas possible, avoidbeing
simply one’s unsubstantiated, subjective opinion and thus potentially harmful
to either the candidate or the recipient. At the other end of the spectrum, one
should also avoid unjustified superlatives about the person, for truth requires
a realistic assessment of the positive aspects of a person’s candidacy as well as
the negative ones.64
63 We would like to thank Rabbis Adam Kligfeld and Elie Spitz for reminding us to address
this situation.
64 Wewould like to thank Rabbi Jonathan Lubliner for pointing out this aspect of telling the
truth.
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Recipients of evaluations also have duties under Jewish law. They must
investigate to determine whether what they are hearing about a person is
indeed true. Otherwise they may be listening to outright lies, assertions based
on rumors or unsubstantiated assumptions, or irrelevant, even if truthful,
speech, thereby illegally aiding the evaluator to violate the law (mesaye‘a
lidvar ’aveirah) and probably also harming the candidate. Thus recipients of
recommendations should not believe whatever they find on the internet about
the person, and they should consult with several people who know the candi-
date in order to confirm what any one of them says.
American Law on References
Whether Jews own their own companies or work for a company or nonprofit
agency owned and operated by Jews or non-Jews, they clearly have a duty to
avoid actions that will harm the company or agency by making it liable to pay
a significant amount of money in a lawsuit or bring down the company or
agency altogether. Aside from the American laws regarding fiduciary duties,65
Jewish law also forbids harming both oneself and others, not only physically
but monetarily.66 So how would following Jewish law in telling the truth about
a candidate for a job or school, as delineated above, fare in American law, for
example?
The largemajority of employers67 in the United States followwhat is known
as an NRS (“Name, Rank, and Serial number”) Policy in response to requests
65 See Section 801 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency: “An agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”
Comment G makes it clear that this general fiduciary principle applies to employees: “As
agents, all employees owe duties of loyalty to their employers.” See also Combs v. Price-
waterhouseCoopers, 382 F.3d 1196, 1200 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (“an employee normally owes
fiduciary duties to his employer”).
66 This is the topic of much of Bava Qamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra in both the Mish-
nah and Talmud. So, for example, Jewish law provides penalties for assaulting others (m.
B. Qam. 8:1) and for damaging their property (e.g., m. B. Qam. 1:1), and Jewish laws gov-
erning bailments (m. B. Meṣ. 7:8) make the various kinds of bailees responsible to varying
degrees for the property under their temporary control. See also the sources in n. 6 above,
according to which people need to take care of themselves first, then their family, then
their community, and only then others in concentric circles of responsibility.
67 Middle schools, high schools, and universities usually require that potential students pro-
vide transcripts, and colleges, graduate programs, and some high schools also require
test scores and letters of recommendation that disclose much more information than
NRS. Some schools also require that students sign the Buckley Amendment waiver that
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for references from prospective employers. That is, they give out only neutral
information such as the dates of employment and title without commenting
on performance, attendance, or expertise—the very subjects that employers
are most interested in learning about. This practice not only undermines artic-
ulated public policy, but also—as discussed above—contravenes important
Jewish values and in certain circumstances may be at odds with obligations
imposed by Jewish law. The question, then, is what does American law actually
require, and if the lawdoes not require such reticence,why do employers adopt
the NRS policy?
Providing employment references implicates a variety of common law and
statutory duties. First and foremost, is the law of defamation from which the
vast majority of legal claims relating to employment references arise. Under
common law principles of defamation, an employer may be held liable if he
or she (1) makes a false and defamatory statement of fact concerning a present
or former employee (2) to a prospective employer or other third party (3) in
at least a negligent manner (4) causing injury to the employee.68 From this list
of elements, it is clear that truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim
and opinions, as opposed to statements of fact, are not actionable at all. What
is more, an employee cannot successfully maintain an action for defamation
where he or she has authorized the employer to discuss the information with a
prospective employer, as often occurs.
In spite of these protections, employers have been reluctant to take advan-
tage of them because of the expense and disruption of litigation which may
result from providing a negative reference. In fact, the 1980s saw a rash of
lawsuits brought by employees who claimed that they had been denied jobs
because of negative references, and as a result, employers largely adopted
policies that prohibited their managers from providing substantive references.
State legislatures, concerned that discouraging candid references was poor
public policy, began to pass legislation granting employers a “qualified privi-
lege” when providing employment references. Currently,more than forty states
have passed such legislation, andmost of the remaining states have developed
a common law “conditional privilege” that provides employerswithprotections
similar to those provided by statute in other states.
indicates that the student waives his or her right to see the recommendation for the
recommendation to be taken seriously and count as a recommendation. With regard to
employees, however, schools and universities may follow the same NRS policy as many
businesses do. We would like to thank Rabbi Pamela Barmash for reminding us of these
practices among schools and universities.
68 Restatement (Second) of Torts, §558 (1977).
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In general, the qualified or conditional privilege provides that employers
will not be liable for defamation claims when providing references, unless
the employer knowingly or recklessly provided false information, acted out of
malice, or excessively published the information to a broader audience than
necessary. For example, the Texas legislature found that “the disclosure by an
employer of truthful information regarding a current or former employee pro-
tects relationships and benefits the public welfare.”69 Therefore, the legisla-
ture enacted a statute that creates immunity for solicited employment refer-
ences pertaining to an employee’s job performance “unless it is proven by clear
and convincing evidence that the information disclosed was known by that
employer to be false at the time the disclosure was made or that the disclosure
wasmadewithmalice or in reckless disregard for the truthor falsity of the infor-
mation disclosed.”70 By imposing both a significantly higher standard of proof
(“clear andconvincing evidence” as opposed to theusual “preponderanceof the
evidence” standard) and by requiring knowing fabrication or reckless disregard
for the truth (as opposed to simple negligence), this statute and others like it
were intended to give employers the comfort and encouragement to provide
candid employment references.71
These statutory and common law qualified immunities have not been effec-
tive in encouraging substantive employment references for several reasons.
First, the qualified nature of the immunity means that one has to be careful to
stay within the boundaries of the protected conduct. For example, the North
Carolina statute applies only to solicited references where the response is lim-
ited to information about job performance or job history.72 Information that
falls outside of those categories or which is volunteered rather than solicited
would not qualify for the immunity. As a practical matter, in large companies,
69 Tex. Lab. Code §103.001.
70 Tex. Lab. Code §103.004.
71 See also R.I. Gen. Laws §28–6.4–1 (2012) (immunity from civil liability under Rhode Island
statute unless reference is knowingly false, deliberately misleading, disclosed for mali-
cious purpose or violative of the employee’s civil rights); N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-539-12 (2011)
(underNorthCarolina statute, employer is immune from liability for statements regarding
job performance unless the statements were false and the employer knew or reasonably
should have known that the informationwas false). See alsoConway v.HermanSmerling et
al., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7–8 (1994) (under Massachusetts common law, employers provid-
ing references are immune from liability, even if the statements contain false information,
unless the employer acted in bad faith ormaliciously); Erickson v.Marsh&McClennanCo.,
569 A.2d 793, 805 (N.J. 1990) (New Jersey common law provides a qualified privilege to an
employer who responds in good faith to the specific inquiries of a third party regarding
the qualifications of an employee).
72 N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-539-12 (2011).
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it is extremely difficult and time consuming to train managers to stay within
these types of boundaries and, even with the best training, some managers
will inevitably stray from the protected limits. Furthermore, even though it is
more difficult to overcome the limited immunities created by statute and com-
mon law, it is not impossible to do so, and therefore employers remain exposed
to the expense, reputational harm, and diversion of management resources
inherent in defending a defamation case. Better to play it safe, reason many
corporate managers, than to expose the company to those types of costs, even
if the employer would ultimately prevail at trial.73
State defamation claims are not the only risks employers may face in pro-
viding candid employment references. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well
as other employment discrimination and retaliation statutes have generally
been interpreted to cover former aswell as current employees. Therefore, when
an employer provides a negative reference, former employees have a potential
claim that the reference constitutes an adverse employment action improp-
erly motivated by their membership in a protected class (e.g., race or gender)
or their protected activity (e.g., filing a discrimination complaint).74
Claims for invasion of privacy and tortious interference75 have also been
asserted in response to negative employment references, although much less
73 Businesses can purchase insurance against defamation claims either as part of a general
liability policy or a special slander and libel policy. Although such insurance policies may
provide a level of protection against attorneys’ fees and settlement costs (up to policy lim-
its), they do not relieve the business distraction and diversion of management resources
which is endemic to this type of litigation. Moreover, such policies often have exceptions
(e.g., for intentional defamation) which may expose a business to the full threat of mone-
tary damages.
74 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (US Supreme Court held that former
employee may sue for retaliation under Title VII when he was given a negative reference
after he filed a discrimination charge against his former employer). Although some have
argued that giving even neutral employment information for someone in a protected class
could give rise to a discrimination claim where it can be shown that positive references
were given by the same employer for non-protected class members, several courts have
rejected that theory. See, e.g., Cooper v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 2007
U.S. Dist. Lexis 1287, at *6 (W.D.N.C. 2007) (giving neutral and limited information about
an employeewhere that is the employer’s commonpractice is not an adverse employment
action and therefore cannot form the basis for a retaliation or discrimination claim).
75 Tortious interference claims are a variation on defamation claims, andmost of the princi-
ples that apply to defamation claims apply equally in this context. The principle distinc-
tion between the two claims is the requirement of malice in tortious interference claims.
That is, the employee must show that the former employer’s actions were malicious in
the sense that the harm was inflicted intentionally and without justification or excuse.
Because this is a difficult standard to meet, these claims typically fail in the ordinary con-
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frequently thandefamationor discrimination/retaliation claims andwithmust
less success. In general, invasion of privacy claims typically arise when an
employer proactively reaches out to a third party to alert them of certain infor-
mation regarding a prospective employee. Employers can avoid invasion of
privacy claims by providing information about an employee only in response
to a specific request and requiring the employee to sign a consent form if any
substantive information is to be provided to potential employers. Moreover,
because the new employer is usually contacting the former employer only after
the employee authorized it to check his or her references, the employee’s con-
sent to the former employer’s provision of that information is often implied
even without a signed consent form.
While most claims arise from the provision of a negative reference, there
have been some cases brought because of what is alleged to be an unwarranted
positive reference. These cases are generally based on claims of misrepresen-
tation and arise when a new employer (or someone in his or her business
or institution) suffered harm from a new employee who was the subject of a
misleadingly positive recommendation. If the former employer had provided
truthful information and by doing so, the new employee would not have been
hired, thereby preventing the harm, the actions of the former employer may
be actionable. For example, in Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,
14 Cal.4th 1066, 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997), a student who alleged sexual abuse by
a school employee successfully brought a claim against the school district in
which that employee had previously worked. The employee had been forced
to resign from that school district as a result of sexual misconduct towards
students, but the school district gave him a positive recommendation any-
way. The student claimed that if the school district had not given such a ref-
erence, the new employer—another school district—would not have hired
the employee as vice principal at the school where the student attended and
where he was allegedly abused by the new employee.76 It should be noted,
however, that the law in this area is less uniform and prevalent, given that—
under American law—employers do not have any duty to provide information
in response to reference requests. In the absence of a duty to warn, courts have
text of a negative reference. See, e.g., Friel v. Angell Care, Inc. 440 S.E. 2d 111, 114 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994) (interference claim relating to reference fails absent evidence of malice by for-
mer employer).
76 See also Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 876 A.2d 885, 890–894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(discussing other states’ approach and determining that under New Jersey law, a former
employee asserting a misrepresentation claim must show that the former employer neg-
ligently disseminated false information).
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hesitated to find that employers have been negligent in performing that duty,
except in egregious circumstances.
Summary: Balancing the Duty and Danger of Disclosure
In light of the Jewish andAmerican laws on giving references, what should Jew-
ish employers and employees do, and what policies should Jewish companies
and nonprofit organizations have?
In general, in light of the strong mandate of Jewish law to tell the truth
about candidates for schools or jobs and the protections in American law for
those who do so when they support their assertions with a record of the can-
didate’s actions, Jewish-owned companies and nonprofit institutions should
adopt policies that abide by the guidance of this responsum. Furthermore, if
a company or school, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, does not have a policy
regarding references, Jewish employees should abide by the guidance of this
responsum.
Jewish employees working for Jewish or non-Jewish companies or nonprofit
institutions, however, must abide by their employer’s policy with regard to
giving references for two reasons: morally, the employee accepted the condi-
tions of employment in taking the job and thus effectively promised to abide
by those conditions, including the employer’s rules governing references; and
pragmatically, the employee presumably does not want to be fired. Thus, if a
Jewish or non-Jewish company, non-profit institution, or school has anNRSpol-
icy, a Jew must abide by it.
The only exception to this is if serious injury could result from following the
NRS policywith regard to a particular candidate for a school or job. Under those
circumstances, a Jewish employee asked for a reference should act in accor-
dance with this responsum in disclosing the danger of harm despite the NRS
policy. For example, if a Jewish school employee is asked for a reference for
someone who was dismissed from a public or private school for sexually abus-
ing a student, or if the candidate committed a felony, especially one relevant
to the position for which she/he is applying, the Jewish person providing the
reference is obligated to provide sufficient factual information towarn a poten-
tial employer, particularly where the employer is another school. Obviously, to
keep one’s job it would be prudent for the Jew asked for a reference in such a
case to discuss the situation with his/her employer before taking such action
with the goal of convincing the employer to make an exception in this case
and possibly even to change the policy itself to permit warning in such cases of
danger to the potential employer. Even without either of those ways to justify
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violating the NRS policy, however, the Jewish employee does have the duty to
warn other schools or companies of the dangers involved in accepting such a
student or hiring such an employee, even if doing so costs the Jew his/her job.
That said, onemust recognize that there aremany gray areas between some-
one convicted of a crime, where the danger has been demonstrated, and some-
one for whom there is mere suspicion of posing harms to a school or company.
There is also a range of harms that a person might cause. These factors of the
degree of certainty regarding the actions of the applicant and the degree of
harm the applicant caused or is alleged to have caused must be taken into
accountwhendecidingwhether to violate anNRS policy or not.More generally,
these factors must also be considered when deciding what one says in provid-
ing any reference.
Ruling (Pesaq Halakhah)
1. The general rule: tell the truth about the candidate. On the Jewish side
of this question, because none of the exceptions to the rule to tell the
truth apply to the context of providing references, we are left with the
demand to tell the truth. Evaluators are cautioned to limit their remarks
to what they know well about the candidate and indicate when they
do not know about salient aspects of the person’s candidacy, emphasiz-
ing that their statement to that effect is not intended to be a negative
reflection on the candidate, just a statement of the limits of the recom-
mender’s knowledge. To make this yet clearer, the recommender might
suggest that the potential employer or school contact other people who
knowmore about aspects of the candidate’s work that the evaluator does
not know. In accordance with the reluctance expressed in the Jewish tra-
dition about saying negative things about people, and in recognition of
the fact that past actions do not always predict future behavior, however,
evaluators, whether listed by the candidate as people the school or job
should contact or not, should respond to the questions asked and not vol-
unteer negative information about a person except if that information
clearly establishes that the person would be dangerous for the school or
job (see paragraph 7 below). At the other end of the spectrum, one should
also avoid superlatives about the person unsubstantiated by the candi-
date’s specific actions, for truth requires a realistic assessment of both the
positive and negative aspects of a person’s candidacy. Evaluators should
phrase any comments, whether negative or positive, with reference to
the candidate’s specific actions rather than describe his or her charac-
ter generally. Moreover, negative comments should be phrased in clear
but respectful and tactful terms, and they should indicate what forms of
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support the school or employer might realistically offer to help the can-
didate overcome his/her weaknesses and thrive in the school or job. Even
though providing a referencemay include disparaging remarks about the
person, this is not a form of prohibited slurs (lashon hara) because the
recipient has a practical need to know the disqualifications of the appli-
cant for the school or job as well as the qualifications.
2. Telling the truth about the evaluator: Evaluators should disclose any posi-
tive or negative bias that they have toward the candidate, such as the fact
that the candidate is a relative of the evaluator or owes him or hermoney.
3. When to refuse to provide a reference: People asked by a candidate to pro-
vide a reference for jobs or schools should refuse to do so if they cannot
say anything substantive about the candidate. They should also decline to
give a reference if the job description or the school program for which the
candidate is applying is unclear, for then the evaluation is likely to include
either irrelevant or unsubstantiated negative information about the can-
didate. An exception to this last rule occurs in those circumstances when
the applicant is applying to a variety of different schools or for a number
of jobs and requests a general letter of reference attesting to the appli-
cant’s academic or professional qualifications. If one is not listed by the
candidate as a potential evaluator but nevertheless finds out that the can-
didate is applying for the school or job, one does not have either the right
or the duty to contact the school or employer to provide an evaluation of
the candidate, especially a negative one, or provide a reference without
the consent of the candidate unless the candidate will pose a significant
danger to the school or job, in which case one should inform the poten-
tial employer or school even if not asked (see paragraph 7 below). If one
does not know the candidate well, one should generally refuse to provide
a reference; if, however, one is an obvious person to consult (e.g., one is
the candidate’s employer but not one’s immediate supervisor), one must
disclose the limits of one’s knowledge of the candidate and his/her work
in the evaluation and limit it to what one actually knows.
4. Recipients of evaluations: Recipients of evaluations also have duties under
Jewish law. They must investigate to determine whether what they are
hearing about a person is indeed true. Otherwise theymay be listening to
outright lies or irrelevant, even if truthful, speech, thereby illegally aiding
the evaluator to violate the law (mesaye’ah ledavar aveirah) and probably
also harming the candidate. Recipients of recommendations should def-
initely not believe whatever they find on the internet about the person,
and they should consult with several people who know the candidate in
order to confirm what any one of them says.
providing references for schools or jobs 65
5. The effects of American law on this ruling: Nothing in American common
law or statutory law prohibits an employer or former employer from pro-
viding truthful information regarding an employee’s job performance,
evaluation history, or other substantive information, whether positive or
negative. In fact, the overwhelmingmajority of states have passed legisla-
tion designed to protect employers who—particularly in response to spe-
cific requests—provide candid job performance assessments to potential
employers. To the extent that Jewish law (as described above) requires
such candid references, American law does not stand as an insurmount-
able obstacle. Nevertheless, in our litigious society, we must recognize
that employerswhoprovide substantive referencesbeyond theNRSPolicy
adopted bymostmajor companies risk facing the expense and disruption
of the assertion of legal claims. Given the compelling values underlying
Jewish law on this issue, however, we believe that those are risks that
Jewish employers, employees, and nonprofit organizations must accept
in fulfilling their halakhic obligations. In the rare circumstances where,
based on legal advice, an employee of a Jewish organization reasonably
believes that a reference will subject his or her employer to severe finan-
cial hardship, the employee—acting consistentlywith his or her fiduciary
duty to the employer—should formulate the reference in a way that best
serves the underlying purposes of this responsumwhile protecting his or
her employer.
6. Jews working for a non-Jewish employer: Jews working for non-Jewish em-
ployers should follow this rulingwhen their employer has no policy about
references,with the samecaveat about acting consistentlywith one’s fidu-
ciary duty to protect his or her employer when the risk of severe financial
hardship is present. When the non-Jewish employer has an NRS policy,
Jews should generally abide by it, but see the next paragraph of this rul-
ing.
7. A candidate who poses known risks of danger for a school or job: Regardless
of whether a Jewish employee’s employer is Jewish or not, and regard-
less of the financial risk involved, if the person asking for a reference has
engaged in sexual abuse of children, committed a felony, or acted in other
significantly dangerous ways relevant to the school or job for which s/he
is applying, the Jewish employee has the duty to warn the recipient of
the reference of such dangers, spelling out the specific past behavior of
the person that demonstrates such danger. If the employer has an NRS
policy, the Jewish employee is advised to consult with his/her employer
before revealing the significant risk that the candidate poses with the
goal of convincing the employer either to make an exception to the NRS
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policy in this case or to amend thepolicy itself to permit awarning in such
circumstances. Furthermore, a Jewwho knows that a personwill pose sig-
nificant risk of harm to a school or job has a duty to inform the potential
school or company even if not asked. In all such circumstances, however,
onemust recognize the range of certainty about the candidate’s behavior
and the degree of harm involved in deciding whether to violate or amend
the NRS policy or to inform a potential school or employer without being
asked.
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chapter 3
Mikveh and the Sanctity of Being Created Human
Susan Grossman
This paper was approved by the CJLS on September 13, 2006 by a vote of four-
teen in favor, one opposed and four abstaining (14-1-4). Members voting in favor:
Rabbis Kassel Abelson, Elliot Dorff, Aaron Mackler, Robert Harris, Robert Fine,
DavidWise, Daniel Nevins, Alan Lucas, Joel Roth,MyronGeller, Pamela Barmash,
Gordon Tucker, Vernon Kurtz, and Susan Grossman. Members voting against:
Rabbi Leonard Levy.Members abstaining: Rabbis Joseph Prouser, LoelWeiss, Paul
Plotkin, and Avram Reisner.
Sheilah
How should we, as modern Conservative Jews, observe the laws tradition-




Judaism is our path to holy living, for turning the world as it is into the world
as it can be. The Torah is our guide for such an ambitious aspiration, sanctified
by the efforts of hundreds of generations of rabbis and their communities to
1 The author wishes to express appreciation to all the following who at different stages com-
mented on this work: Dr. David Kraemer, Dr. Shaye Cohen, Dr. Seth Schwartz, Dr. Tikva
Frymer-Kensky, z”l, Rabbi JamesMichaels, AnnetteMuffs Botnick, KarenBarth, and themem-
bers of the CJLS Sub-Committee on Human Sexuality. I particularly want to express my
appreciation to Dr. Joel Roth. Though he never published his halakhic decisions on tohorat
mishpahah (“family purity”), his lectures and teaching guided countless rabbinical students
and rabbinic colleagues on this subject. In personal communication with me, he confirmed
that the below psak (legal decision) and reasoning offered in his name accurately reflects his
teaching. The positions otherwise expressed in this paper, as well as any errors, remain my
own. (Minor editorial changes have been made in the version printed here which have no
effect on the substance or conclusions of this teshuvah presented and approved in 2006.)
68 grossman
interpret and apply its teachings to the large and small questions of living in
the real world. This is true for the grand ethical statements of the Torah, such
as, “Justice, justice shall you pursue,”2 as well as for the detailed directives that
guide our most personal activities.3
The laws relating to a woman’s menstrual period and the appropriateness of
sexual activity during it certainly fall within these most intimate of categories.
At first glance, the original Levitical context for the source of these laws (the
diagnosis and public safety protocols for skin diseases and genital discharges)
might be more appropriate for inclusion in an ancient medical text. In this
context, the priest of the Biblical period served as diagnostician and doctor, as
well as pastor (in the sense of visiting the sick), in addition to his other cultic
responsibilities dealingwith the sacrifices and the care of the central sanctuary.
(Women never served as priests, per se, although women of priestly families
enjoyed some priestly privileges, such as eating of the priestly portion of the
sacrifices.)
Nevertheless, generations of Jews interpreted the words of Leviticus 15:19–
24 in conjunction with those of Leviticus 18:19 as prohibiting sexual relations.
These laws were grouped together under the rubrics of Hilkhot Niddah ormore
recently Tohorat HaMishpahah, the Laws of Family Purity, still observed today
in many observant communities. Traditional practice prohibits all physical
contact between a woman and her husband during her menses and for seven
“clean” or “white” days following the cessation of any appearance of blood.4
Intimate relations, or any physical contact, are not to be resumed until the
woman immerses in amikveh, a ritual pool. From the onset of menstrual symp-
toms until immersion in the mikveh, the woman is considered a niddah and
ritually impure.
Much has been written about the cultural and psychological significance of
the menstrual laws.5 They contain the potential for great beauty and signifi-
cance but have also been the source of great pain and prejudice.
2 Deut 16:20.
3 My colleague R. Joshua Gutoff many years ago suggested that the modern aversion to giving
up our autonomy overwhatmight be perceived of as purely personal activitiesmay be largely
responsible for the fact that halakhic restrictions on sexuality have largely fallen into disuse,
even among those who are otherwise observant outside the Orthodox community.
4 Traditionally this was interpreted to mean a minimum of twelve days of separation, a mini-
mum of five for the woman’s period plus seven “white” days.
5 E.g., Jacob Milgrom, “Comments—Genital Discharges,” in his Leviticus 1–16, Anchor Bible 3
(NewYork: Doubleday, 1991), 948–1009; David Kraemer, “A Developmental Perspective on the
Laws of Niddah,” Conservative Judaism 38, no. 3 (Spring 1986): 26–33.
For Conservative halakhah, see: IsaacKlein, AGuide to JewishReligious Practice (NewYork:
Jewish Theological Seminary, 1979), 510–522, who permits an outdoor, in ground swimming
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The development and observance of these laws in Judaism have been crit-
icized as reflecting the primal fear of blood, as reflected in cultural blood
taboos,6 and the casting of women as “other” in a society defined bymen. Such
critiques found cause in how the menstrual laws were expanded over the cen-
turies to proscribe a menstruant’s contact with the Torah and involvement in
the synagogue and even in familial society. However, as we will see below, such
rules, which compromised the existential beauty of mikveh and the sanctifica-
tion of awoman’s bodily cycle, particularly in the context of marriage, were not
based on Jewish law and therefore could be easily and appropriately relegated
to folkways.
In their place, a growing number of Jewishwomen turned to the observance
of the laws of Hilkhot Niddah as an area of “women’s mitzvot,”7 women’s com-
mandments. This is part of a larger effort on the part of Jewish women during
pool to be usedwhen amikveh or other source of living water is not available, following a Law
Committee decision based on the teshuvah (responsa), “May a Swimming Pool be Used as a
Mikveh?” by R. Kreitman (p. 522). The articles, “Niddah,” and “Purity and Impurity,”Encyclope-
dia Judaica 12:1141–1148; 13:1410ff., offer a brief survey of relevant sources.
For modern Jewish responses, see: Rachel Adler, “Tumah and Taharah—Mikveh,” in The
First Jewish Catalogue (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1973), 167–171, also published
in The JewishWoman: An Anthology, ed. Liz Koltun (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,
1973), 117–127. Adler rebuts her original position in “In Your Blood, Live: Re-Visions of a Theol-
ogy of Purity,”Tikkun 8, no.1 (1993): 38–41. See also, SusanGrossman, “Feminism,Midrash, and
Mikveh,” Conservative Judaism 44, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 7–17, and People of the Body: Jews and
Judaism from an Embodied Perspective, ed. Howard Eilberg-Schwartz (Albany: SUNY, 1992).
Many books have been written from the Orthodox perspective. Themost popular include
Norman Lamm, A Hedge of Roses: Jewish Insights into Marriage and Married Life (New York:
Feldheim, 1966); and the mystical approach of Aryeh Kaplan,Waters of Eden: An Exploration
of the Concept of Mikvah (NewYork: National Conference of Synagogue Youth, 1976), esp. 40–
46, 62–73. Blu Greenberg offers an Orthodox-Feminist defense, “In Defense of the ‘Daughters
of Israel’: Observations on Niddah and Mikveh,” in her OnWomen and Judaism: A View from
Tradition (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1981).
For comparative material, see James Frazer, The Golden Bough (New York: Avenel, 1981),
ch. 2, “The Perils of the Soul,” 1:109–212; and Robert Parker, Miasma: Pollution and Purification
in Early Greek Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
6 On blood taboos, see Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution
and Taboo (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966; London: Ark Paperbacks, 1984); Mil-
grom, “Comments,” 949; Kraemer, “A Developmental Perspective,” 33. See also n. 8 below. A
comparison between rabbinic and contemporaneous, e.g. Hellenistic, attitudes toward the
menstruant and parturient is beyond the scope of this particular teshuvah.
7 Cf. m. Šabb. 2:6; AdRNB ch. 9 (Schechter, p. 25) and ch. 42 end (Schechter, p. 117), b. Šabb. 31b–
32a, y. Šabb. 2:6, 5b, Tanhuma Buber Genesis, p. 28, Leviticus, p. 53. Cf. Anthony Saldarini, The
Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan (Avot de Rabbi Nathan Version B) (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 83
n. 10.
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the last three decades to reappropriate, through redefinition and reinterpreta-
tion, areas of observance once reserved for women. Such efforts seek as much
to link the experiences of contemporary women with that of our foremothers
as to create ameaningful framework within which to celebrate the uniqueness
of being a female member of the Covenant as women enter the mainstream
of Jewish observance long barred to them. Some women have turned to the
celebration of menses and immersion in themikveh as a JewishOurBodiesOur-
selves, an affirmation of the wholeness of our bodies, created in God’s image
and functioning according to God’s will, with the generative potential that
enables us to be partners with God in creating life.8
Some Jewish women have also embracedmikveh, which traditionally served
as a powerful symbol of transformation,9 as a symbol of healing and renewal.
Women visit the mikveh to mark the renewed hope for pregnancy upon com-
pleting the first menstruation following a miscarriage. Some immerse to
strengthen prayers for the ability to carry life in cases of infertility. Others seek
holiness following rape or wholeness following a hysterectomy or a mastec-
tomy. While all these situations are covered by the gomel prayer, recited upon
recovering from illness, some women find that the public setting of the gomel
prayer, recited following an aliyah to the Torah during services and in front of
the congregation, seems too public for such a private grief. Instead, countless
women have found profound comfort in immersing in the primordial waters of
themikveh, whose source comes directly from heaven.
There is another aspect of these laws that relate not only to the woman, but
to awomanwithin the context of a loving and committed relationship. Formil-
lennia, the laws of niddah were seen as contributing to the stability and sanc-
tity of a marriage. On one hand, a period of monthly abstinence transformed
the marital relationship from one solely focused on sexual satisfaction to one
8 Grossman, “Feminism, Midrash, and Mikveh,” 13 n. 2.
9 The use of the mikveh to symbolize transition and change of status is as ancient as its use to
purify (a change of status from impurity to purity), e.g. m. Miqw. 8:1 ff., and for conversion (a
change of status from non-Jewish to Jewish), e.g., b. Yev. 47a. For an interesting discussion of
the significance ofmikveh in conversion, cf.Michael Chernick, “Mikveh: AMedium forChange
of Status,” Journal of Reform Judaism 35 (Spring 1988): 61–64. As for the existence and use of
the mikveh in antiquity, cf. Encyclopedia Judaica 11:1541–1544, s.v. “Mikveh.” For an example
of first-century mikvaot, cf. Yigael Yadin, Masada: Herod’s Fortress and the Zealots’ Last Stand
(New York: Random House, 1966), 164–167. For more scholarly discussions, see Ronny Reich,
“Archaeological Evidence of the Jewish Population at Hasmonean Gezer,” Israel Exploration
Journal 31, nos. 1–2 (1981): 48–52; his “TheHot Bath-house Baleum, theMiqweh and the Jewish
Community in the Second Temple Period,” Journal of Jewish Studies 39 (Spring 1988): 102–107;
andBryantWood, “ToDip or Sprinkle: TheQumranCisterns in Perspective,”AmericanSchools
of Oriental Research Bulletin 256 (Fall 1984): 45–60.
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founded upon intellectual and interpersonal companionship and compatibil-
ity. On the other, a period of monthly abstinence served to regularly rekindle
the physical desire between aman and a woman that might otherwise become
stale over the years. Sometimes it is what we cannot have that we most desire.
Enforced separation and the concomitant setting aside of time for the resump-
tion of sexual intimacy eachmonth, something that may otherwise be ignored
in modern times due to our busy lifestyles, ideally can help support the long
term health of a marriage.
It is true that we are obligated to observe regardless of our ability to find
compelling significance and meaning (taamei mitzvoth). This is why, for some
women, it is enough to observe the niddah laws simply because they are com-
manded to do so; hilkhot niddah are mitzvot, part of the received tradition of
how we live as Jews in service to God.
In light of all of the above, and for all those seeking tomake sense of howwe
relate to the Torah and its commandments, the Levitical laws relating to men-
struation can offer a deep, meaningful and beautiful opportunity to sanctify
our intimate relationships and express our profound appreciation for having
been created in God’s image.
Biblical andTalmudic Evolution
Let us begin our discussion with Leviticus 15. For the sake of brevity, I will cite
only those verses dealing with the woman in a ritual state of impurity, though












19 When a woman has a discharge, her discharge being blood from her
body, seven days will she be in her infirmity and all who touch her will
be impure until evening. 20 And anything she lies on during her infirmity
will be impure andanything she sits onwill be impure. 21Andanyonewho
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touches her bedding shall launder his clothing and wash in water and be
impure until evening. 22 And anyone who touches any object on which
she sat, shall launder his clothing and wash in water and be impure until
evening. 23 Andwhether it was bedding or an object on which she sat, on
touching it, he shall be impure until evening. 24 And if a man surely lies
with her, her infirmity is communicated to him, and he shall be impure
seven days and any bedding that he lies on will be impure. 25 And if a
woman have an issue of her bloodmany days not in the time of her impu-
rity, or if she have an issue beyond the time of her impurity; all the days of
the issue of her uncleanness she shall be as in the days of her impurity: she
is unclean. 26 Every bedwhereon she lieth all the days of her issue shall be
unto her as the bed of her impurity; and every thing whereon she sitteth
shall be unclean, as the uncleanness of her impurity. 27 And whosoever
toucheth those things shall be unclean, and shall wash his clothes, and
bathe himself in water, and be unclean until the even. 28 But if she be
cleansed of her issue, then she shall number to herself seven days, and
after that she shall be clean.
Leviticus 15 dealswith four types of individuals, grouped in two categories, who
contract ritual impurity through a genital discharge: The zav and zavah, a man
or womanwho suffer an irregular genital discharge, on one hand, and the ejac-
ulant and menstruant, the man and woman with normal genital flows, from
semen and frommenstruation, respectively, on the other.
The zav and zavah are required towait seven days after the discharge ceases,
immerse in mayim hayim (literally living water, such as a spring or river, now
understood to be a mikveh, or ritual pool) and bring a sacrifice before being
fit to reenter the sancta (the Tabernacle and later the Temple) as part of the
worshiping community.While the phrase הֶיְהִּתּהָתָּדִניֵמיִּכ (as the days of her nid-
dah) in verse 25 above could be read to imply that all the restrictions relating
to the niddah should be applied to the zavah, including that of prohibiting sex-
ual relations, the Torah does not specifically prohibit having sexual relations
with a zavah, even though it specifically repeats all the other rules regarding
contact with items that would have come in contact with the woman’s blood
flow, already delineated regarding the menstruant. Similarly, though the Torah
in Leviticus specifies the severe punishment of karet10 for a man who lies with
a menstruant,11 it does not do so for a man who lies with a zavah.
10 Karet, literally being cut off, is understood tomean being excommunicated from the com-
munity or having one’s life cut short prematurely by God.
11 Lev 18:19, 29.
mikveh and the sanctity of being created human 73
The ejaculant (theman experiencing a seminal emission, referred to in later
rabbinic literature as a baal keri) is required to wait one full day and then wash
(but not specifically in mayim hayim) before reentering the sacred precincts
of the Tabernacle. If he has relations with a woman, she similarly takes on his
ritual impurity and is required, like him, to wait until evening and bathe.12
The menstruant waits seven full days (presumably to allow for the conclu-
sion of themenstrual flow).While the text does not specify that shemust wash
at the end of seven days, most commentators assume she is so required. This
is consistent with the fact that, as with the other categories, the text requires
someone who merely touches her linens, etc., to wash. However, immersion
is not required by the peshat (the literal meaning) of the text. Physical con-
tact with anyone experiencing a genital discharge is not otherwise restricted,
except for touching anything in direct contact with their genital discharge (e.g.,
bedding, a saddle, clothes or through intimate relations). Such contact spreads
the contagion of ritual purity which is to be subsequently purified as specified
in the chapter depending on the category of ritual impurity.
The categories of the zav and zavah on one hand and the menstruant and
ejaculant on the other represent only a few of themyriad of categories of impu-
rity within the ritual purity system operative from the time of the Tabernacle
until the destruction of the Second Jerusalem Temple in 70CE by the Romans.
Much has been written about the purity and impurity system in the Torah and
its significance.13 Some scholars have focused on the role of the purity system in
social control, e.g. the control of sexuality.14 Others have suggested the mythic
symbolism that the central sanctuary served as locus of activity for the perfect
human being, who does not experience death. In such a construct, anyonewho
has a life leak, understood as anyone with a bodily discharge, would be barred
from the sacrificial rites.15 (This is perhaps why a dead body is the most seri-
ous and powerful form of ritual impurity and the ritual for its purification the
most complex.16 Judaism as a religion that sanctifies life, makes a distinction
12 Lev 15:16–18.
13 E.g., Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification and Purgation in Biblical Israel,” The
Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of David Noel Freedman, ed. Carol Meyers
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983), 399–414; JacobNeusner,The Ideaof Purity inAncient
Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16.
14 E.g., Douglas, Purity and Danger, 114–158, cf. 41–57; Janice Delany et. al., The Curse: A Cul-
turalHistory of Menstruation (NewYork: Dutton, 1976); Penelope Shuttle,TheWiseWound:
Eve’s Curse and Everywoman (New York: Marek, 1978).
15 E.g.: Rachel Adler, “Tumah and Taharah—Mikveh.”
16 Num 19.
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between life and death in removing death from its ritual center and ritual offi-
ciants. Even today, a priest, a kohen, is prohibited fromparticipating in a funeral
or entering a cemetery except for immediate family.)
Most, though not all, of the laws of ritual impurity fell into disuse with the
destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70CE.
With the destruction of the Temple in 70CE, sacrifices could no longer be
brought. It was therefore no longer possible to prepare the ashes of the red
heifer for the purification ceremony necessary to cleanse one from contact
with the dead. A supply of ashes from the last red heifer, sacrificed before the
destruction of the Temple, seems to have been available through part of the
rabbinic period, since the cultic laws of ritual purity regarding sanctified food
items remained in effect for a period of time after the Temple’s destruction.17
Since then, no purification from contact with the dead has been available and
therefore all Jews, from that time on, can be considered to fall within the cat-
egory of tumat met, impurity from contact with the dead, which is a highly
contagious form of impurity.18 Immersion not being a sufficient purification
for tumat met, anyone who immersed, even in a mikveh, remained as impure,
tameh, after immersion as before immersion.19
For all intents and purposes, therefore, the ritual purity system had been
flattened so that all Jews were, and are, in the same state of ritual impurity
regardless of any individual’s physiological condition.
While theMishnah still retains the laws referring to the ritual purity system,
for example in Seder Tohoroth, the Talmud contains a gemorah on very few of
them.20 The abandonment of these categories of ritual impurity made sense
17 See for example, b. Nid. 6b. Cf. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Tumat Okhlim (The Laws of
Impure Foods) 16:8–11. Joseph L. Blau suggests that, while some ashes of the Red Heifer
(necessary for purification after contact with a corpse) remained available for a limited
time following the destruction of the Temple, the many post first century rabbinic refer-
ences to the ashes of the red heifermay reflect eschatological references to the restoration
of the Temple. Joseph L. Blau, “The RedHeifer: A Biblical Purification Rite in Rabbinic Lit-
erature,”Numen 14, no. 1 (1967), esp. 72–73.
18 The Beta-Israel community in Ethiopia retained the biblical purity laws, including that of
the red heifer. See Emanuela Trevisan Semi, “The Beta Israel (Falashas): From Purity to
Impurity,” Journal of Jewish Sociology 27 (1985): 103–114. A note of appreciation to Shaye
Cohen for pointing out this and several other sources cited in this teshuvah.
19 Similarly, the sacrifice to complete the period of zavah could also not be brought.
20 The notable exception in Seder Tohorot is Tractate Niddah. Other tractates may have
been compiled for the Palestinian Talmud but are no longer extant. The Babylonian
Talmud contains nine of the 11 tractates in Kodashim, none of which are extant in the
Palestinian Talmud. Hermann L. Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (New
York: Atheneum, 1972), 66–67, 358. The only reference to Mishnah Zavim in the Talmud
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within the context of the collapse of the purity system for want of a function-
ing sacred center in the Temple. In addition, the sacrifices necessary for the
purification rituals of a number of impurity categories (such as for the zav and
zavah) could no longer be brought.
Even so, vestiges of the purity system remained actively part of Jewish life for
several centuries, thoughno longer centered around theTemple.21The category
of zav, formenwho had a non-seminal genital emission, became operationally
non-functional by the second century, as evidenced by the fact that Mishnah
Zavim does not have a gemorah. (See also below for a discussion about how
Rabbi Akiva effectively eliminated the application of the category).22 However,
the rules for the ejaculant remained in effect longer, as men who had expe-
rienced a seminal emission were prohibited from engaging in words of Torah
or reciting benedictions.23 The Talmud offers a reason: so that the Sages would
not behave like roosters, always seeking relationswith their wives.24 In this way
the sexual purity laws served to provide religio-social control over themale sex
drive.
As such, the rabbinic tradition regarding ejaculants became stricter than








(b. B.Meṣ. 105b, citingm. Zabim3:1) does not refer to a zav at all. Rambamdoes include the
zav in his comprehensive Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Metamei Mishkav v’Moshav (The Laws
of Impurity Imparted By Those who Lie and Sit), see especially 5:1ff, although Karo, dis-
cussing mitzvot still operative, does not include a section on zavim in his Shulḥan Arukh,
Yoreh Deah.
21 I will focus only upon the purity aspects relating to bodily emissions, rather than other
expressions of the purity system, such as those relating to food and vessels.
22 m. Zabim 2:2. Cf. this discussion in Judith Hauptman, Rereading the Rabbis (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1998), 154–156.
23 Attributed to a takanah promulgated by Ezra, b. B. Qam. 82a–b.
24 b. Ber. 20b–22b; m. Ber. 3:4–6; t. Ber. 2:13, ed. Zuckermandel; y. Ber. 3:4, 6c. See Shaye
Cohen, “Purity and Piety: The Separation of Menstruants From the Sancta,” in Daughters
of theKing:Womenand the Synagogue, ed. SusanGrossman andRivkaHaut (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society, 1992), 107 and 114 n. 8. Note that women, whether as zavot or
menstruants, are not included in these restrictions and so would be permitted to engage






The dispute between all these Tannaim and Amoraim is as to the ordi-
nance of Ezra. Let us see then what Ezra did ordain! Abaye said: Ezra
ordained that a healthy man whose emission is voluntary must immerse
in forty se’ahs, and a healthymanwhose emission is involuntarymust use
nine kabs, and the Amoraim came and differed over the sick person. One
held that a sick personwhose emission is voluntary is on the same footing
as a healthy person whose emission is voluntary, and a sick person whose
emission is involuntary as a healthy person whose emission is involun-
tary; while the other held that a sick person whose emission is voluntary
is on the same footing as a healthy person whose emission is involuntary
and a sick person whose emission is involuntary requires nothing at all.
Raba said: Granted that Ezra ordained immersion, did he ordain throw-
ing?Hasnot amaster said: Ezraordained immersion forpersonswhohave
had a seminal emission? Rather, said Raba, Ezra ordained for a healthy
person whose emission is voluntary forty se’ahs, and the Rabbis [after
Ezra] came and ordained for a healthy personwhose emission is involun-
tary nine kabs and the [Tannaim and] Amoraim came and differed with
regard to a sick person, one holding that a sick person whose emission is
voluntary is on the same footing as a healthy person whose emission is
voluntary and a sick person whose emission is involuntary as a healthy
person whose emission is involuntary, while the other held that a healthy
personwhose emission is voluntary requires forty se’ahs and a sick person
whose emission is voluntary is on the same footing as a healthy person
whose emission is involuntary and requires nine kabs, while a sick per-
son whose emission is involuntary requires nothing at all. Raba said: The
law is that a healthy personwhose emission is voluntary and a sick person
whose emission is voluntary require forty se’ahs, a healthy person whose
emission is involuntary requires nine kabs, and a sick personwhose emis-
sion is involuntary requires nothing at all.25
Even though the restrictions on the ejaculant were derived from a takanah,
these restrictions were already falling into disuse even among segments of the
25 b. Ber. 22b.
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rabbinic class in some Jewish communities during the Talmudic period.26 By
the time of Maimonides in the eleventh century, restrictions on the ejaculant
had been generally abandoned.27 Maimonides writes:
אלו;לובטישדע,ןיאמטהראשמודבלירקלעבארקיאלשונקיתונידתיבוארזעו
.הלטבךכיפל—הבדומעלרוביצהבורבחוכהיהאלו,לארשילכבוזהנקתהטשפ
And Ezra and his Court ordained (tikkenu) that an ejaculant, in particular
among thosewho are [categorized] as impure, not read [the Shema] until
he immerses. But this ordinance (takanah) did not spread among Israel
and the congregation [of Israel] did not have the strength to uphold it,
therefore [the ordinance] was annulled.28
Maimonides explains that the takanahwas annulled for two reasons: because it
did not becomewidespread among the people of Israel and because themajor-
ity of the tzibbur (the community of the observant) did not have the strength
to maintain it.
The application of the commandments of Leviticus 15 regarding women,
however, not only remained in force but were expanded over the centuries to
broaden the social restrictions under which the menstruant, and by extension
all women, functioned within Jewish society. (See the discussion below.)
One reasonable explanation for why Leviticus 15 remained in force for
women at all is because it was linked to Leviticus 18:19, prohibiting sexual rela-
tions with a niddah.
Leviticus 18:19 reads: ּהָתָוְרֶעתֹוּלַגְל,בַרְקִתֹאל—ּהָתָאְמֻטתַּדִנְּב,הָּׁשִא-לֶאְו “Do not
come near a woman in her period of impurity to uncover her nakedness.”
So, for example, the mid-second century sage Rabbi Meir teaches:
אהתהרותהרמאהבץקוהבליגרשינפמהעבשלהדנהרותהרמאהמינפמרמואמ״ר
.הפוחלהתסינכתעשכהלעבלעהביבחאהתשידכםימיהעבשהאמט
26 y. Ber. 3:4, 6c records that Hanina (first generation Amorah) ridicules the sages of Israel as
“morning bathers.” b. Ber. 22a records a tradition in the name of R. Zeira (third generation
Amorah) that those in Israel had abolished immersion as a requirement for the baal keri.
27 Except for thosewho preferred to bemaḥmir (strict with themselves) and thus retain such
strictures, as explained, for example, in Taz on OḤ 88.
28 MishnehTorah, Hilkhot Kriat Shema 4:8, Hilkhot Tefillah 4:4–6, Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 88, cf.
Magen Avraham, on OḤ 88, s.v. veaḥar kach bitlu, and Tur, OḤ 88 Cf. Cohen, “Purity and
Piety,” 103–115. Note also that immersionwas not unanimously required. See R. Elliot Dorff
in his Rabbinic Letter on Intimate Relations for the Rabbinical Assembly, p. 43, n.32.
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Rabbi Meir used to say:Why did the Torah say (that the status of) niddah
(lasts) seven days? Because (if) he (the husband) would become accus-
tom to her (his wife), he would loathe her, (therefore) the Torahmade her
impure for seven days so that she would be as beloved to her husband as
at the moment she entered the ḥuppah.29
Rabbi Meir, clearly speaking to other men from the male perspective, argues
that “absencemakes the heart grow fonder,” suggesting that theTorah ordained
a seven day period of abstention from relations with the menstruant because,
if men could have their wiveswhenever theywanted them, theywould develop
a loathing for them.
While Rabbi Meir’s explanation is homiletic in nature, that the Torah or-
dained seven days of abstinence to enamor a woman to her husband, there
is more than a homiletic message here (though see below for a discussion on
the contemporary significance of supporting marital sanctity): relying upon
the concepts that ulfi darcheinu lamadnu (and according to our practice it is
deduced)30 and afilu sihat hulin shel talmidei hachamim tsericha limud (even
the casual conversation of Torah scholars demands study),31 we can safely posit
that this teaching reflectsRabbiMeir’s positionon theproper observanceof the
laws relating to themenstruant, namely that abstinencewas required for seven
days and seven days only.
It is important to note the halakhic implications of Rabbi Meir’s teaching
here. Rabbi Meir assumes that the total time of separation between the hus-
band and the wife is seven days (not 12 or 14). This means that he interprets the
law as requiring abstinence for the seven days of the woman’s menstrual flow.
He does not require any additional white days, clearly following the peshat of
the Biblical verses of Leviticus cited above.32 In otherwords, the tannaitic prac-
ticewas clearly thatmenstruants observed sexual abstinence only for the seven
days, counted from the beginning of their menses.33 This is supported by the
fact that Rabbi later stringency assumes this earlier tannaitic practice.
29 b. Nid. 31b.
30 m. Sukkah 2:1.
31 b. Sukkah 21b.
32 b. Nid. 31b, cf. Rashi, ad. loc. RabbiMeir seems to be assuming thatwomen are only observ-
ing seven days of separation from the onset of their menstruation. The suggestion that
he would assume abstinence during menstruation was a given by his male listeners and
therefore only had to explain the extra seven days, seems less compelling. See Milgrom,
“Comments,” 935. On Rabbi Meir speaking from the man’s point of view (i.e. the man’s
interest in his wife), cf. Adler, “In Your Blood, Live,” 38–41.
33 Citing b. Nid. 69a., Hauptman, Rereading the Rabbis, 156, goes farther, arguing that all rab-
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R. Joseph, citing Rab Judah who had it from Rab, stated: Rabbi ordained
at Sadoth: if a woman observed a discharge on one day she must wait six
days in addition to it. If sheobserveddischarges on twodays shemustwait
six days in addition to these. If she observed a discharge on three days she
must wait seven white days. R. Zeira stated: The daughters of Israel have
imposed upon themselves the restriction that even if they observe a drop
of blood of the size of a mustard seed they wait on account of it seven
white days.34
This ruling of Rabbi (Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi, the editor of the Mishnah) is tradi-
tionally understood as conflating the restrictions on themenstruantwith those
of the zavah, so that a menstruant remained impure for seven additional days
after the end of her bleeding just like a zavah.35 Rashi, picking up on the men-
tion of Sadoth, explains that it was because Sadoth was a community where
the womenwere unable to distinguish between their niddah and zavah days.36
By the fourth century, the Palestinian sage R. Zeira reports that BanotYisrael,
the daughters of Israel, took upon themselves the stricter category of zavah and
binic practice (not just tannaitic) was to require only seven days total for the menstru-
ant.
34 b. Nid. 66a. As Rabbi Judy Hauptman notes, Rabbi’s words are cryptic According to Rashi
(s.v. shishah v’hu; shana’im) Rabbi treats the blood of the first and second days as men-
strual blood and only with the third day treats her as a zavah (Hauptman, Rereading the
Rabbis, 157 ff.).
35 Hauptman, Rereading the Rabbis, 158, understands it differently: that Rabbi, and by exten-
sion Rabbi Zeira, are speaking only about zavot, not menstruants. Therefore, women took
on the extra stringency not for their periods but only in case of intercycle staining.
36 Rashi, b. Nid. 66a, s.v. sadoth. Cf. MishnehTorah, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 11:3, MagidMishneh,
ad loc. On the problemswith the rabbinic efforts to establish a process for determining the
days of niddah and zavah by counting cycles of 7 and 11 days, and the confusion such a sys-
tem engendered since it is inconsistent with biological reality, see m. Nid. 4:4,7 and Meiri
on b. Ber. 31a. The Shulḥan Arukh is silent on the 7/11 counting system and instead relies
on the fact thatmost women have a standard period (veset) by which they can distinguish
between menstrual and zavah blood (Yoreh Deah, 183, 184).
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extended it to whenever they saw a stain as small as that of a mustard seed.37
In otherwords, the takkanahRabbi promulgated for the conditions relevant for
Sadoth remained in force because BanotYisrael continued to observe it as their
minhag (custom).38 (See below for the halakhic implications of this for today.)
Women and the Ritual Purity System
While the restrictions on the menstruant may have remained in force largely
because of their association with the prohibition of sexual relations with a
menstruant, as delineated in Leviticus 18:19, the language and psychology of
ritual purity and impurity that shaped these laws were carried over from their
37 b. Nid. 66a.
38 According to Rabbi Roth, in a private interview. In addition to whatever difficulty they
may have had in distinguishing between different types of blood, these womenmay have
had other reasons as well for supporting Rabbi’s takkanah. The Biblical archaeologist and
scholar Carol Meyers suggests that these women sought to free themselves from being
dependent upon the male rabbis for an interpretation of a woman’s monthly cycle. Carol
Meyers, Discovering Eve: Ancient IsraeliteWomen in Context (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), 36–37. Their decision to extend the days of sexual abstention may also have
been an effort to affect a form of birth control. Ancient medical knowledge assumed a
woman was most fecund immediately after menstruation. Cf., 2Sam 11:2–5 (in which Bat-
sheva conceives with David shortly after washing, which the text explains as mitkadeshet
mitumatah, sanctifying herself from her impurity). According to the historian Keith Hop-
kins, this knowledge was widely known and used as a form of birth control (as an ancient
rhythm method) by women of many social stations in the Roman world. Cf. Keith Hop-
kins, “Contraception in the Roman Empire,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 8
(1965–1966): 124–151, esp. 140 andn. 47. (Myappreciation to Seth Schwartz for familiarizing
mewith this source and to David Kraemer for suggesting this subject.) Cf. Mishneh Torah,
Hilkhot Issurei Biah 11:15, in which Rambam applies the harsh term apikorsot (apostates)
to parturients who refuse to have relations with their husbands for the entire biblically
proscribed purification period (probably to allow themselves to heal). Other scholars,
most notably Saul Lieberman in such works as Greek in Jewish Palestine: Studies in the Life
and Manners of Jewish Palestine in the II–IV Centuries C.E. (New York: Jewish Theologi-
cal Seminary, 1942), have demonstrated the level of familiarity and integration of Roman
knowledge and culture in thePalestinian Jewish community of which thesewomenwould
have been part. It is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that the daughters of Israel
sought to reduce their chances of becoming pregnant by extending the time for which
they would not engage in sexual relations and thereby missing what they thought to be
their most fertile time of month. It is important to remember that, until modern times,
many women died in child birth. (Of course, for many women today, ovulation occurs
right at the end of the extra seven “white” day period of abstention. Nevertheless, the con-
cern for infertility has generatedmuchdiscussion onhow to helpwomenwhose ovulation
occurs during the seven white days. See full discussion on infertility below.) Either way,
one could posit the desire by Banot Yisrael to exert control over their own bodies even in
a man’s world.
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cultic setting in Leviticus 15. This may have been part of a larger trend reflect-
ing the rabbis growing concern with ritual purity in the home, in general,
as expressed through washing of the hands before eating and other obser-
vances.39 We also begin to see restrictions on the menstruant carried over to
sacred ritual. This is not surprising since the identification of a niddah, men-
struant, as one defiled and a source of defilement, is an ancient one. Although
not present in Leviticus as a negative value, the term niddah already appears
as a negative symbolic motif as early as the work of the sixth-century B.C.E.
prophet Ezekiel.40 By the end of the Rabbinic period, a text called Baraita de
Niddah, which scholars posit comes from sixth or seventh century Palestine,
seeks to revive the purity and impurity system by extending it to all areas of
religious life in the home and synagogue. The text places restrictions on ejacu-
lants and prohibits menstruants from preparing food for their families as well
as from reciting prayers, touching a prayer book or Torah Scroll, or entering a
synagogue.41
While restrictions regarding ejaculants do not become widespread, the re-
strictions regardingmenstruants spread throughout thewomen’s communities
of Europe, often feeding superstition. So, for example, no less eminent a scholar
than Naḥmanides, commenting on Genesis 31:35 (where Rachel explains she
cannot rise because the way of women is upon her), writes:
”תודנ“םלועמןמשןכיכ,דאמתוקחורמםינומדקהימיבתודנהויהיכיניעבןוכנהו
,קיזמןלבהשםתמכחבםינומדקהועדייכובורבדיאלוםדאלאוברקתיאליכ,ןקוחירל
39 t. Šabb. 1:14 seems to indicate that the rabbinic class prohibited eating with a menstruant
to maintain the cultic purity of the table, cf. Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Kepeshuta Shabbat.
12–13, lines 33,34 (Jerusalem: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992) and Avot de Rabbi Natan
A ch. 2, Schechter, pp. 8–9, in which the menstruant is not permitted to eat with her
husband. There is some discussion about whether women lived separately during their
menses, cf. m. Nid. 7:4, on a house of isolation and Rashi, b. Nid. 56b, s.v. Beit Tuma’ot;
Roš Haš 26a, in which R. Akiva reports that in the Roman area of Gaul they call the nid-
dah a galmuda, segregated, Cf. AdRNBch. 42 Schechter p. 117, saying that themenstruant is
driven fromherhome (grushahmbeitah). Cf.Milgrom, “Comments,” 949; andSusanGross-
man and Rivka Haut, “From Persia to New York: An Interview with Three Generations of
Iranian Women,” in Grossman and Haut, Daughters of the King, 220. Archaeologist Avra-
ham Faust suggests, based on excavations of a Biblical period Israelite four room house,
that menstruants were separated for purity reasons within the home during the Iron Age.
See his article, “Purity and Impurity in the Iron Age,” BAR 45, no. 2 (March/April 2019):
36–43, 60, 62.
40 Ezek 36:17, 25.
41 Yedidyah Dinari, “The Violation of the Sacred by the Niddah and the Enactment of Ezra”
[in Hebrew], Teuda 3 (1983): 17–37; and “The Customs of the Impurity of the Niddah” [in








The correct interpretation appears to me to be that in ancient days, men-
struants kept very isolated, for they were ever referred to as niddot on
account of their isolation since they did not approach people and did
not speak with them. For the ancients in their wisdom knew that their
breath is harmful, their gaze is detrimental and makes a bad impression,
as the philosophers have explained. I will yet mention their experiences
in this matter. And the menstruants dwelled isolated in tents where no
one entered, just as our Rabbis mentioned in the Beraitha of the Trac-
tate Niddah: “A learned man is forbidden to greet a menstruant.” Rabbi
Nechemyah says, “Even theutterance of hermouth is unclean.” SaidRabbi
Yochanan: “One is forbidden to walk after a menstruant and tread in her
footsteps, which are as unclean as a corpse; so is the dust upon which
themenstruant stepped unclean, and it is forbidden to derive any benefit
from her work.”42
42 Ramban, Commentary on the Torah: Genesis, trans. Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo,
1971), 387–388. Milgrom, “Comments,” 936–937, notes that this isolation was in contradis-
tinction to the tendency of theTorah tominimize the impurity of themenstruant, limiting
such impurity to the items that may have been touched by her menstrual flow, i.e. those
things she sat upon, as opposed to her touch or her breath, as held in other Ancient Near
Eastern cultures.
Little is known about Beraitha de Niddah (ed. Chaim M. Horowitz, Tosefta Atiqata,
1889). Scholars generally agree to its Palestinian origin around the geonic period (c. 1000
C.E.). Milgrom, “Comments,” 948, notes that restrictions on the involvement of the men-
struant in household chores contradicts BT Ket. 61a. Nevertheless, ethnographic studies
indicate that inPersia, Jewishwomen refrained from touching family foodor dishes during
their menses; see Susan Grossman and Rivka Haut, “From Persia to New York: An Inter-
view with Three Generations of Iranian Women,” trans. Parvin Khoubian, in Grossman
andHaut, Daughters of the King, 219–220. The eldest informant spoke about being treated
as “a dead mouse,” isolated in the corner of her house during her menses.
There are some indications that womenwere isolated during theirmenses even before
and during the rabbinic period: Josephus writes that menstruants were secluded until the
seventh day. Josephus seems to equate these days with the days of isolation observed by
the leper and the one having contact with a corpse, which might imply the same seven
days following cessation of contact with the impurity (Ant. 3.11.3; Loeb, 261). t. Šabb. 1:14
seems to indicate that the rabbinic class prohibited eating with a menstruant to main-
tain the cultic purity of the table, cf. Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Kpeshuta (Jerusalem: Jewish
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By the sixteenth century, the major Ashkenazic authority, the Rema, Rabbi
Moses Isserles, while acknowledging that such traditions have no basis in Jew-
ish law, encourages women to refrain from touching a Torah scroll, entering a
synagogue, touching a prayer book, or reciting prayers.43 Traditional commu-
nities of Iranian women, for example, also observed the severe restrictions of
the Baraita deNiddah until theirWesternization throughmodern urbanization
and immigration.44
Interestingly, all the classical commentators and codifiers who mention
these traditions note that such observances are not grounded in Jewish law but
are “women’s traditions.”45
Regardless of the reason, the extension of the original Toraitic exclusion of
menstruants from the sancta (of Tabernacle and then Temple) effectively ex-
cluded women from public synagogue life. Despite a fine article by the Ortho-
dox Rabbi Avi Weiss explaining why women cannot defile a Torah,46 many
Orthodox synagogues today still refuse to allow women to touch the Torah
scroll.
Vestiges of this tradition can even be found today in the folk piety of women
in Conservative congregations who still refuse to touch a Torah scroll either
Theological Seminary, 1992), 12, lines 33–34; and Avot de Rabbi Natan A ch. 2, Schechter,
pp. 8–9, in which the menstruant is not permitted to eat with husband; m. Nid. 7:4, on
a house of isolation, cf. Rashi, b. Nid. 56b, s.v. Beit Tuma’ot, b. Roš Haš. 26a, in which
R. Akiva reports that in the Roman area of Gaul they call the niddah a galmuda, segre-
gated, Cf. AdRNB ch. 42 Schechter p. 117, saying that the menstruant is driven from her
home (grushah mbeitah). Cf. Milgrom, “Comments,” 949.
In Ethiopia, Jewish menstruants and parturients were also segregated in a menstrual
hut, during which time all their household duties are taken care of by other women in
their family. Ethiopian immigrants to Israel complain of how difficult it is, for example, to
have a new child on one’s own and not have the community support to allow the mother
to rest and recover during her period of isolation. Cf. Emanuela Trevisan Semi, “The Beta
Israel (Falashas): From Purity to Impurity,” Journal of Jewish Sociology 27 (1985): 103–114.
43 Rema to Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 88. For a complete discussion, see Shaye Cohen, “Purity and
Piety,” 103–115.
44 Grossman and Haut, “From Persia to New York,” 219–220.
45 The historian Shaye Cohen has posited that women initiated and spread these traditions
as a way to express their piety. Excluded from meaningful involvement in synagogue ser-
vices or communal leadership, women grasped those aspects of observance within their
power: protecting or defiling the sanctity of the synagogue and its most sacred object, the
Torah. See Cohen, “Purity and Piety.”
46 Avraham Weiss, “Women and Sifrei Torah,” Tradition 20, no. 2 (Summer, 1982), 106–118.
His defense is based upon the idea that a Torah cannot contract ritual impurity. He still
assumes that menstruants are ritually impure.
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all the time or during their periods. Over the last few decades, several ques-
tions have beendirected to theCommittee on Jewish Lawand Standards asking
whether menstruants can lead prayer services or read from the Torah Scroll.
The response has been, and should continue to be, that there is no basis in
halakhah, Jewish law, for restricting a menstruant’s involvement in the syna-
gogue or any religious role or function.
As we have seen, there is no halakhic basis for restricting a menstruant from
public or private prayer, from serving as shlihat tzibor (prayer leader) or as
baalat korei (Torah reader), from access to the synagogue, or from touching a
Sefer Torah or other scrolls or holy books.47 Conservative congregations would
be wise to ignore such customs restricting menstruants because they were
never based on halakhah and certainly do not reflect contemporary sensitiv-
ities among observant Conservative Jews nor general society, which no longer
considers a menstruant a potentially dangerous force or contaminant.
Implications for Contemporary Practice andHalakhic Application
Jewishobservance seems tohave gone far a field fromLeviticus’ original, almost
egalitarian formulation that the anthropologist Mary Douglas points out is so
“meticulously balanced between the sexes.”48 As others have pointed out, the
Torah establishes a clear parallel between men and women in this parsha,
grouping them into two categories: peoplewith irregular genital discharges and
people with regular (healthy) genital discharges.49Male and female are treated
47 See, Cohen, “Purity and Piety”; and on touching a sefer Torah, Weiss, “Women and Sifrei
Torah.”
48 In Reading Leviticus: A Conversation with Mary Douglas, ed. John F.A. Sawyer (Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 139. Similarly, the Biblical scholar Jacob Milgrom points
out that the Torah includes no prohibition barring themenstruant from touching anyone,
which signifies that her hands do not transmit contagion. See his commentary, Leviticus
1–16, 936.
49 Kraemer, “A Developmental Perspective,” 33; and Mary Douglas, in Reading Leviticus, 139.
The seven days ascribed to the impurity of the woman’s niddah (meaning literally flow) in
Lev 15:19 are understood by David Kraemer and others to be counted beginning with the
first day of the woman’s menses and constituting the full number of days of the woman’s
impurity. He argues that limiting to seven days the total number of days a menstruant
refrained from sexual activity would more accurately reflect the original intent of the
text here (“A Developmental Perspective,” 27). Cf. Lev 12:2 ff., regarding the parturient. It is
important to note, however, that whenever the Torahmentions seven days in relation to a
category of impurity, such a time period refers to the period of purification following ces-
sation of the condition which caused the impurity, for example, following contact with
a corpse (Num 19:11), purification of an individual suffering from tzara’at, a scaly afflic-
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alike in all aspects of these laws, except for the seven days allotted to the men-
struant, thoughnot to the ejaculant, necessary to distinguish between anormal
and irregular discharge. (Parturients are dealt with in Lev 12.)
As we saw above, in the tannaitic period, RabbiMeir held that only a total of
seven days sexual abstinence is required for a menstruant, i.e., for Rabbi Meir,
no extra seven white days were required.50 Rabbi’s takanah also assumes such
a tannaitic practice.
This samepracticehas been the recommendedpractice (halakhah l’maaseh)
for several generations of rabbinical students, and upon ordination, their con-
gregants, as guidedby the instructionof Rabbi Joel Roth, a teacher of great piety
and one of the preeminent halakhicists of our Movement.
Rabbi Roth comes to his decision based upon the following application of
rabbinic law:51 It is clear that the two categories of niddah and zavah are dis-
tinguishable according to the Torah. While the classical position of Jewish tra-
dition has ignored the distinction in practice, particularly regarding counting
an additional seven white days following menstruation, the majority of the
Rishonim (excluding Maimonides) do recognize that the distinctions between
niddah and zavah are not so complex as to be undeterminable. The fact that
Rabbi decreed the takanah at Sadoth presents the takanah as conditional upon
the situation at Sadoth, which Rashi understands as the incapability of the
women there to distinguish between their menstrual and zivah blood. Accord-
ing to Rabbi Roth, the reference to the town of Sadoth in this baraita, comes to
teach us that Rabbi made his decision particularly for the conditions that were
operative for the women of the community of Sadoth at that time, specifically
that they could not distinguish between their menstrual days and their days of
zivah, and not for all women for all time. (This is supported by Rashi, as cited
tion of the skin erroneously identified in the New Jewish Publication Society translation
as leprosy (Lev 14:8), and ending the period of impurity for a zav and a zavah (Lev 15:13,
25–30). On the translation of tzara’at as leprosy, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, esp. 823–824.
The man who has had relations with a menstruant takes on her impurity and remains
unclean for seven days following contact with her (Lev 15:24). Ethiopian Jewish practice,
whichwas unaware of rabbinic tradition, also holds that the seven days of themenstruant
in Lev 15:19 are the white days of purification following cessation of the flow. A.Z. Eshkoli,
“Halahka and Customs among the Falasha Jews in Light of Rabbinic and Karaite Halakha”
[in Hebrew], Tarbiz 7 (1936): 121–125. See the discussion in Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 269,
935. However, the concern for the seven white days is eliminated if we are no longer con-
cerned about the ritual purification for which seven white days was required since the
destruction of the Temple and the suspension of the sacrificial system.
50 b. Nid. 31b, discussed above.
51 Based upon a private interview with Rabbi Roth and the video lectures he made for the
Student Life Office of Jewish Theological Seminary. Any errors are my own.
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above.) In other words, the takkanahwas beSadoth, regarding Sadoth, for those
women and not our women.
Citing Rabbi Zeira, who credits Banot Yisraelwith extending the humra (the
stricture) conflating niddah and zavah, Rabbi Roth further argues that the con-
tinued conflation of these two categories is a tradition, created by the women,
and is not amandate of law. Precedents exist to stop observing traditions, even
strictures however widely observed, which are not grounded in a legal require-
ment but rather in amistaken assumption that the custom in question is a legal
requirement (rather than a law).52 That is the situation here.
Rabbi Roth writes:
This possibility, in turn, raises again the question of the status of customs
that arepopularly, althoughmistakenly, thought tobe law rather than cus-
tom. The Rosh addresses this question too. He writes:
Matters concerning which it is known that they are observed custom-
arily as forbidden because the peoplewish to bemore strict with them-
selves, youmaynot declare permitted before them. But if their custom-
ary behavior is based upon an error, namely, that they believe that the
behavior is actually forbidden when, in fact, it is permitted, you may
permit it before them… Similarly, too, a man whose customary behav-
ior forbids something that is permitted, as a fence or a self-imposed
restriction (perishut), no sage ought to declare the act permitted to
him. But a sage may permit it to him if he expresses regret (lehat-
tir lahem ha-haratah). [i.e., declares that he regrets having accepted
the custom upon himself, and wished to be released from its obser-
vance].53
By this reasoning, even though Rabbi Zeira knew that the women of his time
were in error in choosing to be strict with themselves (i.e. that they were not,
in fact, fulfilling an obligation since Rabbi’s takanah was only for Sadoth), he
would not have declared what they were doing in error because the women
themselves were making the decision to be strict with themselves. However,
where the observance is in error (that it is custom and not law) and particu-
larly where the individual regrets the custom, the Sage can make permissible
what had otherwise been forbidden.
52 This material is available on a tape that Rabbi Roth created for the students of Jewish
Theological Seminary. Rabbi Roth concedes that most later poskim would assume the
requirement for seven clean or white days as mandate of law, though it is not.
53 Joel Roth, citing Piskei Rosh Pesahim 4:3, in The Halakhic Process: A Systematic Analysis
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1986), 219.
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According to Rabbi Roth, this is the situation in which we find ourselves
today: the continued conflation of niddah and zavah was in error (in that it
is custom and not law) and the majority of observant Conservative women of
our time regret the custom of conflating niddah and zavah (in requiring seven
white days for both) and wish to be released from the strictures of its obser-
vance. According to the Rosh, they can be so released and what was prohibited
(in error) can now be permitted.
We alwaysmust be wary of seeking the lowest common denominator of obser-
vance and thereby doing damage to the integrity of Jewish tradition and our
covenantal responsibilities. That is not the case here. It is true that the major-
ity of observant in our communities found the additional restrictions of Rabbi’s
takanah so onerous that observance of the niddah laws, even the biblical or
tannaitic prohibition of relations for the seven days of menses followed by
immersion, was largely ignored by them for decades. However, largely as a
result of Rabbi Roth’s ruling that makes theses laws sustainable in our com-
munity, observance of the niddah laws has grown exponentially among the
observant of our Movement. Rabbi Roth’s ruling does so not by annulling the
law but by re-establishing its precedence overminhag.
My own randomsampling of colleagues and observant Conservativewomen
has shown that the majority of observant Conservative women who take seri-
ously the sense of being obligated to Torah and mitzvot, observe mikveh today
without the seven extra white days andwould object to having to keep an addi-
tional seven white days.
Contemporary Conservative women prefer keeping this original tannaitic
proscription for many diverse reasons. One reason may be the reality of con-
temporary society that makes it very difficult for couples to spend time togeth-
er. An unprecedented number of our congregants are on the road each week
traveling for work. When added to obligations for night meetings (for work or
community service) plus child care and other responsibilities, couples today
find it difficult to attend to the intimate aspects of their lives that is such an
important part of a healthymarriage. (Thismaybe one factor in the rising num-
ber of divorces, though such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Under such conditions, the difference between keeping seven or 12 (or more)
days of abstinence can make the difference between whether the couple can
or cannot have relations that month and whether they will even both try to
observe these timeless laws of sexual sanctity.
It must be remembered that, unlike women taking on shofar blowing or
omer counting, the extensionof niddah into a zavahwas aminhag and ahumra,
rather than the embracing of a hiyuv, a religious obligation. We therefore find
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ourselves with a community of women, and the men with whom they are
united, among our most observant members, who “regret” having to be obli-
gated to observe the extra restrictions placed upon them by the application
of a takanah by Rabbi, which was promulgated not for us, but for a particular
community of women. In such a situation, there is ample rabbinic precedent
to allow women to return to the original tannaitic practice of observing only
seven days of abstinence beginning with the first day of their menses, and no
longer requiring the addition of seven white days following the cessation of
blood.
Those whowould prefer to continue to observe sevenwhite daysmay certainly
do so.However, themajority of contemporaryConservativewomenwill be able
to fulfill the commandment of niddah by the requirement of abstinence a total
of seven days beginning with the first day of their menses.
Upuntil this pointwehave specifically beendiscussing the rules of damniddah,
a woman’s menstrual period.What of dam zivah, blood which appears outside
a woman’s regular period, also referred to as mid-cycle staining?
Traditional observance required that a woman who had seen a stain (zavah
ketanah) wait from day to day, to see if she would stain again, in the meantime
refraining from sexual relations. If she stained three days in a row, she “offi-
cially” became a zavah (zavah gedolah) which required that sexual relations
not be resumed until seven white days were observed after staining stopped
(determined by bedikah, internal checking for blood in the vaginal cavity) and
immersion was performed in themikveh.
Aswe have shown above, the categories of zavah and niddah are distinguish-
able. Doraita, a menstruant and her husband are explicitly prohibited from
sexual relations for seven days. This is a commandment independent of the
purity system of the Temple and equally obligatory upon the husband andwife
today. Zavah is a different situation, however. As discussed above, the Torah
does not explicitly prohibit sexual relations with a zavah.
Once we disentangle the laws and observance of niddah from zavah, zavah
can be seen on its own terms.
We have seen, above, that the ritual purity concerns regarding men’s geni-
tal emissions for a zav became effectively inoperative fairly early, as evidenced
by the lack of a gemorah on it. This is not surprising since much of the purity
system collapsed with the destruction of the Temple. As with the baal keri, we
cannot reconstruct the exact moment that the laws of zav became effectively
inoperative. However, we do have a tannaitic source that indicates one of the
ways the category of zav began to be inoperative:






Along seven lines is a zav examined as long as he had not entered the
bounds of zivah: as to his food, drink, what he had borne, whether he had
jumped, whether he had been ill, what he had seen, or whether he had
impure reflections before he saw orwhether he had seen (awoman) prior
to his reflections. Rabbi Judah adds: even if he had watched beasts, wild
animals or birds having relations with each other, even if he had seen a
woman’s colored undergarments. R. Akiva says, even if he had eaten any
(kind of) food, good or bad, or had drunk any liquid, They said to him,
(according to your view) therewouldhenceforthbeno zavim in theworld.
He replied to them: you are not responsible for the existence of zavim…54
The Mishnah challenges Rabbi Akiva on this point, noting that he had effec-
tively made it impossible to consider any man a zav from this point on. He
replies that there is no requirement (any longer) that there be zavim.55
For Rabbi Akiva, the essential fact in determining zavwas no longer just the
source of the genital emission but also the cause. Thus Rabbi Akiva, while not
annulling the law,made it inoperative. RabbiAkivadefined suchabroadvariety
of sources that would render an emission permissible, that they could essen-
tially be universally applicable, thereby effectively rendering anyman suffering
a flux fit rather than a zav.
Something similar canbe applied to the category of zavah forwoman, partic-
ularly when there are mitigating circumstances. The most compelling of these
mitigating conditions relates to issues of infertility treatment in the Jewish
community.
54 m. Zabim 2:2.
55 m. Zabim 2:2; Tiferet Yisrael on m. Zabim 2:2, n. 15. Rambam on m. Zabim 2:2 notes that
the halakhah does not follow Rabbi Akiva (or Rabbi Judah) here. However, within a few
generations, no onewas considered a zav any longer. It is interesting that Rabbi Akiva held
his position, that one does not need zavim, even though he sided with those who sought
Jewish independence and presumably the reconstruction of the Temple.
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Infertility and DamZivah
For many reasons outside the scope of this discussion, there is an increased
problem of infertility in the Jewish community. More and more couples face
great heartbreak in trying to fulfill the mitzvah of peru urvu (be fruitful and
multiply) while trying to be observant of Judaism’s traditional understanding
of the laws surrounding marital sanctity.56
Somewomen strugglingwith infertility find that they aremost fertile during
the seven white days following the cessation of their menses, making concep-
tion impossible for those following the traditional observance of niddahwhich
requires sexual abstinence during the sevenwhite days. For those, this teshuvah
will help by eliminating theneed for thewhite days following regularmenstrual
flow, allowing sexual relations to resume on the eighth day.
For others, opportunities for conception are restricted bymid-cycle staining.
Orthodox poskim are not unsympathetic to the plight of Jewish infertility.
They suggest many ways around considering mid-cycle staining sufficient to
require sexual abstinence.57
Women are advised to wear colored underwear so the stain is not visible or
considered of sufficient color to be considered dam zivah, blood qualifying her
as a zavah. Some posekim ignore any stain on a garment, and only count fresh
blood, for example on a part of the body. Without commenting on the philo-
sophical implications of such a solution, such a strategy is not efficacious for
womenwho find fresh blood, on their skin, etc. that traditionally would qualify
as dam zivah.
Womenwho experiencemid-cycle staining during ovulation can also resort
to chemical therapies. However, such medications present possible long-term
health dangers to women who sometimes must take these drugs for several
years.
Doctors often turn first to clomiphene (also known as Clomid) to treat mid-
cycle staining. This is the same drug used in infertility treatments and is con-
traindicated where liver disease, ovarian cysts, or a history of ovarian cancer is
present. Side effects are generally minor but can include nausea and vomiting
along with severe abdominal pain; pelvic pain or bloating; sudden shortness of
breath; changes in vision, blurred vision, seeing double, and eye sensitivity to
bright light. Clomiphene can also actually reducemucus, thereby reducing the
chances for fertility. A small minority of women may experience more severe
56 SeeMichaelGold, “Mikveh as aFertility Problem,” inhis AndHannahWept: Infertility,Adop-
tion and the Jewish Couple (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1988), 94–100.
57 On counting the sevenwhite days in cases of infertility and other leniencies, see Avrohom
Blumenkrantz, Gefen Porioh: The Laws of Niddah (Far Rockaway, NY, 1984), 26ff.
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side effects such as ovarian hyperstimulation which generally disappears with-
out treatment but, without proper monitoring, can become dangerous. Poten-
tial complications include kidney problems, liver problems, fluid collection in
the lungs and stomach, or twisting of the ovaries.
We are commanded, uvhai bahem (“And you shall live by them”,58 protect-
ing life and health), a mitzvah that overrides all others but three.59 Protect-
ing life overrides other mitzvot even in a case of doubt.60 As discussed above,
when other solutions fail them, observant women who experience staining at
ovulation often must resort to chemical treatments that may bring long term
complications and health risks. In such a situation, the commandment to pro-
tect one’s health, uvhai bahem, should take precedence over the restrictions of
zavah. Thus, women who have mid-cycle staining no longer need to undergo
the pain and, for some, the danger, of manipulating their cycles to merely to
avoid mid-cycle spotting.
For other women, the infertility treatments themselves cause staining in a
way that would traditionally qualify the woman as a zavah, ironically making
conception impossible because intercourse would be prohibited. Such couples
are often counseled to utilize artificial insemination, which can be costly finan-
cially and emotionally, putting an additional terrible strain on the marriage.
Pru urvu (“Be fruitful and multiply”)61 is so compelling that, even though
women are exempt from this mitzvah,62 the Rabbis allowed a husband to be
58 Lev 18:5.
59 Cf. Sanh. 74a (outlining the exceptions for murder, sexual violence, and idolatry).
60 t. Šabb. 15:17 (setting the grundnorm allowing the overriding of other mitzvoth to save a
life, even in a case of doubt.) See the discussion in Roth, The Halakhic Process, 183–185.
Roth cites the Radbaz who writes: “You asked of me that I inform you regarding one for
whom the evaluationwasmade that (saving his life) required the violation of the Sabbath;
yet he does not wish that the Sabbath be desecrated on his account because of piety. Does
his wish reflect piety, in which case, it should be honored, or should it not be honored?
Response: Indeed, such a one is a foolishHasid (hasid shoteh) and the Lordwill requite his
own blood from him for the Torah said, ‘And live by them.’ Not die by them.” (Responsa of
Radbaz, pt. 2, no. 1139.)
61 Gen 1:28.
62 m. Yebam. 6:6. Jewish law traditionally exempts women from the obligation of peru urvu:
m. Yebam. 6:6; Shulḥan Arukh, Eben Haezer 1; Elliot Dorff, “Artificial Insemination, Egg
Donation, and Adoption” (CJLS, 1994), 2–6; David Feldman, Marital Relations, Birth Con-
trol, and Abortion in Jewish Law (New York: Schocken, 1978), 46–59. This is because preg-
nancy endangers her life and one is not obligated to endanger oneself. Such an exemption
strengthens thewoman’s right to protect her health over that of a fetus that endangers her.
However, the Talmud recognizes the permissibility to ease halakhic restrictions to enable
women to conceive, e.g. b. Yebam. 65b, inwhich awoman initiates and is granted a divorce
with her ketubah because she wants children and cannot them with her husband.
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forced to divorce his barren wife at her request.63 The impact of infertility on
the larger Jewish community, let alone the agony experienced by the individ-
uals involved, has always found sympathy within rabbinic jurisprudence. For
those women, for whom medical intervention does not effectively stop ovu-
latory staining, they have no redress: The woman is faced with the terrible
dilemma of whether to abandon her commitment to Jewish law and obser-
vance to try to conceive even if staining.64
There is a larger issue as well.While Jewish fertility is down today for a wide
variety of reasons beyond the scope of our discussion, one significant compo-
nent is the rising infertility crisis among married Jewish women. If ever we, as
a Movement, have talked about easing restrictions for reasons of timely need,
sh’at hadhak,65 the infertility crisis in the Jewish community today should cer-
tainly be among the most compelling, particularly where we are not talking
about compromising a biblical injunction, but rather permitting the release
from a rabbinic stringency.
Rabbi Akiva can provide the precedent to allow us to permit sexual relations
when a woman is experiencing mid-cycle staining. How? Rather than deter-
mining if someone was a zav based on the source or nature of a man’s geni-
tal emission, Rabbi Akiva looked to its cause. He identified causes that were
common and therefore could be widely applied so as to effectively include all
men, thereby effectively eliminating the instance of zav even though Rabbi
Akiva did not eliminate the theoretical category of zav. The same can apply
here, particularly since zav and zavah are analogous biblical and rabbinic cate-
gories, which we can see now that zavah has been separated from the separate
commandment of niddah. Where the cause of a woman’s staining could be
the result of diet, medical treatment, physical exertion, or illness, any emis-
sion would be considered permissible, and the woman would not become a
zavah.
63 Yebam. 65b. For a fuller discussion, see Hauptman, Rereading the Rabbi, 130–146.
64 Rabbi Michael Gold presents a similar dilemma in his book on infertility.
65 See, for example, b. Šabb. 45a (regardingmoving theHanukkah lights); Nid 6a–b, although
there is somedebate about the efficacy of his ruling in the gemorah, Rabbi Eliezer relies on
shat hadakah to rule leniently regarding ritual purity, cf. b. Nid. 9b. These two sources also
make clear that the restrictions on the menstruant and zavah were firmly rooted within
the larger rabbinic approach to the purity rules they imported from the Temple to the
homes of the rabbinic class in Palestine concurrent with and following the destruction of
the Temple. The farther removed from the Temple, generally fewer were the purity laws
observed.
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Effectively, since diet is certainly applicable to all women, therefore, a woman
who experiences staining at a time other than her regular period need not
refrain from sexual relations (as long as such is medically advisable) or require
counting, checking or immersion. While this is particularly helpful to women
specifically struggling with infertility, it is not limited to them.66
Those who wish to bemahmir (strict with themselves) can do so, refraining
from sexual relations when evidence of staining is found, as well as counting
seven white days after three or more days of staining followed by immersion.
(If ever the Temple were to be rebuilt and the purity system reestablished, the
zav and zavah status would be applicable to contact with the Temple and its
holy things.)
While one would normally be hesitant to undermine such a long standing
tradition, there aremitigating circumstances to do so, and, to paraphrase Rabbi
Akiva, we are not obligated to have zavot in theworld.67 By following the guide-
lines above, sexual relations inmost situations of early ovulation andmid-cycle
staining would no longer be precluded.68 Thus we would provide real relief for
the many observant and religiously dedicated Conservative Jews who struggle
to fulfill both the mitzvah of peru urvu (be fruitful and multiply) and the mitz-
vah of halakhically appropriate sexual intimacy as well as other women who
suffer frommedical conditions that cause mid-cycle staining.69
The Use of Mikveh
The Mikveh has been referred to as kissing waters, for it contains fresh water
(often rain water) that is specially collected in a way that flows into themikveh
and then “kisses,” through a small hole in the wall, water that is more con-
ventionally piped in.70 For thousands of years, men and women have found
in the warm waters of the Jewish ritual bath, the mikveh, a profound and
66 For example, there are women who have had a hysterectomy, and therefore lack a womb,
nevertheless can experience staining as a result of tamoxifen treatments.
67 One could also apply the argument of the Rosh, above, as to the permissibility of permit-
ting a previously observed stricture on the basis that it is merely minhag, even if treated
as law, and where, as here, it is regretted. See discussion above, regarding Rabbi.
68 Cf. Gold, “Mikveh as a Fertility Problem,” 94–100.
69 See n. 66 above.
70 A full discussion of the structure and halakhah of the mikveh is beyond the scope of this
teshuvah. A naturally occurring body of flowing water (river, lake, ocean) can be used as
well (CJLS 020458B, 071763). Some permit the use of an outdoor pool where no other
option is available. See Benjamin Kreitman, Proceedings of the RA, 1969, 219–222. The con-
version of a woman who was niddah at the time of her immersion in the mikveh is valid
after the fact (CJLS 070678B).
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transformational experience. Converts were (and continue to be) reborn as
Jews through its waters.71 Hasidic Masters conversed with God while standing
chest deep in its watery shadows. Thousands of generations of womenwashed
away the unrealized potential for life as they began again the miraculous cycle
that makes women partners with God in creation.
Mikveh was traditionally observed by Jewish women for three main pur-
poses: Before one’s wedding; for pietistic purposes, especially before Yom Kip-
pur and, in some traditions, before Passover; and before resuming sexual activ-
ity after a period of abstention (for niddah, zivah, or birth).
It is a tradition for the bride to visit themikveh the night before her wedding
with her closest female relatives and friends. We should revive this tradition
of bringing the bride to mikveh. Sephardic communities use this time as the
equivalent of a spiritual bridal party, at which close female family members
and friends attend the bride as a queen to the mikveh, sing to her while she
is immersing in private, and shower her with candies or flower petals as she
rejoins them as they sing wedding songs and hold beautiful lit candles. Amod-
ern version of this might include going out for coffee (at a kosher restaurant)
with one’s closest female friends and families after the visit to themikveh. (See
below regarding the role of the groom.)
Prayers are traditionally considered more efficacious when recited in the
mikveh, particularly before the third, and last, immersion. This is the source
for women taking a moment to add their personal bakashot, personal requests
and prayers, to God before their final immersion. This tradition is not restricted
to women. Hasidic story collections are full of tales of rebbes who threaten to
stand for hours in the mikveh until God reverses the evilness of the decree on
someone.
In recent years, themikveh has also been turned to as a place of healing and
recovery after miscarriage, hysterectomy, mastectomy, rape, and therapeutic
abortions.72
There is ample precedent for these accretions. Regardless of ages and mari-
tal status, generations of women have attendedmikveh to immerse before Yom
Kippur and, according to some traditions, also before Passover. Although not
traditionally obligated by Jewish law and tradition (indeed, at one time, not
71 For an interesting discussion of the significance of mikveh in conversion, see Michael
Chernick, “Mikveh: AMedium for Change of Status,” Journal of Reform Judaism 35 (Spring,
1988): 61–64.
72 See Susan Grossman, “Finding Comfort after a Miscarriage,” in Grossman and Haut,
Daughters of the King; and Nina Beth Cardin, Tears of Sorrow, Seeds of Hope (Woodstock,
VT: Jewish Lights).
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having immersed in amikvehwas considered a sufficient deterrent to premari-
tal relations), suchwomen should not be stigmatized normade uncomfortable
if theywould like to utilize themikveh for suchobservances. Singlewomenhave
pointed out that at times they feel the tradition excludes them and punishes
them for somethingoverwhich theyhaveno control. Some singlewomencould
use themikveh as an opportunity to pray that Godwill send them their beshert,
their intended. Others could experience immersion as an opportunity to feel
good about themselves within the context of their Judaism.
In a similar vein, post-menopausal woman can also choose to utilize the mik-
veh, though obviously they would not be required to do so. The question would
be, when should post-menopausal women attendmikveh? It seems fitting that
inmemory of amonthly cycle, a post-menopausal woman could choose to visit
the mikveh on Rosh Hodesh (traditionally a woman’s holiday) or before Shab-
batMevorchim, the Sabbath on which the NewMonth is announced which has
been adopted as a special Sabbath bymost women’s davening groups. Alterna-
tively, an individual may choose a special anniversary date, perhaps of getting
through an operation or a medical procedure successfully.
Similarly, immersion rituals marking menarche and menopause are appro-
priate, as are immersion rituals, alreadymentioned above, for healing following
miscarriage, rape, therapeutic abortions, and such surgeries as hysterectomy
and mastectomy. (Such immersions would not substitute for the traditional
recitation of birkat gomel in the synagogue but would provide support through
trying times within the context of one’s Judaism that themore impersonal and
public recitation of birkat hagomelmay make difficult.)
Under this teshuvah, immersion in amikveh is still requiredbefore one’swed-
ding and upon the completion of the seventh day following the beginning of a
woman’s menstrual flow. (For a fuller discussion of the use of the mikveh, see
below.)
A note on men and mikveh is apropos here. Rabbi Joel Roth and others have
taught for years that husbands should also go tomikveh before resuming sexual
relationswith theirwives as an expressionof themutuality of their relationship
and obligation for the sanctity of their relationship. In addition, similar to the
bride attending mikveh before the wedding, a groom could have an equivalent
ceremony with his male relatives and friends, a refreshingly spiritual alterna-
tive to the bachelor party.
The further development of Conservativemikvaot canmake it easier for our
congregants to observe any and all of these alternative uses of the mikveh as
part of their personal piety and efforts to draw closer to God and their Judaism.
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An Alternative Construction of Significance
The idea of framing one fourth of awoman’s existencewithin the context of rit-
ual purity continues to drive many women away from embracing the mitzvah
not to engage in sexual relations during one’s period.
Perhaps a more useful construction for us today regarding women’s men-
struation would be to turn from the concept of ritual purity and impurity to
that of holiness, something to which we all strive and which reflects positive
connotations of the highest order.
For all that Rabbi Meir was speaking to men in a way that may sound dis-
cordant to our modern sensibilities, there is something to be said for the sweet
denial of access to sexual relations to whet the appetite of desire for some peo-
ple. Perhaps more significantly, particularly in long term marriages and where
parents may be running between jobs and childcare, setting aside time at the
end of a woman’s period to fan the flames of desire is good for marriage. These
laws focus attention on the sexual component of themarriage that is often lost
as lovers become parents. The obligation to engage in sexual relations upon the
completion of the period of abstention (while perhaps logistically challenging
in a home hopefully filled with children) helps ensure that attention to each
partner’s sexual satisfaction remains part of the regular interaction between
the partners. (Such conscious attention can also hopefully stimulate more fre-
quent romantic interludes beyond this monthly ritual.) Sexual satisfaction is
an element of marital stability. Therefore such observances are good for the
longevity of marriage. This is especially important today when marriage itself
seems under siege with the rising divorce rate.
A responsemust be added here to critiques thatmay acknowledge the benefits
of self-restraint and sexual abstinence in a marriage but argue that the couple
should be able to choose when to set aside such time and not be restricted
to the seven days of a woman’s period. To such critiques there are several
responses. First, for the faithful, the answer acknowledges that the observance
to abstain specifically during the seven days of thewoman’smenses is the prac-
tice received in the Torah, applied by the Rabbis and sanctified by generations
of our ancestors. As implied above, changes in such a received tradition, while
possible, must be justified by a compelling reason, hopefully such as those
made herein.
Second, an answer lies in the nature of communally shared ritual and its
power to connect us as a People beyond the boundaries of time or space.
Finally, an answer also lies in the power of a spiritual discipline to raise in
the individual a sense of service and purpose beyond one’s self. By definition,
the rules of that spiritual disciplinemust come from outside the individual, for
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part of the nature of a spiritual discipline is submitting to an authority higher
than oneself. Judaism is not a religion of abstinence. God created us with the
natural inclination to enjoy sexuality, as Rabbi Elliot Dorff so eloquently dis-
cusses in the Conservative Movements’ Rabbinic Letter on Intimate Relations.
Just as we control our instinctual drives for food, through kashrut, and for terri-
tory and security, through the laws of business ethics, so, too, can we direct our
instinctual drive for sex to holy ends through self-control.We canbest celebrate
the sanctity of a relationship enjoyed with mutual respect, consideration, and
self-control through refraining fromsexual relations during a regularly set time.
As members of a covenantal community we submit to the structure of sexual
abstention during a woman’s menses for seven days (as defined by the Torah
and our Sages, the Tannaim) just as we submit to the laws of kashrut which
determines that a cow is kosher and a pig is not.
As valid and important as all these observations are, it would be remiss not
to also include the observation by Rachel Adler that such constructions of the
laws of menstruation (regarding sexual availability) are troubling when they
see women only in relation to men, i.e. as a sexual partner, rather than as pri-
marily in relationship to God as our Creator and Commander.73
Under the influence of modern science, we now understand menstruation
as a natural process. Freed of superstition, self aware of primal fears, and rec-
ognizing women as equal members of our covenantal community, perhaps we
can finally transform what had at one time been seen as a stigma into a cele-
bration of the wholeness and sacredness of woman being created by God with
the potential to join God as a partner in creating new life.
Judaism believes we are created by God with a system of ducts and tubes
that must open and close and expel and leak appropriately for us to exist.74
Unlike in Hellenistic thought, which creates a dualism between the purity of
the soul and the degradation of the body, Judaism presents the body as being
created in God’s image and therefore worthy of care and respect75 and impor-
tant to our wholeness in serving God.76 This refers to the female body as much
as the male body. Women can finally celebrate the wholeness and sacredness
of being created by God with the potential to join God as a partner (along with
73 Adler, “In Your Blood, Live,” 38–41 (rebutting her first article).
74 This is expressed in the Asher yatzar prayer recited daily.
75 Gen 1:27, cf. the story about Hillel, Lev. Rab. 34:3.
76 This is one possible reason for the importance of resurrection as a foundational belief of
the Pharisees and Rabbis according toWill Herberg, JudaismandModernMan (NewYork:
Atheneum, 1983), 229.
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their spouses) in creating new life, made possible by the ebb and flow of their
monthly menstrual cycles.
Observance of a woman’smenstrual period through self-care and reflection,
followedby immersion in thewarmwaters of themikvehwith its blessing, then,
can become part of a ritual designed to raise within us a radical sense of appre-
ciation and wonder, like the rituals of reciting the blessings on going to the
bathroom, eating, or engaging in a myriad of other normal human functions.
Such blessings, expressing appreciation for being created as we are, can be per-
tinent to all women, whether married or single, sexually active or celibate.
Such a reinterpretation may require a reconfiguration of the language that
surrounds the development of these laws in a way that captures this sense
of holy awareness. The language of Tohorat HaMishpahah, popularized in the
early twentieth century,77 carries with it not only the negative connotations of
the ritual purity/impurity system, but also the focus on a woman only when





Whatever is written in the Torah and in traditional teaching about the
laws relating to things impure and pure is relevant only to theTemple and
its hallowed things and to heave-offering and second tithe, for it warns
those impure against entering the Temple or eating anything hallowed,
or heave-offering, or tithe in impurity.78
That is true here as well.
I have elsewhere suggested we substitute the traditional usage of Tohorat
HaMishpahah (the purity of the family) with the language Kedushat HaMish-
pahah, the sanctity of the family.79While retaining the focus on the beauty and
sanctity of the marriage, which has value in this age of trying to keep families
together, such language nevertheless ignores the very real challenge of defining
women’s experience as women in relation to God rather than just in relation to
men.
77 My appreciation to Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz for researching this point.
78 Mishneh Torah, Tumat Okhelim 16:8.
79 Grossman, “Feminism, Midrash, and Mikveh,” 14–15.
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Today, I would revise that suggestion with the substitute terminology Kedu-
shat Yetzirah, the Sanctity of Creation, or the sanctity of a created being. This
terminology has many significant allusions, i.e., to the female form of cre-
ated being (ytzir-h), to creation itself (as partners in creation) (ytzirah), to
self-control (kibush hayetzer).80 Either of these terms (KedushatMishpahah or
Kedushat Yetzirah) offer an authentic Conservative contribution to the evolu-
tion of halakhic ritual language.
The term for a menstruant would be based on the more neutral term for
blood, dam, following current Israeli colloquial usage, as in ishah medamemet,
instead of the term niddah, which we have seen above has negative connota-
tions of spiritual impurity and sinfulness.81 This is alsowhy I do not preferwhat
others might consider the neutral language of Hilkhot Niddah in referring to
these laws.
Using the language of kedushah focuses us on the command to be holy that
culminates the list of sexual commandments in Lev. 18, the source for refraining
from sexual relations duringmenses.More importantly, it focuses us on the real
reason we do this: to bring holiness into our lives through Jewish observance
even in our most personal experiences.
It is important tonote that the commandment tomark one’smenses (Lev. 15)
was not given in the Torah to married women, but to all women.While immer-
sion in that ritual context outside of sexual activity is not required (hayav), all
women, not just those in a sexual relationship,may have the desire to enjoy the
spiritual benefits of monitoring their cycles and immersing in amikveh.
Summary of Details of Observance
1. Ritual Purity: Women today know their bodies and can distinguish be-
tween dam niddah and dam zavah.
a. In response to a question received by the CJLS whether a menstru-
ant imparts impurity to that which she touches: Today, when the
80 In a previous paper, “Feminism, Midrash, and Mikveh,” I had suggested the terminol-
ogy “Kedushat Mishpahah.” However, a growing number of single Jewish women have
expressed interest in celebrating the cycle of potential life that God has given them
through their periods. In light of the requests of some of these women, and in consid-
eration of the critique of Adler, “In Your Blood, Live,” 38–41, who argues against mitzvot
directed at women that do not treat the woman as the commanded, I now prefer this
broader category that moves beyond the narrow definition of the family to encompass
the broader category of God’s creation and creative powers.
81 Similarly, the suggestion by Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz to substitute the more normative
Hilkhot Niddah, while accurate and preferable to Tohorot HaMishpahah, has the disad-
vantage of carrying with it the historical negative connotations of impurity.
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Temple no longer stands, the menstruant does not impart impurity
to the items she touches or sits upon, to others who touch her, or
the things the others have touched, or sat upon. No ritual restric-
tions are to be placed upon amenstruant. There is no halakhic basis
for restricting amenstruant frompublic or private prayer, from serv-
ing as shlihat tzibor, from access to the synagogue, from touching or
reading from a Sefer Torah, or other scrolls or holy books, or serving
in, or participating in, any other ritual role or function.82
2. Seven White Days: The categories of niddah and zavah are distinguish-
able. The custom to conflate the two, while representative of tradition,
is not a binding legal mandate. Therefore, a menstruant need not observe
sevenwhite days following the cessation of hermenses. Shemust observe
the minimum requirement of seven days of abstinence, the counting
for which begins with the first day of her menses, followed by immer-
sion.
a. While seven white days are no longer required before immersion
and the subsequent resumption of marital relations,83 any women
who prefers to follow the tradition of observing the extra seven
white days may, of course, do so.
3. SexualRelations:Themenstruant should refrain fromsexual relations for
seven days beginning with the first day of her flow. She can immerse after
the seventh day, or after the cessation of blood flow, if longer than seven
days. (See below for more details)
a. Because this is amitzvah about sexual self control, and because we,
as aMovement, have recognized and provided guidelines about sex-
ual relations prior to marriage,84 these laws are obligatory upon all
sexually active adults, not only when the partners are married.
i. There is a ladder to aspiring to holiness as we walk towards
God’s holy mountain, to utilize the imagery from our Move-
ment’s statement of belief, Emet vEmunah. For some that may
mean participating in a loving, committed relationship that
hopefully will someday culminate inmarriage. Applying these
laws to the unmarried does not blur the boundaries between
82 See Cohen, “Purity and Piety”; and on touching a seferTorah, seeWeiss, “Women and Sifrei
Torah.”
83 Rabbi Roth has been counseling rabbinical students for years that they need not count
the extra seven days following cessation of the woman’s period, but merely wait one day
to be sure the period is over.
84 In Rabbi Elliot Dorff ’s Rabbinic Letter on Sexual Intimacy.
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marital relations (which are encouraged) and pre-marital rela-
tions (which are discouraged) as much as it hopefully moti-
vates thoughtful and mature discussions and decisions about
whether to engage in premarital relations with a significant
other.
b. Although a full discussion regardingparturients, particularly thedif-
ferentiation of periods of abstinence based upon the child’s gender,
is beyond the scope of this paper, couples should abstain from sex-
ual relations for at least twoweeks following birth (or oneweek after
the birth of a boy, in the case of a particular hardship during which
both partners desire sexual intimacy). However, couples should not
resume relations until the woman feels she is sufficiently healed,
physically, to be able to enjoy intimate relations.
4. Determining the Beginning and End of Menses: For our purposes, a
menstruant would be defined as one experiencing her menstrual flow.
While the normalmenstrual flow (a veset, regularly occurring period) has
traditionally been understood to be from three to seven days, we can rely
on a woman’s acumen that she can distinguish for herself when her flow
begins and ends, even when her periods are irregular and even when her
period runs for more or fewer days than the 3–7 average. In the case of
abnormalities, the woman can rely on the expertise of her doctor and can
consult her rabbi.
a. We can rely on the woman to notify her partner when sexual rela-
tions should be suspended, i.e., when the woman feels the onset of
her period is imminent. If a woman gets her periodwhen the couple
is in the middle of relations, the couple merely separates.85
b. Bedikah, internal inspection, is not necessary before resumption of
sexual relations because we assume women know when their peri-
ods are completed. A woman who is particularly pious and has had
a period of irregular length can choose to inspect herself (bedikah)
with a soft cloth or check her tampon86 to be extra sure she has com-
pleted her period. If a woman is unsure whether she is finishedwith
her menstrual flow, she should wait one day to determine whether
85 SeeTeshuvot PoskimUminhagim, R.Meir Bar BarukhM. Rotenberg (Maharam), ed. Yitzhak
Zev Kahana, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Mosad HaRav Kook, 1957), 146, cf. sheilot 90–103.
86 AlthoughOrthodoxhalakhah frownson theuse of a tamponbecause it cannot reach every
part that needs to be checked (Gefen Porioh, 29, 219 n. 21), b. Nid. 66a seems to offer a
precedent for its use, especially since newer tampons are designed to be soft, absorbent,
and expansive.
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her period is over, unless such a wait would endanger the possibility
of conception in the case of infertility. (See below.)
c. The woman must wait the requisite seven days from the first day of
her period before attendingmikveh and resuming relations.
d. In the case of infertility problems, and if there are medical reasons
why waiting until the eighth day to resume relations is problem-
atic, the woman should consult with her rabbi to see if there is a
way to start her count earlier. For example, in the rare case where a
woman ovulates on the seventh day from the beginning of her full
flow, if she began staining several days preceding her full flow, and
her full flow only lasts five days, it may be possible to count the days
of staining that preceded the start of her full flow as the beginning of
her actual flow and therefore part of the requisite seven. Then what
might appear as the seventh day (if counted from the beginning of a
full flow) really is the eighth, ninth or tenth day and is therefore per-
mitted, since the counting could begin from the day she first began
staining. This leniency should only be relied upon for special cases
of extenuating circumstances regarding infertility.
5. Mid-Cycle Staining:We assume that mid-cycle staining is caused by one
of a variety of external reasons (diet, medicine, treatment, physical exer-
tion, illness) which would be permitted and therefore such blood would
not be considered dam zivah prohibiting sexual activity.
a. In all cases of infertility, we should bemakil (lenient).
b. When ovulation can take place during the period where a woman
continues to experience bleeding or staining continuously beyond
her seventh day, and when a woman is battling with infertility, even
here we can assume this is permissible blood (as above) and there-
fore mikveh can take place and sexual relations can be resumed.
This is important because ovulation for some women occurs imme-
diately following their periods or coincides with staining. In such
cases, the mitzvot of pekuach nefesh87 (protecting the woman’s life
from the long term effects of drug therapy) and peru urvu (procre-
ation) take precedence. (For how to determine the end of awoman’s
menses for women without a compelling need, see above.)
6. Physical contact during the week of abstinence: We live in a society
that, while sensitized to sexual harassment and abuse, also treats touch-
87 On pekuah nefesh: e.g., b. Šabb. 151b, Halal alav Shabbat ahat kdae shyshmor Shabbatot
harbeh. (One should transgress this one Shabbat in order that one may observe many
Shabbatot.)
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ing between sexes very casually. Therefore, even during a period of sexual
abstention, types of physical contact which provides support, comfort,
and companionability (such as that appropriate between adult siblings)
can, and should, continue. A handshake, a hug, holding someone’s arm,
shoulder or hand (especially in times of illness or stress, such as at a
funeral or in the hospital), even a kiss on the cheek or a light kiss on the
lips is common between relatives and friends of opposite sexes, with no
sexual innuendo.Therefore, somephysical contact can continue between
partners during the woman’s menstruation as long as it is limited to that
which is generally accepted in society between siblings.88
a. Under these guidelines, partners should not sleep in the same bed
unless clothed and should exercise modesty in undressing and
dressing in front of each other during this time period. Newlyweds
(andespecially unmarried sexually activepartners)must beparticu-
larly careful not to be drawn into physical intimacy which wemight
colloquially describe as necking or heavy petting.
b. One or both partners might very normally experience this period
of sexual abstinence as a time of submerged tensions, of feeling
ignored or of experiencing self-doubt. This time of sexual absti-
nence should be utilized by the couple not to ignore each other,
but to heighten their sensitivity to each other, perhaps by putting
aside time for extensive and intimate discussions. The couple may
choose to utilize this time to study together some of the extensive
literature that is available that helps us better understand how inti-
macy functions in our relationships. The week of sexual abstinence
then can serve as an opportunity for doing the serious interpersonal
work that helps strengthen the foundation of themarriage, particu-
larly around honest and intimate communication. In this way, the
period of sexual abstention becomes a time to reaffirm the non-
sexual component, the intellectual and emotional partnership, of
the relationship.89 Hopefully, such conscious effort during the days
of abstinence can infuse the entire relationship, throughout each
88 Whereas, previously it would have been prohibited, even to the extent of not passing any-
thing to each other and not sleeping in the same bed, even when dressed, all in order
to provide a fence by which to protect against touching that might lead to conjugal rela-
tions. Cf., Num. Rab. 10:8 which prohibits embracing, kissing, conversation, and sleeping
together, and discourages the menstruant from beautifying herself. R. Akiva reversed the
latter, arguing that a woman should not appear repugnant to her husband, b. Šabb. 64b;
cf. Saldarini, AdRNB, 44–45, nn. 1–5.
89 My appreciation to R. James Michaels for suggesting this.
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day of the month, with such sanctity that each partner can see the
other, in every interaction, as an equal reflection of godlinessworthy
of deep and abiding respect and concern, as I and Thou, according
toMartinBuber’s beautiful constructionof the ideal possible in rela-
tionships.
c. Although a full discussion of the parturient is outside the scope of
this paper (particularly regarding the fact that the gender of the
child determines the length of sexual abstinence), regarding physi-
cal, non-sexual, contact: the partner can be present during birth and
should not hesitate to touch the birthingwoman to support her dur-
ing the birthing process and to give comfort and support during the
weeks following birth, as outlined above in paragraph 6.
7. Mikveh: Immersion in themikveh should take place after the seventh day
following the beginning of menses.
a. Immersing while having a flow does not transmit impurity to the
mikveh.90 Therefore in the case of a woman who is experiencing
staining after the seventh day, shemay attendmikveh, particularly if
she is grappling with infertility and resuming sexual relations after
the seventh day will help support the infertility treatments or is on
advice she has received from her doctor.
b. Ideally, both members of the couple should try to immerse in the
mikveh.91Mostmikvaot today have time periods set aside forwomen
and men, to protect modesty.
c. Women can immerse in themikveh during daylight, b’od yom.92 Cer-
tainly for reasons of safety, but even for convenience to encourage
mikveh use, mikvaot should set aside regular hours for women to
attend the mikveh during the day, in which case the woman would
immerse on the day following the end of her period.
d. The mikveh should be open to any women who would like to im-
merse (e.g. singles, brides, women going for healing ceremonies, or
just for pietistic reasons not related to their periods or particular
health or fertility concerns).
90 Thewater of a propermikveh cannot become impure. ResponsaChatamSofer, YorehDeah
213. This implies that for those who permit the use of a swimming pool as a mikveh (see
above herein), where there is continued staining, a swimming pool should not be relied
upon.
91 Rabbi Joel Roth has been recommending this for years to rabbinical students.
92 Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 197:4 permits daytime immersions when there is concern for
safety.
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e. We in the Conservative Movement should encourage the building
of Conservativemikvaot and the use of mikvaot.
f. We should reintroduce the tradition of bringing the bride to the
mikveh and develop a parallel ceremony for the groom as a substi-
tute for the bachelor party.
8. Making the time of resumption of relations special: The night following
the completion of the woman’s menstrual flow can be a special roman-
tic interlude. This is especially important for today’s couples who often
find themselves so busy with dual careers or, even in one career families
where with the daily challenges of raising kids, partners often have little
time to themselves to keep the romantic spark alive between them. The
night following the completion of thewoman’smenses and immersion in
themikveh should be set aside whenever possible for the couple to spend
together. Parents can arrange for a sitter and go out. (Possibly they can
first go to the mikveh and then out to dinner.) This can be a night to set
aside for enjoying the specialmitzvah of sexual relationswithinmarriage.
In long term relationships (marriages of ten years andmore), this ensures
that a sexual component remains alive as part of the relationship.
a. Whenovulation takes place later than the eight day, andwhere there
are infertility concerns, the couple may wait until the day of ovula-
tion to resume sexual relations so as to maximize chances for con-
ception.93
9. Choosing to be Mahmir (Stricter): Anyone who prefers to be mahmir,
stringent with themselves, may continue to observe seven white days, as
long as doing so does not pose a possible danger to the woman’s health
(for example, by relying onmedical intervention that would be necessary
only to conform to themahmir position) for to do so is not piety but pro-
hibited foolishness.94
10. Language and Context: The term Tohorat HaMishpahah continues to be
loaded not only with negative implications and symbolism but also very
real social stigma for women today. That changing language is difficult
should not eclipse the significant changes being initiated that would help
spread observance and help ameliorate the challenges faced by infertile
couples. Therefore, we will just suggest here that, for those who have the
interest and the will, that more positive language can be substituted for
93 This follows medical guidelines to maximize the amount of semen that can be available
during ovulation.
94 Cf. Responsa of Radbaz, pt. 2, no. 1139. See Roth, 183–185.
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the relatively new term Tohorot HaMishpahah which, we should remem-
ber, only became popular in the last century. Kedushat Mishpahah may
appeal to some who seek to strengthen the focus on family. Kedushat
Yetzirah is a more neutral term that focuses on each woman’s direct rela-
tionship with, responsibility to, and appreciation of God. In either case,
instead of referring to the menstruant as a niddah, which has carried a
negative connotation since later Biblical and rabbinic literature, themen-
struant canbe calledby themoreneutral term ishahmedamemet, which is
currently in use in Israel. Similarly, the term Hilkhot Niddah, while prefer-
able to Tohorat HaMishpahah, is not recommended since it continues to
be burdened with the negative connotation of niddah. Following a sug-
gestion by Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz, the permissibility of sexual relations
can be noted with the simple terminology of mutar (permitted) and asur
(prohibited).
Summary
First it is important to reiterate that even under Jewish law as it currently
stands, there are no religious or social restrictions on the role of the menstru-
ant in the synagogue and its rituals. Similarly, under current Jewish law, there is
no fear of contracting ritual impurity from contact with a menstruant or with
that which the menstruant has sat upon.
When we apply this view consistently to men and women in our commu-
nities, we remove the stigma and disadvantages experienced by women by
being labeled impure. For centuries now, men have been treated no differently
whether or not they are zavim or baalei keri. So too, we can now recognize that
womenarenot tobe treateddifferently for being zavot ornashimmedammemot
(menstruants). We are all technically in the ritual state of tumat met, impure
from contact with the dead. If and when the Temple were to be rebuilt, we
could reactivate the detailed observances of these largely inactive categories
of ritual purity and impurity.
That said, evenwith the flattening of the purity system, we are still obligated
to self-control in our sexual relations as delineated in Leviticus 18, which pro-
scribes sexual relationswhenawoman is inher period.TheTannaimheld absti-
nence for only the biblical proscribed sevendays. Rebbe conflated themenstru-
ant with the zavah (adding the seven white days of the zavah) at Sadoth. His
ruling was for the women there at the time because they did not know how to
distinguish between the two types of blood. However Jewish women today can
distinguish between the two. Following the Rosh, we can permit that which
was previously prohibited where it is based upon minhag (even where it is
commonlymistaken for law) andwhen observance of the stricture is regretted.
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This is the case for the majority of observant women of our Movement, who,
unlike their foremothers, regret the obligation of the additional seven white
days. Therefore, women need count only seven days from the first day of their
period and immerse on the eighth before resuming sexual relations.
We can rely on the earlier rabbinic precedent of Rabbi Akiva to consider
the cause, rather than the source, of a genital emission as determinative, and
assume that a woman’s mid-cycle staining is permissible as the result of diet,
medicine, treatment, physical activity, or illness.
This ruling has the immediate advantage of easing the challenges faced
by couples who are observant and struggling with infertility therapies, as de-
scribed above, although it also provides assistance to women encountering
mid-cycle staining for other reasons, for example cancer treatment, as well.
Therefore, based upon our concern for the commandments of vahai bahem (to
protect life and health, even in cases of doubt) and for the emergency concerns
of fertility in the Jewish community and for individual couples in their efforts to
fulfill the mitzvah of pru urvu (procreation), and since the Torah never explic-
itly prohibits sexual relations with a zavah, sexual relations are to be permitted
duringmid-cycle or ovulatory staining, because such staining is consideredper-
missible since it is due to diet, medicine, treatment, physical activity, or illness.
When confronted with infertility issues, the local rabbi as morah d’atra should
make every effort to bemakil.
Finally, in order to support, pedagogically, the embracing of the mitzvah of
self control and distinguish it from the negative attributes and disadvantages
womenhave beenplaced under by the continuing identity of the observance of
sexual abstinence during a woman’s menstruation with the purity system, it is
recommended, though not legislated, that rabbis and teachers begin to utilize
a different terminology than has previously been used: substituting for Toho-
rat HaMishpahah either Kedushat HaMishpahah, the sanctity of the family, or
preferably the more neutral term Kedushat Yetzirah, the sanctity of creation,
for the entire category of observance, and, in either case, substituting for the
word niddah, the more neutral term ishah medammemet, for the menstruant.
Conclusions
There are no social or religious restrictions on the role of themenstruant in the
synagogue and its rituals.
Women should abstain from sexual activity for seven days following the
onset of their menses. Sexual relations can resume on the eighth day without
recourse to counting seven white days, following tannaic precedent.
Mid-cycle staining does not preclude sexual relations, particularly in the
case of infertility, since we assume, based upon tannaitic precedent, that such
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staining is caused by diet,medical treatment, physical exertion or illness. Stain-
ing therefore is not to be considered dam zivah that would preclude sexual
relations, but rather permitted blood.
It is recommended that the language used to describe this mitzvah reflect
concerns for the sanctity of the individual and her family, rather than the neg-
ative connotations of the purity system, by relying on such terms as Kedushat
HaMishpahah or themore neutral term Kedushat Yetzirah, and referring to the
menstruant herself by the current Hebrew term ishah medammemet.
Submitted with Yirat Shamayim by Rabbi Susan Grossman Tishrei, 5767. Revised
Iyar 5779.
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chapter 4
On the Recitation of “Amen” between Ge’ulah and
Tefillah of the Shaḥarit Service
Robert A. Harris
Encomium1
I am both honored and delighted to dedicate this teshuvah to my Rav and
mentor, Rabbi Joel Roth, וישרפולארשיבכר,יבא,יבא ! The great 13th-century com-
mentator, Ralbag (R. Levi b. Gershon, or Gersonides) glossed this verse (2Kgs
2:12) as follows: באארקיברהןכ,םיאיבנהינבומכ,םינבםיארקנםידימלתהשומכהנה
דימלתהלכשדילומהאוהיכ , “Just as disciples are considered as children, as in the
expression ‘children of the prophets,’ so too is a rabbi called father, because he
gives birth to the student’swisdom.” Fromtheday ImetRabbiRothand through
to the very day of this writing, he has been a father to me, and whatever wis-
dom there may be in this teshuvah reflects but a small portion of what he has
helped me to develop. I am forever grateful.
Sheilah
The practice is widespread that during the Shaḥarit service that the shali’aḥ
tzibbur becomes silent during the berakhah “ga’al yisrael,” just before the begin-
ning of the Shaḥarit Amidah. This is presumably for the purpose of avoiding a
break between the blessing and the beginning of the Amidah.2 However, this
custom appears contrary to the whole purpose of having a shali’aḥ tzibbur in
1 This teshuvah was approved by the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee on Jewish Law and
Standards on October 31, 2001. For the original publication, and acknowledgments for the
help I received in writing the responsum, see https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/defa
ult/files/assets/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20012004/oh_66_7_2003‑1.pdf.
2 Thus R. Isaac Klein, A Guide to Jewish Religious Practice (New York: Jewish Theological Sem-
inary, 1979), 20: “It has become customary for the reader to say the concluding words of the
benediction quietly lest the congregation have to respond with Amen and thereby interrupt
the sequence of prayer.”
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first place, i.e., to enable one who does not know the prayer to fulfill his/her
obligation by responding “amen” to the blessing of the shali’aḥ tzibbur.
Shall the one leading services fall silent for the blessing just before the Ami-
dah, in accordancewith this custom?Or should she/he say the blessing audibly
so that thosewhohear theblessing (including thosewhodonot know thebless-
ing or have not yet recited it) can respond “amen” to the blessing?
Teshuvah
On the surface, the question would appear to be quite easily answered. R. Yosef
Karo (Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 66:7) addresses the issue succinctly, and decides the
question in the negative:
.קספהיוהדםושמלארשילאגרחאןמארמואוניא
One should not say “amen” after (the blessing) “who redeemed Israel,”
because it constitutes an interruption.
Thus, the principle of “joining ge’ulahwith tefillah” ( הליפתלהלואגןיכמוס ) is con-
sidered by R. Karo to be so absolute that even the mere recitation of the word
“amen” would be enough to violate it. Presumably, the custom of falling silent
justbefore theblessing is to avoid tempting the congregation to respond “amen,”
even though R. Karo does not state this explicitly here.3 Although R. Moshe
Isserles provides a gloss that diverges somewhat from R. Karo, his ruling does
not seem to have affected the prevalent custom:
ללפתהםאלבא.ןמארובצחילשהרחאתונעלןיגהונןכו,ןמאןינועדםירמואשיו:הגה
.ןמאןינועןיא,דבל
3 See previous footnote, and also Max Arzt, Justice and Mercy: Commentary on the Liturgy of
the New Year and the Day of Atonement (New York: Holt, Rinehart andWinston, 1963), 80–81:
“This blessing … is recited by the reader in an undertone, to obviate the necessity of the con-
gregations’s responding ‘Amen.’ ” Likewise, see Daniel Sperber, Minhagei Yisrael [in Hebrew]
(Jerusalem:MossadHaravKook, 1989), 4:26–28. Sperber reasons asKlein andArzt do, i.e., that
the shali’aḥ tzibur lowers his voice so that no one will respond “amen.” However, he found no
source accounting for that part of the custom! See esp. p. 26, n. 9, and p. 28 ( ,םנמא,םיבותכב(
םירבדהתאיתאצמםרט,רומאכ . The custom of the shali’aḥ tzibbur falling silent before the
blessing ga’al yisrael is related to the practice of not reciting “amen” after the blessing. Below,
we will analyze the Bet Yosef to OḤ 66, which cites the Zohar in connection with this latter
issue.
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Gloss: There are those who say that we do respond “amen,” and so is it
the custom to answer “amen” after the shali’aḥ tzibbur. But one who has
prayed alone should not respond “amen.”4
R. Karo repeats his ruling in a subsequent section of the Shulḥan Arukh (111:1):
םושבאלו,לארשילאגרחאןמאבוליפאםהיניבקיספיאלוהלפתלהלואגךומסלךירצ
.חתפתיתפש׳המץוחקוספ
One must join ge’ulah to tefillah and not interrupt (with any words)
between them, neither with (the response of) “amen” after (the blessing)
ga’al yisrael nor with (the recitation of) any verse other than “O Adonai,
open my lips …” (Ps 51:17).5
Likewise, as he had done earlier, Isserles demurs from R. Karo’s ruling:
.ןיגהונןכו,לארשילאגלעןמאתונעלרתומשםירמואשיו:הגה
Gloss: And there are thosewho say that it is permissible to respond “amen”
for (the blessing ga’al yisrael), and such is the custom.
In both instances (66:7 and 111:1), Isserles relied upon the ruling of the Arba’ah
Turim for his position.Wewill have occasion to review the ruling of this source
below.
The prevalent custom, i.e., of not responding “amen” after the blessing of
the shali’aḥ tzibbur, is indeed reflected in the Mishnah Berurah (OḤ 66:7, para-
graph 32):
.ץ״שהרחאןיבוומצערחאןיב:ןמארמואוניא
One should not say “amen”: i.e., whether in response to one’s own (bless-
ing) or in response to the (blessing of) the shali’aḥ tzibbur.
4 I.e., to his own blessing. The Mishnah Berurah (n. 34) observes that some believe that even a
lone worshipper would respond “amen” at this point to his/her own blessing, since it marks
the conclusion of the segment of the service entitled “the Shema and Its Blessings” ( אוהשןויכ
עמשתאירקלשתוכרברדסלשםויס ).
5 See b. Ber. 4b for the explanation of why the recitation of this verse and, likewise, the recital of
the hashkivenu prayer in the evening service, are not considered to be interruptions between
the blessing ga’al yisrael and the beginning of the Amidah.
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Likewise, the Arukh Hashulhan (66:14–16) essentially agrees with the posi-
tion that the obligation to juxtapose ge’ulah with tefillah includes the prohibi-
tion against reciting “amen” at that point in the service. While he admits that
there are differences of opinion on the subject ( ,לארשילאגלשןמאתיינעןינעבו
…תקולחמשי ), and as well reviews many opinions on the various occasions in
which answering “amen” is either permitted or required, he nonetheless rules
in this instance that—whatever logic or correctness there may be in reciting
“amen”—one should maintain the opinion of R. Karo in not so reciting ( לכמ
ןכוניאוניגהנמםוקמ ).
Background of R. Karo’s Ruling
The reason for R. Karo’s ruling that the response of “amen” is prohibited at this
point in the service is ostensibly based on the principle of הליפתלהלואגןיכמוס ,
the necessity to “juxtapose the blessing ga’al yisrael with the beginning of the




For R. Zeira said in the name of Abba barYirmiya: Three things should fol-
low one immediately upon the other: immediately after the laying-on of
hands, the sacrifice should be slaughtered; immediately after thewashing
of hands, the blessing for food should be recited;8 immediately after (the
blessing) ga’al yisrael, the prayer (i.e., the Amidah) should be recited ….9
6 For a review of the ancient rabbinic texts, and particularly the dissonance between the Baby-
lonian and the PalestinianTalmuds, see Israel Ta-Shma, “Semichat Geulah Litefillah,” inHate-
fillah haashkenazit hakedumah (Jerusalem: TheMagnes Press, The HebrewUniversity, 2003),
101–109. Ta Shma does not address our question with respect to the recitation of “amen” in
between the end of the “Shema and its blessings” and the beginning of the Amidah, since the
question did not come up in antiquity. I am grateful tomy colleague, Dr. Jonathan S.Milgram,
for referring me to this article.
7 See the parallel text in b. Ber. 42a.
8 There is a controversy between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi whether this statement refers to
the washing of the hands before a meal, to be followed by themotzi blessing; or if it refers to
themayyimaḥaronim at the endof ameal, to be followedby theblessings after food. See Louis
Ginzberg, A Commentary on the Palestinian Talmud [in Hebrew] (New York: Ktav Publishing
House, 1971), 1:71–72.
9 The continuation of this text describes many of the benefits accruing to those following the
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Juxtaposing the blessing ga’al yisrael with the beginning of the Amidah
is also praised in the Babylonian Talmud (b. Ber. 9b). Just as we saw in the
Yerushalmi, so, too, in the Bavli the suggestion is followed by aggadic-type com-







For R. Yoḥanan said: the clever ones10 used to finish it [the recital of the
Shema] with sunrise. It was (also) taught thus as a Tannaitic teaching:
the elders used to finish it [the recital of the Shema] with sunrise, in
order to join the ge’ulah with the tefillah, and say the tefillah in the day-
time … R. Yosi b. Eliakim testified in the name of the holy community of
Jerusalem: if one joins the ge’ulah to the tefillah, he will not meet with
anymishap for the whole of the day… R. Ela said to Ulla:When you go up
there [to Eretz Israel], give my greeting to my brother R. Berona … once
he succeeded in joining ge’ulah to tefillah, and a smile did not leave his
lips for the whole day.11
TheYerushalmi foundBiblical precedent for theprinciple, in that the final verse
of Psalm 19 ( ילאגוירוצ׳הךינפליבלןויגהויפירמאןוצרלויהי ), which it considered to
rule, e.g., םויהותואבגרטקמןטשהןיאהליפתלהלואגףכותאוהשימלכו , “and everyonewho
juxtaposes ge’ulah to tefillah—the Satan may not indict him that day.” Louis Ginzberg
explains that Jews in rabbinic antiquity were expected to “pray” five times a day, if one
counts the two readings of the Shema and the three recitations of the Amidah. The
Yerushalmi is thus proposing in this passage that the total number of required prayers be
limited to three, by joining the Amidah in the morning and the evening to the prescribed
Shema of that time of day. See Ginzberg, Commentary, 1:72–75; see also p. lxxii.
10 See David Golinkin, “The Meaning of the Terms ‘Vatikin,’ ‘Vatik’ and ‘Talmid Vatik’ in Ben
Sira and Rabbinic Literature” [in Hebrew], Sidra 13 (1997): 47–60.
11 See the analogous text in b. Ber. 4b: “For R. Yoḥanan says: who inherits the world to come?
The one who follows the ge’ulah immediately with the evening tefillah … Mar b. Rabina
raised an objection. In the evening, two blessings precede and two blessings follow, the
Shema. Now, if you say he has to join ge’ulah with tefillah, behold he does not do so, for
he has to say hashkivenu in between! Then I reply: since the rabbis ordained the blessing,
hashkivenu, it is as if it were a long ge’ulah.”
116 harris
signify the blessing ga’al yisrael, was “immediately” followed by the beginning
(not counting the superscription) of Psalm 20 ( הרצםויב׳הךנעי ), which signified
the beginning of the Amidah.12 However, none of the foregoing aggadic texts
in any way indicates that the principle of joining ge’ulah to tefillah explicitly
prohibits the recitation of “amen,” or indicates that its recitation constitutes a
kind of prohibited interruption.13
Halakhic Sources in Disagreement with R. Yosef Karo
Earlier, we noted that R. Moshe Isserles, in his glosses on the Shulḥan Arukh,
had disagreed with R. Karo’s ruling. Relying on the Tur, Isserles had decided
that the response of “amen” after the blessing ga’al yisrael did not constitute a
prohibited interruption. Here is the relevant text of the Tur (OḤ 66):
ןויכ—ויתוכרברחאדיחיוליפא—ןמארמואו,לארשילאג׳ההתאךורב:םתוחו…
.תוכרברדסלשםויסאוהש
… and he completes (the blessing emet ve-yatziv, following the Shema,
with the words): “Praised are you, O Adonai, Who has redeemed Israel,”
12 y. Berakhot 2d [6a]: הרצםויב׳הךנעי?הירתבביתכהמ—יפירמאןוצרלויהי .
13 R. David Golinkin directs my attention to the additional objections to reciting “amen”
raised in R. Gedaliah Felder’s Sefer Yesodei Yeshurun (Toronto, 1954), 284. The most seri-
ous of these is R. Felder’s claim that the Seder Rav Amram prohibits the recitation of
“amen” after ga’al yisrael ( ,קספהםושמלארשילאגרחאןמאןינועןיאשןואגםרמעברבתכ
הלפתלהלואגךומסלךירצשו ).Were this to be true, it would be amost serious impediment
to the contention of this teshuvah. However, I cannot locate a text within the Seder Rav
Amram that addresses our specific issue. Indeed, in its presentation of the liturgy at the
transition between the Shema and Its Blessings and the Amidah, the Seder Rav Amram
essentially reaffirms the general rule of not making an interruption between ge’ulah and
tefillah that we have already reviewed. See Daniel S. Goldschmidt (ed.), Seder Rav Amram
Gaon [Hebrew] (Jerusalem:MossadHarav Kook, 1971), 20: ׳ההתאךורב.דעוםלועלךלמי׳ה
ךומסישידכ,ביציותמארחאםירבדםירמואןיאו…ךולמי׳הלערבדףיסוהלןיאו…לארשילאג
הלפתלהלואג . The Seder invokes hereTosefta Berakhot 3:6 ( ,ביציותמארחאםירבדרמואןיא
…הלפתרחאםירבדרמואלבא ). Professor Lieberman has, of course, already explained
this passage as referring to the prohibition of reciting piyyutim at this point in the service
( הלואגךמוסוניאשינפמ,ביציותמאירחאהרשעהנומשתלפתינפלןיסוליקרמולוטייפלןיא
הלפתל ); it does not address the question of whether the recitation of “amen” is permit-
ted or prohibited. See Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah: A Comprehensive Commentary
on the Tosefta: Order Zera’im, Part I [Hebrew] (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of
America, 1955), 31.
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and says “amen”—i.e., even an individual after (having recited) his bless-
ings—since this is the conclusion of the order of the Blessings (surround-
ing the Shema).
In a second passage, after reviewing many of the blessings (recounted in the
two Talmudim) accruing to one who joins ge’ulah to tefillah, the Tur enlarges
upon its earlier ruling (OḤ 111):
תוכרבםויסרחאאוהשןויכותונעלהווצמו,קספהיוהאללארשילאגרחאןמאלבא…
.…עמשתאירקלש
… But the (recitation of) “amen” after ga’al yisrael does not constitute
an interruption, and it is a commandment to respond with it, since it
follows the conclusion of the blessings surrounding the Reading of the
Shema.
These two rulings of the Tur themselves have earlier medieval precedents.






A baraitha teaches: the one who leads (the congregation in reciting) the
Shema, and the one who passes before the ark (to lead the congregation
in the Amidah) … and the one who says a blessing with regard to any of
the commandments mentioned in the Torah, should not respond “amen”
after himself (i.e., after his own blessing). And if he did respond, he is a
boor. There is a Tanna who teaches: he is a wise man. Said Rav Ḥisda: the
one who said “he is a boor” (said so) with regard to one who responded
(“amen”) to any individual blessing; the one who said “he is a wise man”
(said so) with regard to one who responded (“amen”) to the end of (an
entire section of the liturgy).
14 Its source is t. Meg. 3:27 and y. Ber. 5:4 [9c]; see also b. Ber. 45b. I am grateful to R. Joel Roth
for calling these sources to my attention.
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The students of Rabbenu Yonah extrapolate ad. loc. from this ruling of the





It follows from this that we learn amanmust say “amen” after the conclu-
sion of the Amidah, when he reaches to the One who blesses His people
Israel with peace—amen. And so must he say “amen” after (the blessing)
ga’al yisrael, which is also an ending—and this does not constitute an
interruption, since he must say it.




The Ge’onimwrote that every blessing that marks the end of a (liturgical)
section, even though it only is one blessing, one must respond “amen.”
And Rabbenu Yonah and Rashi15 wrote that (this is the rule) specifically
after a blessing that is the end of (a series of) blessings, as in the case of
the end of the Amidah and after ga’al yisrael….
Thus, from all of these sources one could reasonably conclude that the halak-
hah should be decided in favor of those who would permit or even require the
recitation of “amen” after the blessing ga’al yisrael, since that blessing consti-
tutes the conclusion of a major liturgical unit.
It would seem that Rambam, R. Moses Maimonides, would also rule in this




15 We will examine Rashi’s position, below.
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… And the one who responds (“amen”) after a blessing that is the end
of last blessings, such a one is praiseworthy, as in the case of (respond-
ing “amen” to) “Who builds Jerusalem” in the Birkat Hamazon, and after
the last blessing of the evening Reading of the Shema. And so it is with
regard to the end of every blessing that is itself the end of last blessings,
he responds “amen” after himself.
It must be admitted that Rambam explicitly mentions the individual reciting
“amen” after his own blessing, regarding the final blessing before the evening
Amidah; this is becausehedoesn’t allow it for a single blessing, and in themorn-
ing service there is only one blessing after the Shema. Nonetheless, one can
surely infer the position of Rambam that the community responds “amen” after
the blessings of the Shaḥarit Shema, since he rules at Hilkhot Tefillah 8:5:
.הרשעבאלאןמאוירחאןינועוםיעמושלכהועמשתכרבךרבמדחאהיהיאלןכו
And so one should not recite a blessing of the Shema, with everyone
responding “amen” after the recitation, except when a minyan is present.
Likewise, Rambam’s ruling seems clear at Hilkhot Tefillah 9:1, which gives the
prescriptions for the leader of community prayer and includes the following
provision:
.הכרבוהכרבלכרחאןמאםינועםהו,םרלוקבעמשלעסרופוליחתמו
He begins to lead the Shema (section of the liturgy) aloud, and they (the
congregants) respond “amen” to each blessing.16
A crucial source for some of the medieval discussions on the subject is found
in the Talmud (b. Ber. 45b):
16 The continuation of the Mishneh Torah here reads in our editions: תורקלוךרבלעדויהו
לארשילאגךרבמשדעארוקומע , “and the one who knows how to bless and read with
him (the leader) reads until he recites the blessing ga’al yisrael.” R. Karo notes that some
manuscripts he has examined include theword “amen” at the end of the sentence. R. Karo
rejects that reading as a scribal error, and declines to draw any halakhic implications from
it. See Kesef Mishneh ad. loc., and on Hilkhot Berakhot 1:16; see also Bet Yosef on the Tur;
OḤ 66. See also Moses Hyamson, ed., Mishneh Torah, by Maimonides, Edited According to
the Bodeleian (Oxford) Codex… [inHebrew] (Jerusalem, 1965), ad. loc.; there, the text like-




One baraitha taught: the one who responds “amen” after his own bless-
ings—such a one is praiseworthy. Another baraitha taught: such a one is
disgraceful. This (contradiction) is not a problem: one (is teaching) about
(the blessing in Birkat Hamazon) “Who builds Jerusalem,” and the other
one (is teaching) about all other blessings.17
Thus, according to this source it would appear that this baraitha regards one
who answers “amen” after his own blessing, in every case other than the bless-
ing “Who builds Jerusalem” in Birkat Hamazon, as a boor. However, this text
does not refer to one who responds “amen” after another’s berakhah.
In his commentary on thisTalmudic passage, theRosh, RabbenuAsher, rules
similarly to the Rif and his interpreters; like them, he regards the recitation of








One baraitha taught: one who answers “amen” after his own blessings—
such a one is praiseworthy; another baraitha taught that this is disgrace-
ful. It is not a difficulty—one rules with regard to all blessings, while the
other speaks specifically about “Who builds Jerusalem”… [That baraitha]
did not rule specifically about “Who builds Jerusalem,” but rather about
every concluding blessing along the lines of “Who builds Jerusalem,” for
one should not say that [the ruling] was specifically with regard to “Who
builds Jerusalem”…But certainly [one should respond “amen” after] every
concludingblessing like yishtabakh, since itmarks the endof pesukei dez-
imrah; likewise with regard to the blessing yehalelukha (since it marks
17 With regard to the expression אהו…אה , it should be noted that the expression is some-
what ambiguous; thus in this instance, it is not entirely clear which practice is “praisewor-
thy” and which “disgraceful.”
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the end of) Hallel; and so [it should be at] the end of the blessings of the
Shemoneh Esrai. And so it should be after the blessing ga’al yisrael. This
[recitation of “amen”] does not constitute an interruption, since onemust
say it.
Thus, Rabbenu Asher comes down squarely on the side of those who would
obligate worshippers to respond “amen” after the blessing ga’al yisrael.18
With similar reasoning, Rashi rules in favor of reciting “amen” after ga’al yis-
rael (on b. Ber. 45b, s.v. “ םילשוריהנובבאה ”):
עמשתאירקדתוכרבףוסבןכו.חבושמהזירה,תוכרבהףוסאיהש:םילשוריהנובבאה
…תיברעותירחש
This is in regard to “Who builds Jerusalem”: (This is so) since it is at the
end of the (section of statutory) blessings; thus it is praiseworthy (to say
“amen”). It is also true at the end of the blessings of the Reading of the
Shema, both in the morning and in the evening service.
In fact, R. Yosef Karo himself cites Rashi’s position, in his commentary (Kesef
Mishneh) on Hilkhot Berakhot 1:16:
.תיברעותירחשדלארשילאגרחאוליפאו,ןמאהנועתוכרבלכםויסרחאשי״שרבתכו
.ורמואלךירצשןויכ,הלפתלהלואגןיבהקספהיוהאלו
Rashi wrote that after the end of all of the berakhot one responds “amen,”
even after (the blessing) ga’al yisrael of the morning and the evening ser-
vice. And this does not constitute an interruption between ge’ulah and
tefillah, since one must say it.
R.Mordecai Jaffe, author of the Levush and a younger contemporary of R. Karo,
provides a useful contrast to R. Karo’s approach. He, too, recognizes that the
18 In this context, we may also refer to a liturgical variant that adds at least historical, if
not necessarily halakhically-relevant, weight to our argument. It is found in a manuscript
of the prayer ביציותמא , and is cited in Ismar Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy: A Comprehensive
History, trans. Raymond Scheindlin (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society; New York:
Jewish Theological Seminary, 1993), 21. The conclusion of the citation of the alternative
version reads: ןמאולאוגולארשירוצי״אב , “Praised are you, Adonai, Rock of Israel and its
redeemer. Amen.” It would seem that the practice indicated by this variant would have
included the recitation of “amen” following the blessing (whether by the congregation
alone or also by an individual worshipper is unimportant for our purposes).
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halakhah as decided by the Rishonim would be to say “amen” after ga’al yis-
rael (OḤ 66:7): םויסאיהשןויכ,ומצעתכרברחאדיחיוליפאןמאתונעלולהיהןידהןמו
עמשתאירקלשתוכרברדסלש , “it is reasonable to think that one should respond
‘amen’—even an individual after his own blessing, since it is the end of section
of blessings surrounding the Reading of the Shema.” Likewise, he understands
that there are people who do not wish to say it on account of the לודגדוס ,
or “deep (kabbalistic) secret” represented by the principle of “joining ge’ula
and tefillah.”19 However, in spite of his understanding of the kabbalistic ram-
ifications, he rules in both paragraphs that the recitation of “amen” does not
constitute an interruption, and should be recited in communal prayer after
ga’al yisrael ( ,לארשילאגרחאוליפאןזחהתכרברחאןמאתונעלבייחרובצהםעלבא
הלפתלהלואגןיבקספהיוהאלו ).
So far we have seen that, while all authorities presumably uphold the rab-
binic principle of הליפתלהלואגםיכמוס , many Rishonim specify that the re-
sponse of “amen” to the blessing ga’al yisrael before the Shaḥarit Amidah does
not constitute an interruption. Among these Rishonim,wemay note, are Rashi,
and R. Yitzhak Alfasi,20 Rabbenu Asher, and Rambam. These last named pose-
qim are of particular importance, we may add, since they are ostensibly the
halakhic determinants followed by R. Yosef Karo in the Bet Yosef, and conse-
quently, in the Shulḥan Arukh. We also cited the Arba’ah Turim in support of
this position, andwemay add R.Mordecai Jaffe, even thoughwe recognize that
he is not considered as authoritative a decisor as R. Yosef Karo.
Kabbalah as the Source of R. Yosef Karo’s Ruling
Why, then, would R. Karomove in the direction of the law he enacted, prohibit-
ing the recitation of “amen,” in the face of this considerable rabbinic opinion to
the contrary? Let us examine the Bet Yosef on OḤ (66), and review the evidence
it offers. After reviewing the positions of many of the authorities cited above,21
R. Karo writes:
19 R. Mordecai Jaffe, Sefer Levush Malkhut (reprint of Prague ed., 1623). See his presentation
of the halakha at OḤ 111:1, where he slightly expands on his understanding of the “secret.”
20 In determining Alfasi’s view, let us recall, we relied on the understanding of the Shiltei
Hagibborim and the students of Rabbenu Yonah.
21 RabbenuAsher, Rashi, and the students of RabbenuYonah. R. Karo also refers to Rambam,
Hilkhot Berakhot 1:18, in which it is stated: המדקשהנורחאההכרברחאאלאןמאןינועןיאו
תרחאהכרבהתוא , “… one only recites ‘amen’ after a final blessing that was preceded by
another blessing.” According to R. Karo, then, Rambam would not allow the recitation
of “amen” after ga’al yisrael since the liturgical section beginning emet ve-yatziv contains




But now the whole world is accustomed not to respond “amen” after ga’al
yisrael…22 Rather the reason is that they consider it to be an interruption
between ge’ulah and tefillah. And I have already written in Section 5123
that it is according to the Zohar that they became accustomed not to say
“amen” after ga’al yisrael….24
It is on the basis of this one source that the question turns, according to R. Karo:
the Zohar, in his mind, overrules all of the other halakhic opinions and prece-
dents.
However, R. Karo appears to misrepresent the Zohar in his affirmation that
the custom of not responding “amen” after ga’al yisrael can be traced to that
source: no text corresponding specifically to R. Karo’s ruling has been found
in the Zohar.25 While the possibility always exists, of course, that he was refer-
ring to some version of a Zohar text that is no longer extant, it is also possible
that R. Karo’s reference to “the Zohar” was for public consumption only, as that
work was already an authoritative text within the Jewish community. Indeed,
only one blessing; thus, “amen” would only be allowed in the case of a liturgical section
containing at least two successive berakhot. See also R. Karo in the Bet Yosef to OḤ 51.
22 This clause (“now the whole world is accustomed …”) remains an enigma at this point
in my research. Since I have not found antecedent to R. Karo a source prohibiting the
recitation of “amen” after the blessing ga’al yisrael, it appears to me rather that R. Karo is
essentially an innovator in this regard. A thorough perusal of siddurim, sifrei minhagim,
aḥaronim, and responsa would be required to determine which communities at the time
of the writing of the Bet Yosef recited “amen,” and which did not.
23 In truth, in the long note he writes in the Bet Yosef to OḤ 51, R. Karo doesn’t explain this
reference to the Zohar at any greater length thanhe does in 66.Hewrites, simply: רחאלבא
רהוזהיפלעןמאתונעלאלשוגהנלארשילאג , “but after ga’al yisrael they were accustomed
not to respond ‘amen,’ according to the Zohar.” See also the judgment of MosheHallamish,
Kabbalah in Liturgy, Halakhah and Customs [in Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University
Press, 2000), 165: רהוזהירבדלקיודמןויצףסויתיבבםוקמםושןיאןכש …
24 Note ad. loc. that the commentaries Darkhei Moshe (of R. Moshe Isserles) and Derishah
both rule against R. Karo, and affirm the recitation of “amen” after ga’al yisrael.
25 In another case, with regard to the degree to which women may participate in funerals
R. David Golinkin has demonstrated that R. Karo exceeded the clear ruling of the Zohar,
upon which Karo’s own more stringent ruling is ostensibly based. See R. David Golinkin,
“The Participation of Women in Funerals” in The Rabbinical Assembly of Israel: Va’ad
Halakhah Responsa 5747 (Jerusalem, 1987), 2:31–40; especially 35, n. 13, where Golinkin
discusses the issue of the relative weight of Talmud and Zohar in halakhic decisions.
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as we shall see, it seems that the tradition to which he was referring originated
notwithin the Zohar itself but in his ownmystical experience. Nevertheless, let
us consider what the Zohar does teach regarding the principle of הלואגןיכמוס
הליפתל , i.e., the “juxtaposition of the blessing ga’al yisrael with the beginning
of the Amidah.” It should come as no surprise that the Zohar places a high
value on maintaining this rule. The Zohar, of course, is following in the foot-
steps of the Talmudic tradition we examined above. However, it invests that
ancient rabbinic instruction with mystical insight. In several passages,26 the
Zohar holds that when the Shema and its blessings are recited, followed by
the Amidahwithout interruption, the worshippers enact themoment of union
between female Shekhinah and male Tiferet (via Yesod)—and it is understood
that nothing must interrupt that yihud, or “union.” However, the Zohar men-
tions nothing with regard to the recitation of the word “amen,” let alone stating
that it constitutes an interruption.
While various Aḥaronim mention customs predicated on R. Karo’s ruling,
none can find a supporting source antedating the Shulḥan Arukh; we will con-
sider thismaterial below, in the conclusion to this teshuvah. The Kaf Haḥayyim
of R. YaakovḤaim Sofer27 provides the key for finally explaining how it came to
be that R. Karo considered the recitation of “amen” to constitute a prohibited
interruption between ge’ulah and tefillah. R. Sofer suggests that the basis for
R. Karo’s decision is not, in fact, the Zohar itself. He refers his readers instead
to the Sha’ar Hakavvanot, the Lurianic Kabbalistic work of R. Ḥaim Vital, and
as well to the Maggid Mesharim; this latter work describes the visitations and
instructions of R. Karo’s own maggid, or heavenly messenger. In this case, the
maggid, representing the personified voice of the Mishnah, is reported to have
instructed R. Karo28 specifically not to respond “amen” after the blessing ga’al
yisrael.
Let us examine these passages. R. Sofer directs us to the end of the Lurianic





26 E.g., Zohar 1:32b; 1:205b; 1:228b; 2:238b.
27 Kaf Haḥayyim (Jerusalem, 1964), comment on OḤ 66:7.
28 … תונעלאלשרהזילףסויתיבלדיגמההווצש .
29 “Kabbalistic Yeshiva,” Sha’ar Hakavvanot (Jerusalem, 1997), 246. It should be noted that
this type of literature encompasses much coded language, meant to be understood only
by the initiate.




And in this way the words of our Sages, may their memory be a bless-
ing, be understood when they said “all who juxtapose ge’ulah to tefillah,
etc.”30 And they should have said, “all who juxtapose tefillah to ge’ulah,”
since that is the truth,31 that one must juxtapose and to cause to ascend
and to join the tefillah—which is themalkhut, upwardswith the ge’ulah—
which is the yesod.32 Consequently, it will be understood with that which
wasmentioned, that at the outset we cause to descend the illumination33
of the yesod, that is called ge’ulah, downwards into the malkhut, that is
called tefillah, standing in the beriah.34 And this constitutes the actual
“juxtaposition” of ge’ulah to tefillah. And after this the tefillah ascends
upwards with the ge’ulah in the atzilut. And thus it is not “juxtaposition”
and illumination alone; rather, it is (the) ge’ulah of atzmiyut35 and not
mere “juxtaposition.”36
30 I.e., that all who juxtapose ge’ulah to tefillahwill be blessed; the reference is to the Talmu-
dic passages cited above.
31 In other words, that is what the worshipper actually does—juxtaposes tefillah to ge’ulah,
and not the other way around as the oft-cited principle expresses it.
32 These two, malkhut and yesod, are mystical terms denoting, respectively, the female and
male parts of the Godhead (or, in the case of yesod, at least this represents the conduit
through which Divine male unites with Divine female).
33 I have translated the term הראה as “illumination.” R. Jeremy Kalmanofsky (private email
communication, June 22, 2000) alerts me to the possibility of “significant wordplay” in
the text at this point: the term הרעה means “penetration,” and that in fact reflects the
kabbalistically-contemplated “act” taking place betweenmalkhut and yesod.
34 From R. Jeremy Kalmanofsky I have learned that “Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah are
the four ‘worlds,’ or ontologically-unfolding dimensions of creation, each one more phys-
ical and less divine than the one before. There are ten sefirot in each, so the Lurianists
always speak of, for example, ‘Yesod d’Asiyah, i.e., the ‘Yesod level of the Asiyah realm.’Atzi-
lut is the realm of the Godhead and the sefirot as they are. The lower realms are derivative.
So Shekhinah/Malkhut ‘standing in the beriah’ would mean that she (her ‘legs,’ her ‘train,’
or something approximating that) stand at the border of theworld of divine unity and the
world of extra-divine/angelic/demi-goddiversity” (private email communication, June 22,
2000). I ammost grateful to R. Kalmanofsky for his learned insight.
35 Or “redemption of the essences.” By this phrase ( תוימצעהלואג ), I think hemeans an actual
“folding over” or “superimposition” of the male and female sefirot into one independent
and unified whole. In other words, in the Lurianic sense the term תוכימס , that we have
been translating all along as “juxtaposition,” really indicates not a linear closeness but a
four-dimensional, theurgic event. I am thinking along the lines of the “parallel universe”
concept in science fiction (!), but I do not think I am too far off the mark.
36 The text I have presented and translate here, describing the assimilation of malkhut into
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The implications of this passage are clear: if the Lurianic position is indeed
that there ideally should be not only a “juxtaposing” of ge’ulah to tefillah, but
rather a (sacramental) act by the worshipper that causes an actual “superim-
position” of that part of the Godhead represented by ge’ulah into or onto that
part of the Godhead represented by tefillah, then any interruption—even of
momentary silence!—of that event by the worshipper is fraught with danger
and sin, and hence, should be avoided. While the passage does not explicitly
teach this with specific regard to the recitation of “amen,” it seems reason-
able to conclude that with such a momentous theurgic event in process, the
author would consider even this type of otherwise-sanctioned interruption to
be forbidden.Moreover, sources such as this help us to understand themystical
milieu in which to consider the following, more significant, text.
The passage in the Maggid Mesharim actually provides the immediate
source of R. Karo’s ruling. It is remarkable in its own right, and deserves to be


















yesod, reflects amajor kabbalistic theme. See ElliotWolfson, “CrossingGender Boundaries
in Kabbalistic Ritual and Myth,” in his Circle in the Square: Studies in the Use of Gender
in Kabbalistic Symbolism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 79–121. Wolfson’s work endeavors to
demonstrate that Kabbalah seeks Shekhinah’s reintegration from independent female to
the newly androgynous phallus. I am grateful to R. Jeremy Kalmanofsky for directing me
to this source.




On the Eve of the Sabbath, the 18th of Kislev,37 I arose early as is my cus-
tom to recite mishnayot, and I recited approximately forty chapters.38
And while the night was yet long, I returned and slept until the sun was
already shining on the earth. And I returned and recited, and I was disap-
pointed that perhaps I had been forgotten from receivingmy usual visita-
tion. And I would always read39 without interruption. And in themidst of
this, it was said tome: “be strong and of good courage; do not be terrified or
dismayed (Josh 1:9), for even though you thought that I had abandoned
you, left you, forgotten you, it would have been appropriate for that to
have been done! For indeed you have forgotten me and abandoned me;
you have left me and have caused the separation of your thoughts from
me! It is me whom you have cast away behind your back! And take heed:
you pray before the Holy One, Blessed be God to cause to descend40 the
ways of returning to God.41 And I am guiding you on this path, (whereas)
you cast and send forthmywords behind you! And take heed: it is not cor-
rect, that thing that you are doing! Therefore, return tome and Iwill cause
you to return, according to all that which I had spoken to you. And always
meditate in my Torah and my Awe and my Worship, and do not inter-
rupt your thoughts, even for a moment. Was it proper in your eyes what
you did last night,42 to interrupt between ge’ulah and tefillah?! Indeed,
in that very moment you caused “the Congregation of Israel”43 to fall by
your hand, and you separated it fromhermate. And on account of thismy
detractors arose against you (andwould have been victorious) were it not
that I and my forces prayed before the Holy One, Blessed be God to have
compassion upon you. Therefore, from now on be extremely careful: do
not interrupt at all, even with the recitation of “amen.” And seek forgive-
ness on behalf of R. Yaakov, who said it is a mitzvah to respond “amen”
37 I do not know the year of the vision that R. Karo relates.
38 The implication is that R. Karo recited the Mishnah chapters by heart and at great speed,
in order to induce the mystical visitation of hismaggid.
39 I.e. he would read the Shema and its blessings, alongwith praying the Amidah; this under-
standing is made clear further in the narrative.
40 Understanding דירוי for דרוי .
41 I.e., the ways for R. Karo to repent of his error and restore his closeness to God.
42 Or, “yesterday.”
43 This term, i.e. לארשיתסנכ , is another mystical term denotingmalkhut or shekhinah.
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after ga’al yisrael.44 He did not descend to the (true) depths of the mat-
ters. The opposite is the case: it is a sin at his hand, and not a mitzvah!
And therefore, one must not interrupt at all. And as regards that man of
whom you spoke, take heed: I have corrected him for you; quickly youwill
see wonders and be astonished. Therefore, Cast your burden on the LORD
and He will sustain you (Ps 55:23). And tomorrow at this time I will come
to you and I will speak with you that secret additionally, at great length,
and youwill see if mywords come (true?) to you or if you do not adhere to
me and to my Torah and to my mishnayot, etc. Upon your walking it will
guide you, andupon your lying down itwill guard you. At your actual lying
down, as (theTorah) says: at your lying downand your rising up (Deut 6:7).
For when you doze45 in your meditation in the Mishnah, its seven worlds
will protect you; and when you awaken from your dozing in the medita-
tion in the Mishnah, it is that which will fill your mouth and cause your
lips to flutter.”46
At last we understand the basis for R. Karo’s pesaq: his own private instru-
ment of mystical vision instructed him of the dire consequences, regarding
that which occurs within the Godhead, of reciting “amen” between ge’ulah and
tefillah.47 In his important study of R. Yosef Karo and the Maggid Mesharim,
R.J. Zvi Werblowsky points to the remarkable similarity between this passage
and the apocryphal teshuvot ascribed to R. Yosef Gikatila, and in fact he con-
siders this work to be the source of the Maggid in this instance.48
The question still remains as to why, in the Bet Yosef, R. Karo referred to the
Zohar as the source underlying his ruling. It may be that R. Karo understood
that the Zohar was already recognized in his own day as an authority that may
have halakhic resonance, as his own private visions did not. If he were to pre-
44 Thus, the text alludes in passing to a difference of opinion among the Safed kabbalists
about whether or not to recite “amen” at this point in the service.
45 Perhaps, “enter your mystical trance.”
46 Maggid Mesharim 45:64. Although when I wrote the original teshuvah, I consulted a
printed volume, the text I cite and translate here is available at: https://www.sefaria
.org/Maggid_Meisharim.45?lang=bi. The image of awaking from sleep (and immediately
speaking) is presented as a type of life-affirming resurrection; see, e.g., b. Sanh. 90b.
47 While it is surely not the purpose of this teshuvah to delve into the question of the role
of “the prophetic spirit” in post-biblical Judaism, interested readers may wish to consult
Benjamin Sommer, “Did Prophecy Cease? Evaluating a Reevaluation,” Journal of Biblical
Literature 115, no. 1 (1996): 31–47 (see especially the excellent bibliographic footnotes).
48 R.J.Werblowsky, JosephKaro: LawyerandMystic (Philadelphia: JewishPublication Society,
1977), 180–181. This judgment is reaffirmed by Hallamish, Kabbalah, 165: רוקמשקפסןיא
הליטק׳גףסוי׳רלםיסחוימהת״ושבאוהםירבדה .
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vent those dire consequences, of which the Maggid warned him, from occur-
ring, he would need to invoke the authority of the Zohar. It must be recognized
that although this is a somewhatmercenary view of R. Karo’s decision-making,
it is nonetheless a plausible explanation. It is also possible, and more charita-
ble, to imagine that once the Maggid had given him the instruction regarding
the recitation of “amen,” R. Karo understood that interpretation to actually
inhere in the text of the Zohar.49 The fact that he acquired this knowledge
through the intervention of his Maggid did not mean in his mind that it was
an independent revelation, but rather that the vision-acquired report, received
within the context of his own mystically-informed consciousness, became for
R. Karo the one and only possible meaning of the Zohar. It was therefore not
disingenuous for R. Karo to attribute to the Zohar that which was, in reality, his
own contribution.
Thus, the Shulḥan Arukh rules that even responding “amen” between the
Shaḥarit blessing ga’al yisrael and the beginning of the Amidah constitutes
a hefseq (a proscribed “interruption”), and therefore the congregation should
omit that response. Subsequent poseqim—and, indeed, almost universal prac-
tice—echo this ruling.
Several possible conclusions emerge from our discussion of the sources
considered thus far; any one of these may legitimately serve as the basis for
halakhic observance:
1) Since in considering this liturgical question, no ethical dilemma presents
itself, congregations may surely choose to maintain the mystically-based cus-
tom of falling silent at the transition from the Shema and Its Blessings to
the Amidah.50 Even though this determination would assuredly contradict the
sources and the discussion presented in this responsum (as well as the senti-
ments of its author!), it must nonetheless be recognized that no actual “harm”
befalls any person followingwhat has by this time become the traditional prac-
tice. Therefore, despite the precedents R. Yosef Karo overturns in arriving at his
pesaq, it may serve as the basis for continued practice.
However, in this case, an important caveat must be noted: I do not think
I have to emphasize the danger to any legal system when important legal
49 A similar view is suggested by Hallamish, Kabbalah, 165: לשלמסאלארהוזהןיאשוא
תילבקהקירוטוא . Still another possibility is that the very idea of a “Zohar text” is an
anachronism, even as late as R. Karo’s own day and age; see Eitan P. Fishbane, The Art
of Mystical Narrative: A Poetics of the Zohar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 38–
50, and the many bibliographic references Fishbane cites there.
50 This is unlike the situation encountered, for example, by R. DavidGolinkin in the teshuvah
relating to women’s participation in funeral practices, considered above.
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decisors can claim that legal decisionsmay be rendered on the basis of explicit
Divine instructions—especially when those instructions so directly contradict
the inherited legal tradition! Despite the tremendous prestige and halakhic
authority of R. Yosef Karo, considering him to be in effect his own halakhic
validator is itself a dangerous jurisprudential precedent. Whatever liturgical
beauty and/or comfort may be adduced in favor of retaining the liturgical cus-
tom based on his ruling should not be construed as providing the basis for
additional halakhic decisions in cases where there would be any deleterious
ethical implications or possibility of human exploitation.
2) In contradistinction to the preceding, Magen Avraham relates a stringent
position, practiced by “particularly careful worshippers” (OḤ 66:7):
הרישבןיתמהלשישעמשמט״סבוןמאתונעלידכלארשירוצבםיניתממםיקדקדמהו
.השדח
And particularly careful worshippers pause at Tzur Yisrael in order to
respond “amen,” and in paragraph nine51 it is made explicit that one
should pause at Shirah Ḥadashah.
It should be emphasized that the first suggestion reported by this important
Aḥaron is to wait specifically in order to be able to respond “amen” to the bless-
ing of the shali’aḥ tzibbur!
3) Another solution, that averts any disruption in the liturgy whatsoever,
is to encourage the congregation to recite the blessing ga’al yisrael aloud and
together with the shali’aḥ tzibbur. This is the suggestion personally advocated
by the Magen Avraham (also on OḤ 66:7, immediately following his report
about the םיקדקדמ ):
.ןמאתונעלביוחמוניאזאוץ״שהםעםייסלןיוכללכויהצריםאדילהארנו
And it seems to me that if the worshipper wishes, he may plan to finish
together with the shali’aḥ tzibbur, and then he is not obligated to respond
“amen.”
Likewise, when R. Solomon Ganzfried, author of the Kitzur Shulḥan Arukh,
articulates the need to juxtapose ge’ulah and tefillah, he apparently is aware
that the recitation of “amen” does not exactly violate that need. He recom-
mends the proposal of the Magen Avraham:
51 I.e., OḤ 66:9.






One should make no interruption between ga’al yisrael and the Amidah,
even for kaddish and kedushah and barkhu,52 since one must juxtapose
ge’ulah and tefillah. It is best to arrange it to conclude the blessing ga’al
yisrael together with the shali’aḥ tzibbur, simultaneously. For if he should
finish it first, and afterwards the shali’aḥ tzibbur, it is unclear whether he
should respond “amen” to the blessing of the shali’aḥ tzibbur or not. But
if the worshipper finishes together with the shali’aḥ tzibbur, it is certain
that there is no obligation to respond “amen,” since one is not obligated
to respond “amen” after one’s own blessing.53
4) However, the avowed purpose of this teshuvah is to suggest a return to
the understanding of the Talmudic tradition by the Rishonim and several
later authorities. Itmaintains that theblessing ga’al yisrael shouldbe recited
aloud by the shali’aḥ tzibbur, and that congregations should be instructed to
respond “amen” in the manner usual with all other blessings.
The response to R. Karo’s ruling in the Bet Yosef advocated in this teshuvah
is to ask—whether or not he is correct in his citation of the Zohar—to what
extent is it halakhically-tenable to rely on a mystical work like the Zohar to
override the rulings of the significant Rishonim who preceded him? And how
much the more so ought this question be raised if in fact the halakhic decision
is rooted not in a source sanctioned by tradition but in the private meditative
experience of an individual, however great his authority?! In the face of such
strong precedent among a wide representation of Rishonim, it is reasonable
to at least suggest that R. Karo was not justified in rejecting their positions in
favor of one that was more sympathetic to his ownmystical inclinations. Thus,
a congregation that would prefer to encourage worshippers to respond “amen”
to the shali’aḥ tzibbur today should feel free to revert to the position held by
this majority of authoritative Rishonim.
52 Note that in listing things for which one must make no interruption, Ganzfried does not
include the recitation of “amen” between ga’al yisrael and the beginning of the Amidah.
53 Solomon Ganzfried, Code of Jewish Law (Kitzur Shulḥan Arukh) [in Hebrew] (New York:
Hebrew Publishing Company, 1927), 1:56. I have modified Goldin’s translation. See also
the opinion of R. Shneur Zalman, below.
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It is my firm opinion that mystically-inclined sources such as the ones
reviewed in this teshuvah should not be considered in the halakhic process
(when these depart from the tradition of the Talmud, the Rishonim, and the
early Codes). Froman historical point of view, they only serve to strengthen the
position taken in this teshuvah: R. Karo’s pesaq is an anomaly, without prece-
dent or parallel in the halakhic process; we shall urge its rejection as the basis
for liturgical practice.
As R. Karo himself makes clear in the Bet Yosef, his ruling is based on an idea
that he attributes to the Zohar. In fact, all three of the major poseqim on whom
he generally relies (i.e., R. Yitzhak Alfasi, Rambam, and Rabbenu Asher) rule
that the response of “amen” does not constitute ahefseq; thus, as is the casewith
any berakhah, one should respond by saying “amen.” In addition, such authori-
ties as Rashi, R. Yaakov ben Asher (the author of the Arba’ah Turim), R. Moshe
Isserles, and others, all rule that the recitation of “amen” does not constitute an
interruption between ge’ulah and tefillah.
Although they were cited above, let us repeat both texts containing Isserles’
rejection of R. Karo’s ruling (on OḤ 66:7 and 111:1):
ללפתהםאלבא.ןמארובצחילשהרחאתונעלןיגהונןכו,ןמאןינועדםירמואשיו:הגה
.ןמאןינועןיא,דבל
Gloss: There are those who say that they may respond “amen,” and so is it
the custom to answer “amen” after the shali’aḥ tzibbur. But one who has
prayed alone should not respond “amen.”54
.ןיגהונןכו,לארשילאגלעןמאתונעלרתומשםירמואשיו:הגה
Gloss: And there are thosewho say that it is permissible to respond “amen”
for the blessing ga’al yisrael, and such is the custom.
Since Isserles remains the principal late authority (at least for Ashkenazic
Jewry), his opinion, bolstered by the Tur and the Rishonim cited above, may
be considered authoritative by those wishing to revert to the liturgical practice
of reciting “amen” after the ga’al yisrael blessing.55
54 I.e., to his own blessing. TheMishnah Berurah (n. 34) observes that some believe that even
a lone worshipper would respond “amen” at this point to his/her own blessing, since it
marks the conclusion of the segment of the service entitled “the Shema and Its Blessings.”
55 One should also not ignore the several Aḥaronim supporting our position, cited in the
body of this teshuvah. For example, see also the opinion of R. Barukh Halevi Epstein:
םרלוקבוזהכרברמול״ץ״שהךירצאליממוארמגהתעדכוזהכרברחאןמאתונעלןיכירצ
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Moreover, additional support for our ruling may be adduced through refer-
ence tomany Aḥaronim. Evenwere one to be of the opinion that kabbalah and
other forms of Jewish mysticism are sources that ought to inform our liturgi-
cal practice, and so be inclined to reject the tenor of this teshuvah, one should
consider that many mystically-inclined halakhic decisors nevertheless reject
R. Karo’s opinion on this specific issue, and rule that “amen” must be recited
after the ga’al yisrael blessing. Even though it is the contention of this teshuvah
that sources of Jewish mysticism such as the Zohar should not be considered
as the basis of pesaq (when such a source flies in the face of overwhelming evi-
dence to the contrary in texts far more authoritative in the halakhic decision-
making process, such as the Talmud, the Rishonim, and the Codes), it would
still be worthwhile to examine Jewish legal sources that often rely on mystical
literature. As we shall see, this further study will only serve to make the prob-
lematic nature of R. Karo’s pesaq even greater.
R.MordecaiMosheHakohenKarfman, in his commentary ( ןהכהארמ ) on the
ShulḥanArukhof R.Yitzḥak Luria, calls attention to the fact that “many kabbal-
ists” cite the Zohar as the source for not responding “amen” to the blessing ga’al
yisrael. However, he, too, cannot find any explicit source which would account








In truth, the kabbalists cite in the name of the Zohar not to respond
“amen;” however we have not found this [rule] anywhere in the Zohar
explicitly, but only by inference in several places, in which prayer [recited
while] sitting and prayer [recited while] standing are compared with
תוכרבהלכבכןמאתונעלךירצאליממ,תוכרבהלככ , “We must respond ‘amen’ after this
berakhah (i.e., ga’al yisrael) in accordance with the opinion of the Gemara; and in any
event the shaliah tzibburmust recite thisberakhah aloud like the rest of theprayers. And in
any event one must respond ‘amen’—as with all berakhot.” Sefer Barukh She’amar: Perush
‘al Tefillot Hashanah (Tel Aviv: AmOlam, 1968), 112–113. This sourcewas cited by R. Ḥayyim
HermanKieval in “The Case of the Lost Amen: Victim of an Erroneous Custom,” Journal of
SynagogueMusic 19, no. 1 (July, 1989): 72–76. I am grateful to R. David Golinkin for alerting
me to this article.
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hand tefillin and head tefillin. And it was from this [comparison] that
probably enabled them to learn [the rule]: just as in that case [of tefillin]
one does not recite “amen” [if he has heard the blessing] between the two
[hand and head tefillin], so too here [with regard to prayers] one does
not respond “amen” … [between the Shema and its blessings, and the
Amidah]. And what difference is there between [reciting] “amen” [after
the blessing ga’al yisrael, before the Amidah] and O Lord, open my lips
[which likewise is recited between ga’al yisrael and the beginning of the
Amidah], which is considered as though it were part of a long [Amidah]
prayer. [Were you to say that the recitation of] O Lord, open my lips is
permitted since its recitation was ordained by the Rabbis, [the recitation
of] “amen” was also ordained by the Rabbis … Therefore it seems that
everyone should respond “amen”…And Imyself practice according to the
rulings of the Tur and the Rosh, may their memories be for a blessing, to
respond “amen” at all the endings of blessings [i.e., major units of liturgy]
after my individual blessing. And I intend to respond together with the
shali’aḥ tzibbur, to respond “amen” after [the blessing] ga’al yisrael, fol-
lowing my own blessing.56
Thus here we have a case of a mystically-inclined commentator who cannot
find the source for R. Karo’s ruling, and who testifies that he himself follows
the Rishonim and early Codes.
Similarly, R. Yitzḥak Safrin of Komarna, an important figure in nineteenth-
century Hassidic Kabbalah, also rules specifically that one must say “amen”





One should not make an interruption between ge’ulah and tefillah with
anyword, except for “amen,” for the essential point is that one is obligated
to respond “amen” even after one’s own blessing. Therefore, it (the recita-
tion of “amen”) is of the essence of the prayer, and howmuch themore so
may one respond (“amen”) after the blessings of others.57
56 MordecaiMosheHa-Kohen Karfman, ShulḥanArukh of RabbenuYizhak Luria (Jerusalem,
1984), 55.
57 R. Yitzḥak EizekYehudahYeḥiel Safrin, SiddurHeikhalHaberakhah (Jerusalem, 1990), 207.
I am grateful to R. Jeremy Kalmanofsky for directing me to this source.
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Thus, R. Yitzḥak is an additional figure who, despite the mystical tradition
espoused by R. Karo, disregards R. Karo’s pesaq.
In addition, the Shulḥan Arukh HaRav of R. Shneur Zalman rules likewise
that the response of “amen” does not constitute an interruption; although he
records the opinion of not saying “amen,” he favors the position that encour-








One must juxtapose [the blessing] ga’al yisrael with [the beginning of]
the Amidah … Therefore, there are those who say that one may not
respond “amen” after [the blessing] ga’al yisrael, neither after one’s own
blessing … nor after that of the shali’aḥ tzibbur. And there are those who
say that the response of “amen” is not considered an interruption, since
it is said for the purpose of the blessing and its conclusion. And so do we
conduct ourselves in these lands, to respond “amen” between [the bless-
ing] ga’al yisrael and [the beginning of] the Amidah, after the shali’aḥ
tzibbur concludes this blessing, but [we do not do so] after one’s own
blessing. One who wishes to fulfill both opinions may intend to conclude
together with the shali’aḥ tzibbur, and then he is not obligated to respond
“amen” according to our custom, since one does not respond “amen” after
one’s own blessing…And there are thosewho practice exactly to pause at
O Rock of Israel specifically to respond “amen” after [the blessing of] the
shali’aḥ tzibbur.58
Thus, this important Hassidic halakhic work seems at one with the important
RishonimandCodes that form thebasis for the decision renderedby this teshu-
vah.
58 Shneur Zalman, Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 66:9 (Brooklyn: Otzar Haḥasidim, 1978), 59.
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Conclusion
This responsum affirms that one should not decide questions of halakhah
on the basis of the Zohar or mystical traditions when these contradict the
Talmudic tradition.59 Even as we continue to be informed and enriched by
the literary treasures of classic Jewish mysticism, especially in homiletical
and theologically-educative contexts, the general approach exemplified by this
teshuvah should characterize the halakhic inclinations of our decisors and
decision-making institutions.
Nevertheless, in considering the question of whether or not a worshipper
should respond “amen” following the blessing ga’al yisrael, this teshuvah con-
cedes that it is permissible to maintain one of several minhagim:
1) One may decide to continue to support the decision of R. Yosef Karo,
maintaining themystically-based customof falling silent at the transition
from the Shema and Its Blessings to the Amidah.
2) One may adopt the position of the Magen Avraham, and choose to com-
plete one’s blessing together with the shali’aḥ tzibbur without saying
“amen,” and thereby avoid any conflict.
3) One may adopt the practice of the םיקדקדמ , and make a special effort—
even to the extent of delaying the completion of one’s own blessing—to
respond “amen” to the blessing of the shali’aḥ tzibbur.
4) However, whether or not one accepts the stringency of the םיקדקדמ , this
teshuvah maintains that the shali’aḥ tzibbur ought to recite the blessing
ga’al yisrael out loud and that worshippers should respond by reciting
“amen.”
59 The question of the relationship between Kabbalah and Halakhah is of course a very old
and a very complex one, and I do not wish tomake light of the subject. It may well be that
the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards will wish to explore this topic in some for-
mal venue in the future. For now, interested readers may consult Jacob Katz, Halakhah
and Kabbalah: Studies in the History of Jewish Religion, Its Various Faces and Social Rel-
evance [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1984); and see also
Katz’s “Halakhah and Kabbalah as Competing Disciplines of Study,” in Jewish Spiritual-
ity: From the Sixteenth-Century Revival to the Present, ed. Arthur Green (World Spirituality:
An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest 14; NewYork: Crossroad, 1987), 34–63. The
comprehensive book byMosheHallamish,Kabbalah in Liturgy,HalakhahandCustoms [in
Hebrew], cited above, would also be a resource in this endeavor. Hallamish devotes and
entire chapter (161–179) to the influence of Jewish mysticism on the halakhah of R. Karo,
and treats our specific question on 164ff.
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chapter 5
Nishmat Kol Ḥai: A Literary and Spiritual
Commentary
Jeffrey Hoffman
It is a delight to dedicate this essay to Rabbi Joel Roth. Rabbi Roth inspired me
early in my rabbinic training as my Talmud teacher (including a wonderful-
group study of a chapter of Sanhedrin with now-rabbis Phil Scheim and Jay
Rosenbaum) andhas sustainedme ever since asmy Poseq. Rabbi Roth’s passion
for studying and teaching the classic texts of our tradition, andhis dedication to
living the life of a scholarly religious leader provided a wonderful model for his
students. The following commentary, part of a larger work I am preparing on
the Siddur, represents one small shibbolet of the lekket that has come to fruition
from the seeds planted by this master-teacher.
Literary Commentary
One of the most prominent differences between the weekday and Shabbat
Shaḥarit service is found at the conclusion of Pesukei DeZimra. On weekdays,
Yishtabaḥ is the blessing that forms the concluding bookend paralleling the
opening bookend of Barukh She’Amar. On Shabbat and festivals, Yishtabaḥ
itself constitutes the concluding paragraph of amuch longer poemcalled (after
its first three words) Nishmat Kol Ḥai, “The Breath of All.” I will briefly survey
some of the history of this text and then analyze its interesting literary struc-
ture.
When the Mishnah discusses the Passover Seder,1 it says that the chanting
of Hallel (Psalms 114–118) is followed by Birkat HaShir, “The Blessing of Song.”
Two sages of the Talmud were divided regarding the identity of this blessing.2
One held that this blessing is Yehallelukha, “May They Bless You.” The bless-
ing concluding Hallel in post-talmudic prayer collections begins with the word
Yehallelukha. The other held that it was Nishmat Kol Ḥai. As is typical of the
1 m. Pesaḥ. 10:7.
2 B. Pesaḥ. 118a.
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Talmud, the full versions of these prayers are not recorded, assuming perhaps,
that its readers were quite familiar with the wording. We cannot, therefore, be
confident that extant versions completely match the putative Talmudic word-
ing.3 Since the Talmud does not come to a conclusion as to which one of these
is Birkat HaShir, many Haggadot include both. Nevertheless, only Nishmat Kol
Ḥai concludes Pesukei DeZimra on Shabbat and festivals.
A series of verses found in Nishmat Kol Ḥai is also cited as one talmudic
sage’s version of a blessing to be recited upon the appearance of rain after a
drought.4 The series of verses begins “Were our mouths as full as song as the
sea and our mouths (full of) song as the roar of the sea …, we still would not
adequately thank You.” Perhaps the two allusions to water comprise the con-
nection to the rain that the blessing celebrates. It may be that one blessing
borrowed the phrase from the other or it could have been a stock expression
of praise.5
A remarkable comment found in the 12th century Maḥzor Vitry and other
contemporaneous sources denies that the author of Nishmat Kol Ḥai was
3 An interesting connection between later versions of Yehallukha and Nishmat Kol Ḥai is that
they both share the exact wording of one sentence: yodu vivarkhu vishabḥu vifa’aru viromemu
veya’aritzu veyakdishu veyamlikhu et shimkhamalkeinu, “let them thank and bless and praise
and exalt and glorify and exalt and sanctify and accept the sovereignty of Your name, our
king.” Whether one blessing borrowed this wording from the other is not clear. An amazing
cantorial rendition of this line, emphasizing, in staccato fashion, the repetition of eight syn-
onymic verbs in a row, was recorded by Yossele Rosenblatt. This famous version is found,
among other places, on The Complete Cantorial Collection (Tel-Aviv: Israel Music, 2006).
4 m. Ber. 9:2; b. Ber. 59b. The citation in the Talmud is Ilu finu malei shirah kayam, etc., ein anu
maspikim lehodot lekha Adonai Eloheinu ad ‘tishtaḥaveh,’ “Were our mouth as full of song as
the sea, etc., we still would not adequately thank You, Adonai, our God, until ‘bow.’ ” This par-
allels over one hundred words in the modern version of Nishmat, but again, it is not clear
what the version was in the Talmudic period.
5 When the Talmud discusses at what point, early in the rainy season, one should recite the
blessingover rain (i.e.,when the first droplets appear orwhen the rain is steady, etc.), it replies,
“From the time the groomgoes out tomeet thebride,” that is,whendrops of rain ricochet from
puddles back up toward the rain that is falling. Itmay be that because thismarriage imagery is
associated in rabbinic literature with Shabbat, that Nishmat Kol Ḥaiwas transferred from the
Haggadah to the conclusion of Pesukei DeZimra on Shabbat (and from there, to the pilgrim-
age festivals). While that is possible, marriage imagery is found in many settings in rabbinic
literature, and even granting the major connection between marriage imagery and Shabbat,
there are dozens of other images in this long prayer, and the groom/bride to which he refers
isn’t evenmentioned in the prayer itself; it ismentioned in the context of another setting (the
onset of rain) for one passage from this prayer. More evidence than this is needed before one
can account for the transference of Nishmat from Pesaḥ to Shabbat. Below, I suggest a con-
nection between the very beginning of Nishmat and the wording of the service on Shabbat
morning just before and just after its location in the service.
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Simon (also called Peter), the apostle of Jesus! If this suggestion had to be
denied, it is evident that at least some people had asserted that he was, indeed,
the author:
There are those who say that that scoundrel Simon Peter the ass6 is the
author of this and other prayers when he was on the rock. This is an error
(worthy of) hell. God forbid that such a thing should occur among Israel.
Anyone who makes this claim will have to bring a substantial, large sin
offering when the Temple is rebuilt.7
This tradition can be traced back to a short medieval Jewish text sometimes
called Aggadeta deShimonKefa, “The Aggadah of SimonKefa” (Kefa is Aramaic
for “Peter,” i.e., “rock,” a reference to Matt 16:13–19).8 The identification of the
author of Nishmat Kol Ḥai with the apostle Peter must be regarded as in the
realm of myth since there is no historical evidence to support it. However, the
attribution of this prayer to Simon/Peter the Apostle is part of a larger, extraor-
dinary, legend found in these texts. According to these teachings, Simon/Peter,
an elder among the Jews at the time of Jesus, volunteered to “go undercover,”
as it were, and infiltrate the newly emerging Christian religion in order to pro-
tect Jews and Judaism. Christian tradition teaches that Simon/Peter was made
6 A play on Exod 34:20, u’feter ḥamor, “the firstling of an ass.” Reading the Hebrew word feter,
“firstling” as a transliteration, the phrase may be read as “Peter, the ass.” Especially since
according to the rules of Hebrew grammar there are occasions when a peh at the beginning
of a word loses a dagesh, it may be all the more appropriate that u’feter could be construed
as a reference to Peter.
7 Aryeh Goldschmidt, ed., Maḥzor Vitry by R. Simẖah bar Shmuel (Jerusalem: Mekhon Otsar
Ha-Poskim, 2004), 2: 412. And see the notes there regarding the other prayers attributed to
Simon the Apostle. The editor, in n. 20, observes that the previous critical edition of Maḥzor
Vitry (the 1860 edition edited by Simeon Hurwitz and Heinrich Brody) emended this passage
to read ta’ut shel Roma (“error of Rome”) by changing the dallet of Duma (“Hell”) to a resh
(“Roma”). The editor criticizes this emendation since there is, he claims, support for under-
standing the image of Duma itself as a symbol of Rome, and then marshals as evidence y.
‘Abod. Zar. 3:6, 42d–43a and Gen. Rab. 39. However, I find no support for this claim in those
two passages, though there is support in another place in the Palestinian Talmud, namely, y.
Taʿan. 1:1, 64a in which it is said that in R. Meir’s copy of The Book of Isaiah, the prophecy of
doom pronounced against the locale called “Duma” is identified as Rome.
8 Three versions of this tradition were published by Adolph Jellinek: Bet ha-Midrasch: Samm-
lung kleiner Midraschim und vermischter Abhandlungen aus der alteren judischen Literatur
(Vienna, 1873 and 1878 = Jerusalem, 1938), 5:60–62; 6:9–11, 155–156. English translations and
analysis may be found in Wout Van Bekkum, “The Rock on Which the Church Is Founded:
Simon Peter in Jewish Folktale,” in Saints and Role Models in Judaism and Christianity, ed.
Marcel Poorthuis, Joshua Schwartz (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 289–310. See also idem, “The Poeti-
cal Qualities of the Apostle Peter in Jewish Folktale,”Zutot 4 (2004): 16–25.
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the first bishop of Rome (and so, the first Pope). These medieval Jewish tra-
ditions claim that this appointment was all part of the Jewish Simon/Peter’s
plan. In Rome, he had a tower built for himself wherein he could live alone and
conduct a secret Jewish life, while at the same time, he could issue laws that
separated Christianity from Jewish practice, thus protecting Judaism. He also
issued instructions not to harm Jewish communities and individuals. These
legends go on to say that during his years in Rome, he composed numerous
liturgical poems.9
Itmay be that NishmatKol Ḥaiwas identified as one of the hymns composed
by Simon/Peter because this prayer contains wording which clearly asserted
that there is no other god or savior other than the one God:
And other than You, we have no king who redeems, saves (moshi’a, same
root as Yeshu, Jesus), rescues, sustains and deals mercifully at every in-
stance of difficulty and distress. We have no king but You …
While this is reasonable, it must also be said that the passage cited from Nish-
mat Kol Ḥai constitutes a very small segment of this long prayer and both
its wording and the supposedly supportive commentary of Rabbi Eleazar of
Worms (who does not mention Simon/Peter at all) constitute stock monothe-
istic declarations found throughout the liturgy.
Most interesting is the proposal for explaining the reason that the Sheli’aḥ
Tzibbur who leads Shaḥarit in Ashkenazic custom begins chanting from the
words shokhenadwithinNishmatKolḤai instead of from Barekhu (which actu-
ally is the beginning of Shaẖarit). The suggestion is that the letter shin (the
first letter of Shimon, “Simon” in Hebrew) with which shokhen ad begins is,
according to a folk tradition, meant to invoke the name Shimon, which itself
is encoded and spelled backwards over various intervals in Nishmat Kol Ḥai.10
This theory, while suggestive, lacks substantiation and so must be left in the
realm of the speculative.
In any case, thewording of this lengthy blessing is nearly identical in all rites,
which may attest to its ancient pedigree.11
9 Shmuel David Luzzatto (1800–1865), in the introduction to the Italian Prayer Book men-
tions him as the author of a hymn for YomKippur and cites a responsum by Rabbenu Tam
(1100–1171) establishing Simon/Peter as the author of another piyyut for Yom Kippur. See
the citations in vanWout, “TheRock onWhich theChurch Is Founded,” 307, andnn. 69–71.
10 The folk tradition is mentioned by J.D. Eisenstein, A Digest of Jewish Laws and Customs
[in Hebrew] (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1938), 279. I am happy to express
thanks to my colleague and friend, Prof. David Golinkin, for alerting me to this citation.
11 Ismar Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy: A Comprehensive History (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication
Society; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1993), 96.
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The location of this prayer at the conclusion of Pesukei DeZimra may be
related to the fact that its first words parallel those of the last verse of Psalm
150. It is likely that the original core of Pesukei DeZimra comprised the last
six psalms of the Book of Psalms, Psalms 145–150.12 Thus, this prayer begins
by invoking the last words of the last psalm:
Psalm 150: Kol ha-neshamah… (“all that breathes …”).
The prayer: Nishmat kol ḥai (“The breath of all”).
This literary link may continue toward the beginning of the next section of the
service, in Shaẖarit itself. There, the prayer El Adon contains wording that adds
another echo to the end of Psalm 150 and the beginning of Nishmat Kol Ḥai:
Psalm 150: Kol ha-neshamah… (“all that breathes …”).
El Adon: Kol neshamah (“everyone that breathes”).
These three examples of nearly identical wording may constitute an aural
thread connecting Pesukei DeZimrawith Shaḥarit.
An important key to the literary structure of the prayer is that the writer
of Nishmat Kol Ḥai was very fond of lists; there are several individual lists, or
litanies, of praises within it. The lists are not merely individual thought-units
within a longer piece, but rather connect to form an extended and complete
thought. That thought is: Even though the gratitude to God that our puny bod-
ies are capable of expressing iswholly inadequate, allwehave is our bodies; and
therefore it falls to us to utilize all the parts and powers of our bodies to do our
inadequate best in expressing our thankfulness. This message culminates with
two midrashic interpretations of Scripture; and some individual units within
the prayer contain their own midrashic citations of, or expansions on, biblical
verses. Indeed, the entire prayermay, in a sense, be viewed as one longmidrash.
The first midrashic interpretation is of “All of my bones shall say who is like
You” (Ps 35:10), taking this phrase to mean that our limbs themselves ought to
be the vehicles of praise to God, and we should not only utilize verbal praise.
The second is extracted fromPsalm 103:1, “(Let)my soul bless the Lord and (let)
all my innards (bless) his holy name.” “Soul” and “innards” taken together add
up to one’s entire physical body. The idea of using one’s physical body in praise
of God is rare in Jewish liturgy where oral expression is the default mode, and
so this prayer stands out in its call for whole body worship.
12 Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy, 72.
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The art of this prayer is expressed in the ways that the individual lists are
woven together creating the larger call for worship through the physicality of
the human body. The following is a chart of the essence of Nishmat that tracks
how the lists combine to form the larger message. The bolded words serve as
key phrases in the narrative arc of the poem:
The breath of all blesses Your name …








At every time of trouble and distress.
Aside from You, we have no king … (Note how this last phrase parallels
the phrase at the beginning of this list).
YHWH “does not sleep nor slumber” (Ps 121:4)
He wakes the sleeping
Arouses the slumbering
Gives speech to the dumb
Supports the fallen
Raises the bowed low
IF ONLY:
Parts of the body Description Simile
Our mouths (were) Full of song As the sea
Our tongues (Full of) exultation As the roar of its waves
Our lips (Full of) praise As the breadth of the sky
Our eyes Shining As the sun and moon
Our hands Outstretched As the eagles of the heavens
Our feet Swift As deer
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WE WOULD STILL NOT MANAGE TO THANK YOU (BECAUSE):
Our situation God’s salvation of us
From Egypt You redeemed us
From the House of Bondage You saved us
In famine You fed us
In plenty You sustained us
From the sword You rescued us
From plague You sheltered us
From severe enduring sickness You released us
THEREFORE …
Parts of our body Which you put in us
Limbs Which You placed within us
Spirit and Breath Which You blew into our nostrils
Tongue Which You put into our mouths











Body part Will extol God in these ways
Mouth (shall) Acknowledge You
Tongue (shall) Swear allegiance to You
Knee Shall bend to You
Back Shall bow to You
Heart (shall) Stand in awe of You
Innards and Entrails Shall sing to Your name
AS IT IS WRITTEN, “ALL MY BONES SHALL SAY WHO IS LIKE YOU…”
(PS 35:10).13
Who compares to You?
Who is equal to You?
Who matches You?
“God great, mighty and awesome” (Deut 10:17).
“Supernal God, creator of heaven and earth” (Gen 14:19).
We shall sing to You
We shall praise You
We shall extol You
We shall bless Your holy name
AS IT SAYS, “OF DAVID: LET MY SOUL BLESS GOD, LET ALL MY IN-
NARDS (BLESS) YOUR HOLY NAME” (PS 103:1).
(Now expanding on each word of Deut 10:17, quoted above):
GOD in the power of Your strength
GREAT through the glory of Your name
MIGHTY forever
AWESOME in Your awesomeness.
13 Elsewhere, this verse is also cited as a possible text for the congregation’s response in an
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Thus, the separate components of the poem—many of which comprise lists
andencompass biblical verses accompaniedbymidrashic interpolations—add
up to a greater whole: An artfully put together appeal for the worshiper to uti-
lize the entire body in expressing praise and gratitude to God.
Spiritual Commentary
If any prayer called out for expression in movement it would be Nishmat Kol
Ḥai. To merely recite the words of the prayer seems to miss its very point: All
parts of our body must be marshalled to express the gratitude that is due to
God for sustaining us in every way. That is both the least we can do—and
the most we can do. And the prayer makes the case that we ought to do the
most we can do to convey our thanks for God’s steadfastness in good times
and in bad. The recitation of this prayer calls for swaying in one’s seat. It also
calls for dance. It calls for creative souls to compose melodies for parts of
the poem, or all of it, so that it may be sung and danced to at joyous occa-
sions, and not just at Shaḥarit of Shabbat and holidays.14 It also lends itself
to guided meditation of bringing various parts of the body into service of the
divine.
Given the religious polemic involved in attributing the prayer to Simon/
Peter, recital of this prayer also calls for some thought about the division and
conflict that religion has wrought, along with all of the beauty that religion
brings. In opposition to the Jewish–Christian clash embedded in the prayer’s
history, the opening words of the prayer strike a note of universality:
The breath of all that lives shall bless Your name, and the spirit of all flesh
shall glorify and exalt You forever.
The substantial fruits rewarding close reading of this prayer leads one to lament
the fact that this richness is usually missed not only by the many worshipers
undertone to the precentor’s chant of Modim, “we acknowledge” in the midst of the Ami-
dah and this, too, is a moment of physicality, namely bowing. See y. Ber. 1:8, 3d.
14 As we have seen, this prayer migrated from one place in the liturgy—the Haggadah shel
Pesaẖ—to another—the conclusion of Pesukei DeZimra on Shabbat and Festivals. Both of
these became permanent locations for it. I encourage us to consider other places that the
prayer as a whole, or in part, may contribute to the spirit of an occasion on a temporary
or one-time basis. It conjures, for me, the Dixie Chicks’ 1999 song, “Some Days You Gotta
Dance” (Troy Johnson and Marshall Morgan).
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who tend to arrive at the service after Nishmat Kol Ḥai is recited, but also by
thosewho—following the example of their prayer leaders—are likely to speed-
davven through it.
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chapter 6
Mar’it Ozen: From the AncientWater-mill to
Automated Electronic Devices
Joshua Kulp and Jason Rogoff
In the fall of 2017, students from the Jewish Theological Seminary Rabbinical
School and the Conservative Yeshiva studied Tractate Shabbat. This article is an
outgrowth of our ḥevruta and the shiurim we delivered on the subject. We will
demonstrate how academic Talmud study helps us gain a deeper understanding
of medieval interpretations of the Talmud andmodern halakhic rulings.
When reflecting on the differences between a prayer service at a typical Ortho-
dox synagogue and one at a typical Conservative synagogue, the first that usu-
ally comes to mind is related to the role of women. Conservative synagogues
do not have a meḥitzah, and for the most part women participate in the same
roles as do men. Many Conservative synagogues shift the liturgy in order to
reflect egalitarian ideals. But there is another difference that equally affects
the experience undergone in these prayer services, one that almost uniformly
distinguishes between Orthodox and non-Orthodox synagogues—the use of a
microphone.1 This paper is not a halakhic responsum on the use of a micro-
phone on Shabbat. Such a discussion would have to discuss all facets of its use,
including the use of electricity. Rather, we focus here on twoTalmudic prohibi-
tions that become intertwined in the Yerushalmi and Bavli and then separated
again in late responsa literature. The first is the notion that one’s vessels must
rest on Shabbat. This is known in theBavli as “the resting of vessels.” The second
is the prohibition of making loud noises on Shabbat.Wewill show how literary
considerations in the Bavli impacted post-Talmudic halakhah2 and then trace
how these two issues play out among severalmodern halakhic authorities. This
case is an excellent example of how the modern academic approach to the
1 In fact, there was a brief period in which some Orthodox rabbis allowed and even used a
microphone in the synagogue. See Louis Bernstein, “The Emergence of the English Speaking
Orthodox Rabbinate” (Ph.D. diss., Yeshiva University, 1977), 82–85. Our thanks to Professor
Jonathan Sarna and Rabbi Zev Eleff for their help in locating this reference.
2 See EthanTucker’s discussion of this phenomenon in his chapter in our book, Reconstructing
the Talmud, 2nd ed. (New York: Hadar Press, 2016), 149–170.
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study of Talmud can potentially impact our adaptation of ancient halakhah
into the rapidly changing technology that so characterizes our society.
The Resting of Vessels
The first chapter of Mishnah Shabbat contains a well-known debate between
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerning whether it is permissible to begin
a process of work on erev Shabbat (Friday afternoon, before dark) that will
continue on Shabbat. In the Mishnah and in the parallel in the Tosefta there
are multiple points of disagreement between the two houses (in each of these
cases Beit Shammai prohibits and Beit Hillel permits) and at least two points of
agreement. In our Reconstructing the Talmud: Volume II, we explain the overall
reasoning behind these debates.3 Here we will only briefly outline our con-
clusions. According to Beit Shammai, one is not allowed to begin processing
a material on erev Shabbat if that material will be ready for use on Shabbat
and could in theory be used on Shabbat. An example is soaking ink. It does not
matter to Beit Shammai that the person is not actively performing work with
his own hands on Shabbat, nor does it matter that the object probably will not
be used (it is forbidden to use ink on Shabbat). In contrast, Beit Hillel says that
as long as one is not performing the work with his own hands on Shabbat, and
he will likely not use the item on Shabbat (such as ink), it is permitted to set
the process in motion before Shabbat.
Following a debate between the two houses and a citation of midrashic sup-
port for both positions, theTosefta continueswith another sourcewhich seems
to relate in general to the same topic: the beginning of processes before Shab-
bat that will continue on Shabbat. But this time neither house is mentioned,








3 Joshua Kulp and Jason Rogoff, Reconstructing the Talmud: Volume II (New York: Hadar Press,
2019), 83–124.
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t. Šabb. 1:23
One may conduct water into a garden on Friday afternoon just before
dark, and it may go on being filled the whole day.
And one may place an eye salve on the eye and a plaster on a wound on
Friday afternoon just before dark and it will continue healing all day.
And one may place sulfur under [silver] vessels on Friday afternoon just
before dark and it may continue making sulfurous odor all day;
Andonemayplace incense on top of coals on Friday afternoon just before
dark.
But one may not place wheat in a water-mill unless it can be ground
[when it is still day].
There are essentially two parts to this baraita: The first part lists processes that
may be set in motion before Shabbat and the second part lists one process
which is forbidden even if set up before Shabbat. In our aforementioned book,
we explain that Beit Shammai would allow the activities in the first section for
they do not consist of processing material. The person is not processing the
water, sulfur, salve, bandage, or incense. Rather he is starting a process involv-
ing one substance, water, sulfur, salve, bandage, or incense, that aids something
else, garden, vessel, eye, wound, or clothes. Since he is not processing an item
on Shabbat, even Beit Shammaiwould permit these activities. Put anotherway,
unlike the example of processing dyes, most of these substances are used up in
the process which they are undergoing, much in the same way that oil is used
up by a lamp, and wood is used up by a burning fire; both activities which Beit
Shammai permits setting in motion on Friday right before Shabbat. The sec-
ond half of the baraita can be explained according to our general reasoning as
a point where Beit Hillel agrees with Beit Shammai.When it comes to grinding
wheat, an item is being processed, and since this is a food item that potentially
could be eaten on Shabbat,4 even Beit Hillel would agree that it is prohibited.
Yerushalmi
Since in this articlewe focus primarily on the placing of wheat into awater-mill
and the justification for this prohibition, we will quote here only the section of
the Yerushalmi relevant for the issue at hand.
4 Ground wheat can be chewed, see t. Ber. 4:6.








y. Šabb. 1:4, 3d
One may not place wheat in a water-mill unless it can be fully ground
when it is still day.
R. Ḥaggai says: Because it makes noise.
R. Yose said to him: What you say is true, Rabbi, if you hold like R. Yehu-
dah. But according to the other rabbis, it is like we said there, for each
drop has not yet begun [to drip into the lamp]. So too we say here that
[the grinding] has not begun with each piece of wheat.
R. Yose son of R. Bun said: Because he will forget and he will put in the
peg.
Following the quote of the baraita, we have three different explanations from
Amoraim from Eretz Yisrael as to why it is prohibited to place wheat into a
water-mill on erev Shabbat. R. Ḥaggai explains that the problem with grinding
wheat on Shabbat is that it will make noise, and thus is prohibited even if the
process is set inmotion on erev Shabbat. The prohibition of creating a noise on
Shabbat iswell-documented inbothTalmudim.R.Ḥaggai’s explanation reflects
the general ban on noise-making found in Eretz Yisraeli texts. Activities such
as ringing a bell, clapping, shaking a rattle, and knocking on a door are pro-
hibited because they are a disruption of the tranquil atmosphere of Shabbat.5
In light of the intention of this prohibition, it does not matter that the pro-
cess is set in motion before Shabbat. The noise will be made on Shabbat, and
therefore it is prohibited. This concern will be the focus of our analysis of the
Bavli and medieval commentators below. The Yerushalmi contains two other
Amoraic explanations of the water-mill prohibition, neither of which appears
in the Bavli. These explanations are not germane to the subject of this paper.
However, it is worth noting that the Yerushalmi does not entertain the possi-
bility that Beit Hillel would permit putting wheat in a water-mill. Nor does the
5 See m. Beṣah 5:2; t. Šabb. 13:15–17; y. Beṣah 5:2, 63a; b. ‘Erub. 104a. See Avraham Goldberg,
Commentary of Mishnah Eruvin (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986), 312 n. 55.
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Yerushalmi seem to struggle as to why Beit Hillel would prohibit this action,
but permit the other actions which are the subject of theMishnah and the ear-
lier section of the Tosefta.While there is some dispute as to why this particular
action is prohibited, it is abundantly clear in theYerushalmi that it is prohibited
by both Houses.
Bavli
TheBavli beginswith theToseftanbaraita and thenoffers the sameexplanation







Our rabbis taught: One may conduct water … But one may not place
wheat in a water-mill unless it can be ground when it is still day.
What is the reason? Rava6 answered: Because it makes a noise.
Up until this point, the sugyot in the two Talmudim are identical, and both rel-
atively simple to explain. In contrast, the structure of the continuation of the
sugya in the Bavli is exceedingly difficult, it contains some strained points, and




6 All textual witnesses of our sugya, including genizah fragments, manuscripts, and the major-
ity of printed editions, attribute this statement to Rava. The Vilna printed edition, influenced
by the emendation of R. Solomon Luria (16th century), reads Rabbah. The early medieval
commentators also attribute this statement to Rabbah because the sugya presents his state-
ment as a direct response to R. Yosef, his colleague. In our analysis below of themedieval and
modern halakhic authorities we will attribute the statement to Rabbah in order to remain
consistent with their attribution. On the difficulty of determining the attribution of state-
ments toRava/Rabbah see ShammaFriedman, “Orthographyof theNamesRabbah andRava,”
Sinai 110 (1992): 140–164.








R. Yosef said to him: Let the master say it is on account of the resting of
vessels? For it was taught: And in everything that I have said to you take
heed (Exodus 23:13) this includes the resting of vessels.
Rather R. Yosef said: it is on account of the resting of vessels.
Now that you say that Beit Hillel holds that the resting of vessels is a bib-
lical commandment, why did they permit sulfur and incense? …
Now, however, that R. Oshaya said in the name of R. Assi: Which tanna
[holds that] the resting of vessels is a biblical commandment? It is Beit
Shammai.
Then according to Beit Shammai, whether it [the utensil] performs an
action or not, it is forbidden, while in the opinion of Beit Hillel even if it
performs an action it is permitted.
R. Yosef asks why Rava did not explain that the prohibition was “because of the
resting of vessels.” R. Yosef then cites a midrashic baraita supporting the idea
that one is commanded to allow one’s vessels to “rest” on Shabbat.7 He then
replaces Rava’s explanation as to the water-mill prohibition with his own rea-
soning, because of “resting of vessels” (shevitat keilim).
According to the arrangement of the material in the sugya, which assumes
that the baraita is agreed upon by both Houses, R. Yosef is supposed to be
explaining the baraita such that it will accord with both Beit Hillel and Beit
Shammai. R. Yosef seems to posit that Beit Hillel prohibits using a water-mill
not because of a specific problemwith this particular activity but due to a larger
category of prohibitions which he terms “the resting of vessels on Shabbat.”
This is, we should note, the earliest appearance in rabbinic literature of this
broad term. The problem is that the notion that Beit Hillel agrees with Beit
Shammai that one’s “vesselsmust rest on Shabbat” contradicts Beit Hillel’s gen-
erally permissive position as reflected in Tannaitic sources. How can Beit Hillel
7 This baraita is not found in Tannaitic midrashim. It was included in the printed edition of
the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai but this portion of that composition is based on a
medieval collection and is not found in any manuscript.
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hold that one’s vessels must rest when they permit nearly all of the other activ-
ities discussed in the Mishnah, including those in the baraita! “Shevitat keilim”
might be able to explain why Beit Hillel would prohibit grinding wheat in a
water-mill, but only if we totally ignore Beit Hillel’s overall approach to the
issue.8 Furthermore, without any particular difficulty, the sugya later reverses
this position, citing a statement by R. Oshaya in the name of R. Assi who limits
the concept of shevitat keilim to Beit Shammai. It is not at all clear from the
sugya whether this position opposes R. Yosef or simply clarifies his statement.
Ultimately, the Bavli’s presentation of the Amoraic explanations of the baraita
creates the impression that Rava believes that Beit Hillel would prohibit using
awater-mill because of the loud noise it makes while other Amoraim, certainly
R. Oshaya in the name of R. Assi attributes the restriction on the water-mill to
Beit Shammai because of shevitat keilim.9 Beit Hillel, who does not agree with
such a general prohibition, would indeed allow one to put wheat into a water-
mill on erev Shabbat. The Bavli offers no explanationwhatsoever as to why this
is not an infringement on the prohibition of making a noise.
We should emphasize here that early literature agrees that it is prohibited
to place wheat in a water-mill before Shabbat. This is stated anonymously in
the Tosefta, is explained in three different fashions in the Yerushalmi, and is
explained by Rava in the Bavli. No Amora ever waives this prohibition, at least
not explicitly. In a reconstruction of this material that we offer in our book,
we interpret R. Yosef as stating that Beit Shammai would prohibit the action
due to their general mandate that one’s vessels must rest on Shabbat. This
does not, however, mean that R. Yosef would necessarily say that Beit Hillel
permits. However, the construction of the sugya by the editors of the Bavli
creates a direct dispute between Rava and R. Yosef. If one follows Rava, then
placing wheat in a water-mill is prohibited because it makes noise. If one fol-
lows R. Yosef, who, according to the Stammaitic arrangement of his statement,
attributes the baraita to Beit Shammai exclusively and not to Beit Hillel, then
the action is permitted because we assume the halakhah does not follow Beit
Shammai.
This sugya is thus another example as to how the Stammaitic editors create
dialectical sugyot, passages inwhichAmoraim raise difficulties on one another,
respond to each other’s explanations of Tannaiticmaterial, and seamlessly shift
their dialogue fromone topic to another.While their aims are primarily literary,
such creations have significant impact on post-Talmudic halakhah. Halakhah
8 See Tosafot s.v. רמאמילו .
9 For a full analysis of the reconstruction of the sugya see Kulp and Rogoff, Reconstructing the
Talmud: Volume II, ibid.
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can, at times, significantly shift without any sage actually having intended for
such a shift to occur. Post-Talmudic halakhah is sometimes the result of literary
processes of earlier editors, and not just of the legal decisions made by earlier
halakhic authorities.
Geonim
The impact of the Bavli’s construction of the sugya can already be seen in the
Geonic period. R. Natronai Gaon, in a responsum concerning a Jew who leases












Teshuvot of Rav Natronai Gaon no. 5810
And that which you asked concerning a Jewwho has a mill outside of the
Shabbat border (teḥum) and leases it to a gentile, may he [the gentile] use
it for grinding on Shabbat?
Thus we have seen: Since he leased it to the gentile, the gentile has
acquired it. Aswe say: borrowing—he acquires it; leasing—he acquires it.
And if you say [there is the problemof] “resting of vessels,” it is Beit Sham-
mai who forbids. But Beit Hillel does not hold “resting of vessels” and
does not prohibit, as we say: “But one may not place wheat in a water-
mill unless it can be ground when it is still day.”
And that baraita is according to Beit Shammai, as we say further, “Now
that R. Oshaya said in the name of R. Assi: Which Tanna [holds] the rest-
10 Text of responsum from Robert Brody, ed., Teshuvot Rav Natronai bar Hilai Gaon (Jerusa-
lem: Makhon Ofeq, 2011).
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ing of vessels? It is Beit Shammai, for Beit Hillel permits”11—this is the
conclusion according to Beit Hillel who permits.
We will begin with an analysis of the question. M. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:9 prohibits leas-
ing a bathhouse to a gentile because it is referred to as belonging to the Jew. b.
‘Abod. Zar. 21b cites a baraita (= t. ‘Abod. Zar. 2:9) where R. Shimon b. Gamaliel
explains that the prohibition exists because the gentile will operate the Jew’s
bathhouse on Shabbat. This will lead onlookers to think that either the Jew
himself or the gentile at the behest of the Jew is performing forbidden labor
on Shabbat.12 The questioner asks the Gaon whether it is permissible to lease a
mill to a gentile outside of the town limits, a placewhere Jewswouldnot be able
to travel on Shabbat.13 The location of the mill removes the concern for mar’it
ayin, the appearance that the Jew is doing work on Shabbat.14 This leaves the
Gaon with the independent question of whether a Jew’s vessels must rest on
Shabbat.
R. Natronai Gaon begins by quoting a short piece of Talmud found on b.
‘Abod. Zar. 15a. The statement, which is ultimately refuted at the end of the
sugya, suggests that a gentile legally acquires whatever he borrows or leases
from a Jew.15 Therefore, there would be no prohibition preventing the gentile
from using it on Shabbat. R. Natronai adds that since the vessel is leased and
thus there is not a complete transfer of ownership, some might suggest that
the gentile’s use is prohibited because of “the resting of vessels.” However, the
mandate for “resting of vessels” is held only by Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel does
not have such a halakhic category, and thus there is no problem with the Jew’s
11 It is likely that R. Natronai has a version of the Bavli which explicitly states that Beit Hillel
would permit. See ibid., 166 n. 1.
12 See also responsum no. 59 about leasing a bathhouse that is not widely recognized as
belonging to a Jew. See ibid., 166–167.
13 The distinction between the ruling in and out of the town limits is based on b. Moʿed Qat.
12a. We follow Brody who believes that the mention of the town limits was part of the
original question. It is possible that R. Natronai rules that mar’it ayin would not apply to
a mill as it would a bathhouse, in which case his lenient ruling would be applicable in all
cases. See Brody, ibid., n. 3.
14 A similar question is asked about Jewish–Gentile partnerships. If a business and all of its
assets are co-owned by a Jew and gentile how can the Jew be certain he will not bene-
fit from the forbidden labor performed on Shabbat. The question is particularly relevant
when the partners own a bathhouse, bakery, olive press, or mill. All are examples of fixed
locations which would carry the name of the Jewish owner. There is less of a concern
withmovable property. See JoelMeuller, ed.,GeoneyMizraḥUma’arav (NewYork:Mekhon
Menora, 1959), no. 50.
15 This is true even if the gentile does not acquire the vessel according to the final halakhah.
See Brody, Teshuvot, 165 n. 2.
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mill being used by a gentile on Shabbat. Note that R. Natronai is clearly follow-
ingwhat seems to be the conclusion of the sugya—Beit Hillel does not prohibit
the use of thewater-mill. Beit Hillel is not the author of this baraita. R. Natronai
does not even refer to Rava’s explanation that puttingwheat in thewater-mill is
prohibited due to the noise; he reads the sugya as rejecting Rava’s reading of the
baraita in favor of that of R. Yosef. He fully accepts R. Yosef ’s explanation of the
prohibition as being due to “resting of vessels” as well as R. Oshaya’s ascription
of the Toseftan baraita to Beit Shammai. In sum, since themill is found outside
the town limits there is nothing to prohibit its use by the gentile on Shabbat.
Rishonim
In direct contrast to the geonic leniency, R. Ḥananel holds that Beit Hillel pro-
hibits using the water-mill because it makes a noise and that we should rule in





Rabbenu Ḥananel on b. Šabb. 18a
Even thoughwe follow Beit Hillel, and Beit Hillel does not hold “resting of
vessels,” placing wheat in a water-mill on erev Shabbat in order to grind it
on Shabbat is forbidden. For only R. Yosef said it is prohibited because of
“resting of vessels.” Rabbah said it is because it makes noise. And his logic
is reasonable.
R. Ḥananel reads the sugya as a debate between R. Yosef and Rabbah concern-
ing why it is prohibited to place wheat in a water-mill. Were we to explain that
it is prohibited because of “the resting of vessels,” then we would have to per-
mit the action because only Beit Shammai rules this way. But R. Ḥananel insists
that the halakhah follows Rabbah,16 probably due to the general preference for
Rabbah over R. Yosef.17
16 Rif 6a–b presents both explanations without making an explicit decision. He begins with
the geonic position that Beit Hillel permits use of the water-mill and then adds “there are
those who say it is forbidden because of noise.” Both Ran and R. Zerachia HaLevi take this
as an indication that the Rif himself is lenient.
17 See b. B. Bat. 114b. This is stated explicitly in Tosafot HaRosh b. Shabbat 18a.
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The Tosafists continue the debate over the appropriate halakhic ruling in













Tosafot b. Šabb. 18a s.v. Vehashta
RabbenuTamrules that the law followsR.Yosef whoattributes the baraita
to Beit Shammai for R. Oshaya follows him. Therefore, use of amill is per-
mitted, for according to R. Yosef, Beit Hillel permits even if he performs
an action, and he has no concern for making a noise.
However, it appears tome that R. Oshaya does not attribute the baraita to
Beit Shammai. Rather, it is the anonymous voice who states: “who is this?
It is Beit Shammai according to R. Yosef who says the problem is shevitat
keilim.”18 However, it is possible to say that R. Oshaya attributes it to Beit
Hillel, and he holds [there is concern] of making a noise, as does Rabbah.
This is also the ruling of R. Ḥananel: the reason for the [prohibition of the
use of the] mill is because it makes a noise and this follows Beit Hillel.
Furthermore, the sugya later on (19a) can only be understood according
to Rabbah, as I have explained previously.
We do rule like R. Oshaya that the Tanna who holds of shevitat keilim is
Beit Shammai.
18 The language of theTosafot raises the possibility that there is a variant reading in the sugya
which explicitly asks “who is this.” The passage as presented in the Tosafot HaRosh ad. loc.
clarifies that author of the Tosafot is simply rephrasing the Talmudic argument in his own
words.
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It is permitted to lend vessels to a non-Jew, and there is no problem with
what the non-Jew will do with them on Shabbat. But, one cannot lend an
animal to a non-Jew because there is a Torah law requiring his animals to
rest.
There are two voices in this passage, RabbenuTam and an anonymous collocu-
tor, likely R. Samsonof Sens.19 RabbenuTam rules according toR.Yosef because
R. Yosef is supported by R. Oshaya, making this a case of two Amoraim against
Rabbah, who remains a lone voice. To RabbenuTam the line in theTalmud that
states, “Now, however, that R. Oshaya said in the name of R. Asi: Which Tanna
[holds that] the resting of vessels is a biblical commandment? It is Beit Sham-
mai” is not only a general remark of R. Oshaya concerning the dispute between
theHouses. R. Oshaya is claiming that theToseftan baraita should be attributed
to Beit Shammai. Since we do not rule like Beit Shammai, the water-mill prohi-
bition is waived.
The anonymous author of theTosafot disagreeswith RabbenuTam’s reading
of the sugya. He provides two pieces of support for ruling according to Rab-
bah that the water-mill is prohibited because it makes noise. First, he engages
in a bit of Talmudic criticism to show that the sugya takes R. Oshaya’s words
out of context. R. Oshaya originally stated only that Beit Shammai mandates
shevitat keilim and not Beit Hillel. R. Oshaya was not referring to the Toseftan
baraita. Rather, he was referring to the midrashic baraita quoted earlier, “ ‘And
in everything that I have said to you take heed’ this includes the resting of ves-
sels.” This baraita should be ascribed to Beit Shammai and not Beit Hillel.While
he does not state this explicitly, hemay even have detected this from the phrase
“from theTorah” which implies that R. Oshaya is referring to a source that reads
shevitat keilim into the Torah—and that can only be the midrashic baraita.
In contrast, the Toseftan baraita does not in any way imply that the prohibi-
tion is from the Torah. R. Oshaya clarifies that the midrashic baraita should be
ascribed to Beit Shammai and not Beit Hillel. It is only the context of the sugya,
where R. Oshaya’s statement follows the debate between R. Yosef and Rabbah,
that makes it seem as if R. Oshaya is siding with R. Yosef, who explains the pro-
hibition as the result of shevitat keilim and not due to the problem of making
noise. It is the editors who portray R. Oshaya as clarifying the Toseftan baraita,
which he attributes only to Beit Shammai; they lead us to believe that Beit Hil-
lel would allow putting wheat into the water-mill. This is an excellent example
19 The Tosafot on Shabbat found in our collection were compiled and edited by R. Eliezer
(ben Solomon) of Touques based on the Tosafot of R. Samson of Sens. See Ephraim
E. Urbach, Ba’aley HaTosafot (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1968), 470–474.
from the ancient water-mill to automated electronic devices 161
of the sensitivity of the Tosafot to separating the editorial layer from the words
of the Amoraim themselves.20 The anonymous Tosafist separates R. Oshaya’s
statement from its context in the sugya and arrives at his halakhic conclusion
by focusing on the original intent of the Amoraic material.
The Tosafist further supports his halakhic ruling by arguing that another
sugya accords with Rabbah. The sugya on 19a refers to m. Šabb. 1:9, “and both
[houses] agree that one may lay olive press beams and wine rollers [on erev
Shabbat].” The sugya explains that Beit Shammai concedes to Beit Hillel in this
instance because even if one performed either of these activities on Shabbat
itself one would not be liable for a ḥatat, a sin-offering, the punishment for a
transgression of a biblical Shabbat prohibition. According to this sugya, Beit
Shammai does not prohibit starting certain activities on erev Shabbat due to
a general category of “resting of vessels.” Rather, they prohibit beginning on
erev Shabbat any activity which if done on Shabbat would cause one to be
liable for a ḥatat. This understanding of Beit Shammai’s position contradicts
R. Yosef ’s explanation of their position, and thus implies that the explanation
of the baraita on 18a should follow Rabbah and not R. Yosef.
An interesting modification to the interpretation of the sugya emerges in
13th-century France. Sefer HaTerumah and others append an explanation to





Sefer HaTerumah, Hilkhot Shabbat No. 220
One may not place wheat in a water-mill unless it can be ground when it
is still day.
Rabbah said: because it makes a noise and they will say, “So-and-so’s mill
is grinding on Shabbat,” and they will think that he placed the wheat on
Shabbat.22
20 Formore examples see ShammaFriedman, “AlDerekhḤekerHasugya,”Texts andStudies I,
ed. H.Z. Dimitrovsky (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1978), 288–296.
21 On R. Baruch b. Yitzḥak, the author of Sefer HaTerumah, and his mistaken association
with the city of Worms see Simha Emmanuel, “Biographical Data on R. Baruch b. Isaac,”
Tarbiz 69, no. 3 (2000): 423–440.
22 See also Semag no. 65.
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Following the anonymous voice in the Tosafot, Sefer HaTerumah rules in
accordance with Rabbah and against R. Yosef. Placing wheat in the water-mill
is prohibited because it produces a noise. However, his explanation of the pro-
hibition of making noise is quintessentially different from any other explana-
tion we have yet encountered. Sefer HaTerumah explains that the concern of
noise production is one of mar’it ayin, or perhaps we should say, mar’it ozen.
Passersby will hear the grinding mill and assume that the owner has actively
violated Shabbat by placing the wheat in the mill on Shabbat itself. This expla-
nationdiffers dramatically from theoriginalAmoraicmaterialwhere the sound
itself is the problem. A cacophonous sound such as thatmade by thewater-mill
will disrupt the intended Shabbat atmosphere.
We should note the similarity between the question posed to the Gaon and
the ruling of Sefer HaTerumah. The questioner in the Geonic responsum is also
concerned with what other people might think, and this is why he mentions
that the water-mill is outside the Shabbat border. If it is inside the border, he
assumes it would be prohibited lest people think that the Jew is using hiswater-
mill on Shabbat, just as the Talmud is concerned lest people think a bathhouse
leased to a Gentile is being operated by a Jew (b. ‘Abod Zar. 21a). This is the
Talmudic source for the fear that people will confuse something being oper-
ated on Shabbat without a violation (because the Gentile is operating it) with
something being operated on Shabbat in violation of the law (because the Jew
is operating it). Sefer HaTerumah takes this concern and applies it to hearing
a water-mill grinding on Shabbat. Unlike the other cases in the first chapter of
m. Šabb, where the work is being done silently (soaking of dyes, dyeing wool,
setting traps), the water-mill is an audible process and will attract attention.
This is why the noise causes it to be prohibited. Not because making noise on
Shabbat is itself a problem.
What causes Sefer HaTerumah to change the interpretation of Rabbah’s
explanation? His explanation is not found in either Talmud. Nowhere in the
Talmudim is it suggested that a permissible act, such as beginning a process
on erev Shabbat, is prohibited because it makes a loud enough noise such that
passersby may think that the Jew himself is working on Shabbat. It seems as if
his innovative interpretation is a direct result of the Babylonian sages’ limita-
tion of the general prohibition against making loud noises on Shabbat.23
The primary sugya on the prohibition of making a noise on Shabbat is found
on b. ‘Erub. 104a:24
23 See Ethan Tucker, https://mechonhadar.s3.amazonaws.com/mh_torah_source_sheets/CJ
LVInstruments.pdf 27 n. 43.
24 We will limit our citation to the Amoraic discussion which opens the sugya. For a full






Ulla was visiting R. Menashe’s house. Aman came by and knocked on the
door. Ulla said: Who is that? May his body shudder (leitḥal) for having
violated (maḥeil) Shabbat.
Rabbah said to him: They forbade only music.
Ulla, the Eretz Yisraeli Amora who would travel back and forth to Babylonia,
is appalled by a knock he hears on the door while visiting Rav Menashe. Ulla
reacts so viscerally because he believes, in line with the Eretz Yisraeli tradition,
that producing a loud noise on Shabbat is strictly prohibited. Rabbah responds
that the prohibition is limited to musical sounds. As the sugya continues, ear-
lier rabbinic sources are brought which seem to contradict Rabbah’s claim. The
Stam succeeds in contextualizing each source in order to defend Rabbah’s rul-
ing. However, while the sugya does defend Rabbah against all difficulties, it
ultimately offers no clear-cut statement of preference for RabbahoverUlla. The
lack of a clear ruling in the Talmud leads post-Talmudic authorities to debate
whether loud noises or only music is prohibited on Shabbat.
Rabbenu Ḥananel argues that despite the resolutions to Rabbah’s position,




Rabbenu Ḥananel b. ‘Erub. 104a
Despite the fact that Rabbah deflected all the challenges brought against
him, we do not rely on [strained] resolutions, and we do not reject Ulla’s
tradition.
This conclusion is consistent with his ruling in the case of thewater-mill where
he also prohibits the production of a loud non-musical noise. R. Yitzhak Alfasi
analysis see See Aviad Stollman, Commentary of Chapter Ten, Eruvin, 375–391 and Ethan
Tucker, ibid.
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R. Yitzḥak Alfasi b. ‘Erub. 35b
Itmakes sense to say that the halakhah follows Rava [= Rabbah], who said
that only music is prohibited … We have seen that some of the masters
[like R. Ḥananel] hold like Ulla and they rely on theTalmudYerushalmi…
Butwedonot hold thisway; since the sugya of our [= Babylonian]Talmud
is permissive, we don’t care if the Talmud Yerushalmi forbids, because we
rely on our Talmud, for it is later, and [its editors] were experts in the Tal-
mud Yerushalmi more than we are. They would not have permitted here
unless they knew that the statement from the Land of Israel was unreli-
able.
According to the Rif, the Bavli follows Rabbah, probably because he senses that
the Stammaitic deflection of all difficulties reveals the “Bavli’s” position. Unlike
R.Ḥananel, the Rif is not concernedwith the forcednature of these deflections.
He is aware of theYerushalmi’s ruling thatmaking any type of loud noise is pro-
hibited, but argues that the law accords with the Bavli because it is later and
it would have had the opportunity to reject the Yerushalmi. The Rif ’s position
accordswithwhat seems to be his lenient ruling on thewater-mill.25 Thus, both
the Rif and R. Ḥananel correlate their general position concerning noise on
Shabbat with their particular position regarding the water-mill. To R. Ḥananel,
all noise is prohibited, and thus the water-mill can be prohibited due to the
noise. To the Rif, only music is prohibited, and the water-mill prohibition is
ascribed to Beit Shammai, due to shevitat keilim.
Twice on b. Beṣah 30a (s.v. ןיחפטמןיא , and s.v. ןיחפטמןיאןנת ) theTosafot imply
that they acceptRabbah’s limitationof thenoise prohibition. First, they explain
that one reason that clapping might be prohibited is that it is considered mak-
25 See above n. 16.
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ingmusic. Had it simply been noise, it would have been permitted. Later on the
same page, cognizant of the fact that people in their community do not adhere




Tosafot, b. Beṣah 30a, s.v. Tenan
However, for us, these activities are permitted; for itwas only in their time,
when people had the skill to make musical instruments, was it necessary
todecree [against clapping lest someonemakeamusical instrument]. But
for us, we are not such experts that we know how tomakemusical instru-
ments, and therefore there is no need for the decree.
According to the Tosafot, based on the Stam on b. Beṣah 36a, the prohibition
against clapping exists only in a situation where the people are skilled artisans
whoknowhow to fashion their own instruments.Absent this concern, clapping
is permitted. Clearly, the Tosafot have no problemwith the loud noise made by
clapping itself, thus indicating that they rule according to Rabbah—onlymusi-
cal sounds are prohibited.26
Sefer HaTerumahwas written by R. Baruch b. R. Yitzḥak, a student of R. Yitz-
ḥak the Elder, one of the greatest of the Tosafists. Thus, Sefer HaTerumah is the
first halakhic authority to combine the Tosafot’s restrictive ruling on using a
water-mill with their lenient view of the concern of making noise in general
on Shabbat. To resolve this albeit minor crisis, Sefer HaTerumah reinterpreted
the problem of the noise produced by the water-mill—the noise itself is not
prohibited, it is the potential misunderstanding that it might cause. Note that
there is no other possible reason available for him to prohibit putting thewheat
in the water-mill on erev Shabbat, for this is the only reason that can accord
with Beit Hillel. And since the water-mill sound is not music, it should seem
to be permitted. To resolve all of these issues, he interprets the prohibition in
the sugya in an innovative fashion: The noise will make outsiders think that the
Jew is operating his mill on Shabbat.27
26 The Tur and Beit Yosef, OḤ 338 explain that Rabbenu Tam also holds like Rabbah because
he permits drawing water with a wheel which would make a noise loud enough to forbid
according to those who follow Ulla.
27 R. Asher b. Yeḥiel questions the very nature of the prohibition because he finds no prece-
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The Chime Clock: A Test Case
The technological advancement of a verge escapement clock,which for the first
time allowed a clock to ring hourly, brought 15th-century Ashkenazi halakhic
authorities to revisit the case of a water-mill set in motion before Shabbat.
These rabbis understood the two situations to be similar—both set in motion
before Shabbat an instrument that will emit a noise on its own on Shabbat.
And since Ashkenazim (with the exception of Rabbenu Tam) ruled that the
water-mill was prohibited because it makes a noise (and not because of shevi-
tat keilim), they needed to decide why such noise was prohibited, and whether
it applied to the clock as well. In other words, their debate echoed the dispute
between earlier Rishonim concerning the interpretation of Rabbah’s state-
ment, “because it makes a noise.”
R. Jacob Weil cites what is certainly the original interpretation of Rabbah’s





R. JacobWeil ResponsumNo. 130
That which I was asked about a vessel made with weights to sound a
chime on the hour, it seems that it is prohibited. For R. Ḥananel and
R. Israel of Krems ruled according to Rabbah in the first chapter of Shab-
bat who explains that the baraita which prohibits placing wheat in the
mill is even according to Beit Hillel because it makes noise.
R. JacobWeil follows the rulingof R.Ḥananel and forbidsperforming anyaction
that will make a regular noise on Shabbat because of the noise itself. This rul-
ing remains consistent with the original meaning of the prohibition. A chime
clock makes a loud noise much like the grinding of a water-mill that even Beit
Hillel would prohibit.
R. Judah Landau, on the other hand, permits because he understands the
noise prohibition in light of the interpretation innovated by Sefer HaTerumah.
dent for it. He describes it as “a poor reason…an innovationwhich is not found anywhere.”
See Rosh on Šabb. 1:33.









Sefer HaAgur, Hilkhot Hotsa’at Shabbat no. 519
My father and teacher R. Judah Landauwas asked about a bell which rings
hourly through the use of weights, is it permitted to prepare and set it up
so that itwill ring on Shabbat, for perhapswe should compare it to placing
wheat in the mill? And he answered: It seems to me that the main reason
[to prohibit] is because the matter will be noticeable as was explained
by the Tosafot Shantz, Sefer HaTerumah and Sefer Mitzvot Hagadol, who
explained that “thematter will be noticeable” [as follows]: People will say
that so-and-so’s mill is grinding on Shabbat because they will think that
he placed the wheat in it on Shabbat. If so, the reason is not relevant with
regard to the bell which rings because everyone knows that they are nor-
mally set up the previous day to work on the following day and on the day
it rings it is not set up at all.
According to R. Judah Landau the loud noise produced by the chime is not a
direct violation of Shabbat. The chime, like the grindingmill, is not considered
music and therefore is permitted.28 But unlike in the case of the mill, when it
comes to the clock, the concern that passersby will think that a Jew violated
Shabbat does not exist. Everyone knows that chime clocks are set up before
Shabbat so there is no reason to forbid them on Shabbat. Note that R. Landau
agrees with R. Jacob Weil that the law accords with Rabbah in that Beit Hillel
would prohibit the use of the water-mill on Shabbat. Their disagreement over
the halakhic ruling stems from their interpretation of that prohibition, i.e. if
there is a problem with the noise itself or what people may think when they
hear the noise.
28 Cf. Shulḥan Arukh HaRav who describes the chime as musical sounds.
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Shulḥan Arukh
R. Yosef Karo and R. Moshe Isserles (Rema), in their combined product of the









Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 252:5
(1) And onemay put wheat into a water-meal before dark. Note: and we
are not concerned aboutmaking noise, that people will say so-and-so’s
mill is grinding on Shabbat.
(2) And there are thosewhoprohibitwith amill and inany situationwhere
there is a concern of making noise. And this is the primary practice.
However, in a case of loss one can be lenient …
(3) And it permitted to set up a vessel with weights called a clock, on erev
Shabbat, even though it makes a noise to announce the time on Shab-
bat, because everyone knows that it is set up the previous day.
R. Yosef Karo rules that one is permitted to place wheat into a water-mill on
erev Shabbat. In the Beit Yosef, he explains that his ruling follows Rabbenu
Tam, the Rif, and Rambam who all rule according to R. Yosef, who they read
as attributing the baraita to Beit Shammai. Since halakhah follows Beit Hil-
lel, the prohibition is waived.29 In section one, R. Moshe Isserles opens by
noting that if we rule according to R. Yosef, we must say that the noise that
the water-mill makes is not a problem. The Rema then must explain why it is
not a problem. His explanation as to why this is not a concern demonstrates
that he understands the noise problem in the same way as Sefer HaTerumah
and R. Judah Landau do. Isserles imagines that the reason to prohibit could
29 Neither the Rif nor the Rambamexplicitly permit. He explains that the Rif follows the per-
missive opinion which he cites first and that Maimonides permits because he rules that
there is no concern for the resting of vessels (Šabb. 6:16) and makes no mention of the
case of the water-mill in the Mishneh Torah.
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only be that others would suspect the owner of a Shabbat violation. R. Yosef,
who rejects Rabbah, must therefore not have had such a concern. We should
emphasize the radical transformation occurring here in the interpretation of
R. Yosef. In the original sugya, and essentially through the Tosafot, there was
no real explanation as to why R. Yosef rejected Rabbah. He strangely just says,
“why not say [putting wheat in the water-mill] is prohibited because of shevi-
tat keilim.” He does not add in any rejection of Rabbah. Indeed, this is one of
the essential difficulties in the sugya. Paradoxically, what was originally offered
by Sefer HaTerumah as an explanation for Rabbah in order to rule according
to him despite the fact that making noise was considered permitted (and only
song prohibited), here ultimately solves the conundrum as to why R. Yosef the
Amora rejected Rabbah. R. Yosef rejected Rabbah because the former is simply
notworried that thenoise createdby thewater-millwillmakepeople think that
the mill was operated by a Jew on Shabbat. The earlier prohibition of making a
noise was absolute; but its later understanding, connecting it with mar’it ayin,
is subjective and canmore easily be waived. This is an excellent example of the
timelessness of classical Talmudic interpretation. An interpretation that arises
in the thirteenth-century (Sefer HaTerumah) is seamlessly used to explain the
statement of a fourth-century rabbi.
In section two, Isserles proceeds to rule against Karo and maintains that it
is indeed prohibited to set up a water-mill before Shabbat or in any situation
where a sound might lead one to think a violation of Shabbat is taking place.
This too is, of course, a result of his following the reasoningof SeferHaTerumah.
Finally, in section three, Isserles again relates to the subjective nature of mar’it
ayin. Despite the fact that the chime clock emits a noise (and a musical one at
that), since there is no concern that a passerby may think there is a Shabbat
violation, there is no reason to rule stringently. By this point, the Talmudic con-
versation has been thoroughly shifted into a question of mar’it ayin. The noise
itself is never a problem, the only question is whether the noise will attract
attention and lead people to think that a prohibited labor has been performed
on Shabbat.
Modern Halakhic Rulings
Modern halakhic authorities have used the case of the water-mill as a refer-
ence point in discussing automated electronic devices set up ahead of Shabbat
to operate on Shabbat. Despite the fact that modern Jews rarely encounter
water-mills (except on trips to Neot Kedumim) modern devices can easily be
set to emit noises on Shabbat. In our analysis belowwe address two prominent
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examples: the microphone and the radio.We will see how, in light of R. Moshe
Isserles, the focus of the contemporary halakhic authorities has shifted entirely
from the problem of the noise itself to a debate over the applicability of mar’it
ayin.
R. Moshe Feinstein (d. 1986) refers to the noise prohibition in his discussion















Iggrot Moshe OḤ 3:55
(1) It is not common on a weekday to set it [the microphone] up long
before use and therefore it is prohibited [for use] on Shabbat even
if it was set up and prepared before the time when they will speak
and pray …
(2) And it seems from the fact that the author [of the Shulḥan Arukh]
also cited the leniency to allow theuse of a chimewhich rings hourly
if it was set up before dark (338:3), that he permits placing wheat
[into the mill] only close to dusk because anyone who hears the
grinding knows that they are hearing what was placed before Shab-
bat for he put the wheat in place immediately before grinding. It is
only in such a case that R. Yosef disagrees with Rabbah. For Rabbah
prohibits in a case where one places a lot of wheat in the mill and it
grinds for a long time if someone was not there when the grinding
began before Shabbat because they will hear the grinding on Shab-
bat and think itwas just placed there just now. R. Yosef permits since
it is usual to place the wheat in the mill immediately beforehand
there is no reason to be suspicious.
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(3) But making noise in this manner [with a microphone] which is
heard for the first time on Shabbat and it is not customary to set
it up beforehand; the author [of the Shulḥan Arukh] believes that
even R. Yosef would concede that it is prohibited. That is why he
needed to write that setting up a chime which rings hourly is per-
mitted based on the reasoning of the Agur cited by the Beit Yosef,
which is that it is set up daily for the subsequent day.
In section one, R. Feinstein forbids using a microphone on Shabbat, because
of Rabbah’s prohibition of the water-mill as explained by the Rema.30 In sec-
tion two, he addresses the two issues brought up in the Shulḥan Arukh, the
water-mill and the chime clock, and interprets the dispute between Rabbah
and R. Yosef as hinging on the difference between the two. Chime clocks, he
argues, are always set up the day before, and therefore, no one will think that
the process was set up on Shabbat. Rabbah and R. Yosef disagree only concern-
ing the water-mill. R. Yosef thinks that people will know that it is common
to set up such a process well in advance, and therefore they will not believe
that forbidden labor was performed on Shabbat. Rabbah disagrees and is con-
cerned that peoplewill think that the processwas set up on Shabbat.We should
note how seamlessly R. Feinstein integrates the medieval interpretation of the
prohibition into the Amoraic debate fashioned by the editors of the sugya. To
him, the debate is simply a question of the applicability of mar’it ayin. As we
have said before, issues of mar’it ayin are inherently subjective. They are also
more flexible and each particular situation can be judged differently. This dif-
fers, as we have stated, from the original two rabbinic justifications—shevitat
keilim and making a noise, which were less flexible and more principled. With
this interpretation in mind, when it comes to the microphone, people do not
normally set it up the day before. Therefore, when a passerby sees or hears
the microphone in use they will assume it was set up on Shabbat.31 In such
a case even R. Yosef would prohibit (assuming that he rules against the “shevi-
tat keilim” baraita, which he attributes to Beit Shammai). This is a significant
step for R. Feinstein, for while we have a dispute concerning the water-mill
(between Amoraim and Rishonim) and even a dispute concerning the chime
clock (among Aharonim) over the microphone he posits that no one would
disagree. This ability to posit a uniform stringency on this situation is a direct
result of the transformation wrought by Sefer HaTerumah. Once the dispute
30 In this responsum he provides four reasons to prohibit. We deal here only with one of
those reasons.
31 Tzitz Eliezer 4:26 makes a similar argument.
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becomes completely overmar’it ayin, a halakhic authority is essentially free to
judge each situation as he or she sees fit, based on whether they believemar’it
ayin is potentially a problem.32 We should note that R. Feinstein’s thinking is
also reflected in another of his responsa (OḤ 4:84) wherein he prohibits the
use of a radio or television on Shabbat that was turned on before Shabbat.
In stark contrast to R. Feinstein’s consistently stringent rulings on the use of
electronic devices set up before Shabbat, R. Mordechai Yaakov Breish (d. 1973)
offered a lengthy argument theoretically permitting setting up a radio before
Shabbat to broadcast music or news on Shabbat for a person who is merely ill
and not in mortal danger. The starting point for his ruling is found in R. Moshe
Isserles’ formulation of the prohibition: “And there are thosewho prohibit with
amill and in any situationwhere there is a concern of making noise. And this is
the primary practice.However, in a case of loss one can be lenient.” According
to R. Breish, the Rema’s words “in a case of loss one can be lenient,” indicates

















Ḥelkat Yaakov OḤ no. 63
Therefore, in our casewhere themain concern ismaking a noise, because
all labors are permitted to be set in motion before Shabbat according to
Beit Hillel, and it is only here that there is a concern for making noise, as
32 See also Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Minḥat Shlomo 1:9.
from the ancient water-mill to automated electronic devices 173
is true in the case of the water-mill, since it (making noise) is permitted
in a case of loss, all the more so [it is permitted] in a case of a sick person
who is not in mortal danger … If this is correct, all the more so when it is
permitted to set it up on erev Shabbat wheremaking noise is permitted in
the case of a loss and all the more so that it is permitted for a sick person.
The use of a radio is prohibited because it is considered lighting a flame
which is permitted if done before Shabbat like all other acts of burning,
and themain concern is making a noise which is permitted for a sick per-
son.33
Furthermore, in my humble opinion, according to the law and not in
practice, any person who sets up a radio to broadcast the news or music,
although it certainly is not pious behavior, should not be disparaged as
one who transgresses, since R. Moshe Isserles permitted in all cases of
“honoring the Shabbat” as he does in the case of incurring a loss …
We can compare the radio to the chime clock which is permitted because
everyone knows that it was set up yesterday [before Shabbat]…The same
is true in our case, where everyone knows that it was set up before Shab-
bat because electricity is forbidden [on Shabbat] due to burning. This is
especially true because the entire prohibition even according to Rabbah
is only a rabbinic prohibition due to the debasement [of Shabbat] but
according to the letter of the law there is noprohibition asRavYosef ruled.
Therefore, in our case where one can say that it is similar to the chime
clock, and there is the permissive ruling of the “enjoyment of Shabbat,”
we do not disparage one who permits, and as was said, this is not meant
to be a permissive ruling and it should not be stated in public …
In brief, R. Breish posits that even according to the Rema, who expresses con-
cern for making noise on Shabbat, one can set up a radio before Shabbat to
operate on Shabbat. There is no question that this is true in the case of an ill
person, for whomwe can be lenient because the entire prohibition of making a
noise is only rabbinic in origin, but it may even be theoretically permissible for
everyone because the radio is analogous to the chime clock. Remarkably, in an
observation we can assume was true for the community in which he lived, he
argues that there is no concern formar’it ayin because everyone knows that the
33 R. Breish understands there to be a total prohibition on actively using electricity on Shab-
bat because of the prohibited labor of burning. See Daniel Nevins, “The Use of Electrical
and Electronic Devices on Shabbat,” https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/
files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/2011‑2020/electrical‑electronic‑devices‑shabbat.pdf, 22–
26.
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use of electricity is a violation of Shabbat and anyone who hears the radio on
Shabbat will assume that it was set up before Shabbat. Note that this assump-
tionwhich serves as the foundation of R. Breish’s leniency is the exact opposite
of R. Feinstein who argues that anyone who hears the microphone or radio in
use on Shabbat will assume that it was set up on Shabbat.34
R. Feinstein and R. Breish, both Ashkenazi authorities, engage with the rul-
ing of the Rema in their responsa. R. Feinstein relies on the Rema’s concern
for mar’it ayin in order to rule stringently in all cases. R. Breish posits that the
Rema’s concern is not applicable in the case of a radio that was set up before
Shabbat.
Using the prohibition of the water-mill as the basis to prohibit setting up
microphones and radios was not available to Sephardi poseqim. The Shulḥan
Arukh rules according to R. Yosef, who attributes the prohibition of using the
water wheel to Beit Shammai and, by deduction, does not believe that setting
up a process before Shabbat that will make a noise on Shabbat is prohibited at
all. He simply does not seem to be worried about mar’it ayin. By extension, we
could assume that setting up automated devices before Shabbatwould also not
seem to entail any problem of mar’it ayin. Thus, modern Sephardi authorities
do not have available to them the precedent of the water-mill or the chime
clock to prohibit the use of electronic devices on Shabbat that were set up
before Shabbat. This issue is best articulated in thewritings of R. OvadiahYosef
(d. 2013) and his son R. Yitzḥak Yosef.
R. Yitzḥak Yosef was sent the following question after the publishing of the
first edition of YalkutYosef, a digest of his father’s halakhic rulings.Thequestion






34 R. Breish wrote the above responsum in September of 1939. In responsum no. 124, dated
August 1965, R. Breish explains that he regretted issuing his earlier ruling and had since
reversed his position. He forbids the use of all electronic devices apart from “opening a
refrigerator door when themotor is operating,” out of fear that the unlearnedwould intuit
that all use of electronic devices is permitted on Shabbat.
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Yalkut Yosef Shabbat I Notes no. 252
According to the Beit Yosef who follows R. Yosef against Rabbah, and has
no concern for the debasement of Shabbat, what prohibition can there
be against listening to a radio [on Shabbat] from a station that is entirely
[operated by] gentiles. Granted, it is not appropriate to do so because a
person should only engage with holy matters on Shabbat but on what
basis can you write that our master, the Beit Yosef, prohibits …
In his response to the question, R. Yitzḥak Yosef concedes the point and yet








One who examines the aforementioned passage in the Yalkut Yosef will
see that we were careful to write “it is correct and appropriate to be strin-
gent in thismatter” butwedidnotwrite that itwas prohibited. For indeed,
how could we use the language of prohibition in a matter in which our
master [R. Yosef Karo] did not prohibit because he is not concerned to
prohibit this because it is debasement of Shabbat. On the other hand,
how can we permit an action such as this, i.e. setting up a timer to play
a cassette tape on Shabbat, thereby turning Shabbat into a weekday … It
is very appropriate to be stringent in this matter, and to distance oneself
from electronic appliances that operate on Shabbat in this manner, even
if they operate automatically … and here too we wrote it is not appropri-
ate to do so. But we did not use the language of absolute prohibition.
R. Yitzḥak Yosef cannot ascribe to R. Yosef Karo an absolute prohibition in the
case of setting up a radio or cassette player before Shabbat to operate on Shab-
bat. After all, R. Yosef Karo ruled that setting up the water-mill before Shabbat
was permitted, thereby rejecting the applicability of the prohibition of mak-
ing noise to a process set up before Shabbat. R. Yitzḥak Yosef cannot issue an
outright prohibition. Therefore, he relies on the broader and vaguer category of
“not turning Shabbat into aweekday” in order to strongly discourage the action
without using language that implies explicit prohibition. We should note that
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R. Yitzḥak Yosef, of course, is well aware that according to his father, if the pro-
hibitionwas biblical (if performed on Shabbat), evenR. Yosef Karowould agree
that setting up the process before Shabbat is prohibited (aswe shall see below).
Here he is directly addressing the concern of his questioner that R. Yosef Karo
never explicitly prohibits setting up a process that will make noise on Shabbat.
R. Ovadiah Yosef, in his responsum on the use of a radio that was turned on










There is another reason to prohibit, which is that it makes noise and is a
debasement of Shabbat, and one must be concerned because of mar’it
ayin, that those who hear it will suspect that he turned on the radio
on Shabbat, especially in our day wherein, due to our many transgres-
sions there are a great number of violators of Shabbat [prohibitions], and
although we may no longer make our own decrees, there is an exception
withmar’it ayin of a Torah prohibition… and even though ourmaster the
[author of] the Shulḥan Arukh ruled to permit (in the case of the water-
mill), it should be said that such a case is different because even if he
places the wheat in the mill to be ground on Shabbat he violates only a
rabbinic prohibition … which is not true here (in the case of the radio)
where there is a suspicion of a Torah prohibition … It should be stated
that this is the position of our master [R. Yosef Karo] … and he would
agree to forbid in this case.
R. Ovadiah Yosef cannot easily prohibit the radio due to his strict adherence to
the rulings of R. Yosef Karo who, in the Shulḥan Arukh, allows placing wheat in
thewater-mill and seems unconcerned about the intendantmar’it ayin.35 How-
35 On R. Ovadiah Yosef ’s strict adherence to the rulings of R. Yosef Karo see Benjamin Lau,
From ‘Maran’ to ‘Maran’: The Halakhic Philosophy of Rav Ovadia Yosef [in Hebrew] (Tel
Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2005), 223–265.
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ever, he still posits that even R. Yosef Karo would explicitly prohibit turning on
a radio before Shabbat for use on Shabbat. He distinguishes between the case
of the water-mill which he classifies as a rabbinic prohibition if performed on
Shabbat and turning on the radiowhich involves aTorah prohibition due to the
use of electricity. In such a case, even R. Yosef Karo would be concerned about
mar’it ayin. R. OvadiahYosef ’s desire to explicitly prohibit such an action forces
him to unhinge the issue of the use of the radio from its Talmudic precedent,
the water-mill. All rabbis, R. Yosef, and Rabbah, and their corresponding suc-
cessors, R. Yosef Karo and R. Moses Isserles, would agree that if the process set
in motion before Shabbat performs an action which can be misconstrued as
being a Torah violation of Shabbat, that process is prohibited.
Conclusion
Modernhalakhic authorities havebeendeeply concernedover theuseonShab-
bat of electronic devices set up before Shabbat. While most have reluctantly
allowed the use of Shabbat timers to turn off and on lights,36 itself seemingly
quite in line with the notion that Beit Hillel does not demand “shevitat keilim,”
when it comes to the use of microphones, radios, televisions, and other such
devices, they invoke the prohibition of making noise, understood as being a
result of the attention such devices attract, a problem of mar’it ayin. They are
also clearly motivated by a general concern for the debasement of Shabbat. If
all electronic devices are permitted for use on Shabbat as long as theywere pro-
grammed beforehand, howwould Shabbat be distinguishable from aweekday?
Our Jubilee honoree, Rabbi Joel Roth, has articulated the force of this concern
in his instructive article, “Melakhah U’Shevut: A Theoretical Framework.” He
writes:
While it is clear that the prohibition of excessively and unnecessarily
exertive activities enhances the rest of Shabbat, it is also clear that their
prohibition alone is insufficient to guarantee the restful spirit of Shab-
bat. There are so many things that one could do which would be neither
melakhot nor overly exertive but would surely turn the unique Shabbat
almost into a weekday. The other categories of shevut-prohibitions pro-
vide a reasonable response to the problem. They link the positive com-
mandment that mandates rest with the negative commandment that
36 See for example Iggrot Moshe OḤ 4:60.
178 kulp and rogoff
prohibits melakhah. Shevut-prohibitions of the resemblance, habit and
conducive types link the prescriptive and the proscriptive elements of
Shabbat. They provide further necessary safeguards against turning Shab-
bat into a weekday.37
Shevut, the prohibition of performing any act on Shabbat which violates the
“spirit of Shabbat,” is flexible in its application in much the same way that
mar’it ayin is inherently flexible and subjective. Rabbi Roth is concerned that
the “unique Shabbat” would be turned into “a weekday,” a concern that clearly
lies behind the reasoning of those halakhic authorities who prohibited setting
up automated devices before Shabbat. While no violation of melakhah takes
place if the process is set up before Shabbat, halakhic authorities are clearly
concerned not only with technicalities but with outcomes as well. Despite the
fact that the category of shevut exists to prohibit such cases where there is no
performance of melakhah but a violation of the “spirit of Shabbat,” contempo-
rary poseqim preferred to prohibit setting up electronic devices before Shabbat
on the grounds ofmar’it ayin, a secondary concern. It seems that in theirminds,
if they were to invoke the category of shevut such for actions, although not
melakhot, they would be considered a direct violation of Shabbat. Instead, they
are prohibited because of a concern that others might think one is violating
Shabbat. This choice of contemporary poseqim stems both from the language
of the debate codified by the Rema and the larger concern of “not creating new
decrees.”38The latter concern, referred to byR. Breish andmanyof the responsa
on the use of electronic devices on Shabbat, prevents a contemporary poseq
from adding new actions into the category of shevut prohibitions because they
do not appear in classical rabbinic literature.
In response to the restrictive application of the shevut prohibition Rabbi
Roth writes:
… it is … absurd to refrain from promulgating shevut prohibitions for
behaviors which might now be judged either to resemble or to be linked
by habit, or to be linked by conduction to melakhot on the ground that
earlier ages did not do so.39
37 Joel Roth, “Melakhah U’Shevut: A Theoretical Framework,” Conservative Judaism 35, no. 3
(1982): 25–26.
38 See Shimon Levi, “Ein Gozrin Gzerot Ḥadashot Aḥar Hatimat HaTalmud,” Shmatin 158
(2005): 65–83.
39 Ibid., 27.
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Thus, in contrast to more conservative poseqim, Rabbi Roth argues for the
revival of the category of shevut as grounds for prohibiting actions on Shabbat
which cannot strictly be consideredmelakhah. This case thus provides an inter-
esting distinction between the halakhic mindset of a leading authority in the
Conservative movement and his counterparts in the Orthodox world. The for-
mer is willing to be more innovative in his application of an ancient concept,
shevut, that Orthodox rabbis refrained from invoking. He is also more “tradi-
tional,” in a sense, in that hedoesnot invoke the category ofmar’it ayin, a notion
never connected in the Talmud to setting up a process that will begin before
Shabbat and continue on Shabbat. Together, his invocation of shevut and his
rejection of mar’it ayin (in these types of case) would provide Rabbi Roth, we
can assume, with a possibility not open to many of his Orthodox counterparts.
To allow setting up a microphone before Shabbat to operate in a synagogue on
Shabbat, a move that will only enhance the Shabbat experience for synagogue
attendees, but to prohibit turning on a radio or television before Shabbat and
allowing it to operate all of Shabbat, a clear violation of the religious spirit of
the day.
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chapter 7
Who Gets a Voice at the Table?: Eating and Blessing
with Rav Naḥman
Marjorie Lehman
With gratitude I dedicate this analysis of Berakhot 51a–b tomy teacher, Rabbi Joel
Roth, who understands the need for women to be counted as rabbinic leaders and
as scholars in the field of Talmud and Rabbinics. Because of him, women have an
equal voice at JTS.
For the rabbis, study and learning was a communal phenomenon, not an iso-
lated experience. The third-century rabbinic scholar from the Land of Israel,
R. Yose b. Ḥanina discredits learning alone, equating those who fail to study
in partnership as enemies of the rabbinic elite and its overarching project.
Solitude functions like a sword, maiming those who study unaccompanied,
he claims. Ideal study involves two who “sharpen” the minds of one another
(b. Ta‘an. 7a). This image recalls the intense and passionate study relation-
ship of R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, as R. Yoḥanan says; “When[ever] I would
say something, he [Reish Lakish] would pose 24 difficulties, and I would give
24 solutions, and as a result the subject became clear (b. B. Meṣ. 84b).”1 In
building a male–male “fraternity” with Torah as its central value,2 the rabbis
offer numerous examples of male rabbi–rabbi interchanges, featuring many of
the characteristics of strong relationships—introspective dialogues, passion-
ate discussions, rabbiswilling to travel long distances to see one another, rabbis
1 The Beit Midrash (the House of Study) was the communal space where ideally these male–
male (only) relationships were constructed and sustained.While there are numerous sources
in rabbinic literature that refer to Batei Midrash (Houses of Study), scholars still have ques-
tions about their structure and scope. Catherine Hezser and Jeffrey Rubenstein argue that
disciples gathered around a rabbinic master and learned traditions from him in his home
or possibly in a private dwelling. See Catherine Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic
Movement in Roman Palestine (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 196–205; and Jeffrey Ruben-
stein, “Social and Institutional Settings of Rabbinic Literature,” in The Cambridge Companion
toTalmudandRabbinicLiterature, ed. CharlotteElishevaFonrobert andMartin S. Jaffee (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 59–60.
2 Daniel Boyarin, Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish
Man (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 154.
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who dine together, not to mention relationships of respect and love. In fact, a
rabbi’s study partner is referred to as his ḥaver (his friend).3 That said, in think-
ing about male rabbi–rabbi relationships it is important to recognize that the
rabbis never shy away from exposing the downside of collegiality, including
male competition, its power dynamics, the tensions betweenmasters and their
disciples, the struggles for authority, the desire to best the other at their own
process of intellection, and most especially, the decision to be exclusivist in
order to define the boundaries of their circle of companions. Such boundaries
were constructed to close off entry to those who were not male, not rabbis, not
Torah-knowledgeable, not heteronormative, not able-bodied, and not Jewish,
thereby imposing social, religious, ideological and even physical exclusions on
those with whom the rabbis lived their everyday lives.
For centuries many faced impenetrable boundaries and relied on rabbinic
texts to support desired power structures. Indeed, a text, in and of itself, is not
necessarily exclusionary unless someone grants it the power to be so. Feminist
inquiry, in particular, pushes us to approach rabbinic texts from another van-
tage point, prompting a search for instances where the rabbis contest the very
structures they construct.4 Indeed, the rabbis leave a record of their opposi-
3 See Mishnah Pirkei ’Avot 1:6 which states: “acquire for yourself a friend (ḥaver)” and has tra-
ditionally been interpreted as stressing the need to find a study partner. The term, ḥaver,
however is also a technical term in Tannaitic literature, referring to a member of an elite
group that is committed to maintaining strict standards of purity. In Sifre Deut. 305 (Finkel-
stein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 323–324) and ’Avot Derabi Natan A 8:36 and B 18:40 to “acquire
a friend” is defined as someone one eats with, drinks with, studies Scripture with, studies
Oral Torah with, sleeps with, and to whom one reveals all his secrets of Torah and secrets
of derekh ’eretz. In later rabbinic sources, it also connotes establishing friendship with some-
one who maintains piety, righteousness, purity, not to mention, one who studies Torah. See
JonathanWyn Schofer, TheMaking of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 33. See also Catherine Hezser, “Rabbis and Other Friends,” in The
TalmudYerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture, ed. P. Schäfer and C. Hezser (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2000), 2:189–254, esp. 202.
4 SeeCharlotte Fonrobert, “Feminist Interpretation of Rabbinic Literature:TwoViews,”Nashim:
A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies and Gender Issues 4 (2001): 10. Following in the path of
Fonrobert, I root myself in Daniel Boyarin’s (now twenty-five-year old) approach exhorting
us to pay attention to the ruptures and the discontinuities that highlight cracks in the rabbis’
systems of power, ones that emerge when we pay attention to the very sources that comprise
a rabbinic sugya (119). See Daniel Boyarin, “Rabbinic Resistance to Male Domination: A Case
Study in Talmudic Cultural Poetics,” in Interpreting Judaism in a Postmodern Age, ed. Steven
Kepnes (NewYork: NewYork University Press), 119; Carnal Israel (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1993), 227–228; “Reading Androcentrism against the Grain: Women, Sex, and
Torah-Study,”Poetics Today 12, no. 1 (1991): 29–30. Also see Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault:
Feminism, Power, and the Body (Thinking Gender) (New York: Routledge, 1991), 14.
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tion to the values they purport, that is, “a fissure” for us to creep into, if only we
look for it.5 Significantly, we find that just as there are rabbinic sources about
collegiality, passionate dialogues, students searching out teachers and teach-
ers learning from students all in the name of Torah, there is also a thread that
exposes the rabbis’ vulnerability as well as the pain and the loss that comes
with asserting an authority wedded not only to what one knows, and who one
knows, but also to the ways one acquires knowledge.6 Inasmuch as the rab-
bis go to great lengths while in conversation with other rabbis to establish
their authority as legal experts, they also challenge the ways that authority is
affirmed, highlighting problems that exist on the inside of power, that is, within
their rabbi–rabbi sphere. At the same time, they also assert how that sphere
affects others outside of it.
While rooted in a feminist methodology, the focus of this analysis is soci-
ological, that is, on how relationships were defined and constrained by the
social structures, including the learning aspirations, in place at the time.7 The
emphasis will be on the structure of rabbinic society and how its weddedness
not only to the acquisition of Torah knowledge, but also to halakhah and rit-
ual observance, controlled interpersonal connections and choices. A shared
value system as well as shared norms link the individuals who claim member-
ship. Not surprisingly, rabbinic Jews are socialized into particular gender and
power relationships that govern who leads and who is led, that is, who teaches
and who is taught.8 But, they also recognize what is at stake in a system that
connects Torah knowledge with interpersonal relationships as well as with sta-
tus, authority, power and control.9 As such, the rabbis reflect and critique the
5 Boyarin, “Rabbinic Resistance to Male Domination,” 125–126.
6 See Schofer, The Making of a Sage, where he argues that the rabbis’ “elitism and sexism are
entangled with their persuasive visions of community and fellowship,” 22.
7 Graham Allan, Friendship: Developing a Sociological Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press,
1989), 2, 8–9.
8 Elite Ben-Yosef, “Literacy and Power: The Shiyour as a Site of Subordination and Empower-
ment for ChabadWomen,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 27, no. 1 (2011): 58.
9 Present-day research is prevalent regarding the value of cooperative learning and teach-
ing that centers, more specifically, on havruta study with respect to Talmud. See Jeff Kress
and Marjorie Lehman, “The Babylonian Talmud in Cognitive Perspective: Reflections on the
Nature of the Bavli and Its Pedagogical Implications,” Journal of Jewish Education 69, no. 2
(2003): 58–78; Elie Holzer and Orit Kent, A Philosophy of Ḥavruta: Understanding and Teach-
ing the Art of Text Study in Pairs (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014); and Elie Holzer,
Attuned Learning: Rabbinic Texts on Habits of the Heart in Learning Interactions (Boston: Aca-
demic Studies Press, 2016). Additionally, in the field of general education, many have turned
to the cognitive development psychologist, Lev Vygotsky, who emphasizes the significance of
the social nature of learning, suggesting that students be engaged together in learning activ-
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patriarchal framework that they so desire to construct. Their self-critique repo-
sitions us to think about the effects of power in our own relationships, whether
they involve teaching and learning, or not.10
Rabbinic literature offers usmany rabbi–rabbi interchanges, not tomention
numerous stories of rabbis engaging with non-rabbis. For this reason, there are
many entry points for examining the sociological framework that conditions
the rabbis’ interpersonal relationships. Rather than centering this analysis on
the rabbinic term for a rabbi-study partner, ḥaver, or on one rabbinic corpus,
or on tracing a given rabbi–rabbi relationship throughout Talmudic literature,
or on examining the way rabbis learn from and with one another, I have cho-
sen to focus on one aggadic story found in Massekhet (tractate) Berakhot of
the Babylonian Talmud as a paradigm for continued work on examining the
social-emotional elements that connected one individual with another or, in
some cases, drove them apart.11 Rooted within the seventh chapter of tractate
Berakhot with its focus on Birkat Hamazon (Grace after Meals) recited in a
rabbi’s home rather than in the Beit Midrash, the purpose is to think about the
ways the rabbis present the interpersonal interactions taking place around a
commonplace event mentioned frequently in rabbinic texts, of people eating
together.12 Within the context of discussing the laws and etiquette of reciting
Birkat Hamazon together with others, there is a story that appears only in the
Bavli (Ber. 51b). The story involves two rabbis and onewoman and invites analy-
sis regarding the relationship among them. It is just one example, amongmany,
ities to achieve the greatest outcomes. Vygotsky argued that the cognitive development of
an individual cannot be understood outside the patterns of relationships and interactions
in which such development takes place. Samuel J. Hausfather, “Vygotsky and Schooling:
Creating a Social Context for Learning,” Action in Teacher Education 18 (1996): 1–4; James
A.Wertsch,Vygotsky and the Social Formation of theMind (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity
Press, 1985), 59–76.
10 In some instances, scholars have used Talmudic material as case studies in the service
of teacher development for today’s Jewish educators, exploring master-disciple interac-
tions; see Jane Kanarek and Marjorie Lehman, “Making a Case for Rabbinic Pedagogy,” in
The International Handbook of Jewish Education, ed. L. Grant and A. Pomson (New York:
Springer, 2011), 581–596; and seeMoshe Berger, “Towards the Development of Jewish Ped-
agogy: Rav Ḥiya’s Vision of Torah Education,” in Judaismand Education: Essays inHonor of
Walter I. Ackerman, ed. Haim Marantz (Beer-sheva: Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Press, 1998), 109–120; and the collection of essays in Turn It and Turn It Again: Studies
in the Teaching and Learning of Classical Jewish Texts, ed. J.A. Levisohn and S.P. Fendrick
(Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2013).
11 See Schofer, TheMaking of a Sage, 4.
12 See Hezser, “Rabbis and Friends,” 216–221. Although Hezser focuses primarily on sources
found in the Jerusalem Talmud, she also contextualizes eating habits in Greco-Roman
sources in an attempt to describe the realia of the time.
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of how ritual practice, authority, gender, and knowledge aswell as the emotions
of respect, frustration, anger, and jealousy intersect to build and undermine
relationships in rabbinic culture, ultimately with lessons for us today.
Unsurprisingly, the male–male homosocial structure of rabbinic culture
generated many instances of male rabbis dining together, presumably dis-
cussing Torah as an extension of their learning partnerships in the Beit
Midrash.13 These discussions about meals prevalent in the Talmuds, from the
Passover seder to the daily meal, most especially in the seventh chapter of
Massekhet Berakhot, suggest that rabbis dined with or around non-rabbis. At
each meal space one might find servers, Cutim, non-Jews, women, children,
slaves, and ‘amei ha’aretz14 in close proximity to the rabbinic elite.15While some
of these individuals could join the introductory invitation to Birkat Hamazon,
called zimun, to complete the cohort of three necessary for invoking this ini-
tial call to blessing, including a server, a non-Jew and a Cuti; others, including
women, minors, and slaves could not join together.16 Therefore, looking at the
structure of meal rituals, with blessings before meals and blessings afterward
to sanctify God, offers a window intowho had an actual “seat at the table.”Who
counted as the hosts’ companions? And, what was the nature of that compan-
ionship? No doubt, a lot of ambiguity emerges in trying to determine whether
women, when present at meals, are related to the host, or what the nature of
the relationship was among rabbis dining together, especially when one rabbi
was from the Land of Israel and one from Babylonia. Because we can never
really know how peoplementioned together in rabbinic sources came to know
13 Regarding the fact that women also gathered together to perform rituals in ḥavurot, see
Judith Hauptman, “From the Kitchen to the Dining Room: Women and Ritual Activities
in Tractate Pesaḥim,” in A Feminist Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud: Introduction
and Studies, ed. T. Ilan et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 122–124. See also b. Ber.
45b regarding the allowance for women to make their own zimun. Also see Charlotte
Fonrobert’s larger discussion, “Gender Politics in the Rabbinic Neighborhood: Tractate
Eruvin,” in A Feminist Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud: Introduction and Studies,
ed. T. Ilan et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 51.
14 See for example, b. Ber. 47b where an ‘am ha’aretz is not included in zimun. An ‘am
ha’aretz can generally refer to someone who is not Torah-knowledgeable, although here
the baraitan (Tannaitic)material is more specific in defining an ‘amha’aretzmore broadly
to include anyonewho does not know the laws of tithing to someonewho readsTorah and
Mishnah, but not Gemara. Also see b. Sotah 22a.
15 Seem. Ber. 7:1; b. Ber. 46b (dining together with less prominent people); 47b (with servers,
cutim); 47b (with ‘amei ha’aretz); 47b (with sons who are not Torah-knowledgeable); 47b
(with those who have not tithed); 47b (with women, slaves and minors); and 47b (with
Canaanite slaves).
16 Womenwere allowed to join together andperform zimun. However,women could not join
with other men. They also could not join together with slaves or minors. See b. Ber. 45b.
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one another, all that we can unearth are observations about the patterns of
social integration among those who belong to a similar communal organiza-
tional structure, one that, indeed, shaped their ties to one another.17
Birkat Hamazon and the Ritual of the Cup of Blessing
Rabbinic literature discusses many holy moments that revolve around a cup
of wine. Wine marks sanctified time. Weddings, circumcisions, holiday Kid-
dush, Shabbat Kiddush, and Havdalah are all accompanied by wine (b. Pesaḥ.
105b–106a). According to tractate Berakhot, one also said Birkat Hamazonwith
a cup of wine, referred to as a “cup of blessing” (kos shel berakhah) in b. Ber.
51ab.18 The cup was passed to those who ate together, although it is not clear
whether someone eating alone would also use a cup of wine when reciting
Birkat Hamazon.19 On one level, the ritual seems somewhat odd.Why does the
four-paragraph long recitation of Birkat Hamazon to thank God for one’s food
in fulfillment of the Toraitic commandment (Deut 8:10) require a cup of wine?
Does this wine rite convey a desire to extend more gratitude to God? Is it for
the purposes of sanctification? Or maybe it is about praising God still further?
Ber. 51a leaves uswith the impression that the purpose of reciting BirkatHama-
zon along with a “cup of blessing” is to request God’s blessing for physical land
and/or spiritual space, building on the theme developed in the second blessing
of Birkat Hamazon:
R. Yoḥanan said: Whoever recites Birkat Hamazon over a full cup is
awarded an inheritance beyond boundaries, as it is said [byMoses before
his death, “O Naftali, sated with favor, and full of the Lord’s blessing, you
will], take possession on the west and south” (Deut 33:23). R. Yose b. Ḥan-
ina says: He merits and inherits two worlds, this world and the world to
come.20
However, while not to confuse the recitation of Birkat Hamazon with zimun
or zimun with the appearance of this additional ritual component, the “cup
of blessing,” the following story suggests that it was customary in Babylonia to
17 Allan, Friendship, 18.
18 Also see b. Ber. 48a regarding King Yannai and R. Sheshet as well as the discussion below.
19 See Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 182 indicating that as late as the early 16th century this issue was
still the subject of halakhic debate.
20 b. Ber. 51a
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pass a cup of wine to those partaking of a meal together. Seen this way, the cup
of blessing communicates that people eating together construct a moment of
holiness by virtue of being with one another. The group created sanctifies this
moment in time. Additionally, not only was it customary for guests who led
Birkat Hamazon to bless their hosts (b. Ber. 46a), in passing the cup of bless-
ing to each person, they expressed a desire that God would continue to bestow
blessing on those with whom they dined, paralleling God’s blessing of food.
Therefore, the ritual of passing the cup of blessing to those around one’s table
works in tandemwith acknowledging the value of interpersonal relationships.
Ber. 51b in the Babylonian Talmud includes a story about a meal that oc-
curred at the home of the prominent Amoraic rabbi from Babylonia, Rav Naḥ-
man bar Ya’akov (d. 320). Ulla, an equally eminent rabbi from the Land of Israel
and of the same generation, is diningwith him.21 One of the fewnamedwomen
in the Bavli, Yalta, is present as well. Ulla signifies the power of the Jewish
community in the Land of Israel as a rabbinic center and its desire to assert
control over Babylonia. Known as an itinerant rabbi, he has come to Babylonia
to do just that.22 R. Naḥman stands for the authority of the Babylonian rab-
binate while Yalta represents the non-rabbi, the rabbinic “other.” Possibly she
is R. Naḥman’s wife or a member of his household. We cannot be sure.23 But,
at the very least, the appearance of a woman along with Ulla and Rav Naḥman
is far from incidental.24 Her inclusion problematizes the ways that relation-
ships are cultivated amongmale rabbis so as to reveal the underside of rabbinic
21 Both R. Naḥman and Ulla were third-generation Amoraim.
22 For more examples of Ulla’s travels from the Land of Israel to Babylonia see b. Šabb. 157b
(whereUlla visits theBabylonian exilarch); andb.Ned. 22a (whereUlla returns to the Land
of Israel).
23 See Tal Ilan’s discussion of Yalta in Mine and Yours Are Hers: Retrieving Women’s History
from Rabbinic Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 122 and n. 61. Also see Ilan’s final comment
about Yalta where she claims that the proximity between men and women in rabbinic
literature, like R. Naḥman and Yalta, led many to presume that they were married when
this might not have been the case (129). She also points out that Talmudic sources refer to
Ḥoma as Abaye’s wife (b. Ketub. 65a), Beruriah as R. Meir’s wife (b. Ber. 10a; b. Pesaḥ. 62b;
and b. ‘Abod. Zar. 18a) and Imma Shalom as R. Eliezer’s wife (b. Šabb. 116a and b. B. Meṣ.
59b). While it is true that in five of the seven instances in the Bavli that mention Yalta,
R. Naḥman appears as well, each of these instances leaves a degree of ambiguity as to
how she is related to him and do not mention that she is his wife. b. Ber. 51ab mentions
the word for wife, והתיב , but does not do so immediately following Yalta’s name in a way
that would mark her clearly as the wife of R. Naḥman. Indeed, her relationship to R. Naḥ-
man is ambiguous.
24 SeeMichael Satlow, “FictionalWomen: A Study in Stereotypes,” in The TalmudYerushalmi
and Greco-Roman Culture, ed., P. Schafer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 3:226, 233; and
Fonrobert, “Gender Politics in the Rabbinic Neighborhood,” 51.
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patriarchal authority, that is, the way that it can cultivate a desire for one to
outdo another with their Torah knowledge.25 Instead of constructing social
relations and reinforcing stable rabbinic cultural norms, as many narratives
do in rabbinic literature, this story questions what the rabbis construct—does
it always work? Indeed, what we find percolating beneath the interactions
between the figures in this rabbinic story is a failed sense of the rabbi–rabbi
relationship, not to mention a strained connection with others who are not
rabbis. The story exposes the precarious grounds upon which the rabbis fash-
ion their authority, even within a social group that held Torah and halakhah as
central. The story begins as follows:
[And the following incident occurred]: Ulla visited the house of R. Naḥ-
man.
He [Ulla] ate bread and recited Birkat Hamazon. He [then] passed the
cup of blessing to R. Naḥman. R. Naḥman said to him [Ulla], “Let Master
send the cup of blessing to Yalta.”
Amid the daily ritual of Birkat Hamazon, R. Naḥman requests that Ulla pass
the “cup of blessing” to Yalta, in keeping with what appears to be a Babylonian
custom of sharing the cup with the members of one’s household, including
one’s wife. Ulla seems to have a different custom where the “cup of blessing”
is only passed to the men at the table. To assert his rabbinic prowess, that is,
to prove his deep knowledge of Torah and of course to support his point, Ulla
not only refers to a verse from Deuteronomy, but also quotes the opinion of
the second-generation Amora from the land of Israel, R. Yoḥanan (d. 290), a
rabbinic colleague from the generation prior to his own. In addition, the redac-
tor of the story includes the opinion of the Tanna, R. Natan, who is also from
the Land of Israel. The presence of R. Natan’s opinion bolsters the authority of
R. Yoḥanan’s argument, pointing to its origins in the Tannaitic era:
[Ulla said to R. Naḥman, that is not necessary] because R. Yoḥanan said:
“The fruit of a woman’s belly [womb] is only blessed through the fruit of
a man’s belly, as it is written [in Deut 7:13], ‘He [God] will bless the fruit of
your [male (heb. singular)] belly.’ It does not say the fruit of her belly but
[rather it says] the fruit of your [masculine] belly.”
It was similarly taught in a baraita: R. Natan said: “From where [do we
derive from Scripture] that the fruits of a woman’s belly are only blessed
25 See Schofer, TheMaking of a Sage, 7.
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through the fruits of the husband’s belly? For it is stated: ‘And He [God]
will bless the fruits of your [masculine] belly’; it does not say, the fruits of
her belly.”26
Unquestionably, Ulla’s decision not to pass the cup of blessing to Yalta is an
insult to her as well as to his host. He wants to flex his masculine rabbinicmus-
cle by claiming that his decision emerges from an interpretation of a verse in
Deuteronomy—mentioning blessing. In so doing, he deemsmen as having sole
procreative power. Claiming that the blessing of progeny comes only frommale
seed (“his belly”), rather than from the womb of women, he renders Yalta (and
all women) completely irrelevant, not to mention undeserving of blessing.27
Objectified, she has no voice, despite material elsewhere in the Bavli suggest-
ing that she too is Torah-knowledgeable.28
Ulla seems to care more about being right, more about imposing his own
custom on R. Naḥman, and more about asserting hegemony over his Babylo-
nian colleague. In this regard, teaching Torah is not a neutral act. It emerges
from a desire to dominate another rabbi, solidifying his own power as if to rep-
resent that of the rabbis in the Land of Israel.29 Ulla’s knowledge of Torah and
his familiarity with the teachings of his predecessors overrides the respect due
to those at whose table he sits. Furthermore, any potential openness to another
way of performing the “cup of blessing” rite is squelched by the commitment
to, and knowledge of, a chain of legal transmission in the names of R. Natan
and R. Yoḥanan. Ulla’s knowledge is the knowledge of a past rabbinic scholar
and repeating it gives him great authority. Ironically, the performance of this
rite (whether it includes zimun, the four-paragraph long Birkat Hamazon, or
the additional “cup of blessing” that has as its objective—blessing God and the
26 Deut 7:13 (larger context):
And if you obey these rules: God will favor and bless you and multiply you. He will
bless the issue of your womb and the produce of your soil, your new grain and wine and
oil, the calving of your herd and the lambing of your flock, in the land that he swore to
your fathers—you shall be blessed above all other peoples—there shall be no sterilemale
or female among you or among your livestock— רָ֥ק ָעָ֛ךְבהֶ֥יְהִי־ֹאלםיִּ֑מַעָה־לָּכִמ֖הֶיְהִּֽתְךּו֥רָּב
׃ָךֶּֽתְמֶהְבִבּוהָ֖רָקֲעַֽו .
27 See b.Nid. 31bwhere the physiological differences betweenmenandwomenare discussed
in greater detail. Discussing ways that the male body differs from the female body can be
found in many places in rabbinic literature.
28 See b. Ḥul. 109b and b. Nid. 20b. Also see Charlotte E. Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity: Rab-
binic and Christian Reconstructions of Biblical Gender (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2000), 118–127; and Ilan, Mine and Yours Are Hers, 122 and 127.
29 Madeleine Arnot, “MaleHegemony, Social Class, andWomen’s Education,” Journal of Edu-
cation 164, no. 1 (1982): 64–89.
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others with whom one dines), reveals Ulla’s self-centeredness in his attempt to
isolate R. Naḥman in his own home, as well as Yalta. Failing to pass the cup to
Yalta, that is, disrespecting R. Naḥman albeit through the lens of his knowledge
of a midrashic support, highlights the complexities of membership in the rab-
binic hierarchy—when what you know effects who you know and controls the
way you engage in conversation.
Ulla’s self-centeredness is not surprising given the rabbinicmilieu intowhich
he is born. Looking just at the etiquette surrounding the performance of Birkat
Hamazon, as conveyed in the seventh chapter of tractate Berakhot, presents a
glimpse into a world where, understandably, egos are built and shattered. The
manner in which rabbis were to recite the zimun or Birkat Hamazon accentu-
ated howmuch they were valued for their Torah scholarship. For example, in a
narrative appearing earlier in this chapter and mentioning a “cup of blessing,”
the Jewish kingYannai, an enemyof the rabbiswho—according to b.Qidd. 66a,
had massacred them in his desire to consolidate power—discloses to his wife,
the queen, that he could not recite Birkat Hamazon without a member of the
rabbinic elite leading him. Therefore, he turns to Shimon b. Shetaḥ, the brother
of the queen and a lone rabbi-survivor, to recite it (b. Ber. 48a).30 The message:
even kings need the rabbis to perform daily rituals in accordancewith the rules
that the rabbis invent, despite how much kings, such as Yannai, despise them.
Additionally, halakhic sources in the very same chapter convey that reciting
zimun, followed by Birkat Hamazon, falls to the person at the table with the
greatest knowledge of Torah (b. Ber. 47a).31 And while it was also the custom
that a guest ledBirkatHamazon in order to graciously bless his host (b. Ber. 46a),
read contextually this text suggests that such a guest did so in accordance with
his status as compared to others at the table. Additionally, two Torah scholars,
each of whom had the ability to sharpen the intellect of the other in matters
of halakhah, could join to form a zimun that, by law, required three individu-
als. This means that their (inanimate) Torah knowledge counted as the third
person (b. Ber. 47b). Finally, rabbis who ate together and were of equal stature
did not join in saying Birkat Hamazon, but recited it alone, to signify that each
respected the knowledge of the other (b. Ber. 45b). Given howmuch the rabbis
valued Torah knowledge and community, it seems counterintuitive to encour-
age colleagues of equal status to bless God individually, especially while they
30 See b. Qidd. 66a for the extensive narrative on King Yannai’s destruction of the rabbis. See
y. Ber. 7:2, 11b for another version of this story.
31 See Rashi b. Ber. 45b, s.v. lo havu behu (“and there was none among them”) where Rashi
argues that greatness wasmeasured in accordancewith both knowledge of Torah and age.
Also see b. B. Bat. 120a.
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happen to be together at the same table. Such etiquette seems to discourage
the experience of rabbinic colleagues coming together at a meal, and subverts
the overarching theme of the chapter, which is zimun and blessing God as a
group. In fact, the larger the group, the greater the blessing.32 Admittedly, the
rabbis use food ritual to instantiate a desired hierarchical social structure. And
the way daily rituals are discussed here underscores how a rabbi’s communal
standing was structured around who knew the most Torah. Ulla’s status is rec-
ognized when R. Naḥman allows Ulla to recite Birkat Hamazon.
For men status was achieved most readily through Torah knowledge and
Torah granted them communal status; for women it was all about marriage
and procreation. Interestingly, in this story it is not clear that Yalta is married
to R. Naḥman, that she is pregnant, or has children. She also does not appear
to be the housewife, the server, or the cook.33 The details are simply not clear.
The ambiguity generates a feeling that she is here to confuse categories, rather
than to offer a clear-cut rabbinic characterization of a rabbi’s wife.34 She leaves
open the possibility that somewomen did, in fact, converse withmen because,
at least as the story begins, she seems to have a seat at the table; R. Naḥman
wants the “cup of blessing” passed to her.35
32 See b. Ber. 49b–50a, especially themishnah (m. Ber. 7:3) where it indicates that three peo-
ple who have eaten together are to say, “Let us bless,” ten people who eat together add to
their zimun saying, “Let us bless our God,” 100 people who eat together continue to add to
zimun and say, “Let us bless God, who is our God,” etc … However, the gemara that com-
ments on this mishnah indicates a desire to use the same language for zimun whether
there are ten or more than ten.
33 There are many rabbinic sources that refer to women taking part in domestic tasks,
although here Yalta is not mentioned in conjunction which them. In fact, there are sev-
eral Talmudic anecdotes, for example, that speak of women who bring food to the head
of household. See, for example, y. Šabb. 3:1, 5d; b. Šabb. 48a; b. Šabb. 51a. See Judith Haupt-
man’s discussion in “ANewViewofWomenandTorah Study in theTalmudic Period,” JSIJ 9
(2010): 263, esp. note 40, https://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/9‑2010/Hauptman.pdf; and her arti-
cle, “Hadavar masur lenashim: nashim betekasei daat beitim,” Sidra (5770): 83–111.
34 See Satlow, “Fictional Women,” 228–230 for a good overview of rabbinic stereotypes of
women, specifically regarding domesticity. Also see Dina Stein, “A Maidservant and Her
Master’s Voice: Discourse, Identity, and Eros in Rabbinic Texts,” Journal of the History of
Sexuality 10, nos. 3–4 (2001): 377, where she discusses how the relationship between Rabbi
Yehudah the Patriarch and his maidservant blur the expected hierarchy of social cate-
gories. See also Hauptman’s Talmudic examples in her article, “A New View of Women
and Torah Study in the Talmudic Period,” where women voice their knowledge of matters
of halakhah, indicating that in certain areas they were Torah knowledgeable; JSIJ 9 (2010),
https://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/9‑2010/Hauptman.pdf, 249–292.
35 Galit Hasan-Rokem, Tales of the Neighborhood: Jewish Narrative Dialogues in Late Antiq-
uity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), prompts discussion on whether Yalta
could be a neighbor and not R. Naḥman’s wife. Unfortunately, as she points out, even
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We also know from other sources, specifically b. Qidd. 70ab, that Yalta ad-
vised R. Naḥman and offered halakhic advice to men in the areas of niddah
and kashrut (b. Nid. 20b and b. Ḥul. 109b). She also helped to heal R. Amram
who was tortured by the “house of the exilarch,” bathing him so that he would
recover (b. Git. 67b). This suggests that the pattern of rabbinic relationships
outside the Beit Midrash, that is, of men discussing Torah or eating together,
maynot alwaysbe genderedmale.At the very least, given that the issue inb. Ber.
51b revolves around a “cup of blessing,” as compared to numerous examples in
chapter 7 of tractate Berakhot that discuss zimun (fromwhichYaltawould have
been excluded at this meal), it seems that by including an interaction between
two rabbis and a woman, a woman who may or may not be R. Naḥman’s wife,
there is a desire to test how far the exclusion of women should go.36 Who is in
and who is out?Who controls the decision and under what circumstances?
As it happens, Ulla’s teaching in the name of R. Yoḥanan, does not make
sense; he seems to misread the verse. Not only does the context in Deuteron-
omy refer to blessing both men and women with progeny saying, “there shall
be no sterile male or female among you (7:13),” but Deuteronomy also makes
clear: women become pregnant and give birth to children and it is a bless-
ing God bestows. The Talmud’s redactors, possibly recognizing the weakness
of R. Yoḥanan’s interpretive comment, inform us that this teaching about male
seed originatedwith the earlierTannaitic rabbi, R. Natan, aTalmudicmove that
though neighbors are the closest relationship in ancient culture beyond the family unit,
the relationship is often overlooked. While in patriarchal cultures, neighbors may belong
to the same family, aggadic stories in rabbinic literature that present dialogues between
neighbors often include women as their protagonists who may not be family members.
Due to their frequent presence at the homes of others, they can be considered members
of the household (8 and 11). See also Hezser, “Rabbis and Other Friends,” 216, who dis-
cusses neighbors in the ancient world, noting that friends who were neighbors crossed
the threshold into another’s home and became intimates of the family. If Yalta andR. Naḥ-
man are neighbors, this might introduce the potential for a relationship of symmetry and
mutuality, more so than if she is his wife, serving him. Indeed, there are instances in rab-
binic literature where women sought out rabbis to study with them, although, in the case
of the wife who studied with R. Meir, she was berated by her husband and discouraged
by her female neighbors from returning to study. See Vayikra Rabbah (Margoliot edition),
96:9; y. Sotah 1:4, 16d. Also see a summary of the sources referring to Beruriah in Marjorie
Lehman, “Reading Beruriah through the Lens of Isaac Bashevis Singer’s Yentl,”Nashim: A
Journal of JewishWomen’s Studies and Gender Issues, 31, no. 1 (2017): 123–145.
36 See Fonrobert, “Gender Politics in the Rabbinic Neighborhood,” 52–53, where she argues
that thepresence of womenwithin adiscussion about rituals (in her case, the ‘eruv), serves
a meta-halakhic purpose. Fonrobert reminds us of the importance of seeing the presence
of women in rabbinic narratives as pointing to something the rabbiswish to express about
themselves, their communal framework or about the laws they create.
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surely supports Ulla. Additionally, while Ulla transmits the view of others, he
adds nothing creative to the discussion. He sees women as the receptacles of
male seed, yet he is nothing more than a vessel containing rabbinic wisdom to
which he adds nothing.
In addition, the presence of Yalta conveys a degree of anxiousness on the
part of the rabbis about the nature of male authority. Ulla’s legal reasoning is
faulty, and his ethics are questionable. He does not use his Torah knowledge to
show respect for R. Naḥman or for Yalta by engaging them. He merely discred-
its their custom entirely, as if to say, “I am right and you are wrong.” Ironically,
Torah knowledge, which defines his relationship with R. Naḥman, distances
him from his host and from Yalta. In addition, he invokes the authority of his
predecessor in the Land of Israel, R. Yoḥanan when R. Yoḥanan is not at the
table.Why does Ulla’s respect for R. Yoḥanan supersede his respect for those of
his own generation who happen to be alongside him? Why does he venerate
his predecessors, and disparage his contemporary, R. Naḥman? Collegiality is
missing; the opportunity for two rabbis to learn from one another is thwarted;
connections between the Land of Israel and Babylonia are strained—all in the
name of a desire to assert that, “what I know is better than what you know.”
The response on the part of Yalta to Ulla is anger and frustration. She “rose
passionately andwent to thewine storehouse and broke 400 barrels of wine.”37
Her method of communication feels stereotypically female in that she acts
emotionally rather than engaging Ulla in a more typical male–male / rabbi–
rabbi verbal debate. It is also symbolic. Don’t dismiss the vessel, she commu-
nicates to Ulla, because without the vessel, there is no wine; that is, without
a woman’s womb, there is no child. And with this Yalta challenges the control
Ulla presumes he has. Arguably, the relationship between men and women, as
Ulla understands it, is one of total power of men over women, even in creating
progeny. A woman is blessed through a man; she has children because of him.
But what Yalta reveals when she smashes 400 barrels of wine is that men, in
fact, depend on the object of their power wholeheartedly.38 Recognizably, they
do need women. Ulla’s midrashic words are empty, just like the barrels.
37 See also b. Ketub. 104a where the maidservant of Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi throws a jar off
the roof to silence those praying for his mercy, competing with God who wanted him as
well. Upon hearing the noise, the rabbis stop praying and R. Yehudah dies. See Stein “A
Maidservant and Her Master’s Voice,” 391 and her discussion 392–393.
38 See Stein, “AMaidservant andHerMaster’sVoice,” 377,who inquotingHegel’s understand-
ing of the master–slave relationship argues that “total personal power becomes a form of
total dependence on the object of that power”; seeGeorgeWilhelmHegel, Phenomenology
of the Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (London: Sonnenschein, 1910), 228–240; and W. Fitzgerald,
Slavery in the Literary Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–8.
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Although Yalta’s message comes through to R. Naḥman, he seems to back
down in support of Ulla. When he says, “Let the Master send her another cup,”
R. Nahman appears to favor Yalta, but instead he fuels the fire. “Another cup,”
אנירחאאסכ , would not be the one overwhich BirkatHamazonwas already said;
it would be an entirely new cup. It would be a cup of wine with no connection
to the ritual thatwas just performed.There is noplan to repeat BirkatHamazon.
In so doing, R. Naḥman offers a compromise position, kowtowing to Ulla, but
trying to pacify Yalta at the same time. Such a make-up strategy merely rein-
vokes the rabbinic social status quowheremen assert their power over women
and the hierarchy is maintained.39 Passing a second cup to Yalta signifies that
she is, in fact, second to R. Naḥman and Ulla. She is pushed to the sidelines,
positioned exactly where, in this socio-cultural world of the rabbis, women are
to be. Her emotional outburst and physical spillage of such a valuable com-
modity reveals the ways in which she—and not Ulla—destabilizes the order
and is firmly other.
Ulla seems to support R. Naḥman’s plan regarding the additional cup, albeit
using a stronger, more disparaging tone. Unlike R. Naḥman, who speaks to Ulla
and not to Yalta, Ulla speaks directly to Yalta. In so doing, he infantilizes her
and provokes her to lash out at him, not with words of Torah, but with insult-
ing words:
He [Ulla] sent40 it to her [saying the following]: “All the wine [from] this
barrel can be [counted as] the wine of blessing.”41
39 See Judith P. Goetz and Linda Grant, “Conceptual Approaches to Studying Gender in Edu-
cation,”AnthropologyandEducationQuarterly 19 (1988): 182–196, as discussed inBen-Yosef,
“Literacy and Power,” 59.
40 The word “sent” from the Hebrew root, רדש, is somewhat unclear as it makes this inter-
change between Ulla and Yalta seem as though they are not speaking directly to one
another. However, a look at b. Qidd. 70a shows that the word “sending” can mean talking
to a woman. Qidd. 70a is as follows: “[R. Nahman said]: Let theMaster ‘send’ [greetings] of
peace to Yalta.” Read along with b. Ber. 51b and noting that Yalta responds to Ulla, suggests
that Ulla must have said something to her that provoked her words of insult.
41 Note that while themanuscript traditions indicate that this story (b. Ber. 51ab) is relatively
stable, both the Munich manuscript (97) and the Paris manuscript (671) do not include
R. Naḥman’s second request that Ulla send Yalta another cup. Instead, following Yalta’s
decision to break 400 barrels of wine, Ulla retorts, “All the wine [from] this barrel can be
[counted as] the wine of blessing.” Then Yalta responds with words of insult. Without the
second request of R. Naḥman, the harshness of Ulla’s retort is intensified. Yalta breaks the
barrels, at which point Ulla implies that she has destroyed all blessing.
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She sent him [a response]: “From itinerant [peddlers come idle] words
and from old rags [come] lice.”
As Ulla tries to placate Yalta, he invents a way of deeming the second cup
of wine to be considered “a cup of blessing” by claiming that the entire bar-
rel from which the wine was originally taken was blessed. But, are there any
barrels left? Has Yalta destroyed them all? Are Ulla and R. Naḥman trying to
say—“Ha! you missed one?” Is there a pitcher of wine on the table from which
the first cup of blessing was poured? Here these two rabbis emerge more as
facetious men trying to convince Yalta that the cup can still be passed to her,
than as legal experts with a viable solution. In the end, Yalta is not fooled.
She is familiar with the ritual and knows she is being duped. Even if the bar-
rel (or the pitcher from which wine was drawn for the first cup) is still intact,
they cannot make up for Ulla’s refusal to include her initially with a second
cup. Voicing her despair this time around, Yalta transposes a folk-saying found
in the book of Ben Sira 42:13 that connects the notion of wickedness coming
fromwomenwith insects coming from cloth.42 Instead, as Yalta utters, wicked-
ness comes not from women, but from itinerant rabbis such as Ulla, who try
to exercise authority over rabbis, like R. Naḥman, not to mention those who
dismiss women when engaged in ritual tied to eating. Yalta’s anger intensi-
fies.
There is no end to the story. The concluding remark is made by Yalta, which
silencesUlla andR.Naḥman. Any evaluation as towhether she is right orwrong
is absent. And finally, no one is reproved.43 Talmudic literature is replete with
material that discusses punishments for individuals who lodge insults, includ-
ing rabbis. Punishments, such as 30-day bans (nidui) or harsher excommuni-
cations (ḥerem), ensure a stable social order where social interactions operate
according to a set of enforceable rules. So now the question that arises is why
did the redactors of the Talmud preserve this story?44Why include a story that
42 See Sir 42:13, “From a garment comesmoths and from awomanwickedness.” Also see Ilan,
Mine and Yours Are Hers, 125 and note 66. Although it is not clear whether Yalta had any
familiarity with the book of Ben Sira, the rabbis were certainly aware of it. See b. Sanh.
100b where the lines found prior to this verse are quoted.
43 See b. Moʿed Qaṭ. 14b–16b regarding punishments for lodging insults at someone else. See
Jason Sion Mokhtarian, “Excommunication in Jewish Babylonia: Comparing Bavli Moed
Qatan 14b–17b and the Aramaic Bowl Spells in a Sassanian Context,”Harvard Theological
Review 108, no. 4 (2015): 553–554.
44 Others ask this question about sources mentioning women that appear to subvert main-
stream rabbinic thinking, including Gail Labovitz who queries: What does the inclusion
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underscores the challenges of rabbi-rabbi collegiality; accentuates the dan-
gers of asserting rabbinic authority in developing interpersonal relations and
exposes egocentrism; competition and exclusion in the acquisition and dis-
seminationof Torahknowledge?Why intimate thatwhatbindspeople together
in rabbinic culture, meaningTorah and ritual, can drive awedge between them
and make companionship difficult? Ulla also does more than dismiss Yalta; he
excludes her from blessing.
Following in the footsteps of Mieke Bal’s feminist readings of biblical texts,
it is important to note that rabbis establish and sustain a working culture
that is patriarchal. However, they also indicate that companionship rooted in
dominance and exclusion is not “unproblematically established.”45When Ulla,
R. Naḥman and Yalta meet for the same meal, the patriarchy is visible, but
so are its consequences.46 Feminist scholars might be drawn to Yalta as the
protagonist who stands for all that does not fit in rabbinic culture. Ulla, after
all, does not think she, or any woman for that matter, deserves to be counted,
even in birthing children, highlighting amale-centered viewof continuity.47He
denies Yalta’s personhood making her the quintessential outsider in the name
of power and authority.Women are mere receptacles for the seed of men, that
is, ironically, in thewake of Ulla’s decision to appear as amere vessel of rabbinic
teaching, quoting his predecessor, rather than as an inventive contributor. But,
Yalta’s presence also brings out the egocentrism, the jealousy, the insecurity,
and the disrespect that can exist betweenmale rabbis who, in this case, are dis-
of stories into rabbinic literature, like this one about Yalta, imply about the rabbis and
rabbinic culture? See “Rabbis and ‘Guerrilla Girls’: A Bavli Motif of the Female (Counter)
Voice in the Rabbinic Legal System,” Women in Judaism: A Multidisciplinary E-Journal
10, no. 2 (2013), https://wjudaism.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/wjudaism/article/view/
20906/17081.
45 Mieke Bal, Lethal Love (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 3; and also see
Hasan-Rokem, Tales of the Neighborhood, 61.
46 Bal, Lethal Love, 5.
47 See past scholarship on Yalta, including Rachel Adler, Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive
TheologyandEthics (Philadelphia: JewishPublication Society, 1998), 57; Charlotte Elisheva
Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic and Christian Reconstructions of Biblical Gender
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 120; and Gail Labovitz who builds upon their
work in “Rabbis and ‘Guerrilla Girls’: A Bavli Motif of the Female (Counter) Voice in the
Rabbinic Legal System.” Indeed, Labovitz identifies other stories in the Bavli not only of
female participation and agency, but also of barriers to female entry into legal settings.
See Admiel Kosman, “A Cup of Affront and Anger: Yaltha as an Early Feminist in the Tal-
mud,” Journal of Textual Reasoning, https://jtr.shanti.virginia.edu/volume‑6‑number‑2/a
‑cup‑of‑affront‑and‑anger‑yaltha‑as‑an‑early‑feminist‑in‑the‑talmud/. And see Ilan, Mine
and Yours Are Hers, 121–130.
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agreeing about who receives God’s blessing and about how they receive it (via
the original cup or the second one). Their failure to model an effective inter-
personal rabbi–rabbi relationship, accentuated by the fact that the story does
not end with any final words exchanged between them, means that the rabbis,
in including this story, are willing to expose the fault lines in the patriarchal
homosocial society they operate within and wish to sustain. The rabbis admit
that patriarchies falter, a point that is often overlooked. While at times it is a
womanwho is disempowered, at others, it is a rabbi who disempowers another
of equal status in the name of Torah, a rabbi who is supposed to be his ḥaver.
Furthermore, if the pattern of learning in rabbinic culture is entirely social,
such that learning with and through another is highly valued and generative,
occurring not only in batei midrash, but also at one’s table, then relationships
become the fodder upon which rabbinic society is built and sustained. Unfor-
tunately, as this story reveals, human personalities can threaten the formation
of needed interpersonal relationships. Ego impedes relationships. The need
to be in control evokes anger in those who are excluded.48 Disrespect drives
people apart. Power that is tied to knowledge and/or to gender, can prevent
or destroy rabbi–rabbi relationships (Ulla-R. Naḥman), male–female relation-
ships (Ulla and Yalta/R. Naḥman and Yalta), and husband–wife relationships
(if R. Naḥman and Yalta are husband and wife). Interpersonal relationships,
formed within a patriarchal structure and governed by how much Torah one
knows, run the danger of promoting worlds that lack dynamism and make
limited room for even those who belong to the same social structure. The rab-
bis admit through the interchange between R. Naḥman, Ulla, and Yalta in Ber.
51b that patriarchal structures can frustrate relationships, even those among
equals, inasmuch as they construct patterns of belonging that inspire connec-
tion.49
48 Stein, “A Maidservant and Her Master’s Voice,” 379 and 384, suggests that there cannot be
any relationship when you fall in love with yourself, like the Greek Narcissus who sees his
reflection in a pool of water.
49 As Judith Hauptman argues, it is possible that the rabbis were not entirely comfortable
with their patriarchal privilege and, therefore, sought ways to ameliorate the status of
women. See Rereading the Rabbis: A Woman’s Voice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 4.
Moreover, as Hauptman points out, not all Talmudic women abided by disempowering
structures (Yalta) and not all men wanted to silence them (R. Naḥman). In her article,
“A New View of Women and Torah Study in the Talmudic Period,” 249–292, https://www
.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/9‑2010/Hauptman.pdf, Hauptman is clear to point out that men relied
on women in many categories of law in order to properly observe it. Women voice their
knowledge.
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This rabbinic story is about characters who, on the one hand, appear to be
members of the same communal structure—who sit at tables together much
like friends do—but, at the same time, stand in tense, ambivalent relationships
to one another.50They are embedded in an organizational communal structure
related to Torah and halakhah that dictates the boundaries of their relation-
ships, that is, with how male rabbis relate to other male rabbis and with how
male rabbis relate towomen. But, whatwe observe is both the potential and the
loss. Ulla is connected to R. Naḥman by virtue of them both being rabbis, even
though they live miles apart. Potentially, they can bridge two centers of Torah
learning. And yet, the competition between Babylonian Jewry and that of the
Land of Israel, as represented in the R. Naḥman andUlla disagreement over the
ritual of the “cup of blessing,” reveals the obstacles that can work against com-
panionship and strong interpersonal relationships needed for learning Torah.
In the process, some, like Yalta, will find themselves completely sidelined and,
therefore, suffer a greater sense of loss than others.
And so—looking at rabbinic texts brings to light the question as to whether
exclusivity and exceptionalism, empowerment and disempowerment—all of
which are characteristics of patriarchies—generate strong social fabrics. In-
deed, when Robert Frost asked himself this question—“Why do [fences] make
good neighbors,”—he responded that before he would build a wall he would
ask to know, “what I was walling in or walling out, and to whom I was likely to
give offense.”51 However, despite the recognizable downsides of a patriarchal
social fabric, which the rabbis in b. Ber. 51b unabashedly critique, the patri-
archywas continuously reinvoked and protected.More equitable socialmodels
never arose. The story of Ulla, R. Naḥman, and Yalta indicates that some rabbis
were struggling with the model they had created, but not enough to propose
another social structure. After all, Torah learning happened; intellectual pro-
ductivity ensued for generations. As such, the message that emerges from this
story is to look harder at the issues that constrain us today and determine the
extent towhich thenatureof relationships is informedbypast social structures.
Indeed, the goal is to rejoice in what has changed, like the admission 34 years
ago of women to rabbinical school because of rabbis and scholars like Rabbi
Joel Roth who spoke out relying on halakhah to enable this to happen. But we
also need to assess what remains to be changed to avoid the type of behavior
that results in irreparable damage or in stories that are told and retold offering
no good endings.52
50 Bal, Lethal Love, 4–5.
51 Robert Frost, The Poetry of Robert Frost, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (1916, etc.).
52 Mary Beard,Women and Power: AManifesto (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation,
2017), 97.
who gets a voice at the table? 199
Bibliography
Adler, Rachel. Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics. Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society, 1998.
Allan,Graham. Friendship:DevelopingaSociological Perspective. Boulder, CO:Westview,
1989.
Arnot, Madeleine. “Male Hegemony, Social Class, and Women’s Education.” Journal of
Education 164, no. 1 (1982): 64–89.
Bal, Mieke. Lethal Love. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
Beard, Mary.Women and Power: AManifesto. New York: Liveright, 2017.
Ben-Yosef, Elite. “Literacy and Power: The Shiyour as a Site of Subordination and
Empowerment for Chabad Women.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 27, no. 1
(2011): 53–74.
Berger, Moshe. “Towards the Development of Jewish Pedagogy: Rav Ḥiya’s Vision of
Torah Education.” In Judaism and Education: Essays in Honor of Walter I. Ackerman.
Edited by Haim Marantz, 109–120. Beer-sheva: Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Press, 1998.
Boyarin, Daniel. Carnal Israel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Boyarin, Daniel. “Rabbinic Resistance to Male Domination: A Case Study in Talmudic
Cultural Poetics.” In Interpreting Judaism inaPostmodernAge. Edited by StevenKep-
nes, 118–141. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
Boyarin, Daniel. “Reading Androcentrism against the Grain: Women, Sex, and Torah-
Study.”Poetics Today 12, no. 1 (1991): 29–53.
Boyarin, Daniel. Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the
Jewish Man. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Fitzgerald, W. Slavery in the Literary Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
Fonrobert, Charlotte. “Feminist Interpretation of Rabbinic Literature: Two Views.”
Nashim: A Journal of JewishWomen’s Studies and Gender Issues 4 (2001): 7–14.
Fonrobert, Charlotte. “Gender Politics in the Rabbinic Neighborhood: Tractate Eru-
vin.” In A Feminist Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud: Introduction and Studies.
Edited by T. Ilan et al., 43–59 Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007.
Fonrobert, Charlotte E.Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic andChristian Reconstructions of Bib-
lical Gender. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Frost, Robert. The Poetry of Robert Frost. Edited by Edward Connery Lathem. (1916,
etc.).
Goetz, Judith P., and Linda Grant. “Conceptual Approaches to Studying Gender in Edu-
cation.”Anthropology and Education Quarterly 19 (1988): 182–196.
Hasan-Rokem,Galit.Tales of theNeighborhood: JewishNarrativeDialogues inLateAntiq-
uity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
200 lehman
Hauptman, Judith. “FromtheKitchen to theDiningRoom:WomenandRitualActivities
inTractate Pesaḥim.” In AFeminist Commentary on theBabylonianTalmud: Introduc-
tion and Studies. Edited by T. Ilan et al., 109–126. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007.
Hauptman, Judith. “Hadavar masur lenashim: Nashim betekasei daat beitim.” Sidra
(5770): 83–111.
Hauptman, Judith. “A New View of Women and Torah Study in the Talmudic Period.”
JSIJ 9 (2010): 249–292. Online: https://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/9‑2010/Hauptman.pdf.
Hauptman, Judith. Rereading the Rabbis: AWoman’s Voice. Boulder, CO:Westview, 1998.
Hausfather, Samuel J. “Vygotsky and Schooling: Creating a Social Context for Learning.”
Action in Teacher Education 18 (1996): 1–4.
Hegel, GeorgeWilhelm. Phenomenology of theMind. Translated by J.B. Baillie. London:
Sonnenschein, 1910.
Hezser, Catherine. “Rabbis and Other Friends.” In The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-
Roman Culture. Edited by P. Schäfer and C. Hezser, 2:189–254. Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2000.
Hezser, Catherine. The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine.
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997.
Holzer, Elie. Attuned Learning: Rabbinic Texts on Habits of the Heart in Learning Inter-
actions. Boston: Academic Studies, 2016.
Holzer, Elie, and Orit Kent. A Philosophy of Ḥavruta: Understanding and Teaching the
Art of Text Study in Pairs. Boston: Academic Studies, 2014.
Ilan, Tal. Mine and Yours Are Hers: RetrievingWomen’s History from Rabbinic Literature.
Leiden: Brill, 1997.
Kanarek, Jane, and Marjorie Lehman. “Making a Case for Rabbinic Pedagogy.” In The
International Handbook of Jewish Education. Edited by L. Grant and A. Pomson, 581–
596. New York: Springer, 2011.
Kosman, Admiel. “A Cup of Affront and Anger: Yaltha as an Early Feminist in the Tal-
mud.” Journal of Textual Reasoning 6, no. 2. Online: https://jtr.shanti.virginia.edu/
volume‑6‑number‑2/a‑cup‑of‑affront‑and‑anger‑yaltha‑as‑an‑early‑feminist‑in‑the
‑talmud/.
Kress, Jeff, and Marjorie Lehman. “The Babylonian Talmud in Cognitive Perspective:
Reflections on the Nature of the Bavli and Its Pedagogical Implications.” Journal of
Jewish Education 69, no. 2 (2003): 58–78.
Labovitz, Gail. “Rabbis and ‘Guerrilla Girls’: A Bavli Motif of the Female (Counter)
Voice in theRabbinic Legal System.”Women in Judaism:AMultidisciplinaryE-Journal
10, no. 2 (2013). Online: https://wjudaism.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/wjudaism/
article/view/20906/17081.
Lehman,Marjorie. “Reading Beruriah through the Lens of Isaac Bashevis Singer’sYentl.”
Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies and Gender Issues 31, no. 1 (2017): 123–
145.
who gets a voice at the table? 201
Levisohn, J.A., and S.P. Fendrick, eds. Turn It and Turn It Again: Studies in the Teaching
and Learning of Classical Jewish Texts. Boston: Academic Studies, 2013.
Mokhtarian, Jason Sion. “Excommunication in Jewish Babylonia: Comparing Bavli
Moed Qatan 14b–17b and the Aramaic Bowl Spells in a Sassanian Context.”Harvard
Theological Review 108, no. 4 (2015): 552–578.
Rubenstein, Jeffrey. “Social and Institutional Settings of Rabbinic Literature.” In The
Cambridge Companion to Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. Edited by Charlotte Eli-
sheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee, 59–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
Satlow, Michael. “FictionalWomen: A Study in Stereotypes.” In The Talmud Yerushalmi
and Greco-Roman Culture. Edited by P. Schafer, 3:225–243. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2002.
Sawicki, Jana. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body (Thinking Gender).
New York: Routledge, 1991.
Schofer, JonathanWyn.TheMaking of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics. Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 2005.
Stein, Dina. “A Maidservant and Her Master’s Voice: Discourse, Identity, and Eros in
Rabbinic Texts.” Journal of the History of Sexuality 10, nos. 3–4 (2001): 375–397.
Wertsch, James A. Vygotsky and the Social Formation of the Mind. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1985.
© daniel s. nevins, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004420465_009
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
chapter 8
Contemporary Criteria for the Declaration of Death
Daniel S. Nevins
Sheilah
What is the precise moment of death according to halakhah?
Teshuvah1
The Process of Dying
The time of death is perhaps the most mysterious of all human transitions. In
halakhic literature, much attention has been focused on the treatment of the
person up until the moment of death, and of his/her body and survivors after
that point. But when, precisely, does a person die?
The prominent medical writer and surgeon Sherwin Nuland writes that
“every one of death’s diverse appearances is as distinctive as that singular face
we each show theworld during the days of life.”2 TheTalmud in b. Ber. 8a cites a
beraita claiming there to be 903 forms of death. Themost painful separation of
soul from body is described as croup; the gentlest is death by a kiss, likened
1 I am grateful for special assistance given to me on this project by my father and teacher,
Michael A. Nevins, M.D., my friend David Bar-Shain, M.D., and by my congregants, Dr. Bruce
Silverman, Dr. Alex Steinbock, Dr. Richard Trosch, who are neurologists, and Dr. Leonard
Rosenthal and Dr. Ronald Sherman, who are pulmonologists. The bioethics subcommittee
of the CJLS helped me research and sharpen this paper. I thank its chairman, Rabbi Aaron
Mackler and Rabbis Kassel Abelson, Elliot Dorff, Avram Reisner, Joel Roth and Elie Kaplan
Spitz for their guidance.
This responsum was approved by the CJLS on September 8, 2004 by a vote of twelve in
favor, none opposed, with one abstention (12-0-1). The current version has been revised based
on continued developments in the medical literature, but the halakhic conclusions remain
unchanged. In June 2018 Rabbi Leonard Sharzer, M.D. organized a conference on brain-death
at the JewishTheological Seminarywith akeynote address byDr.AlanShewmon.His remarks,
aswell asmine and those of the other presenters are available in video format at: https://youtu
.be/c8EgdCY6xTQ (Part 1) and https://youtu.be/dwsK1k21OhE (Part 2).
2 Sherwin B. Nuland,HowWeDie: Reflections on Life’s Final Chapter (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf,
1994).
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to the withdrawal of a hair from milk.3 Some deaths are sudden, but often
the final passage is a gradual transition. Contemporary medical discussions of
death describe a process in which the body shuts down its vital functions until
the person is declared dead. Jewish mystical sources likewise discuss a transi-
tion, three days in duration, duringwhich the soul gradually separates from the
body.4
Therefore, it may not be accurate from a physiological or a spiritual perspec-
tive to speak of a single moment of death. Some bioethicists, such as Norman
Fost, question both the accuracy and the purpose of identifying a uniform stan-
dard.5 Others, like Baruch Brody, argue that it is most useful to choose different
definitions of death for different courses of action.6
Nevertheless, there is an halakhic need to identify a point of transition
between life and death. One set of obligations—to heal or at least to comfort
the dying person—is exchanged at the time of death for a new set of obliga-
tions to prepare the body for burial, to mourn the deceased, and to comfort
the bereaved. The declaration of deathmay be necessary for terminating treat-
ment, especially for patients who lack relatives to authorize such a change.
Defining a moment of death is also necessary to establish the date of yahrzeit.
Yet it is the issue of organ donation that has lent the greatest urgency to this
question. Lives can be saved by harvesting vital organs from a person who has
died. But it is impossible to remove vital organs such as the heart and liver
without raising the prospect of murder unless clear anddefensible criteria have
been established for the declaration of death.
In ordinary circumstances, breathlessness (apnea) can be verified directly,
and is accompanied by other signs of death such as cardiac arrest. In the
extraordinary circumstance that a ventilator-dependentpatientwithheartbeat
has been shown to have no upper or lower brain function, and is a candidate
for organ donation, precisemedical and halakhic criteria of death are required.
The definition of these criteria is the focus of our study. We shall argue in this
paper that Judaism has historically defined life and death primarily in terms
3 For an extended study of this concept, see Michael Fishbane, The Kiss of God: Spiritual and
Mystical Death in Judaism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).
4 See Rabbi Yechiel Michal Toktzinski, Gesher HaḤaim 2:27 (Jerusalem, 1960).
5 Norman Fost, “TheUnimportance of Death,” inTheDefinition of Death: ContemporaryContro-
versies, ed. Stuart J. Younger, RobertM. Arnold, andRenie Schapiro (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins
University Press, 1999), 161–178.
6 Baruch A. Brody, “How Much of the Brain Must Be Dead?,” in The Definition of Death, 71–82.
DerickT.Wade has suggested further expanding the continuum to include patients in a “min-
imally conscious state.” See “The Dis-integration of Death,” The Lancet 360 (August 10, 2002):
425–426.
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of breathing.7 In our day, the absence of breathing is likewise the single most
significant criterion in the determination of death.
The Evolution of Death
For much of Jewish and general history, the permanent cessation of breath-
ing was the standard for determining death. By the nineteenth century (with
the invention of the stethoscope), physicians began to emphasize lack of pulse
rather than breathlessness in the declaration of death, though there remained
difficulties in establishing either in some cases. Until the last few decades,
physicians used the following methods to determine death: the observation of
fixed, dilated pupils after some defined time had passed; auscultation (listen-
ing for presence of heartbeat and respiration); and eventually, rigor mortis and
putrefaction.8
In the late 1960s, two technological developments inspired the search for an
additional method for the diagnosis of death. The first was the improvement
in and profusion of ventilators which could allow a patient, while incapable
of spontaneous respiration, to remain alive. Many patients used such ventila-
tors on a temporary basis, yet it had become evident by 1968 that a significant
number of people being kept alive in this fashion had no prospects of recovery.
Margaret Lock described the resultant “living cadaver” as a machine–human
hybrid.9
The second development was the introduction of anti-rejection medica-
tions, such as cyclosporine, which allowed far greater success in the trans-
plantation of whole organs. By 1968, an ad hoc committee of Harvard Medical
School proposed a new definition of “brain-death” to allow for the removal of
ventilators in certain cases, and for the harvesting of vital organs from brain-
dead patients for transplantation to human recipients. This process became
particularly important for the harvesting of the liver and heart, which lose via-
bility rapidly upon traditional cardio-respiratory death.
The story of the Harvard Medical School committee and the subsequent 13
years of medical and legislative activity to clarify and standardize the brain-
death diagnosis is beyond the scope of our study.10 One ambiguity that was
7 [2018 update: In the original paper I used the words respiration and breathing interchange-
ably, but they are not identical. Respiration refers also to the exchange of gases on the cellular
level and continues even when a person is incapable of breathing.]
8 I thank my father, Michael A. Nevins, M.D., for this description.
9 Margaret Lock,TwiceDead:OrganTransplantsand theReinventionof Death (Berkeley:Uni-
versity of California Press, 2002), 40.
10 See Martin S. Pernick, “Brain Death in a Cultural Context: The Reconstruction of Death,
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quickly clarified was the equation of brain-death with what came to be called
“whole brain-death,” defined by the destruction of the cerebrum and the brain
stem, rather than “higher brain-death” which describes the destruction of the
cerebrum and results in the permanent loss of consciousness.
Today, “brain-death” refers to the complete loss of function of all areas of the
brain. Still, the term “brain-death” remains confusing, since the issue is human
death defined by neurological criteria. This term is also often misapplied in
common parlance to refer to prolonged and apparently permanent cases of
coma. For example, family members sometimes refer to a comatose patient as
“brain-dead” even though they are breathing spontaneously.
Legally, brain-death is defined as “the irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the brain stem.”11 Patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state may have lost higher brain functions, but they still respond to certain
stimuli, may breathe without ventilators, and are not considered by rabbinical
or medical authorities to be dead.
The notion of brain-death was first proposed in 1968 and gained currency
and legal status starting in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the definition of death has
grown more complicated and controversial.12 In recent years, the medical lit-
erature has produced numerous critical evaluations of the brain-death diagno-
sis.13
There are recent detailed protocols available for the diagnosis of brain-
death,14 yet such careful methods may not be consistently employed by physi-
cians before calling in the transplant team. Protocols may vary from the emer-
gency room to the critical care units, fromhospital to hospital, and fromdoctor
to doctor.15 NeurosurgeonsMichaelWang and J. Peter Gruen and nurse Pamela
1967–1981,” in The Definition of Death, 31–33; and the chapters, “Locating the Moment of
Death,” and “Making the New Death Uniform,” in Lock, Twice Dead, 78–126.
11 American Medical Association and American Bar Association, 1983.
12 For a harsh critique, see Gary Greenberg, “As Good As Dead: Is There Really Such a Thing
As Brain Death?,”New Yorker, August 13, 2001, 36–41.
13 For example, see Ronald Cranford, “Even the Dead Are Not Terminally Ill Anymore,”Neu-
rology 51 (1998): 1515–1516; D. Alan Shewmon, “Chronic ‘Brain Death,’ ”Neurology 51 (1998):
1538–1545;TheHastingsCenterReportof July-August 2001; and JamesBernat, “Refinements
in theDefinition andCriteria forDeath,” inTheDefinition of Death. See also the editorial by
Michael Swash and Richard Beresford, “Brain Death: Still-Unresolved Issues Worldwide,”
Neurology 58 (2002): 9–10. [2018 Update: Neurologist D. Alan Shewmon has continued to
raise fundamental questions about the validity of the brain-death diagnosis. His concerns
will be addressed below.]
14 See Eelco F.M. Wijdicks, “The Diagnosis of Brain Death,” The New England Journal of
Medicine 344, no. 16 (April 19, 2001): 1215–1221.
15 Based on personal conversations with emergency, pulmonology and neurology special-
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Wallace documented the variety of tests used in the diagnosis of brain-death
in one California hospital, and called for greater uniformity in how this diagno-
sis is made.16 They concluded that “physicians are trusted to rigorously apply
accepted standards and practices when making the diagnosis of brain-death.
Failure to strictly adhere to the whole-brain guidelines jeopardizes the public’s
trust in the clinical diagnosis of brain-death.”
Bioethicists initially raised concerns that the new definition of death was
driven simply by the desire for donated organs, and some physicians pointed
to the continuation of minimal brain function even in cases of “whole brain-
death.”17 Nonetheless, Western societies quickly adapted to the new standard.
Yet in Japan, a society with comparable levels of education and medical
resources, the new standard of death has not been accepted so readily. Despite
concern for saving the lives of potential organ recipients, Japanese society has
been slow to view the patient who appears alive—if not lively—to be a “living
cadaver.” As a result, donor cards in Japan ask people to select either a tradi-
tional cardio-pulmonary definition of death or brain-death before authorizing
removal of their organs.18
Even in America, where the acceptance of brain-death is presumed to be
widespread, physicians are wary of the presence of relatives during the admin-
istration of clinical tests for brain-death.19 Brain-dead patients may continue
to exhibit spinal reflexes including the “Lazarus sign” in which the body briefly
sits up and raises its arms when the ventilator is shut off, making it appear as if
the patient had been more “living” than “cadaver.”20
ists. Transplant teams follow separate protocols for determining death before harvesting
vital organs.
16 Michael Y.Wang, PamelaWallace, and J. Peter Gruen, “Brain Death Documentation: Anal-
ysis and Issues,”Neurosurgery, September 2002, 731–736. A similar claim is made by Sam
D. Shemie, Christopher Doig, and Philip Belitsky, “Advancing toward a Modern Death:
The Path from Severe Brain Injury to Neurological Determination of Death,” Journal of
the CanadianMedical Association 168, no. 8 (April 15, 2003): 993–995.
17 Specifically, “the continued hypothalamic secretion of antidiuretic hormone (ADH) suffi-
cient to prevent diabetes insipidus” in patients declared brain dead according to accepted
protocol. James Bernat, in The Definition of Death, 86. However, Bernat argues that ADH
secretion should not be classified as a “clinical function” of the brain, and therefore is not
an impediment to the diagnosis of brain-death.
18 See Twice Dead; and also Masahiro Morioka, “Reconsidering Brain Death: A Lesson from
Japan’s Fifteen Years of Experience,” in The Hastings Center Report, July-August 2001. Also
see R.D. Truog, “Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?,” The Hastings Center Report 27, no. 1
(1997): 29–37.
19 See “Really, Most SINCERELY Dead: Policy and Procedure in the Diagnosis of Death by
Neurologic Criteria—Views and Reviews,”Neurology 62 (May 25, 2004): 1683–1686.
20 See Fred Plum, “Clinical Standards and Technological Confirmatory Tests in Diagnosing
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Nevertheless, a broad American consensus in support of accepting brain-
death as a new standard has taken hold in the past three decades, driven no
doubt by theprospect of saving lives through theharvestingof vital organs from
people who “no longer need them” and avoiding futile treatment. The standard
definition of death has been clarified by the UniformDeclaration of Death Act
(1981), which “has been upheld by statute or judicial opinion in each of the 50
states and has been at least partially adopted in most of the world’s industrial-
ized nations”:21
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circu-
latory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.22
Differences remain between states in the required form of diagnosis; New Jer-
sey and NewYork are distinct for granting a religious exemption from the diag-
nosis of brain-death.23 In a comprehensive survey of brain-death legislation
across the world, Wijdicks found that 70 of 80 countries surveyed had guide-
lines or codes of practice governing the declaration of brain-death, although
the standards for diagnosis varied widely.24 The variety of diagnostic proce-
dures among medical professionals lends greater urgency for clarity among
practitioners of halakhah. Our purpose in this responsum is to review the cur-
rent medical standards of brain-death diagnosis and to determine whether
these can satisfy the requirements of Jewish law.
[2018 update: The case of Jahi McMath has attracted significant attention.25
She was diagnosed as brain-dead in 2013, but maintained ventilator-dependent
heartbeat until 2018, during which time she experienced puberty and was able to
survive outside of thehospital.Video files documentedher family’s claims that Jahi
responded to verbal commands with limb movement. Dr. Alan Shewmon exam-
ined her and confirmed these claims. He questions her brain-death diagnosis,
Brain Death,” in The Definition of Death, 53. Such a case was described in The New York
Times, October 8, 2002.
21 Plum, “Clinical Standards,” 39.
22 A more technically-precise statement which addressed the issue of confounding factors
was published in JAMA 246 (1981): 2184–2186.
23 New Jersey provides the exemption in the original statute, New York in a separate regula-
tion.
24 Eelco F.M.Wijdicks, “Brain DeathWorldwide: Accepted Fact but No Global Consensus in
Diagnostic Criteria,”Neurology 58 (January 2, 2002): 20–25.
25 See Rachel Aviv, “What Does it Mean to Die?”New Yorker, February 5, 2018, https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/what‑does‑it‑mean‑to‑die.
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arguing that she was instead in a minimally conscious state. His explanation is
that she had a different condition of global ischemic penumbra (GIP), whichmim-
ics brain-death.26 Shewmon argues that the only way to verify brain-death, rather
than GIP, would be to prove that there is absolutely zero blood flow to any part of
the brain, which is not currently possible. He further argues that the apnea test
may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, in some cases causing the condition of brain-
death that it proposes to measure. His position would hold all declarations of
brain-death in abeyance, preventing the donation of vital organs on this basis.
Shewmon prefers using the non-heart-beating protocol for organ donation. This
position has its own critics, since cardiac arrest in such cases may not be irre-
versible. We acknowledge Shewmon’s concerns, but also that his position is an
outlier in the neurological and bioethics discourse.27 See update to final conclu-
sions below.]
Within the halakhic community, the acceptance of brain-death remains
unsettled.28 As we shall see, Conservative rabbis have generally accepted the
idea of whole brain-death, while Orthodox rabbis are divided on the subject.
Yet many of the articles from the 1970s and 1980s employed now-obsolete cri-
teria such as a flat electro-encephalogram (EEG); this is now considered an
unreliable indicator of brain-death.29
The development of neurological criteria for the declaration of death has
challenged halakhic authorities either to adopt or to reject the new standards.
Whilemuch has beenwritten on both sides of the issue, the crucial question of
what specific diagnostic criteria are required for an halakhic declaration of death
has received relatively little attention. Although diagnostic procedures may be
constantly evolving, it is incumbent upon the local poseq to become familiar
with contemporary criteria of death to guide families faced with difficult deci-
26 D. Alan Shewmon, “Truly Reconciling theCase of JahiMcMath,”Neurocritical Care, August
15, 2018.
27 Ariane Lewis, “Reconciling the Case of Jahi McMath,”Neurocritical Care, June 19, 2018.
28 See Zev Farber, ed., Halakhic Realities: Collected Essays on Brain Death (Jerusalem: Maggid
Books, 2015), for a sample of Modern Orthodox studies.
29 James L. Bernat, writes that EEG activity persists in some patients “unequivocally deter-
mined to be brain dead by accepted tests. This rudimentary EEG activity neither responds
to sensory stimuli nor appears to represent coherent brain functioning. Rather, it repre-
sents isolated nests of neurons whose random and purposeless cellular electrical activity
can be recorded technologically but whose functioning is utterly divorced from that of
the organism as a whole.” See “Refinements in the Definition and Criteria for Death,” in
The Definition of Death, 87. See Fred Plum, in the same volume, 42–43. False negatives
are also possible with EEG. EEG is increasingly being supplanted by transcranial Doppler
ultrasonography as a confirmatory test of brain-death (see below).
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sions at the end of life. This paper aims to apply classical rabbinic sources to
contemporary medical norms in order to establish a working halakhic defini-
tion of death for our time.
The Definition of Death in Classical Rabbinic Texts
Respiratory Death
The primary rabbinic text to define physical criteria of death is from Talmud
Tractate Yoma. The relevant Mishnah, m. Yoma 8:7 (found in the Babylonian
Talmud on 83a), states:
קפסירכנקפס,תמקפסיחקפס,םשוניאקפסםשאוהקפס,תלופמוילעהלפנשימ
.והוחיני—תמםאו,ןיחקפמ—יחוהואצמ.לגהתאוילעןיחקפמ—לארשי
If a building collapsed [on Shabbat], and it is unknown if a person is
[trapped] there or not, whether he is alive or dead, gentile or Jew, they
should clear the rubble off him. If they find him alive, they should extri-
cate him; if he is already dead, they should leave him [until after Shab-
bat].30
The Gemara, b. Yoma 85a, seeks to clarify how the rescuers are to determine
whether the victim is dead or alive:
.ובלדע:םירמואשיו,ומטוחדע?קדובאוהןכיהדע:ןנברונת
The Rabbis taught: How far [into the rubble] should they check [to deter-
mine if he is alive]? Until his nose. Some say: until his heart.




“How far should they check?” If he appears dead, for he is not moving his
limbs, how far should they excavate to learn the truth?
30 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
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In such a case, which criteria are necessary to verify that the victim is dead—
cardiac or respiratory?31 Although it might be expected that clearing rubble off
the chest would allow the victim to breathe, the halakhah assumes that res-
piration can be checked even if only the head is exposed. What, then, is the
dispute about? After a short digression in the Gemara, Rav Papa explains that
this dispute relates only to a case in which the victim is uncovered feet (and
thus chest) first—some would accept evidence of asystole [cardiac standstill]
as conclusive; otherswould insist ondigging further until thehead is uncovered
to confirm the lack of breathing:
—ומטוחדעהילקדבדןויכ,הטמלהלעממלבא,הלעמלהטממתקולחמ:אפפבררמא
.ויפאבםייחחורתמשנרשאלכביתכד,ךירצוניאבוש
Rav Papa says, the dispute is from the bottom [of the victim’s body]
upward; but if [he were found] top to bottom, once his nose had been
checked [for signs of breathing], nothing further is required, for it is writ-
ten, “all in whose nose is the breath of life” (Gen 7:22).
Therefore, the primary criterion of death is respiratory, although some would
accept cardiac criteria as conclusive in cases where the person could not be
checked for breathing. This latter view is rejected by the codes of halakhah.
Rashi explains Rav Papa’s analysis with diagnostic precision:
ומטוחדע:רמארמו,םשתקפודותמשנש,תויחובשיםא,ןיחבהלשיובלב:רמארמד
.ומטוחברכינו,ובלברכינתויחןיאדןינמיזד
One opinion is to inspect the heart—if it is alive—that his spirit is beat-
ing there; the other opinion is to continue to the nose, for at times life is
not discernible at the heart, but it is discernible at the nose.
Rashi’s gloss indicates that cardiac arrest is harder todiscern than is the absence
of breathing. Yet from theGemara it is evident that breathlessness is notmerely
easier to verify than cardiac standstill; it also accords with the Biblical concept
of the “breath of life.” In other words, the Gemara indicates that respiratory
failure bears more significance than does asystole.
31 y. Yoma 8:5 (45b) provides an interesting variant. In this version, the dispute concerns the
best method of proving respiratory failure—at the nose or at the diaphragm. Cardiac cri-
teria play no role at all. It is possible that even the Bavli’s reference to checking “to his
heart” refers to the rising and falling of the chest.
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The Gemara’s breath-based standard of death is codified in the medieval
codes of Jewish law. Maimonides states that the absence of respiration dis-
cernible at the nose is sufficient evidence of death:32
.תמרבכשםשותואןיחינמהמשנובואצמאלוומטחדעוקדב
If they examined his nostrils and found no breath there, they leave him
there, for he is already dead.




Even if a person were discovered crushed, who cannot live for more than
a moment, they should continue excavating and checking him until his
nostrils; if they detect no life [i.e. breathing] at his nostrils, then he is cer-
tainly dead, and it matters not whether they first found his head or his
legs.33
The Mishnah Berurah explains the final phrase to mean that absence of heart-
beat alonedoesnot provedeath, but absenceof breathing alone is conclusive.34
TheBabylonianTalmudand codes of Jewish lawview lack of breathing, not car-
diac arrest, as the primary criterion for the declaration of death.35
Although the Rabbis considered absence of breathing to be sufficient evi-
dence of death, it is evident that they meant permanent apnea. Maimonides
warns to wait for some time to verify permanent cessation of respiration in
case the person had merely fainted.36 Of course, people who faint continue
to breathe, but it could be difficult to detect their respiration. Rambam’s rul-
ing is confirmed by Rabbi Karo in Beit Yosef.37 Rabbi Isserles makes a similar
statement regarding a woman in labor who has apparently died—a caesarean
32 Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat 2:19.
33 Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 329:4.
34 Mishnah Berurah 329:11.
35 In section V, we shall scrutinize Rabbi J. David Bleich’s surprising argument that Rashi
establishes the primacy of a cardiac standard.
36 Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel 4:5.
37 Beit Yosef, YD 339:1. The Talmudic basis is found on Šabb. 151b.
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section should not be attempted lest she is merely comatose and now would
be killed by the surgery.38
Such fears of premature declarations of death became greatly pronounced
in both general and Jewish society in the late eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. In Germany, the fear of apparent death (Scheintod) leading to live burial
became a sensation, prompting civil legislation in 1772 to mandate a three-day
waiting period before burial. This law impinged upon the Jewish custom of
burying, when possible, within a day of death. The Jewish community, led by
Rabbi JacobEmden andphilosopherMosesMendelssohn, successfully secured
a Jewish exemption from this law. Yet many Jews, agitated by radical maskilim
who dismissed rabbinic authority, were shaken in their confidence to diagnose
death and proceed with burial within 24 hours.39 Permanent lack of pulse and
breath can be hard to verify, particularly in cases involving hypothermia and
drowning.
In our day, the extraordinary adjustment being proposed is to view a patient
who is apparently breathing (albeit via a ventilator) and maintaining a heart-
beat as nevertheless dead. To be blunt, this means removing functioning vital
organs from one person and giving them to another. Based on the texts
reviewed above, such an adjustment would seem unthinkable. Indeed, one
might expect a horrified reaction in our day similar to the Scheintod panic of
earlier generations. Surprisingly, this has not been the case inWestern societies,
and it has also not typified the responses of many halakhic authorities. The
measured Jewish response may be motivated by the prospect of saving lives,
but it is also grounded in classical halakhic examples of an additional set of
texts used for the diagnosis of death.
Alternative Evidence of Death: Fatal Neck and Back Injuries
So far, we have been dealing with the diagnosis of death in a person whose
body appears completely inert and lifeless. The Rabbis also discussed cases
in which death could be declared, despite continued convulsions of the body,
based on the observation of mortal injury. Although the respiratory criteria dis-
38 Rema to OḤ 330:5. See Magen Avraham there, n. 11.
39 See John M. Efron, Medicine and the German Jews: A History (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001), 95–104. Margaret Lock also discusses the eighteenth-century panic over pre-
mature burial inTwiceDead, 66–69. This uncertainty among Jews over proving a diagnosis
of death was still a source of concern to Ḥatam Sofer (YD 338). Some contemporary Jews
even recalled a beraita from Tractate Semaḥot (8:1) of a Jewish Rip VanWinkle, who was
found alive twenty-five years after burial in a crypt—and who went on to marry and have
children! Yet Rabbi Emden and then Ḥatam Sofer railed against viewing this story as a
precedent.
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cussed above have been the primary means for determining death in Jewish
texts, there is an alternative criterion for death even in the classical literature:
destruction or severance of the spinal cord. The Biblical story of the death by
neck injury of the priest Eli after the Holy Ark had been captured in battle by
the Philistines (1Sam 4:18) is studied by the Rabbis in b. Ḥul. 21a to understand





Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: if a person’s spine was broken
and most of the surrounding neck severed, he defiles in a tent [i.e. he is
considered dead and conveys ritual impurity]. But youmay object—what
about the case of Eli, whose spine was broken, but not most of his neck
[and yet he was considered dead]? The elderly are different, for it is writ-
ten, “When he [the messenger] mentioned [the capture of] God’s ark, he
[Eli] fell backwards off his chair by the side of the gate, breaking his spine,
and he died, for he was an old man and also heavy.”
According to Rav Yehudah, citing Shmuel, the observation that a person’s neck
is broken and mostly severed is by itself sufficient evidence of death. Yet
because Eli was elderly, he was considered dead even without his neck being
severed.40 That is, injuries do not occur in isolation from other causes of frailty
or illness in a person.
The Ḥullin text continues to describe other types of spinal cord injuries that
would leave a person legally dead, even should his body continue to convulse:
:קחצירבלאומשר״א.להאבאמטמ—גדכוערק:ןנחויר״אינמחנרבלאומש׳ררמא
.ובגמו
Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, if he were
torn like a fish, he defiles in a tent. Said Rav bar Yitzḥak, provided his back
[were sundered].
40 In his commentary to the Rosh, Ma’adanei YomTov, Rabbi Lipman HaLevi Heller makes a
fine distinction between the description of Eli as heavy, which he believes caused the fall,
and elderly, which caused him to die evenwithout his neck being gashed. Folio 149a in the
Vilna Shas.
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Rashi explains that such a mortally wounded person “defiles in a tent” even
if his body continues to convulse. The Shulḥan Arukh41 restates this Gemara,
claiming that some people are so grievously wounded as to be considered dead
even while displaying signs of life:
אוהןיידעוליפא,גדכובגמבערקנשימןכו,המערשבבורואותקרפמהרבשנשימ
.אמטמו,תמכבישח,יח
Someone whose spine is broken, and most of whose neck is severed, or
one whose backbone is ripped out like a fish, even if he is still alive [i.e.
moving], is considered as if dead, and renders [others present] ritually
impure.
In addition to these sources that which detail spinal injuries, there are several
rabbinic sources that equate the decapitation of animals with death, despite




A person does not render others impure [i.e. die] until his soul departs.
Even if he is severely lacerated or nearly dead, he is still considered alive
to fulfill or seek exemption from leviratic marriage, to entitle [his mother
or wife] to eat priestly tithes or to deprive her. So too cattle and beasts
do not render unclean until their life departs. If their heads are sev-
ered, even if their bodies continue to convulse, they are already impure,
just like the severed tail of a newt twitches [even after it has been cut
off].
Maimonides explains סוכרפ , the convulsions of a decapitated animal, saying:
.סוכרפהתואםיארוקתומהרחאםירבאהןיעעונתמשהעונתהו
The movement of the limbs after death is called “pirkus.”42
41 YD 370.
42 Peirush Mishnayot, Yosef Kapach translation, Mosad HaRav Kook (5727), 3:150.
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In Hilkhot Tum’at Meit, he codifies the distinction evident in the Mish-
nah between a terminally ill person, who is considered alive, and a mortally
wounded person, who is considered dead despite the continued convulsions.43
In b. Giṭ. 70b Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel describes the case of טחש
םינשבורואםינשוב , a man whose esophagus and trachea have been severed,
but who is nevertheless allowed to execute a bill of divorce for his wife. Jewish
law requires the husband to be not only alive but lucid while the get is writ-
ten, witnessed, and then delivered to his wife! If he can’t breathe, why isn’t he
considered to be legally dead?
Perhaps some air could still get to theman’s lungs through the severedwind-
pipe, ormaybe hewas simply holding his final breath, and he had a very speedy
scribe at his side. Surely a person with a severed trachea and esophagus could
not remain conscious for more than a few brief moments. Later in the Gemara
this case is challenged, since Rav Yehudah also said in the name of Shmuel
that a man who had his trachea and esophagus slit and ran away—observers
can testify that he has died. Indeed, Rambam cites this as halakhah in Hilkhot
Gerushin 13:17. This may notmean that he was considered dead at themoment
that he was last seen running, but his death is deemed by halakhah to be
inevitable and imminent due to his inability to breathe.
These strange cases are comparable to an animal that has been ritually
slaughtered—its trachea and esophagus are severed but it may retain con-
sciousness for a few moments. Nevertheless, the animal’s imminent death is
considered inexorable.44 It is noteworthy that הטיחש does not involve sever-
ing the carotid artery. Rabbi Yehudah does differ from this position (b. Ḥul.
27a), requiring severing the ןידירוו , but the Gemara on 28b clarifies that Rabbi
Yehudah’s opinion applies only to birds that will be roasted whole, and that his
purpose is to expel the blood, not to qualify the slit of the artery as an integral
part of הטיחש .45 As Rashi says there, “life does not depend on the blood vessels,





44 Because of the laws of sheḥitah, a Jew may eat the meat while it still quivers, but a non-
Jew is forbidden the flesh based upon יחהןמרבא . See b. Ḥul. 121b, and Tanḥuma (Buber,
180) VaYeishev 6.




This confirms that halakhah employs respiratory, not circulatory, criteria in
the determination of death.
Another text that clarifies the legal consequences of decapitation comes
from the laws of Shabbat. A significant halakhic concept is that if an action is
generally permitted on Shabbat, but it has a forbidden and unavoidable con-
sequence, then the first action is not allowed. This theory is known by the
expression, תומיאלוהישירקיספ “If you cut off [a chicken’s] head, will it not
die?”47 In other words, decapitation leads inexorably to death, even if tempo-
rary signs of bodily life persist. The heart may be beating, and the limbsmay be
moving, but the chicken cannot breathe, and it therefore is considered dead.
Synthesis of the Classical Halakhic Sources
Despite the ambiguities that result from the Talmud’s diverse descriptions of
death, an underlying principlemay be deduced. The key to the halakhic under-
standing of death comes from the words ושפנאצתשדע , “until his life departs.”
The word שפנ is explicitly connected to breath by the Torah: תמשנויפאבחפיו
היחשפנלםדאהיהיוםייח “[God] breathed the breath of life in his nostrils; and
the man became a living creature” (Gen 2:7). Other words that describe the
animating spirit that defines life, המשנ and חור , likewise relate to respiration.
The דייוגמ and the ססוג mentioned in our Mishnah are nearly dead, but they
are still breathing, and are therefore considered alive. One who is decapitated,
or whose trachea is slit is no longer able to breathe and is therefore considered
dead within moments of the injury. The Yoma text describes a motionless per-
son who is declared dead based on respiratory failure. The Ḥullin and Ohalot
texts describe humans (and animals) who, though still moving, are declared
dead due to catastrophic injury to the neck or chest. Such injuries prevent
the victim from breathing. Movement of the body implies continued cardiac
activity. But the victim’s inability to breathe means that death is imminent.
Indeed, Rambam’s definition of סוכרפ captures this state precisely—the move-
ments made after death.
Similarly, the Gittin text allows that a person may remain alive for a few
moments after his trachea is slit, but it still considers him to be dead with no
further inspection after that. Severe neck and torso injuries make breathing
impossible and death inevitable. The case of Eli, whose neck was broken but
not severed, and yet whowas considered deadwithout verifying lack of breath-
ing, is presented as an exception to the general practice.
47 See, for example, b. Šabb. 103a, and many similar sources. We may even discern in the
future tense of “he will die” that decapitation leads to death rather than constitutes death.
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At the other end of life, the heart of a human embryo begins to pump
fluid through blood vessels on day twenty of gestation.48 Nevertheless, it is not
deemed a שפנ , a true life, until many months later, םלועהריואלאצתשדע “when
it exits [the womb] into the air of the world.”49 The fetus has a special status as
part of the mother’s body, but it is not considered an independent life until it
is born and begins to breathe.
Thus, it is not movement or even pulse which ultimately defines life and
death, but the ability to breathe. This interpretation harmonizes the Talmudic
and later halakhic materials, yielding a consistent standard for the start and
end of life.
While somehave argued that the decapitation texts constitute an alternative
to the breathlessness standard, there is no reason to assume that the ancient
Rabbis or their gentile contemporaries ascribed particular significance to the
functioning of the nervous system in determining death. The spinal cord is
ignored in הטיחש , and all of the neck-injury cases except for that of Eli require
that the neck be mostly severed in order for death to be declared without test-
ing directly for breathing. Our synthesis of the disparate rabbinic sources inte-
grates the legal and linguistic data into a coherent halakhic approach which
will guide us as we explore the medical literature.
Current Medical Criteria for the Diagnosis of Death50
In The New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Eelco F.M. Wijdicks provides a
protocol detailing a neurological examination used to declare brain-death.51
The first priority is to assess whether the patient’s condition is permanent, or
is rather the temporary result of reversible factors. Before an examination for
brain-death can proceed,
48 TheMerck Manual of Medical Information, Second Home Edition (Whitehouse Station, NJ:
Merck & Co., 2003), 1437.
49 Rashi on b. Sanh. 72b, s.v. yatza rosho. See Rabbi Susan Grossman, “Partial Birth Abortion
and the Question of When ‘Life’ Begins,” 6. This responsum was approved by the CJLS,
September 17, 2003. A different conclusion about the precisemoment of birthwas defined
by Rabbi Avram Reisner in his responsum, “Ein doḥin nefesh mipnei nefesh,” approved by
the CJLS on December 19, 2001.
50 For an excellent online resource, see www.braindeath.org/clinical.htm. See also the book,
Brain Death, ed. Eelco F.M.Wijdicks (Philadelphia: LippincottWilliams &Wilkins, 2001),
esp. ch. 4.
51 NEJM 344, no. 16 (April 19, 2001): 1215–1221. See n. 14 above, and his book, Brain Death
(2001).
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the following prerequisites [must be] met: the ruling out of complicated
medical conditions that may confound the clinical assessment, particu-
larly severe electrolyte, acid-base, or endocrine disturbances; the absence
of severe hypothermia, defined as a core temperature of 32°C or lower;
hypotension; and the absence of evidence of drug intoxication, poison-
ing, or neuromuscular blocking agents.
Once these confounding factors have been ruled out, the clinical exam for
brain-death commences.Wijdicks describes in great detail a three-part clinical
exam,which tests for the lack of spontaneous or responsive cranial nerve activ-
ity, the absence of brain-stem reflexes, and apnea. The latter is tested by turning
off the ventilator for severalminutes andmeasuring the rise of CO2 in theblood-
stream. These tests are typically repeated between six and 24 hours after the
first exam.52 Dr. Plum’s detailed protocol is presented below as an appendix.
The brain-death protocol for pediatric cases differs from the standards de-
scribed for adults.53 Because most pediatric cases of brain-death are caused by
severe asphyxial injury (whichmay injure organ systems other than the brain),
organ procurement from pediatric donors is rare.
The apnea test—which measures the presence or absence of effective
breathing—is typically the final and conclusive clinical examination for brain-
death. Dr. Plum writes,
The apneic test represents the ultimate physiological-clinical test to diag-
nose brain-death. I knowof no personal observation of a responsibly con-
ducted, positive apnea test that has been reversed by subsequent recov-
ery. Conversely, instances of omission of the apnea test have led to poten-
tially unfortunate errors or premature assumptions of brain-death.54
52 Andrew Newberg, Abass Alavi, Salina van Rhijn, Adolfo Cotter, and Patrick Reilly, “Radio-
logic Diagnosis of BrainDeath,” in JAMA 288, no. 17 (Nov. 6, 2002): 2121. The six-hourwait is
cited from the Quality Standards Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology,
published in Neurology 45 (1995): 1012–1014. In Michigan, the standard waiting period is
24 hours, according to a personal communication with Dr. Bruce Silverman.
53 See Stephen Ashwal, “Clinical Diagnosis and Confirmatory Testing of Brain Death in Chil-
dren,” in Brain Death, ch. 5. He writes, “the neurologic examination is more difficult to
perform and interpret because of the smaller size of the patient, immaturity of certain
development reflexes being tested, and pathopshysiologic differences due to the presence
of open sutures and fontanels in the neonate and infant.”
54 “Clinical Standards and Technological Confirmatory Standards in Diagnosing Brain
Death,” in Younger, The Definition of Death, 40.
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Thus, after confounding factors have been ruled out and the patient has
demonstrated neither any response to painful stimuli to the higher brain nor
to the examination of brain-stem reflexes, the apnea test confirms the brain-
death diagnosis.
Although the patientmightmove during the test, the absence of any breath-
ing efforts, confirmed by a rise of carbon dioxide levels in the blood, shows
that the patient is not breathing spontaneously. This test is repeated and, if it
confirms the total lack of respiration, death is declared. Bodilymovements dur-
ing the exam are understood as spinal cord and not brain stem reflexes. These
spinal cord reflexes are consistent with the rabbinic literature’s description of
סוכרפ , spasmodic motion after death.
In rare cases55when the apnea test cannotbe administereddue to confound-
ing factors (suchas thepresenceof barbiturates that cannot be clearedor initial
CO2 levels that are too high or too low) radionuclide brain perfusion and other
imaging techniques are used to verify a diagnosis of brain-death. Such diag-
nosis depends upon measurement of “the complete absence of [blood] flow
throughout the brain and the internal carotid arteries.”56 This exam is seldom
used since it ismuchmore complicated and is not as conclusive as the protocol
described above.
A simpler option is transcranial doppler ultrasonography (TCD), “a noninva-
sive monitoring tool which allows imaging of blood flow velocities in intracra-
nial blood vessels.”57 Such tests may play an important ancillary role in the
diagnosis of brain-death, but they do not alone suffice for medical purposes.
In a study of cerebral blood flow after brain-death, doctorsW.Mel Flowers and
Bharti R. Patel conclude that “visualization of arterial flow does not exclude
brain-death, but the diagnosis should be confirmed by repeat studies and other
means.”58 Wijdicks cautions that, “absent flow intracranially may be due to
transmission difficulties and in itself is not a criterion for death.”59
If there is no blood flow in the brain, does this not prove the patient’s inabil-
ity to breathe, albeit less directly than the apnea test? In fact, intracranial blood
55 Neurologist Bruce Silverman, M.D., who regularly examines patients for brain-death, has
not ordered the radionuclide test once in the past 15 years. Personal communication.
56 See n. 53, “Radiologic Diagnosis of Brain Death.”
57 V. Singh, J.P. McCartney, and J.C. Hemphill, III, “Transcranial Doppler Ultrasonography in
the Neurologic Intensive Care Unit,”Neurology (India) (June 2001), Suppl. 1:S81–89.
58 W. Mel Flowers, Jr., and Bharti R. Patel, “Persistence of Cerebral Blood Flow After Brain
Death,” SouthernMedical Journal 93, no. 4 (April 2000): 364–370; and in an earlier article,
“Accuracy of Clinical Evaluation in the Determination of Brain Death,” in Southern Medi-
cal Journal 93, no. 2 (February 2000): 203–206.
59 Brain Death, 82.
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flow exams measure the carotid arteries, but the medulla, which directly con-
trols the respiratory impulse, is supplied by the vertebral artery.60 Thus it is
possible that a patient could show no intracranial blood flow, but still be capa-
ble of spontaneous respiration.
From the perspective of halakhah, neither radionuclide brain perfusion
imaging nor TCDmeasures respiration, and therefore these tests do not suffice
to prove death. In contrast, the clinical neurological examination culminating
in the apnea test has been proven effective over time as a verification of the
complete absenceof respirationandof brain-death. Should a future test of total
respiratory failure be developed, it would apparently satisfy the halakhic defi-
nition of death. Meanwhile, apnea is the best halakhic measurement of death
in a ventilator-dependent patient who has met all the other criteria of brain-
death.
[2018 update. This remains the medical consensus, but we note the objections
raised by Alan Shewmon.61 He argues that the apnea test can demonstrate only
the loss of brain function, not necrosis of the brain, and thus it does not prove
death.Moreover, by cutting off the supply of oxygen to the brain during the apnea
test, clinicians may cause cellular necrosis. These suggestions are alarming. Yet
the halakhic texts are concerned not with cellular life, but with organic function.
Aswe have shown, if a person is injured in away thatmakes it impossible for them
to breathe, that is evidence of death.We would add that if a person is incapable of
spontaneousbreathing, butdoespossess other evidenceof brain function, perhaps
their apnea could be caused not by brain-death but rather by anupper spinal cord
injury or global ischemic penumbra. If so, evidence of evenminimal consciousness
could be declared “ḥayut” (vitality) and prevent an halakhic declaration of death,
halting removal of vital organs.]
Halakhic Responses to Brain-Death Criteria
Soon after the discussion of brain-death standards entered American legal dis-
course, halakhic authorities here and then in Israel began to review traditional
texts such as those mentioned in Section II to determine the Jewish status of
brain-death. Dozens of articles have been published to date, and it will not be
60 Neurologist Richard Trosch, M.D., personal communication.
61 See D. Alan Shewmon, “False-Positive Diagnosis of Brain Death Following the Pediatric
Guidelines: Case Report andDiscussion,” Journal of Child Neurology 32, no. 14 (2017): 1104–
1117.
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possible to review them here. We will rather focus on specific rationales and
guidelines offered by the defenders and critics of using brain-death criteria to
declare death.
Although שפנחוקפ , saving a life, is one of the highest of all Jewish values,
avoiding homicide supersedes even this commandment. As the Rabbis said, ןיא
שפנינפמשפנןיחוד , “one life cannot be disposed of in favor of another.”62 Never-
theless, halakhic authorities have beenwilling to examine new criteria of death
to see if additional livesmight be savedeither by transplantationof vital organs,
or bymaking scarcemedical resources available to other patients. Concerns for
not desecrating the body ( תמהלווינ ), not delaying burial ( תמהתנלה ), not prof-
iting from the dead ( תמהןמהאנהןיא ) and maintaining the general dignity of
the dead ( תמהדובכ ) remain operative, but do not outweigh the requirement to
save a life ( שפנחוקפ ). The first task, of course, is to determine if the potential
donor is truly dead.
In 1976, the journal Conservative Judaism published articles by Rabbi Daniel
C. Goldfarb and Rabbi Seymour Siegel z”l, each of whom reviewed the relevant
rabbinic sources and contemporarymedical informationand foundgrounds for
“updating the criteria of death.”63 Since that time, numerous Conservative rab-
bis have touched upon the subject, including Rabbi David Feldman,64 Rabbi
David Golinkin,65 Rabbi Avram Reisner,66 Rabbi Elliot Dorff,67 Rabbi Joseph
Prouser,68 and Rabbi Aaron Mackler.69 All of these authors accept the theory
of brain-death, though only Golinkin and Reisner specify clinical tests neces-
sary for this diagnosis to be halakhically accepted.
The Reform Movement’s Central Conference of American Rabbis has pub-
lished a responsumon the harvesting and storage of organs for transplantation
62 b. Sanh. 72b.
63 Daniel C. Goldfarb, “The Definition of Death,” and Seymour Siegel, “Updating the Criteria
of Death,” Conservative Judaism 30, n. 2 (Winter 1976): 10–39.
64 DavidM. Feldman, “Rabbinic Comment: Definition of Death and Dying,” TheMount Sinai
Journal of Medicine 51, no. 1 (January-February 1984): 73–76.
65 Rabbi David Golinkin, “Responsum Regarding Organ Transplantation” [in Hebrew], Re-
sponsa of the Law Committee of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel, vol. 5: 121–122.
66 Avram I. Reisner, “Care for the Terminally Ill: Halakhic Concepts and Values,” in Life and
Death Responsibilities in Jewish Biomedical Ethics, ed. Aaron L. Mackler (New York: Jewish
Theological Seminary, 2000): 278–281, n. 5.
67 Elliot N. Dorff, “End-StageMedical Care: Practical Applications,” in Life andDeath Respon-
sibilities, 351.
68 Joseph H. Prouser, “Ḥesed or Ḥiyuv? The Obligation to Preserve Life and the Question of
Postmortem Organ Donation,” in Life and Death Responsibilities, 455–456.
69 Aaron L. Mackler, “Respecting Bodies and Saving Lives: Jewish Perspectives on Organ
Donation and Transplantation,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (2001): 424f.
222 nevins
that approves the use of brain-death criteria accepted by the medical profes-
sionbut doesnot stipulate its own standards.70 RabbiMosheZemer reviews the
relevant literature and observes that “the halakhic test for death, the cessation
of breathing, parallels the modern medical test for brain-death.” Although he
does not endorse any specific diagnostic test, Rabbi Zemer accepts the finality
of the brain-death diagnosis for organ donation and saving a life.71
A great deal has been published on this subject by Orthodox rabbis, with
two distinct camps emerging. One side is led by Rabbi J. David Bleich, who has
argued that unless the complete lysis (liquefaction) of the brain can be proven
(which it can’t without autopsy), the diagnosis of brain-death has no halakhic
standing.72 Prominent Ḥaredi poseqim have adopted this position as well. On
the other side are Rabbi Moshe Tendler, Dr. Fred Rosner,73 and the Israeli Chief
Rabbinate,74 who argue that brain-death is comparable to the descriptions of
spinal cord destruction or decapitation made in early rabbinic sources.75
A central drama of this debate has been determining the final opinion of
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, z”l, whose authority is accepted by all of these rabbis,
butwhose thoughts onbrain-death evolved and remained finally subject to dis-
pute.76
Many of these articles focus on intracranial blood flow tests, with rabbis
such as Shlomo Zalman Auerbach z”l warning that injecting substances for the
radionuclide test into a dying patient may hasten his death and is therefore
forbidden.77 Nevertheless, these poseqim contemplate the significance of such
tests done after the fact—do they prove death?
70 Central Conference of American Rabbis, Contemporary American Reform Responsa, #78.
Available online at: www.ccarnet.org.
71 Moshe Zemer, “Determining Death in Jewish Law,” in Death and Euthanasia in Jewish Law:
Essays andResponsa, ed.Walter Jacob andMoshe Zemer (Pittsburgh: Rodef ShalomPress,
1995), 108.
72 J. David Bleich,Time of Death in Jewish Law (NewYork: Berman, 1991). See also idem, “Neu-
rological Criteria of Death andTimeof Death Statutes,” in JewishBioethics, ed. FredRosner
and J.DavidBleich (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1979, 2000), reprinted fromTradition 16, no. 4 (Sum-
mer, 1977).
73 Fred Rosner and Moshe David Tendler, “Definition of Death in Judaism,” The Journal of
Halacha and Contemporary Society 17 (Spring 1989): 14–31.
74 “Brain Death and Heart Transplants: The Israeli Chief Rabbinate’s Directives,” trans. Yoel
Jakobovits, Tradition 24, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 1–14.
75 For a reviewof Orthodoxdiscourse, seeAvrahamSteinberg, Encyclopediaof JewishMedical
Ethics (1998 Hebrew original; 2003 English Feldheim edition, trans. Fred Rosner), 2:695–
711.
76 See Yitzhok A. Breitowitz, “The Brain Death Controversy in Jewish Law,” available online
at: www.jlaw.com/Articles/brain.html.
77 See Abraham S. Abraham, Nishmat Avraham, vol. 2 Yoreh Deah: Medical Halacha for Doc-
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Dr. Fred Rosner uses the decapitation texts (particularly the Shulḥan Arukh)
to make the case that any injury which effectively severs communication be-
tween body and brain is tantamount to death, even if cardio-pulmonary signs
of life persist.78 Rabbi Bleich argues strenuously against the equation of brain-
deathwith decapitation, claiming that only the complete lysis of the brain (and
perhaps not even that) could be considered tantamount to physical decapita-
tion.79
In an extensive footnote contained within his CJLS-approved paper on end
of life medical care, Rabbi Reisner cogently defends the position of Rabbi
Tendler and Dr. Rosner against Rabbi Bleich’s requirement of the complete
destruction of the brain to declare death:
Decapitation does not signal total destruction of the tissue of the brain,
but only its loss of contact with the organism. Destruction of the brain
tissue will surely follow, but only at some unspecified later time. It is pre-
cisely the irreversible cessation of the integrated function of brain and
body that is modeled by decapitation.80
Based on this argument of integrated function, Reisner finds the UniformDec-
laration of Death Act acceptable under halakhah, provided that the appro-
priate diagnostic tests have been completed. Despite continued opposition
by prominent Israeli poseqim such as Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, the Israeli
Chief Rabbinate has issued a similar finding, which has been the basis of suc-
cessful heart transplant programs in Israeli hospitals.
The Heart of the Matter
However, Rabbi Bleich’s fundamental objection to brain-death rests not on any
claims regarding the integrated functioning of the brain. The cornerstone of his
argument is that heartbeat is the primary criterion of life.81 In order to make
tors, Nurses, Health-Care Personnel and Patients (New York: Mesorah Publications, 2003),
310.
78 Fred Rosner, Bioethics (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2001), ch. 22, “Definition of
Death,” 297.
79 Time of Death, 131–135, esp. n. 4.
80 “Care for the Terminally Ill,” 280.
81 Time of Death, 148–154.
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this argument, hemust set aside the clear meaning of the standard texts found
in Yoma, Ḥullin, Gittin, Ohalot as well as the codes of Maimonides and Rabbi
Karo.
Rabbi Bleich bases his argument primarily on Rashi’s comments on b. Yoma
85a.82 Bleich claims that the heart itself is to be considered an רביא —one
of his limbs. Although the heart is indeed counted by the Rabbis among the
248 םירביא (body parts), in this context such a reading is unpersuasive. Rashi’s
phrase, וירביאזיזמוניאש (“he doesn’t move his limbs”), clearly refers to volun-
tary movement. If Rashi meant to include the heart in this phrase, then the
Gemara’s question would be rendered non-sensical. We would have to under-
stand it: “If the person appears dead, for he is not moving his limbs, [not even
his heart], then how far should we excavate—to his heart, or to his nose—to
know the truth?”
Rabbi Bleich also cites Rashi’s explanation of רמארמד , the position in the
Gemara that lack of heartbeat would suffice to declare death. Rashi explains
this position with the words, םשתקפודותמשנש , “for it is there that the soul
beats” [his translation]. Bleich takes this as Rashi’s own position, and neglects
tomention that this gloss is simply Rashi’s explanation of the opinion that was
rejected by all codes of Jewish law. He acknowledges that Rashi’s commentary
is not viewed as an halakhic code but persists in using it to build an untenable
position.
Rabbi Bleich also argues against the halakhic significance of spontaneous
respiration. He notes that victims of polio epidemics in the last century often
suffered respiratory paralysis, and yetwere conscious and able to conversewith
the assistance of an iron lung. By the standard of spontaneous respiration, he
asserts, they would absurdly have to be considered dead. He further cites the
example from b. Giṭ. 70b to prove that a man who cannot breathe is still con-
sidered alive enough to execute a writ of divorce.
Rabbi Bleich’s examples are interesting, but are the cases indeed compara-
ble? The polio victims exhibited תויח , other tangible indications of life, includ-
ing the ability to talk. The Gittin case, which is frankly difficult to imagine
possible, describes a man who is able via pantomime to execute a complicated
document despite his slit trachea.The brain-dead individual, in contrast, is per-
manently unconscious, unresponsive to stimuli and unable to breathe. He or
she is, to use Rashi’s earlier phrase, וירביאזיזמוניאשתמלהמוד , “like dead, for he
doesn’t move his limbs.” Bleich argues that the halakhah pays no heed to con-
sciousness in the diagnosis of death. This may be true, but he himself argues
82 See above, 7.
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that bodily movement has significance. From the case of Eli, discussed in b.
Ḥul. 21a, we learn that the context of an observation is significant. Normally,
the neck would need to be nearly severed, making respiration impossible, for
the person to be declared dead without further examination. Because of Eli’s
advancedage, hewasdeclareddeadevenwithouthis neckbeing severed. Based
on the Talmudic sources, we can say that a person who lies still, and appears
dead, and is not breathing, as is the case with brain-death—is dead.
Even Bleich’s prooftexts work against his argument for a cardiac, rather than
a respiratory, standard. He cites a responsum of Ḥatam Sofer83 out of context
which purportedly proves that cardiac activity is more important than respi-
ration. This responsum84 is a polemic against those secular authorities and
maskilim who wished to delay burial until the body began to decompose.85
Ḥatam Sofer vigorously asserts the adequacy of respiratory arrest in proving
death.
Referring to the story of Elijah’s miraculous resuscitation of a boy who had
stopped breathing (1Kgs 17:17), Rabbi Sofer mentions a condition called קותיש
or גאלש in which a pulse could be felt at the neck even though the person was
apparently not breathing. Somewould say therefore that Elijahmerely restored
breath to the boy, but Sofer sees the boy’s respiratory arrest (even with con-
tinued heartbeat!) as a true death, and Elijah’s act of resuscitation as a true
resurrection of the dead.
In normal cases, Sofer continues (addressing the skeptical maskilim), when
a body is still as a stone, and there is no heartbeat, and there is no breath, then
the person is surely dead and can be buried without further delay. Bleich seizes
upon this sentence as proof that Sofer requires stillness. Cardiac arrest and
respiratory failure to certify death. Once again, a careful reading belies Ble-
ich’s claim. To skeptics who would require waiting until putrefaction before
burial, Sofer cites every possible proof of death—rigor mortis, asystole, and
apnea—to prove the finality of the diagnosis. But as far as the halakhah is con-
cerned, respiration is the sole criterion. In apassagewhichBleichdoesnot quote,





83 Rabbi Moses Sofer, 1762–1839.
84 .חלשןמיס)העדהרוי(בקלחרפוסםתחת״וש
85 See above, p. 7.
226 nevins
Once his breathing ceases, one should no longer violate Shabbat [to res-
cuehim].This is the general principle for allwhodie, and this hasbeen the
accepted criterion in our hands ever since God’s congregation became a
holy nation and should all the winds in the world fill their sails with wind
they would not budge us from the place of our holy Torah!
Bleich has tried very hard, but the Ḥatam Sofer will not be budged from the
traditional halakhic definition of death: permanent respiratory arrest. Indeed,
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach reaffirms the respiratory standard in his early
responsum on the topic:86
תמוופאבהמשנריזחהלונחלצהאלוותמישנהקספשימלכדרבדהתמאשד״נעלניכ
ותמישנהלדחוויפאמקלתסנםייחחורהשעגרהותואמתמכבישחריפשד
For it seems, in my humble opinion, that the truth of the matter is that
anyone who has ceased breathing, and in whose nose we have not suc-
ceeded in restoring breath is dead. He should be considered to have died
from the very moment when the breath of life departed his nostrils and
his breathing ceased.
Yet Rabbi Bleich remains convinced of the cardiac standard. He summons non-
halakhic sources such as Rabbenu Baḥya’s homiletical comment about the
need to love God “with all your heart,” for that is the final organ to die. He also
cites a responsum of Ḥakham Tzvi87 regarding whether a chicken whose heart
could not be located should be deemed tereifah.88 Based on his understanding
of anatomy and Kabbalistic beliefs,89 Ḥakham Tzvi proclaims the heart to be
essential to all life. This may or may not be the case—mechanical hearts are
no longer theoretical—but it does not displace the clear halakhic definition of
death: respiratory failure.
Another prominent halakhic authority, Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik, has ad-
vanced an even more restrictive definition of death.90 He argues that the
86 Rabbi ShlomoZalmanAuerbach,Minḥat Shlomo 2.86.5 (1 Adar 5728/March 1, 1968). Aswe
shall see, he eventually rejected brain-death based on concerns about blood flow studies
hastening death.





90 Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik, “Death According to the Halacha,” The Journal of Halacha and
Contemporary Society (Spring, 1989): 41–48.
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halakhah requires three criteria for thedeclarationof death: respiratory, cardiac
and neurological.
The process of death beginswith cessation of respiration and it endswith
the total termination of all the three vital functions in life—respiration,
cardiac activity, and brain activity … A person who becomes devoid of
respiration but who still has cardiac activity is considered semi-alive and
semi-dead. Consequently, if someone will kill him, he will be considered
amurderer. Hence, it is absolutely forbidden ( רובעילאוגרהי ) to cut out the
heart of that person even though the removal of the heart of the donor is
indispensable to the preservation of the life of the donee.
This argument is powerful, but on what is it based? None of the halakhic texts
present these three criteria of death—respiratory, cardiac and neurological—
as a unified set. The category of being “semi-alive” is apparently Rabbi Solove-
ichik’s own invention.Hebases the cardiac criterionupon the samephilosophi-
cal, homiletical andKabbalistic texts about theheart citedbyRabbiBleich from
Moreh Nevukhim,91 Rabbenu Baḥya, and the Ḥakham Tzvi’s citation of Rabbi
Yitzḥak Luria. These texts do not relate to the Talmudic criteria of death, nor
are they presented as halakhic rulings. Soloveichik goes so far as to claim that
brainwaves registeredonanEEGconstitute bodily “movement” but evenBleich
finds this difficult to accept.92Aswehave seen, theTalmudand codes of law focus
on lack of respiration, not cardiac activity—and certainly not brain activity—for
the diagnosis of death.
Within the Ḥaredi community, statements made by prominent poseqim
against brain-death continue to carry great influence. Like Rabbi Feinstein,
Rabbi Auerbach’s position seems to have vacillated based on continued medi-
cal updates (and lobbying). His writing assumes that the blood flow test is the
final determination of brain-death, but even if that test is met, he considers
the patient a goses until the heart has permanently stopped. Rabbi Auerbach
ultimately rejects the brain-death standard, apparently without realizing that
brain-death today establishes the complete and permanent cessation of respi-
ration.93
Nevertheless, within the Orthodox community, support for the donation of
vital organs is growing, as evidenced by the advocacy organization H.O.D.S.
91 Section 1.39.
92 “Neurological Criteria of Death,” 333.
93 See Nishmat Avraham, 313 f.
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(HalachicOrganDonor Society).94Dr.AvrahamSteinberg’s recent article inThe
Encyclopedia of JewishMedical Ethics reviews the primary halakhic approaches
to brain-death, and concludes that permanent cessation of spontaneous respi-
ration is the halakhically-significant criterion of death in these circumstances:
Based on the above-mentioned criteria, the establishment of themoment
of death as being defined as the complete and irreversible cessation
of spontaneous respiration is not a change in the halakhahh. What has
changed is the medical technology to establish that the cessation of res-
piration is absolute and irreversible.95
Heart and liver donations are accepted by observant Jews; it is clear that they
may also be donated by observant Jews so long as the appropriate criteria are
met for the halakhic diagnosis of death. To accept organs donated by gentiles
but to refuse to donate them would be a particularly galling example of לוליח
׳ה , the desecration of God’s holy name.96
Conclusion
Jewish law has consistently favored the respiratory standard for the determi-
nation of death. Although Rashi on b. Yoma 85a implies that the respiratory
standardwas adopted due to ease of diagnosis, the Gemara states that breath is
םייחתמשנ , the essence of life. The sources thatwe have cited fromb.Ḥul. 21a,m.
ʾOhal. 1:6 and b. Giṭ. 70b view severe neck injury, destruction of the spinal cord
or decapitation as tantamount to death. We have concluded that these cases
are distinguished by the inability of the victim to breathe. Because the proto-
col for ascertaining brain-death currently includes verification of the complete
cessation of respiration, it suffices to prove halakhic death.
This understanding differs from that advanced by previous advocates of
accepting brain-death such as Rosner, Tendler and Reisner, who view the neu-
94 See their web site, www.hods.org. They are neutral on the brain-death controversy, pre-
senting both sides of the debate.
95 Avraham Steinberg, “Moment of Death,” in The Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics,
trans. Fred Rosner, 3 vols. (New York: Feldheim Publishers, 2003), 2:702. Emphasis in the
original.
96 Rabbi Auerbach rules that one may accept organs from a brain-dead donor in the dias-
pora, where it can be assumed that the donor is non-Jewish, and that doctors will remove
organs regardless of the halakha. In Israel, however, he forbids acceptance of such organs
for fear of encouraging the hastening of death in a goses.
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rological injury suffered to the brain stem as halakhically significant in and of
itself. Our position focuses on the inability to breathe caused by brain-death as
the halakhically-significant criterion.
A diagnosis of brain-death, according to its rigorous protocol, is required for
halakhic purposes only when contemplating an action such as the harvesting
of vital organs.97 It may be possible one day to transplant the hearts and liv-
ers of non-heart beating donors, thereby avoiding this ambiguous situation.98
Meanwhile, the brain-death protocol with its test of apnea satisfies the tradi-
tional definition of death established in b. Yoma 85a and the codes that follow
it.
We must remain clear that the stringent criteria proposed by Wijdicks and
Plum et al. to rule out any temporary or reversible factors, followed by care-
ful clinical examination, are prerequisites to the diagnosis of death according
to halakhah. The brain-reflex clinical examination should indicate whether
the components of the brain stem—mid-brain, cerebellum, pons andmedulla
oblongonta—have indeed ceased to function. These examinations are also pre-
liminary to the halakhic diagnosis of death. They satisfy Rashi’s explanation of
b. Yoma 85a, that the patient is utterly unresponsive. These tests also can pre-
ventmedical staff fromperforming an apnea test which could be dangerous for
a patient who does retain brain function, and whose death could be hastened
by a premature apnea test.
What about the continued heartbeat? It seems counterintuitive to dismiss
this rhythmic function as סוכרפ , which is generally spasmodic movement after
death. Yet the heart is a muscle which can continue to beat even outside of the
body (as it often does during heart-transplant operations).We do not consider
a heart transplant recipient to have died and been reborn. Asystole alone does
not define death, and continued heartbeat may indeed qualify as סוכרפ .
97 If the proposed course of action is to remove futile treatments that are deemed an imped-
iment to death, then a diagnosis of irreversible coma will suffice for a shift to palliative
care. Dr. Hayim Brodie notes that the brain-death diagnosis may also be used to justify
withdrawal of life support for a patient who has no relative or guardian. Conservative
movement authors are divided about the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration,
but this controversy obtains in cases of coma, rather than brain death. See Rabbi Dorff
and Rabbi Reisner, in Life and Death Responsibilities in Jewish Biomedical Ethics.
98 A notable development in the field is the “Pittsburgh Protocol” which involves terminat-
ing artificial respiration allowing the patient to go into cardiac arrest in the operating
room and, after a few moments of official death, proceeding with the harvesting of vital
organs. This procedure, which does not establish irreversibility, raises numerous ethical
and halakhic difficulties, and is to be the subject of a separate study by Rabbi Dorff.
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Heartbeat alone does not constitute a היחשפנ , a living person, either in the
womb or in the ICU. The brief persistence of cardiac activity in cases where
there is no consciousness, nomovement in response to any neurological exam-
ination, nor any spontaneous respiration as demonstrated by the apnea test, is
consistent with a declaration of death in halakhah. The cardiac standard has
clearly been rejected by the Gemara and codes in cases where the person is
found to be תמלהמוד , “like dead.”
The apnea test confirms that the brain stem has ceased to function and also
meets the traditional respiratory criterion of death. This is the halakhically-
significant and final determination of death. Indeed, a patient who fails to
breathe during the apnea test, showing no signs of spontaneous respiration
after all the preliminary confounding factors and brain reflex exams have been
accounted for, is dead by both classical Jewish and contemporary medical cri-
teria. The moment that this test is completed can serve as the official moment
of death according to halakhah.
[2018 update: As noted above, recent medical literature has drawn attention to
conditions such as upper spinal cord injury and global ischemic penumbra which
could mimic brain-death on the clinical exams and apnea test. We would not go
so far as Dr. Alan Shewmon in declaring brain-death to be an unusable diagnosis
absent currently impossible proof of complete cessationof blood flow toall parts of
the brain. Rather,wewould cautionhalakhic authorities to questionmedical prac-
titioners about the possibility of other conditions that might mimic brain-death,
and to verify that there are no indications of consciousness, before accepting the
brain-death diagnosis and permitting organ transplantation.]
This paper has of necessity focused on the technical aspects of medical
practice and halakhic precedent. This should not obscure the fact that each
incidence of such a death is tragic for the patient and for his or her family.
Indeed, the declaration of death based on neurological criteria despite con-
tinued heartbeat can be particularly troubling for relatives who are not fully
convinced that their loved one has died. The medical literature is likewise
concerned with this problem. Clergy who are properly sensitive to both the
halakhic and the pastoral challenges of this moment can be an invaluable
resource for the grieving family. They may explain the spiritual significance
of the “breath of life” and its connection to familiar Hebrew terms such as
nefesh, neshama and ruach. It would be appropriate to tear a garment ( העירק )
at the time that death is declared, to recite Psalms, to ask forgiveness from the
deceased and to follow all of the other sensitive customs taught by our holy
Torah.
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Conclusion
1. A ventilator-dependent patient with heartbeat but no apparent brain
function may be declared dead based on the following criteria:
2. If, after the establishedwaitingperiod, confirmatory tests andbrain-reflex
exams show there to be no brain function, [2018 update: and if there is no
indication of confounding factors, including alternative injuries that might
suppress responses to the clinical exam,] the patient shall be tested for
apnea. Failure to breathe during this test (or any future procedure which
verifies the absence of spontaneous respiration) proves that the patient is
considered dead according to the traditional standard of Jewish law—the
permanent cessation of respiration.
3. After the apnea test is concluded, ventilation shall be continued until the
results are known, death is declared, and the family has had an opportu-
nity to consider donation of vital organs to save another person’s life. The
donor’s body should be treated with the utmost dignity and be prepared
for Jewish burial at the earliest possible opportunity.
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chapter 9
Big Data Meets the Shulḥan Arukh
Michael Pitkowsky
Earlier Discussions of the Sources Used in the Shulḥan Arukh1
Soon after its publication, commentators began topore over almost every state-
ment in Yosef Karo’s Shulḥan Arukh. Some commentators wanted to simply
elucidate Karo’s sometimes laconic language, desiring to help readers under-
stand statements whose meaning or intention weren’t clear. Others felt the
need to further expand upon Karo’s text, adding layer upon layer of interpreta-
tion. This multi-layered approach of the commentaries on the Shulḥan Arukh
was even cited by Abraham Zevi Hirsch Eisenstadt in his Pitḥei Teshuvah in
order to justify the relianceon the ShulḥanArukh for halakhic decision-making.
In response to the criticism of those who used the Shulḥan Arukh as the sole
source for halakhic decision-making voiced by the Maharsha, Samuel Edels,2
Eisenstadt wrote that
It is possible that [Maharsha adopted his position because] inMaharsha’s
time no glosses had yet been written to the Shulḥan Arukh. Nowadays,
however, since Taz, Shakh, Magen Avraham, and other later commen-
taries have been written and the reason for each law is explained along-
side it [i.e. alongside the law itself], reliance on the Shulḥan Arukh and
the later commentaries is appropriate.3
Thus we see that the commentaries that were written on the Shulḥan Arukh
became almost inseparable from the text itself.
I would like to return to the very text of the Shulḥan Arukh that has at times
been almost superseded by themany commentaries that have been written on
1 I would like to thank this volume’s honoree, Rabbi Joel Roth, for all that he has taught me
about halakhah and halakhic literature. Through hismany public talks and lectures, writings,
and personal conversations Rabbi Roth has helped shapemy understanding of what itmeans
to be a Jew who tries to live their life according to the halakhah.
2 See Maharsha, Ḥiddushei Aggadot, Soṭah 22a, s.v. Yere et ha-shem beni. Cited in Menachem
Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. B. Auerbach and M. Sykes (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society, 1994), 1422.
3 Pitḥei Teshuvah, Shulḥan Arukh, YD par. 242, subpar. 8. Cited in Elon, ibid.
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it.4 Specifically, I would like to examine the sources that Karo used in compiling
the ShulḥanArukh by utilizing tools of data analysis that are based upon exam-
ining collections of data, asking specific questions about this data, quantifying
the answers to those questions, and using these answers as the foundation for
further analysis of the material.
Previous scholars, both academic and traditional, have already asked similar
questions about the sources that Karo used in composing the Shulḥan Arukh
and any possible modifications or editing that Karo may have applied to these
texts. Alyssa Gray, in her insightful article that included a literary analysis of
the laws of charity in the Shulḥan Arukh, showed both Karo’s reliance on Jacob
b. Asher’s Tur and also the freedom that he sometimes took with the sources
from the Tur.5
SA’s literary dependency on Ṭur has been long-known, as well as its ten-
dency to make changes to Ṭur. By thinking about SA as not simply a “law
code,” “restatement,” or “collection of rulings,” but as a work of legal and
literary interpretation inwhich a gifted scholar systematized his interpre-
tations of and additions to his received legal heritage, the door is opened
to searching out the “latent structures of thought” in the work—in this
casepertaining topoverty, thepoor, and the Jewish communities of which
they are a part. Moreover, by noting the differences between the laws
of poverty and charity that SA inherited and what it bequeathed, this
study is able to show aspects of SA’s distinctive contribution to that body
of law, including its reintroduction of topics (as James Boyd White and
J.M. Balkin understand the term) that would thenceforth be part of the
canon of poverty and charity topics for study and application. To para-
phrase James BoydWhite, SA may be understood as “attempting to estab-
lish a conversation of a certain kind,” and as “establishing a set of topics,
a set of terms in which those topics can be discussed, and some general
directions as to the process of thought and argument” by which its laws
are to be applied.6
Gray understood how an examination of Karo’s literary sources and any editing
that these sources may have undergone are essential to helping us understand
the nature and goals of the Shulḥan Arukh.
4 For a bibliography of scholarly literature on the Shulḥan Arukh see Alyssa Gray, “Poverty and
Community in R. Joseph Karo’s Shulḥan Arukh: ‘Law and Literature’ and Halakhic History,”
Diné Israel 29 (2013): 57*–89*, esp. at nn. 1–5.
5 Gray, “Poverty and Community.”
6 Gray, “Poverty and Community,” 88*.
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Among traditional scholars, in the seventeenth century Ḥayyim Benvenisti
recognized Karo’s reliance on the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, writing
That which R. Yosef Karo decided in his “short work” [i.e. the Shulḥan
Arukh], is not decisive enough for us to rely upon it, since it is known that
this book is entirely based upon the reasoning of the Rambam.7
More recently Yitzhak Yosef has formulated a good summary of Karo’s reliance
on previous literary sources.8
And that which we have found regarding a number of contradictions in
the words of Maran [i.e. Karo] in the Shulḥan Arukh, the essence of the
matter is that since the method of Maran the Shulḥan Arukh is to rely
upon the language of the poseqim [halakhic decisors], and he doesn’t use
his own words, sometimes he copies the language of the Rambam, and
he doesn’t intend to [i.e. agree with] all of the words, and sometimes he
copies the language of the Rosh (Rabbeinu Asher) or the Tur, every case
must be examined individually.9
We have seen that both critical and traditional scholars have both exhibited
an awareness of the literary dimensions of the Shulḥan Arukh and have offered
numerous observations regarding the sources that Karo used when composing
the Shulḥan Arukh. The two dominant sources used by Karo that scholars have
identified were the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah and Yaakov ben Asher’s Tur.
AData-Based Analysis of the Sources Found in the Shulḥan Arukh
I will now present the preliminary results of an analysis of the first 25 simanim
(chapters) of theOraḥḤayyim (OḤ) section of the ShulḥanArukh that includes
both an attempt to identify the sources that Karo used in composing the Shul-
ḥan Arukh and also a discussion of some of the editorial activity undertaken
7 Ḥayyim Benvenisti, Shayarei Knesset ha-Gedolah, OḤ 495:5. For other sources that stated
something similar see Yitzhak Ze’ev Kahana, Meḥkarim be-Sifrut ha-Teshuvot (Jerusalem:
Mossad Harav Kook, 1973), 69–70.
8 Yosef was addressing the phenomenon of contradictions that are found between different
statements in the Shulḥan Arukh. This question has also been treated by Eliav Shochet-
man, “AlHa-Setirot be-ShulḥanArukhve-AlMahutoShelHa-ḤibburU-Maṭarotav,”Asufot: Sefer
Shanah le-Mada’ei ha-Yahadut 3 (1989–1990): 323–329.
9 Yitzhak Yosef, Ein Yitzḥak (Jerusalem: Ei”sh Pituhim, 2009), 3:62.
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table 9.1 Major sources of citations in the Shul-
han Arukh sections under review




Rosh on the Talmud 25
Karo’s own words 25







by Karo in his writing of the Shulḥan Arukh. These results are very preliminary,
based upon only the first 25 simanim of the Shulḥan Arukh, and it is very pos-
sible that they will have to be modified after further research.
In the first 25 simanim of the Shulḥan Arukh there are 170 se’ifim (para-
graphs).10 The topics covered in these simanim are: hanhagat adam ba-boker
(morning behavior by a person); levishat begadim (wearing clothing);hanhagat
beit ha-kisei (bathroom behavior); netilat yadayim (washing one’s hands); kav-
vanat ha-berakhot (proper intention for blessings); birkat asher yatzar ve’elo-
hai neshama (the blessings of asher yatzar and elohai neshama); Tzitzit (ritual
fringes); Talit (four cornered garments); Tefillin (phylacteries).11 I will begin by
presenting some data points regarding the sources that Karo brought and then
illustrate some of these with examples from the Shulḥan Arukh itself.
In these 25 simanim Karo quoted from 47 different sources, this is in addi-
tion to the instances in which Karo formulated a statement entirely of his
own words. A breakdown of the most frequently cited sources can be found
in table 9.1.
10 Some of the se’ifim includemore than one halakhah but my total count is of simanim and
se’ifim and not halakhot [laws].
11 There aremorehalakhot related toTefillin in subsequent simanim that I have not included.
I have also not listed all of the sub-categories of the laws of Tzitzit.
big data meets the shulḥan arukh 239
The sources cited fewer than ten times can be found in table 9.2.
I will now analyze in more detail the data found in the above tables. First, it
should be pointed out that in these 25 chapters Karo used material from over
three-dozendifferent sources.12 Iwould first like to go into further detail regard-
ing the sources from the Tur and the Rambam. Table 9.3 shows the number
of sources from the Rambam quoted in the Shulḥan Arukh, how many were
quoted verbatim, and howmany of these were also quoted in the Tur.13
From table 9.3 it is possible to see that of the 22 sources brought from the
Rambam in these simanim of the Shulḥan Arukh, six of those were brought
verbatimwithout any changes. Of these 22, seven were also brought in the Tur.
We can therefore say that in the simanim examined, themajority of the sources
brought from the Rambam underwent some type of editing and a little less
than a third of the sources brought from the Rambam were also quoted by the
Tur.
Regarding the sources quoted from the Tur, of these 87 sources 16 were
quoted verbatim, meaning that in the simanim that I examined of the sources
that Karo brought from the Tur, 18% of them were quoted verbatim while
he edited 82% of them. Below we will go into further detail and bring exam-
ples of the types of editing done to sources from both the Rambam and the
Tur.
By far the largest number of sources found in these simanim of the Shul-
ḥan Arukh come from Karo’s commentary on the Tur, the Beit Yosef. Of the
125 instances in which a source from the Beit Yosef is brought in the Shulḥan
Arukh, 25 of them are either verbatim or near verbatim statements that Karo
himself wrote in the Beit Yosef, while the other 100 sources are almost without
exception from other Rishonim (medieval rabbinic authorities) who are listed
in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. It should be noted that, with very few exceptions, sources
from theRambam that are found in the ShulḥanArukhwere either first brought
in the Tur or the Beit Yosef.
12 In a preliminary examination of the first 100 chapters (simanim) of the Shulḥan Arukh I
have identified material from approximately 75 different sources. For a discussion of the
books that Karo had at his disposal see Yehudah Lavi, “Otzar ha-Sefarim shel ha-Beit Yosef,”
Ha-Ma’ayan 34, no. 2 (Tevet, 5744): 21–42; Tirza Kelman, “Ketuvot be-Ot Barzel ve-Oferet bi-
Defus: Mahapeikhat ha-Defus ve-Yetzirat ha-Ḥibbur Beit Yosef,”Pe’Amim 148 (2016): 9–26.
13 I would like to thank Tirza Kelman for stressing to me the importance of distinguishing
betweenmaterial that Karo has brought in the ShulḥanArukh from theMishnehTorah but
was not also brought byYaakov benAsher in theTur andmaterial from theMishnehTorah
that was also brought in the Tur.
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table 9.2 Minor sources of citations cited in the Shulhan
Arukh sections under review
Source Number of times
Agur 9











Responsa of the Maharik 3
Responsa of the Rosh 3
Responsa attributed to Ramban 2
Rokeaḥ 2
Responsa of the Maharil 2
Kaftor va-Feraḥ 2
Ran 2
Responsa of the Ribash 2




Responsa R”I Migash 1
Tashbetz 1
Shibbolei ha-Leket 1
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table 9.3 Citations of Maimonides in the Shulhan Arukh sec-
tions under review
Sources from the Rambam 22
Sources from the Rambam quoted verbatim 6 (27%)
Sources from the Rambam also in the Tur 7 (31%)
The above figures show that the sources for the simanim in the Shulḥan
Arukh that I examined come from the following sources: the Tur; the Rambam;
sources in the BeitYosef, whether they are from theTalmud, the Rambam, other
Rishonim, or the words of Karo himself.
Verbatim Quotations in the Shulḥan Arukh from the Tur and the
Rambam14
I would now like to bring some specific examples of the types of sources that
are found in the Shulḥan Arukh and some characteristics of the editing that
they sometimes underwent.15 The first type of sources that I want to bring are
verbatim quotations from either the Tur or the Mishneh Torah that were then






14 The texts of the Mishneh Torah are from the RambamMeduyak (Maaleh Adumim, 2008),
and translations from https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/682956/jewish/
Mishneh‑Torah.htm.
Texts from the Tur and the Shulḥan Arukh are from Tur ha-Shalem Shirat Devorah ve-
Shulḥan Arukh ha-Bahir (Jerusalem, 2016). Early printed editions of the Shulḥan Arukh
have also been used. Translations from the Tur and the Shulḥan Arukh are my own.
15 Menachem Elon examined numerous examples of the literary relationship between









Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 3:7 MishnehTorah, Hilkhot Beit ha-Beḥirah
7:9
Whoever urinates fromMt. Scopus
inward to the city should sit facing the
Temple or have the Temple at his side.
Whoever urinates fromMt. Scopus
inward to the city should sit facing the
Temple or have the Temple at his side.
Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 13:1 Tur, OḤ 13
The four tzitzit (ritual fringes) can dis-
qualify one another so that as long as
all of the four corners do not have tzitzit
attached according to the halakhah if
one goes out into the public domain on
Shabbat they are obligated to bring a sin
offering.
The four tzitzit (ritual fringes) can dis-
qualify one another so that as long as
all of the four corners do not have tzitzit
attached according to the halakhah if
one goes out into the public domain on
Shabbat they are obligated to bring a sin
offering.
As canbe seen from these sources, there are instanceswhenKaro simply quotes
verbatim in the Shulḥan Arukh a source from either the Mishneh Torah or the
Tur.
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Modification of Source in the Shulḥan Arukh
Already in the very first se’if of the Shulḥan Arukh we see an example of how













Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 1:1 Tur, OḤ 1
One should gather strength in the morn-
ing to arise and worship his creator that
he should wake the dawn.
Therefore a person needs to gather
strength in the morning to arise and wor-
ship his creator that he should wake the
dawn.
And even if in the winter his urge should
entice him and say “how can you get up
in this great cold,” or in the summer it will
entice him and “how can you get up from
your bed while you still haven’t satisfied
your sleep?”
Overcome it and get up, that you should
wake the dawn and not he wake you as
David may he rest in peace said “Awake
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(cont.)
Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 1:1 Tur, OḤ 1
up, my glory; awake, psaltery and harp: I
myself will awake early.” (Psalms 57:8)
I wake up the dawn, and the dawn does
not wake me.
In this example Karo selectively chose portions from a larger text that was in
theTur. Other times the editingwas as simple as adding aword or a slightmod-
ification in order to make a statement easier to understand.
אןמיסםייחחרוארוט ד:אםייחחרואךורעןחלש
.הנוכבאלשםהבתוברהמהנוכבטעמבוטיכ .הנוכאלבתוברהמהנווכבםינונחתטעמבוט
Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 1:4 Tur, OḤ 1
It is better a few supplications with
proper intention than many without
intention.







Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 4:22 Tur, OḤ 4
If one does not have water he should
clean his hands with a stone or dirt or
If one does not have water he should
clean his hands with a stone or with any-
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Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 4:22 Tur, OḤ 4
with anything else that cleans and bless
“on the cleanliness of hands.”
thing else that cleans and bless “on the
cleanliness of hands.”
In another place Karo made a change that on the surface reflects a different
opinion regarding how towrite God’s name, but on a deeper level may possibly






Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 8:8 Tur, OḤ 8
One should intend in their wrapping [of
the tallit] that the Blessed be He com-
manded us to wrap ourselves in order
that we remember all of his command-
ments and to perform them.
One should intend in their wrapping [of
the tallit] that the Place commanded us
to wrap ourselves in it in order that we
remember all of his commandments and
to perform them.
Other times there is both a slight change in language alongwith the editing out
of a clause.
16 The use of ה״בה in the Venice 1567 edition is most likely an abbreviation for ה״בקה , the
Holy One Blessed be He, which is either אוהךורבשודקה or אוהךירבאשדוקה , and it was
subsequently changed to ה״בקה in later editions. The influence of the Zohar on Karo will
be discussed below. On the different ways in which God’s name was written see Yaakov
Spiegel, Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri: Ketivah ve-Ha’atakah (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan
University Press, 2005), 565–632, esp. 592–594. See also Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages,










Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 3:13 Tur, OḤ 3
A person should not urinate standing up
because of the droplets that are sprayed
on his legs, unless he stands in a high
place or urinates into soft dirt.
And a person should not urinate standing
up in order that droplets should not spray
on his legs and it should not seem as if he
is a castrated person and thus causing his
sons to be slandered, unless he stands in
a high place or urinates into soft dirt.
There are other times when Karo added an interpretation to an otherwise







Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 11:8 Tur, OḤ 11
One who bows down to an animal [in
order to worship it], its wool is disqual-
ified for tzitzit. One who bows down to
planted flax, it is fit for tzitzit since it has
changed.
One who bows down to an animal [in
order to worship it], its wool is disquali-
fied for tzitzit, but one who bows down to
planted flax, it is fit for tzitzit.
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In this last example Karo added a reason to a law from the Tur that previ-
ously did not include one. From the above examples we see that while there
were instances in which Karo quoted sources from either the Tur or the Ram-
bamverbatim, therewere also examples inwhichhemade changes, some slight
and others not so slight, to earlier sources.
The Centrality of the Beit Yosef in theWriting of the Shulḥan
Arukh
In this section I will bring examples of different ways in which the Beit Yosef
served as a vehicle and a source for later formulations found in the Shulḥan
Arukh. The first example that I will bring in order to show the important role
that the Beit Yosef played in the writing of the Shulḥan Arukh will be from the
se’if that was brought at the end of the last section, OḤ 11:8. Above I empha-
sized how the formulation of this se’if differed in the Shulḥan Arukh from the








Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 11:8 Tur, OḤ 11
One who bows down to an animal [in
order to worship it], its wool is disqual-
ified for tzitzit. One who bows down to
planted flax, it is fit for tzitzit since it has
changed.
One who bows down to an animal [in
order to worship it], its wool is disquali-
fied for tzitzit, but one who bows down to
planted flax, it is fit for tzitzit.
As seen in the above quoted se’if, there is a slight change between the Shul-
ḥan Arukh and the Tur. In the Beit Yosef Karo directly references the Rambam
who included a reason for this specific halakhah and this explanationwas then















Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 11:8 Beit Yosef, OḤ 11 Rambam, Hilkhot Tzitzit
1:11
One who bows down to
an animal [in order to
worship it], its wool is dis-
qualified for tzitzit. One
who bows down to planted
flax, it is fit for tzitzit since
it has changed.
“But one who bows down
to planted flax, it is fit for
tzitzit”: So wrote the Ram-
bam in chapter one [of
the laws of tzitzit] and
gave a reason, since it has
changed.
If, however, one bows
down to flax which is
planted, it is acceptable,
since it has changed.
Isadore Twersky has previously written about the instances when Karo seemed
to have gone out of his way and removed a reason found in the Rambam for a
commandment, yet here we see a case in which Karo went out of his way to
include a reason for a commandment that was included by the Rambam but
excluded from the Tur.17 Another example of when Karo added a reason for a
commandment or practice that was not found in the Tur but was brought in
the Beit Yosef can be seen in the following source.
In OḤ 3:11 Karo brings numerous instructions regarding how to clean oneself
after defecating.18
17 See Twersky, “Ha-Rav R’ Yosef Karo Ba’al ha-Sh”Ar,” Asufot: Sefer Shanah le-Mada’ei ha-
Yahadut 3 (1989–1990): 257. As Twersky has shown, Karo’s use of sources found in the
Rambam was multi-faceted and not uniform.
18 See Julius Press, Biblical and Talmudic Medicine, trans. F. Rosner (New York: Sanhedrin
Press, 1978), 550. Also see this comment by Philippe Charlier et al., “Toilet Hygiene in
the Classical Era,”British Medical Journal 2012; 345:e8287: “The abrasive characteristics of
ceramic suggest that long term use of pessoi [i.e. pebbles, MP] could have resulted in local
irritation, skin or mucosal damage, or complications of external haemorrhoids.”


























Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 3:11 Tur, OḤ 3 Beit Yosef, OḤ 3
A person should not wipe
themselves with a pot-
tery shard because of
witchcraft nor with dried
grass, since one who wipes
themselves with some-
thing that is affected by
light his bottom teeth fall
out. Nor with a rock that
his friend used to wipe
himself since it causes a
person to develop hemor-
rhoids.
A person should not wipe
themselves with a pot-
tery shard because of
witchcraft nor with dried
grass nor with a rock that
his friend used to wipe
himself.
“A person should not wipe
themselves with a pot-
tery shard because of
witchcraft”—At the end
of chapter “ha-motzi” (b.
Šabb. 82a) and in chap-
ter “kol ha-basar” (b. Ḥul.
105b). “Nor with dried
grass”—This is also at the
end of chapter “ha-motzi”
(b. Šabb. 82a). And the rea-
son is that since one who
wipes themselves with
something that is affected
by light his bottom teeth
fall out. “Nor with a rock
that his friend used to wipe
himself”—At the end of
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Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 3:11 Tur, OḤ 3 Beit Yosef, OḤ 3
the chapter “ha-ro’eh” (b.
Ber. 55a): “ten things cause
a person to develop hem-
orrhoids and one of them
is wiping with a rock that
his friend used.”
In this se’if we see how in the Shulḥan Arukh Karo quoted the Tur verbatim
yet also felt the need to add comments that explained the halakhah. Unlike the
case cited above where Karo added an explanation that was found in the Ram-
bam,19 here Karo added two explanations that were based on the Talmud and
were brought in the Beit Yosef.
In some instances Karo codified a halakhah in the Shulḥan Arukh that is not
found in the Tur. OḤ 13 discusses which types of four-cornered garments are
obligated to have tzitzit on them, specifically the difficult cases when the gar-
ments are not entirely open at the sides, but rather only partially open. How
muchdoes the garment have to be open at the sides in order for it to be required
to have tzitzit? The Tur addressed a number of related issues, but there was
enough missing that Karo brought a large amount of supplementary material
















19 That Rambamdoes not codify any of the halakhot found in this se’if in hisMishnehTorah.
For related material see chapters four and five of Hilkhot De’ot.







Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 10:7 Beit Yosef, OḤ 10
Articles of clothing that are open on the
sides at the bottom and they have four
corners at the bottom and at the top they
are closed, if the majority of it is closed
it is exempt [from tzitzit] and if the most
of it is open it is obligated. If half of it
is closed and half is open one attaches
[tzitzit] in order to be strict and it is obli-
gated to have tzitzit and one does not go
out with it [into the public domain] on
Shabbat.
In the book Kaftor va-Feraḥ chapter 60
it is written in the following language:
Rabbi Meir of Rothenberg wrote that
articles of clothing that are open a little
bit at the bottom of the four corners are
not obligated to have tzitzit since we fol-
low the body [of the garment]. It seems
that anything that is mostly open is con-
sidered a four-cornered garment and
is obligated in tzitzit. Rabbi Meir only
exempted [a garment] which was mostly
open … so too wrote the Maharik in sec-
tion 149, that Rabbeinu Simchah did not
exempt a garment except one that was
mostly closed but if most of it was open
it was obligated [to have tzitzit] … And
in this case the Rashba and Rabbeinu
Simchah agreed. and if half of the gar-
ment is closed and half is open, it seems
to me that we attach tzitzit in order to be
strict and it is obligated in tzitzit and one
does not go out with it [into the public
domain] on Shabbat.
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In the Beit Yosef on OḤ 13, Karo brought many medieval sources that ad-
dressed thesepartially opened four-cornered garments.These sources included
responsa collections such as the responsa of the Rashba20 and the Maharik21
in addition to codes such as Kaftor va-Feraḥ.
In the Beit Yosef Karo quoted some of these sources verbatim while oth-
ers he paraphrased. Similarly, in the Shulḥan Arukh Karo quoted some of his
statements from the Beit Yosef verbatim while he also paraphrased and refor-
mulated other material. This se’if in the Shulḥan Arukh shows how sometimes
the BeitYosef was used as a supplementary commentary on theTur, addressing
material and issues that were not directly addressed in the Tur. This mate-
rial was then subsequently brought in the Shulḥan Arukh, sometimes verbatim
while at other time paraphrased and modified.
The Beit Yosef and the Influence of the Zohar on the Shulḥan
Arukh
I would now like to address a specific phenomenon found in the relation-
ship between the Beit Yosef and the Shulḥan Arukh. OḤ 4 discusses the laws
surrounding netilat yadayim, washing one’s hands in the morning and before
prayer. When one compares the amount of material found in this siman in the
Tur and the Shulḥan Arukh it isn’t hard to see that the Shulḥan Arukh contains
much more material on this subject than does the Tur. The material in the Tur
amounts to just a few lines.22
Tur, OḤ 4 דןמיסםייחחרוא,רוט
One should wash their hands hygieni-
cally and bless “Blessed are You Lord our





One should be meticulous to pour over
them three times since an evil spirit
dwells on the hands until they are
washed and is not removed until one






20 R. Shlomo ben Aderet.
21 R. Yosef Colon.
22 On the concept of הערחור see 1Sam 16:14, 23; m. Šabb. 2:5; b. Pesaḥ. 112a.
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Tur, OḤ 4 דןמיסםייחחרוא,רוט
fore one needs to refrain from touching
his mouth, nostrils, ears, and eyes, with
his hands before washing because an evil
spirit is dwelling on them.
And if one does not have water he should
clean his hands with a rock or anything




The subjects addressed in this siman are the following: 1. The blessing recited
when washing one’s hands in the morning; 2. Howmany times water is poured
over the hands and how; 3. What happens when a person does not have
water.
Unlike this relatively small amount of material in theTur, the ShulḥanArukh
contains a total of 23 se’ifim on this topic. A closer examination of the dif-
ferences between them shows how in the Shulḥan Arukh Karo added a large
amount of material to what is found in the Tur. Primarily, although not exclu-
sively, this material came from the Zohar.
The first example will be regarding the possible relationship between wash-
ing one’s hands in the morning and washing one’s hands before eating a meal.
In siman 4 of the Tur there is no mention at all of washing one’s hands before
eating a meal while in the Shulḥan Arukh the relationship is explicitly ad-
dressed. The Shulḥan Arukh contains the following in 4:7.
It is good to be meticulous about wash-
ing one’s hands in the morning regarding
anything that disqualifies washing one’s
hands for a meal.
םירבדהלכבתירחשםיידיתליטנבדיפקהלבוט
.הדועסלםיידיתליטנבםיבכעמה
An examination of the Beit Yosef on this siman shows Karo’s sources for mak-
ing the connection between washing one’s hands in the morning and washing
one’s hands before eating a meal.
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And it seems from the words of the Rosh
that we do not need a vessel for wash-
ing hands in the morning as one requires
for washing hands for a meal. And so it
is written in Hagahot Mordechai chap-
ter “Eilu Devarim,” and so wrote the Ran
in the beginning of chapter “Kol ha-
Basar.” It seems that so too is the law
regarding other things that disqualify
washing hands for a meal that they are
not required for washing hands in the









The sources quoted here by Karo in the Beit Yosef seem to imply that there isn’t
any connection between the laws of washing one’s hands in the morning and
those of washing one’s hands before eating a meal, so why then did he write in
the Shulḥan Arukh that it is “ םיבכעמהםירבדהלכבתירחשםיידיתליטנבדיפקהלבוט
הדועסלםיידיתליטנב ”, “that it is preferable or good to be meticulous in matters
relating to washing one’s hands in the morning just as one would regarding
washing one’s hands before a meal”?
If one wants to focus on the narrow literary source for Karo’s formulation in
4:7, the source seems to be a based upon a statement in the Beit Yosef, specifi-










23 See Responsa of the Rashba I:191.







Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 4:7 Beit Yosef, OḤ 4
It is good for one to be meticulous in
washing one’s hands in the morning
regarding all things that disqualify wash-
ing one’s hands for a meal.
And we learn that the same laws that
apply to the other things that disqual-
ify washing one’s hands for a meal do
not apply to washing one’s hands in the
morning since this hand washing is only
because of cleanliness.
But in a responsum of the Rashba it is
written that he was asked why the bless-
ing “on washing hands” was established
for [washing hands] in the morning
and he responded: It is clear that this is
the practice everywhere, to bless in the
morning “on washing hands,” and they
are meticulous about all of the conditions
that apply to the washing just as like with
a meal.
And I didn’t find any clear source that
would require a person to wash their
hands in the morning.
It still needs to be explained why Karo moved from his first statement where
he said that it seemed there was no necessary correlation between the laws of
washing one’s hands in the morning and those of washing one’s hands before
eating a meal to the recommendation that one should be meticulous in mat-
ters relating towashing one’s hands in themorning just as onewould regarding
washing one’s hands before a meal.
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After bringing a number of halakhic authorities, some of whom supported
such a correlation and some who opposed, Karo proceeded to bring a number
of sources from the Zohar, “ רהוזהרפסבבותכןכו ”. In this instance the sources
from the Zohar played the role of tilting the scales in favor of one school of
halahkic thought over another.
This decisionbyKaro to attribute to theZohar a central role in thediscussion






















24 In order to understand this se’if it is important to note that according the Zohar the left
side, sitra de-smola, is considered evil. See Joseph Dan, Kabbalah: A Very Short Introduc-
tion (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006), 52–53: “In the Zohar the realmof evil is called
sitra ahra, an Aramaic phrase meaning ‘the other side.’ ‘Other’ is the unmentionable left
side, which is also the name of God’s archenemy, Samael.”
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Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 4:10 Beit Yosef, OḤ 4
One takes a vessel of water in his right
hand and passes it to his left [hand] in
order that he pour out the water on his
right hand first.
And it is possible that there is a difference
between washing hands in the morning
and washing hands for eating since in
the case of washing hands in the morn-
ing, because [the hands] are impure on
account of the impure side that is rest-
ing on them, if he would first have water
poured from right hand onto his left hand
it would seem that the right power (“sitra
de-yemina”) is working for the other side
(“sitra aḥra”), therefore one needs to first
pour on his right hand from his left hand
as it is written in Parashat Vayeshev [in
the Zohar].
But in the case of washing hands for a
meal when one’s hands are pure and
washing is only done in order to add holi-
ness, one needs to first pour from the
right hand on the left hand as is written
in Parashat Terumah [in the Zohar].
One should interpret that first the right
hand is always washed from the left hand,
whether it is for washing in the morning
or for a meal, as it is written in Parashat
Vayeshev [in the Zohar]. And that which
is written in Parashat Terumah [in the
Zohar], “whoever pours water on his
hand,” that means to say that one takes
a vessel of water in his right hand and
passes it to his left [hand] in order that
he pour out the water on his right hand
first.
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In this caseKaro addresses the question of inwhichhand aperson first holds
the vessel for washing one’s hands, the right or the left. When confronted with
two possibly conflicting sources from the Zohar, Karo decided that one begins
by holding the vessel in the right hand, then passes it to the left hand, andwhile
it is in the left hand, water is then poured over the right hand.
The role of these Zoharic sources in Karo’s decision-making process in this
simanwas directly addressed by Jacob Katz.
Karo, working systematically on the basic of a comprehensive survey of
the sources, absorbed Zoharic prescription and granted them higher sta-
tus than had any halakhist before him. In Chapter 4 of the Beyt Yosef
which deals with “hand-washing in the morning,” Karo quotes a long
passage from the Zohar as supporting evidence before announcing his
decision between two conflicting schools of thought. Was the Talmudi-
cally prescribed hand-washing in the morning a mere hygenic provision
or was it, rather, a ritual one requiring the observance of all minutiae con-
nectedwith thewashing of hands before a propermeal. Karo adopted the
second position for which he found support in the Zoharic passage he
quoted.25
Katz continued and discussed the relationship between Karo’s discussion of
this topic in the Beit Yosef and his later formulation in the Shulḥan Arukh.
While in the BeytYosef these prescriptionswerewrapped in Zoharic sym-
bolism which they were intended to reflect, in the Shulḥan Arukh they
were reduced to a few laconic statements.26
Katz then added an important observation that helps us understand Karo’s
thoughts about the role of Zoharic material in the halakhic process in a clearer
fashion.
In the first of these concerning the ritual minutiae of hand-washing,
where the Zohar had merely supported one of two halakhic opinions
25 Jacob Katz, Divine Law in Human Hands: Case Studies in Halakhic Flexibility (Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, 1998), 53. For a discussion on the role of the Kabbalah in Karo’s halakhic
decision-makingprocess seeMosheHallamish,Ha-Kabbalahbi-Tefillah, be-Halakhah,uve-
Minhag (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2000), 161–179.
26 Ibid., 54.
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Karo’s decision was presented as a recommendation only. (‘It is com-
mendable to take care.’27) The others, based exclusively on the Zohar’s
authority and uncontested by any known halakhist, were formulated
authoritatively … For Karo … the Zoharic view would be binding as long
as it was not explicitly repudiated in the Talmud.28
This siman illustrates another aspect of the ShulḥanArukh in relation to earlier
sources and that is the importance of Zoharic sources for Karo in his formula-
tion of halakhic practice. In this case Karo first discussed these sources and
opinions in the Beit Yosef and it is possible to see how they then migrated to
the Shulḥan Arukh.
OḤ 17 As an Example of Different Editorial Actions by Yosef Karo
within the Same Siman
If we look at OḤ 17, we can see how within one relatively short chapter Karo
quoted and added to the foundation that he found in the Tur with material
from the Beit Yosef, chose to edit a larger selection from the Tur while at the
same time adding new material, and then chose to quote from the Tur verba-
timwithout adding anything. The first se’if is an example of Karo quoting from













27 In 4:7, דיפקהלבוט .
28 Ibid.
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Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 17:1 Tur, OḤ 17 Beit Yosef, OḤ 17
Even though it is written
“and you shall see it” (Num
15:39) a blind person is
obligated in tzitzit because
it was included in the
interpretation of “which
you shall cover with” (Deut
22:12), and the verse “and
you shall see it” is needed
in order to exclude [from
the commandment] night-
time garments.
A blind person is obligated
in tzitzit.
It is taught in a baraita:
“and you shall see it” (Num
15:39)—excluding night-
time garments. You say
that it excludes nighttime
garments, but maybe it
excludes the garments
of a blind person?When
he says “which you shall
cover with” (Deut 22:12) it
is speaking about the gar-
ments of a blind person.
Karo’s comments in the Beit Yosef on this siman seem to be the source for the
contextualization of the quotation from the Tur. Here Karo does not quote his
ownwords from the BeitYosef verbatim, he rather summarizes the conclusions
of the baraita that he brought in the Beit Yosef and in the Shulḥan Arukhwrote
his own reformulation of that source.29
In the next se’if we see another example of when Karo copies certain parts











29 The baraita is found on b. Menaḥ. 43a.
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Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 17:2 Tur, OḤ 17
Women and slaves are exempt [from
tzitzit] since it is a positive time-bound
commandment. A tumtum and androg-
ynos are obligated because of a doubt
[whether they are obligated or not] and
they should wrap themselves [in a four-
cornered garment with tzitzit] without
reciting a blessing.
And women and slaves are exempt [from
tzitzit] and a tumtum and androgynos are
obligated because of a doubt [whether
they are obligated or not]. And the Ram-
bam wrote: they should wrap themselves
[in a four-cornered garment with tzitzit]
without reciting a blessing. He follows
his own approach since he interpreted
that women are unable to make a bless-
ing on something from which they are
exempt, but Rabbeinu Tam wrote that
they are able to make a blessing even if
they are exempt. It’s best if they don’t
bless.
The additionalmaterial found in this se’if again seems to be from a baraita that
is brought in the Beit Yosef.
Beit Yosef, OḤ 17 זיןמיסםייחחרואףסויתיב
In the chapter “techeilet” (b. Menaḥ. 43a)
our rabbis taught: Everyone is obligated
in tzitzit, Priests, Levites, Israelites, con-
verts, women, and slaves. R. Shimon
exempts women since it is a positive
time-bound commandment and women







In this case it was the Tur who did not see fit to include any explanation why
women and slaves are exempt from themitzvah of tzitzit, even though this rea-
son is found in the Talmud. Karo then chose to return the explanation to his
discussion of the exemption, adding it between two different quotations from
the Tur.
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The last se’if in this siman is an example of a verbatim quote from the Tur






Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 17:3 Tur, OḤ 17
Aminor who knows how to wrap himself
in a four-cornered garment with tzitzit,
his father needs to take for him tzitzit in
order to educate him.
A minor who knows how to wrap himself
in a four-cornered garment with tzitzit,
his father needs to take for him tzitzit in
order to educate him.
It should also be emphasized that the order of the halakhot in this siman are
identical to those found in the Tur.
1. Obligation of a blind person with regard to themitzvah of tzitzit.
2. Obligation of women and slaves with regard to themitzvah of tzitzit.
3. Obligation of tumtum and androgenuswith regard to themitzvah of tzitzit
and whether they recite a blessing.
4. Performance of themitzvah of tzitzit by a minor.
From the examination of this single siman that includes only three se’ifim we
can see how Karo chose a different approach to the formulation of every se’if
and se’if, even within the same siman, while at the same time relying upon the
overall structure of the siman found in the Tur.
Conclusion
Menachem Elon summarized the literary methodology of the Shulḥan Arukh
in the following words.
Themethod of the ShulḥanArukh is distinct from that of the other codes.
The Shulḥan Arukh states the substance of the law briefly, sometimes
adopting the formulation of the Turim for this purpose. However, when
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clarity is particularly needed, the Shulḥan Arukh frequently prefers Mai-
monides’ text; and in these instances, the Shulḥan Arukh is more expan-
sive than theTurim. The Shulḥan Arukh presents only the normative rule;
in contrast to Maimonides and the Turim, it includes neither rationales
for the law nor any philosophic considerations. Laws are generally stated
without attribution of source and with no reference to contrary opin-
ions.30
There is much in common with my conclusions after examining the first 25
simanim of the Shulḥan Arukh and those of Elon. The literary foundations of
the Shulḥan Arukh can be found in the Rambam, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef.
When Karo chose to deviate from a verbatum quotation from either the Ram-
bamor theTur the reasons varied, sometimes itwas in order to clarify a difficult
to understand statement, while other times it reflected legal or theological con-
siderations. In addition, Karo’s Beit Yosef served as a conduit for sources that
he felt were needed to supplement what was found in the Rambam and the
Tur.
Far frombeing amere collection of sources, Karo’s ShulḥanArukh represents
a new literary creation, one that while standing on the shoulders of both his
own work and that of others, is also a new and creative restatement of Jewish
law.
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chapter 10
The Joint Bet Din of the Conservative Movement
Mayer E. Rabinowitz
There is hardly a part of ourMovement that has not been impacted and enhanced
by the knowledge, expertise, dedication, and service that Rabbi Joel Roth has
devoted to the programs and projects of Jewish life and learning in the Conser-
vative Movement world-wide. Since our days as students together in Rabbinical
School, over 55 years ago, I have learned from him, been inspired by his exam-
ple, and have been honored to call him my good friend. One of the many projects
on which we have worked together is the Joint Bet Din of the Conservative Move-
ment, on which we have served together since its establishment in 1989. We have
attempted toapplyanunderstandingof rabbinic literatureand theongoingdevel-
opment of halakhah to issues related to the problems of iggun in the Jewish
Community. Rabbi Roth’s presence andparticipationhave enhanced thework and
reputation of the Joint Bet Din, and have made a significant difference in the lives
of the individuals who have turned to us, and the integrity of the Jewish Commu-
nity in general.
Background
Among the most difficult Jewish legal issues with which rabbinic leaders have
dealt is the issue of the agunah, a [civilly] divorced woman whose husband
has not given her a get. Traditionally, where no getwas given to the woman, the
couple was still considered married and she was prohibited from remarrying.
According to halakhah, not only could she not remarry, but any children who
might result from a later union would bemamzerim.
This problemwas so serious both for the woman involved and for the Jewish
community in general, that inmany cases even the strictest of rabbis are known
to have relied on leniencies within halakhah to find a solution. For centuries, in
places where local Jewish communities had a measure of autonomy and self-
regulation, the rabbis were often in a position to force the husband to give a
get. But as Jewish communities lost their autonomy and were governed by the
laws and requirements of the countries in which they resided, they lost their
civil powers to enforce the laws of marriage and divorce. One of the results
of this change was that the rabbis had less power, or (even) no power at all,
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to force a recalcitrant husband to give a get, even after the civil court had
declared the couple divorced.
In the United States, over the years, various communities grappled with
these issues of personal status in a variety of ways. Within the Conservative
Movement, rabbis andmesadrei gittinworked to implement halakhically justi-
fiable ways to alleviate the plight of the agunah and tominimize the damaging
effects of mamzerut. In the middle of the 20th Century, a course was given at
The Jewish Theological Seminary to train mesadrei gittin; and in 1969 the Rab-
binical Assembly through its Committee on Jewish Law and Standards (CJLS)
authorized hafka’at kiddushin by a bet din (annulment of a marriage by a rab-
binic court) in carefully-reviewed cases, where it was clear that the husband
would never agree to give a get.
These developments, while necessary and welcome, still meant that inde-
pendent mesadrei gittin handled individual cases on their own. There was no
standardized and centralizedmechanism for setting standards formesadrei git-
tin or for training and certifying new mesadrei gittin; nor was there a central
database of information and documentation concerning all gittin that were
granted within our Movement.
There was also little recourse for dealing with individuals who remembered
getting or giving a get, but were unable to identify anyone reliable who could
verify their information. There were many cases where the Mesader Gittin, or
the rabbi with whom the couple worked, was either unknown to them or was
no longer available.
In 1988, the Rabbinical Assembly, together with the Jewish Theological Sem-
inary and the United Synagogue of America (now the United Synagogue of
Conservative Judaism), decided to establish the Joint Bet Din of the Conserva-
tive Movement, to centralize the training and certification of mesadrei gittin,
to establish a comprehensive database of previously married individuals and
their status according to Jewish Law, and to familiarize rabbis and congregants
with the importance of and the availability of halakhically-acceptable solu-
tions related to the dissolution of marriages.
I was asked to chair the Joint Bet Din, and on February 9, 1989, the first meet-
ing of the Joint Bet Din took place. The Joint Bet Din consisted of nine rabbis
who were appointed by the Rabbinical Assembly, the Jewish Theological Sem-
inary, and the United Synagogue of America. At its formation, the members
were: Rabbis Ben Zion Bergman a”h, Morton Leifman a”h, Yehezkel Musleah
a”h, Lionel Moses, Mayer Rabinowitz, Joel Roth, Steven Saltzman a”h, Morris
Shapiro a”h, and Israel Silverman a”h.
To help achieve the goal of standardization and centralization, the Join Bet
Din asked all members of the Rabbinical Assembly who had been writing git-
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tin to submit the necessary documentation in order to be certified by the Joint
Bet Din. In 1990, The Rabbinical Assembly asked all of its members to use only
mesadrei gittinwho had been certified by the Joint Bet Din, and to make use of
the Get Registry Database of the Joint Bet Din for the protection of men and
women who are issued gittin through our Movement as well as for the pro-
tection of their future children. It further asked all regional batei din of the
RabbinicalAssembly andmesadrei gittin certifiedby the Joint BetDin to submit
all cases of a recalcitrant husbandwho refused to give a get to the Joint Bet Din.
Since that time, the Joint Bet Din has trained and certified many mesadrei
gittin who serve communities all over the United States as well as Canada,
Central and South America, Europe, and Israel. On the Rabbinical Assembly
website, the Joint Bet Dinmakes a list of mesadrei gittin available to the public,
so that interested parties can contact themdirectly. The Joint BetDinhas estab-
lished an extensive database that enables rabbis to check information about
previouslymarried individuals to ascertainwhether they are eligible to remarry
according to the halakhic requirements of the Conservative Movement. Those
requirements state that no Rabbinical Assembly member shall perform a wed-
ding of a woman who has not received a get, nor of a man who has not given a
get.
In carrying out its mission and its agenda, the Joint Bet Din has sought to
minimize the number of agunot in the community. It has worked diligently to
allow a maximum number of Jewish men and women whose marriages have
been dissolved to “move on with their lives” within the framework of Jewish
Law. Current members of the Joint Bet Din are: Rabbis Stanley Asekoff, Pamela
Barmash, Elliot Dorff, Karen ReissMedwed, LionelMoses, ChaimWeiner, Avra-
ham Reisner, Scott Rosenberg, and Joel Roth.
The Joint Bet Din utilizes various methods and mechanisms to achieve its
goals.
Measures Taken toMinimize the Problem of Iggun
Our halakhic solutions to the problem of iggun can be divided into two cate-
gories: preventative measures and curative measures. Preventative measures
can be taken before a wedding to ensure that if the marriage were to end with
a civil divorce, the wife would not become an agunah. Curative measures are
used when preventative measures have not been taken and there is a civil
divorce, but a get has not been granted. In this situation, the divorcedwoman is





In 1953, the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary accept-
ed an additional clause in the ketubah proposed by Professor Saul Lieberman
a”h. The purpose of the Lieberman takanah was to help solve the problem of
agunot. By including this clause, the bride and groom were agreeing to recog-
nize the authority of the Bet Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish
Theological Seminary to summon either the husband or thewife at the request
of the other in order to dissolve the marriage, thus enabling both husband and
wife to go onwith their respective lives, and to remarry in accordancewith Jew-






_______________, the groom, and __________, the bride, further agreed that
should either contemplate dissolution of the marriage, or following the
dissolution of their marriage in the civil courts, each may summon the
other to the Bet Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish The-
ological Seminary, or its representative, and that each will abide by its
instructions so that throughout life each will be able to live according to
the laws of the Torah.
Including this clause means that the couple has agreed that if a get had not
been given following the civil divorce, the couple would appear before the Bet
Din of the Jewish Theological Seminary and the Rabbinical Assembly, and they
would obey the dictates of the Bet Din. If the Bet Din decides that the husband
must give a get, and the wife must accept the get, then both must abide by the
ruling of the Bet Din, thereby enabling both parties to remarry according to
halakhah, and hopefully live a full Jewish life thereafter.
This was an innovative attempt to try to limit cases of agunot. This novel
approach found favor with many rabbis and halakhic authorities, both inside
of the Conservative Movement as well as outside of it. In fact, when Professor
Lieberman suggested adding this clause to the ketubah, the respective heads of
The Rabbinical Council of America (Orthodox) and the Rabbinical Assembly
(Conservative) met to discuss the inclusion of the clause. Among those par-
ticipating in these discussions were Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik and Professor
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Saul Lieberman. At the time, all agreed that from a halakhic point of view, the
clause could be added to the ketubah, and could be used in the marriage cere-
mony.However, forwhatever reasons, the Lieberman clause appears today only
in what are referred to as “Conservative ketubot.”
The Lieberman Clause was, for many years, the only standardized preven-
tative measure, and still appears in many versions of “Conservative Ketubot.”
But there are a number of problems with the use of this clause if the husband
refuses to appear before the Joint Bet Din or follow its decision.
In order to force the recalcitrant partner to appear and follow the directives
of the Joint Bet Din, onemust get an American court to enforce the clause. Our
experience has been that in theUnited States, the highest courts inmany states
will not involve themselves in the ketubah at all, because they feel that doing
sowould violate the principle of separation of church and state. This leaves the
civilly-divorced wife with no legal recourse.
Even when a civil court is willing to hear the case, there are no guarantees
that the recalcitrant husband will live up to the decision of the court and give
a get. As with cases where husbands have been ordered to pay alimony or child
support, and have found ways to avoid it (disappearing, serving time in prison,
etc.) so too, recalcitrant husbands can avoid giving a get, leaving the civilly-
divorced wife an agunah.
Letter of Intent
In 1991, based on these problems, the Joint Bet Din created a “letter of intent”
to be used together with a ketubah that includes The Lieberman Clause. This
Letter was to be signed by the husband andwife, and is, indeed, a separate doc-
ument. It is carefully worded in order to ensure its viability in American courts.
It reads as follows:
Each of us hasmetwith Rabbi _________, who has provided uswith a copy
of the ketubah (a copy of which is attached) and explained to each of
us the provisions contained in the ketubah concerning the dissolution of
marriage.
Each of us acknowledges and confirms our understanding that this
ketubah is a legal contract and shall be binding under both Jewish and
civil law concerning the formation and dissolution of our marriage.
In particular, each of us acknowledges that according to this ketubah,
should our marriage be dissolved in the civil courts, each of us is bound
to appear before the Joint Bet Din of the ConservativeMovement, or such
Bet Din as shall be designated by the Joint Bet Din, if so requested by the
other, and to abide by its instruction and decision with respect to the
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dissolution of our marriage under Jewish law. Each of us intends that the
undertaking to appear before and to be bound by the directions of the
Bet Din may be enforced by the civil court of law. Each of us acknowl-
edges our agreement to the ketubah and our willingness to be bound by
its terms.
Dated ________________________
Signature of Bride ____________________
Signature of Groom _____________________
Explained and signed under the supervision of Rabbi ___________________
Signature of Rabbi__________________________________
By signing this letter of intent, the husband and wife agree to uphold the terms
of the LiebermanClause, and accept the fact that this letter of intent is a civilly-
binding document that can be upheld by a civil court.
However, a general objection to the use of the Lieberman clause even with
the letter of intent is that, in cases of recalcitrant husbands, we must resort to
using civil courts to enforce halakhah! If, in fact, our halakhic system is a full-
fledged legal systemwith integrity of its own, we should not need to rely on the
civil courts to solve our halakhic problems.
T’nai B’kiddushin—Ante-Nuptial Agreement
In 1969, theConservativeMovement’s Committee on JewishLawandStandards
created an “ante-nuptial agreement” in which the couple agrees that if they
divorce in civil court and the husband authorizes the issuing of a get within
six months, then their marriage was valid. But if a get is not issued within six
months of the civil divorce decree, then their marriage (retroactively) was not
a valid marriage from the moment it was performed and celebrated. The text
of the ante-nuptial agreement reads as follows:
On the ___ day of __________, ____, corresponding to the _____ day of
_________ [in the Jewish calendar], in _________ [City and State], the
groom, ___________, and the bride, __________, of their own free will and
accord, entered into the following agreementwith respect to their intend-
ed marriage.
The groommade the following declaration to the bride:
“I will betroth you and marry you according to the laws of Moses and
the
People Israel, subject to the following conditions: If our marriage
should be terminated by decree of the civil courts and if by expiration of
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six months after such a decree, I give you a divorce according to the laws
of Moses and the People Israel (a get), then our betrothal (kiddushin) and
marriage (nissuin) will have remained valid and binding. But if our mar-
riage should be terminated by decree of the civil courts and if by expira-
tion of sixmonths after such adecree I donot give you adivorce according
to the laws of Moses and the People Israel (a get), then our betrothal (kid-
dushin) and our marriage (nissuin) will have been null and void.”
The bride said to the groom: “I consent to the conditions that you have
made.”
Signature of the groom: ______________
Signature of the bride:________________
We, the undersigned, acting as a Beth Din [court], witnessed the oral




This is a separate document which is not part of the ketubah. The T’nai B’kid-
dushin, as the term implies, serves to make the marriage a “conditional mar-
riage” dependent upon the fulfilment of the terms in it.
When using the T’nai B’kiddushin, the groom must read the document in
the presence of a bet din of three, and the bride must reply that she consents
to these conditions. The bride and groom must sign the document, and the
members of the Bet Din must sign it as well. Under the ḥuppah, before the
groom betroths the bride, the rabbi must ask them if they agree to be married
in accordance with the laws of Moses and Israel and the conditions to which
they agreed beforehand. If they each answer “yes,” then the wedding ceremony
continues with the betrothal formula.
Eventually, if the couple gets a civil divorce, and the husband refuses to give
a get, the wife can petition the Joint Bet Din for an annulment of the marriage,
based on the fact that the husband did not abide by the T’nai B’kiddushin. If,
in reviewing the case, the Joint Bet Din verifies that the condition was agreed
upon but not fulfilled, the Joint Bet Din annuls the marriage and issues a p’tor
to the woman, so that she is free to remarry.
Our use of T’nai B’kiddushin is based upon solid precedents in halakhic lit-
erature and the issue of conditional marriages has been studied by various
authorities. Two important books on the subject are: A. Freimann’s Seder Kid-
dushin ve’Nissuin (Jerusalem, 1945); and Eliezer Berkowitz’s T’nai be’Nissuin
uv’Get (Mossad Harav Kook, 1966).
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Two notable examples of the use of T’nai B’kiddushin in the early 1900’s are
from theFrenchRabbinate (1907) and theTurkishRabbinate (1924).With grow-
ing numbers of civil divorces in their communities, and the inability of the Jew-
ish rabbinic courts to pressure husbands to give a get, the French and Turkish
rabbinates introduced a takanah, allowing the T’nai B’kiddushin (conditional
marriage) to be used as an halakhically valid method. This would ensure that
women would not remain agunot and would not enter into second marriages
that would have been prohibited by Jewish Law.
Today, although there is sometimes discomfort about raising the issue of
divorce to a couple that is about to be married, we have embarked on a cam-
paign to convince couples and the rabbis officiating at their weddings to use
the T’nai B’kiddushin. In a society where so many marriages end in divorce,
the protection that the Tnai B’kiddushin offers the wife and, by extension, the
integrity of the Jewish community in matters of personal status, are of utmost
importance. To that end, we recommend that rabbis raise the issue in their
pre-marital meetings with couples, an appropriate time to talk about the T’nai
B’kiddushin, and to point out its positive and protective elements.
CurativeMeasures
In cases where preventative measures were not taken, the following curative
solutions have been used by the Joint Bet Din.
Hafka’at Kiddushin (Annulment)
This juridical principle states that all betrothals are done with the approbation
and approval of the rabbis, and the rabbis who offered their approval at one
time could subsequently rescind their approval. Discussing a particular case,
the Talmud states:
)א,גלןיטיג(הינימןישודיקלןנברוהניעקפאושדקמןנברדאתעדאשדקמדלכ
When a man betroths a woman, he does so under the conditions laid
down by the rabbis, and in this case, the rabbis annul his betrothal.
b. Giṭ. 33a
From this instance and from others, we see that the rabbis had the power and
prerogative to rescind their approval of a marriage and thereby annul it. The
only question confronting us is whether we are restricted in using the princi-
ple only for those cases and situationsmentioned in theTalmud, orwhetherwe
can we extend the use of the principle to other cases where we deem it neces-
sary to do so today? Because of the high rate of divorce, and the implications of
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havingmany agunot in the Jewish community, we feel compelled to extend the
use of the principle to solve the problems of today, rather than only applying
the principle to cases mentioned in the Talmud. The precedent we rely on is
the method that was used in the past, and not the specifics of earlier cases. We
see those cases as examples and not as limiting instances.We share the attitude
of the rabbis of the Talmud, about whom we read:
)א,גןיטיג(ןנברהבוליקאאנוגיעםושמ
In matters of iggun, the rabbis utilized lenient approaches.
b. Giṭ. 3a
Clearly, the rabbis were deeply committed to limiting the number of agunot
in the community, even if doing so required them to take lenient positions.
Since the rabbis are the ones who grant approval of a marriage, they have
the right to rescind that approval, thereby annulling the marriage. Though
the marriage was annulled, the children of the annulled marriage are not
tainted according to Jewish law, even though they were born out of wed-
lock.
Our experience has been that in some cases, when the husband is told that
the only alternative to his giving a get is for us to annul the marriage, the
husband agrees to give a get because of his discomfort at the thought of the
marriage being annulled.
Our procedure in an annulment is as follows:
A file is presented to the Joint Bet Din by one of our mesadrei gittin. It is
then reviewed to make sure that it contains documents and testimonies cor-
roborating the woman’s claims. The Joint Bet Din then tries to employ a variety
of approaches to get the husband to authorize the giving of a get. When the
members of the Joint Bet Din are convinced that the husband will not give a
get, the Bet Din votes on whether to annul the marriage.
Among the reasons for which the Joint Bet Din has annulled marriages are:
– Blackmail on the part of the husband, usually to try to overturn the property
settlement.
– Disappearance of a husband fleeing from the authorities or from debts,
when all efforts to locate him are to no avail.
– Physical abuse by the husband, even after the civil divorce.
– Inability to locate a former husband aftermany years of divorce, but with no
indication that he has died.
– Recalcitrance on the part of the husband, after the civil divorce, for no rea-
son other than spite.
274 rabinowitz
Get Al Yedai Zikkui—ABet Din Accepts a Get on theWife’s Behalf
We read in the Tamud:
)א,גכןישודיק(וינפבאלשםדאלןיכז
One may obtain a privilege for a person in his absence.
b. Qidd. 23a
There are cases where a husband is prepared to authorize a get, but the wife
is unable or unwilling to accept the get at that time. This situation can arise
because the wife is recalcitrant, inaccessible, ormentally incompetent. In each
of these cases, the wife herself will not accept the get, even though it is to her
advantage. In order to properly terminate themarriage according to Jewish law,
a bet din can accept the get on her behalf. This procedure is based on the prin-
ciple that onemay act for the benefit of an individual, even if that individual is
not present.
Once the Joint Bet Din approves of utilizing Get Al Yedei Zikkui for a particu-
lar case, the Mesader Gittin arranges for the get to be accepted by a bet din on
her behalf, and a record of the procedure is entered into the database of the
Joint Bet Din. The husband is issued a p’tor, which enables him to remarry. If
the woman ever wants to remarry, she can request a p’tor from the Mesader
Gittinwho had accepted the get on her behalf.
Heter Meah Rabbanim (Permission by 100 Rabbis)
Rabbeinu Gershom of Mainz had issued a decree around 1000CE, banning
polygamy. But in certain limited cases, thebanpermits theman to take a second
wife, after receiving the permission of 100 rabbis from three different countries
or jurisdictions.
In the past, the use of heter meah rabbanimwas limited because of the diffi-
culties of communication between and among different Jewish communities.
Today, the procedure is much easier because of the ease of communicating
with Jewish communities around the world. However, even though commu-
nicating with 100 rabbis representing three countries or jurisdictions is so easy
today, the Joint Bet Din has used this procedure only once. The case involved
a man whose wife was in an irreversible coma and a civil divorce had been
granted. But the husband did not want to give her a get lest that be under-
stood to signify that he would no longer continue to care for her and provide
for her needs after he remarried. A form was sent to over 100 rabbis in dif-
ferent states within the United States, as well as in Europe and Israel. Over
100 positive responses were collected, and on the basis of those responses,
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the Joint Bet Din instructed the Mesader Gittin to issue a p’tor to the husband,
enabling him to remarry.
Examples of Cases That Have Come to the Bet Din
Case I
Shortly afterMrs. G.wasmarried, her husband insisted that he did notwant her
socializing with her friends and prohibited her from seeing them. He also pro-
hibited her frompursuing a career and insisted that hewanted to have children
immediately. None of these demands had been suggested before the wedding,
and the woman was totally shocked by these developments. When physical
abuse began, she realized that she had to sever the relationship. The man and
woman were separated for several years and she finally sued for a civil divorce,
which was granted. Her ex-husband now lives with a non-Jewish woman and
has a son. When the Mesader Gittin for Mrs. G contacted the ex-husband to
try to have him authorize a get, the ex-husband refused, and threatened the
Mesader Gittin if he tried to contact him again.We annulled the marriage, and
she received a p’tor from the Mesader Gittin, which would allow her to remarry
in the future.
Case II
A woman from a very Orthodox community in Monsey, New York turned to us
to help her free herself from her recalcitrant husband. Even though she had
turned to multiple batei din in her community, all of whom ordered her hus-
band to give her a get, the husband refused to abide by their decisions and did
not give her a get. We explained to her that our Joint Bet Din was part of the
Conservative Movement and that our annulment would not be recognized in
her community. She respondedby telling us that shewas aware of whowewere,
and that she understood that if she remained in her community, she would not
be able to remarry. Nevertheless, she wanted closure to this chapter of her life,
and needed an affirmation that she was a free woman, according to halakhah!
We annulled the marriage.
Case III
Mrs. T turned to us when her husband refused to consider giving her a get,
though the civil divorce had been decreed long ago.We sent him a “registered,
return receipt requested” letter explaining that giving her a getwould allow her
tomove onwith her life, and thatwithout his giving her a get, neither henor she
could bemarried by a Conservative rabbi. The letter was returned to usmarked
“refused delivery.” He had obviously seen the return address and wanted no
contact with us.We tried to contact him a fewmonths later and he did respond
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to our letter, saying that he did not want to give a get because he wanted to rec-
oncile with Mrs. T. However, a few weeks later we received proof that he was
about tomarry another woman.Whenwe contacted him about this, he did not
deny that he was getting married to another woman, but still refused to give
her a get. It became clear that his refusal to give his first wife a get was based
on spite, and he had no intention of ever authorizing the preparation of a get.
We annulled the marriage.
Case IV
An Iranian woman who had been married in her teens and had suffered years
of mental and physical abuse, turned to us to help her pressure her husband
to give her a get. The civil divorce had been decreed, but all the terms of cus-
tody and finances had not yet been settled.We were able to reach the husband
only by cell phone, and he indicated that he was in themidst of a civil suit con-
cerning financial matters and child custody issues. He claimed that once those
were resolved to his satisfaction, he would grant her a get. At his court case,
when he claimed that he had no income and no permanent domicile, the judge
asked him how he expected to gain custody of the children and support them.
It became clear to the court and to us that he had intended to take the children
and disappear. He lost the civil suit and refused to give a get. We annulled the
marriage.
Case V
A woman came to the Joint Bet Din seeking some solution, after having been
divorced for some time but unable to convince her ex-husband to give her a
get.When we contacted the husband, he claimed that he was still trying to rec-
oncile with his ex-wife, and that was the reason he hadn’t wanted to give her a
get. It came to our attention that the husband was already scheduled to marry
a Catholic woman soon, and was planning to convert to Catholicism. We con-
tacted the Archbishop responsible for the parish where the marriage was to
take place, explained the situation the woman was facing, and asked him to
refuse to allow the marriage to take place in the church, until the gentleman
gave his first wife a get. The prelate agreed, and within a few hours the hus-
band authorized the preparation of a get. There was no need to annul the first
marriage.
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Closing
The ConservativeMovement, and specifically the Joint Bet Din, are committed
to helping minimize the number of agunot in the Jewish community, and to
enablingwomen andmenwho have been divorced civilly to dissolve theirmar-
riage according to halakhah. We see our work as essential in helping divorced
individuals live within the framework of Jewish law, in protecting any chil-
dren who may result from subsequent marriages, and in helping maintain the
integrity of the Jewish community in matters of personal status.
As our predecessors found solutions to the halakhic problems of their times,
we try to follow in their footsteps and continue to work to find halakhic solu-
tions to the problems in our own day. תלשלשהתכשמנדוע (the unbroken chain
continues).Maywe be granted the zkhut to serve as links in this precious chain.
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chapter 11
Rabbinic Authority and Personal Freedom
in theModern Age









We honor Joel Roth, a decorous sage,
Studied in Jewish law and the Talmud page,
An instructor, a teacher, a master of halakhah,
Learned and wise, always spreading Torah.
His fervor and faith have grown with age.









Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua says: There are three types of sages. A hewn stone, a cornerstone
and a decorative stone. A hewn stone is a student who, having studied midrash, when he
encounters a sage asks questions [to master midrash]. That is a hewn stone. It has only one
facet. A cornerstone is a student who, having studied both midrash and halakhah, encoun-
ters a sage and asks about both. That is a cornerstone which has just two facets. A decorative
stone is a student who, having studied midrash and halakhah, tosefta and aggadah asks of all
these. This is a decorative stone, with facets at every side. (Avot of Rabbi Nathan A, 28).
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For the Jewwho integrates halakhah into his or her life, emotionally charged
situations bring fundamental intellectual challenges to the forefront, demand-
ing a resolution. Consider, for example, a pregnant woman informed by her
doctors that the fetus she carries suffers from anencephaly. Her baby will be
born without the frontal lobe and the thinking and coordinating parts of his
brain. With no known treatment, this baby will die shortly after birth.
Faced with this problem in a different time and place, observant Jews would
turn to their rabbi and seek a ruling on what to do. May—or should—the
mother abort, or must she go through pregnancy and labor to give birth to
a child who will soon perish, then sit in mourning should the child survive
thirty days? To answer this heartrending query, the rabbi would wrestle with
the tomes of Jewish tradition and law without involving the parents. Although
the rabbi might consider their feelings and ability to bear this tragedy as fac-
tors in reaching a decision, the rabbi would not bring the parents into the legal
process toweigh and choose between differing legal opinions. The parents’ fate
as to how to proceed would be dictated by the ruling received from their rabbi,
which the parents would willingly obey.
In the democraticWest, however, in a society that elevates individuality, ini-
tiative and autonomy over willful obedience, tragedies like anencephaly, and
even other less trying situations,2 raise front and center the conundrum as to
what role we as individual Jews play in Jewish decision making. If, as will be
argued below, there is no substantive halakhic basis for today’s rabbis to exer-
cise their authority through compulsion, what role then, if any, do the feelings,
intellect, and autonomy of the Jew play in reaching halakhic decisions? Must
we bemute in the face of the determinations of rabbis who interpret and apply
halakhah, or can we, and should we, play a role in the legal process and assert
our individual inclinations in reaching a P’saq? To answer these weighty ques-
tions, this article examines howour Sages—who view themselves as caretakers
of our Torah—understood the reach and limits of their ability to compel obe-
dience with their dictates.
2 Among many examples: whether to honor a relative’s request to donate his or her body to
science; whether to take a business dispute to secular court or only to a bet din; whether to
eat in vegan restaurants that lack formal kashrut supervision; whether to permit kitniyot on
Pesach given the constriction of various dietary restrictions of members of the family; or sim-
ply whether to say “barukh hashem l’olam” atMaariv as domost Ashkenazim in theDiaspora,
or not to recite that prayer, as per the GR”A and as has become normative in Israel.
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A Covenant of Consent
At the outset, we note that the nature of the relationship between God and
the Jewish people originated in a brit, a covenant of consenting parties. The
Torah’s description of Sinai in Exodus 24:73 reflects that enthusiastic consent—
עמשנוהשענ׳דרבדרשאלכורמאיוםעהינזאבארקיותירבהרפסחקיו ([Moses]
took the record of the covenant and read it before the people, and they said:
All that which God has said we shall perform and obey).4 Pursuant to that
brit, the Jewish people agreed at Sinai and later in the flats of Moab5 to be
bound.
Laws can be the authoritarian decree of amonarch, as indeed the laws given
at Sinai by God might have been viewed. God, however, seeks, throughout the
Torah, to gain acceptance as Israel’s God (Elohim),6 and predicates His calls to
obedience upon it. Acceptance requires volition: a brit, a pact or covenant, as
is clear from the language of brit used to describe the events both at Sinai and
again in the plains of Moab.7 Describing the receipt of the Torah as effectuated
in a brit entails certain complications. If the Torah is conceived as a contract, a
brit, whatwill bind future generations?This questionmust be addressed by any
system which posits that law rests on the consent of the governed. John Locke
argued that it is only by individual consent that a person may subject himself
tot the laws of a society in which he chooses to live. How then are those soci-
eties perpetuated over time? “Locke’s most obvious solution to this problem is
3 All citations of verses from the Bible and of rabbinic passages appear here in our own trans-
lation. The Hebrew original of rabbinic passages will be found in the notes.
4 That this was the intent of this verse in the Torah itself seems clear, and rabbinic com-
ments highlighting Israel’smerit inwillingly acceptingGod’s commands are common. See, for
instance, the midrashim of R. Ḥizkiyah and of R. Simlai on the latter half of b. Šabb. 88a, the
comment by R. Joshua that God was pleased by Israel’s response in Masekhet Derekh Eretz,
Perek haShalom 3, or the well-known midrash from Mekhilta d’R. Ishmael, Yitro, Masekhta
D’baḥodesh, Parashah 5, that the Torah was offered each of the gentile peoples, but they
rejected it, whereas Israel received it with open arms, and many more.
As is often the case inmidrash, an alternative view is expressed in b. Šabb. 88a byR. Avdimi
bar Ḥama (on b. ʿAbod. Zar. 2b, Dimi) that God threatened Israel with destruction if they did
not accept the Torah. R. Aḥa bar Jacob, however, rejects this, arguing that coercion would
undercut the binding claim of the Torah upon Israel ( אתיירואלהבראעדומןאכמ ). Be this as
it may, the p’shat of the Torah’s narrative stands on its own.
5 The alluvial plain east of the Jordan River opposite Jericho, which reaches to the foothills of
the mountains of Moab.
6 See, for instance, Exod 6:7, Lev 22:32–33, Num 15:41, Deut 29:9–12.
7 See, for instance, Exod 24:7–8; 34:27–28; Deut 5:2–3; and the verses that are a focus here, Deut
29:9–14.
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his doctrine of tacit consent.”8 Individuals functioningwithin a societywithout
registering objection to its ways implicitly grant tacit consent to those norms.
Moses, in his final speeches in Deuteronomy, proposes more than Locke’s
implicit consent. He describes a timelessness to Torah which transcends gen-
erations. Speaking to the children of the original recipients of the covenant,
Moses asserts that, even though many of them had not yet born, they them-




Adonai our God established a covenant [brit] with us at Ḥoreb. It is not
with our ancestors [alone] that Adonai established this covenant, but
with us, we who are here today, all of us alive today. Adonai spoke to
you face to face on the mountain from the midst of the fire while I stood
between Adonai and you at that time to convey to you Adonai’s word.
(Deut 5:2–5)
As is appropriate for a timeless God—theGod of creation and of eternity—His
brit (covenant) stands across all time, confirmed by explicit consent, even by
future unborn generations.
He explains further when speaking to the people of Israel in Moab at the






You stand here today, all of you, before the Lord your God … every mem-
ber of Israel, to enter the Lord your God’s covenant [brit], and His oath,
which the Lord your God establishes with you today in order to consti-
tute you, today, as His people and so that He shall be your God, as He said
to you … It is not with you alone that I establish this covenant and this
8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed online at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
locke‑political/#ConPolOblEndGov on 11/21/17.
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oath, but [both] with the one who is here standing with us today before
the Lord your God, and with the one who is not here with us today. (Deut
29:9–14)
The Sages made clear that the brit applies not just to the second generation
under Moses, but is a commitment true for all generations of future members
of the Jewish people.
“[Both] with the one who is here standing”—This refers only to those
standing at Mount Sinai.Whence do I know [that it includes] future gen-
erations and converts who are destined to convert in the future? Scripture
teaches: “and with the one who is not [here].”9 (b. Šebu. 39a)
Thismidrash is tied to the verses surrounding the second covenant in theplains
of Moab, but makes clear that it is speaking about standing at Sinai.10 Thus
Judaism has always understood that the relationship between God and the
Jewish people was one of explicit consent by all generations, a covenant both
binding and eternal.11
ANational Court with the Authority to Compel
Our Sages saw as well thatMoses formulated an approach to addressing anoth-
er problem of the law—how it should resolve issues that arise after the giving
of the covenant, situations that are not spoken of clearly in the covenant’s text.
9 ןידיתעהםירגוםיאבהתורוד,יניסרהלעןידמועהןתואאלאילןיא—הפונשירשאתאיכ
.]הפ[ונניארשאתאו:ל״ת?ןינמרייגתהל
10 See also b. Šabb. 146a. Indeed, the Mishnah’s ruling that one cannot make a vow about a
clear Toraitic commandment because one is “in a continuing state of commitment ever
since Mount Sinai” ( יניסרהמדמועועבשומ ), which appears many times in the Talmud,
owes its formulation to the idea that all Jewish souls, even those not yet born, even those
destined to enter Israel through conversion, had stood together at Mount Sinai.
11 In a blog for the Times of Israel published on February 2, 2018, entitled “The bond of loy-
alty and love,” seeking to describe the difference between a contract and a covenant, Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks writes: “In a contract, two or more people come together, each pursuing
their self-interest, tomake amutually advantageous exchange. In a covenant, two ormore
people, each respecting the dignity and integrity of the other, come together in a bond of
loyalty and trust to do together what neither can achieve alone. It isn’t an exchange; it’s a
moral commitment … Contracts benefit; covenants transform. Contracts are about “Me”
and “You”; covenants are about “Us” … OnMount Sinai … the people made with God, not
a contract but a covenant.”
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InDeuteronomy 17:8–13,Moses foresees the foundation of a national court able
to interpret and extend the law, and grants that court the authority to com-
pel.12 This power appears to stand in contrast to the consent implied by brit,
but Locke, too, understands consent to imply acceptance of obeying the gov-
ernment even in its function as lawgiver and punisher.13
Moses describes an authoritative national court associated with God’s cho-





When a matter of judgment escapes you … you shall go up to that place
which Adonai your God has chosen and approach the Levitical priests
or the judge who shall exist in those days and seek [counsel in that mat-
ter], and they shall tell you [the proper] judgment [in the matter]. And
you shall act in accordance with that which they have told you [which
emanates] from that place which Adonai has chosen … You shall act in
accordance with the instruction that they teach you and the judgment
that they have spoken to you. Do not veer from that which they tell you
neither right nor left.




12 This description assumes that Moses intended a national court that would exercise leg-
islative functions, expressed by the phrase טפשמלרבדךממאלפייכ (“When a matter
of judgment escapes you”). That is certainly the assumption of later rabbinic sources. A
cogent argument, however, can be made that in the Torah’s p’shat the next words (that
we left here in ellipsis because they are not relevant to this discussion), ןיב,םדלםדןיב
ךירעשבתובירירבד,עגנלעגנןיבו,ןידלןיד , (“whether a matter of homicide, civil law or
torts, matters of dispute in your gates”) are intended to define the type of judgment under
consideration, which is exclusively judicial and not legislative. In that event the authority
even of the Bet Din haGadol would derive from later considerations. Be this as it may, it
is clear that the Sages understood the warrant of the High Court in legislative matters to
flow from here.
13 See above, n. 8.
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And the man who willfully refuses to heed the Kohen who serves before
Adonai your God or to [heed] the judge, this person shall be put to death,
and you shall wipe out the evil from your midst. And all the people will
hear and see, and they will no longer go astray.
The High Court’s location is described in m. Sanh. 11.2,14 which details the pro-
cess to be followed in the case of a sage who holds a contrary opinion and acts
upon it, referred to as a ארממןקז (zaken mamre / rebellious sage) [presented
here with an explanatory note by the commentator Ovadiah of Bertinoro]:
[Regarding] a sage who is rebellious against the word of the court, as
it says, “When a matter of judgment escapes you”: There were three
courts there. One sat at the entrance to the Temple Mount, one sat at the
entrance to theTempleCourt, and one sat in theChamber of HewnStone.
[(Bertinoro): If a certain sage taught in his town and the court in his
town differed with his teaching, he and the court of his town] travel to
the court that sat at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and he [the sage]
says: ‘Thus did I expound and thus did my colleagues expound. Thus did
I rule and thus did my colleagues rule.’ If they [the court that sat at the
entrance to the Temple Mount] had a tradition, they would tell them. If
they did not, all of them go to the court that sat at the entrance to the
Temple Court. He says: ‘Thus did I expound and thus did my colleagues
expound. Thus did I teach and thus didmy colleagues teach.’ If they had a
tradition, they would tell them. If they did not, all of them go to the High
Court that sat in theChamber of Hewn Stone, fromwhom theTorah flows
to all Israel, as it says, “from that place which Adonai has chosen.”
If he returned to his town and studied and taught as he was wont to
teach,15 he is not liable. But if he ruled that one should act [in contraven-









See Sifre to Deut 17:8.
15 The Mishnah functions under the assumption that the High Court ruled against him, for
otherwise how would he have become a rebellious sage.
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Reinforcing thebiblical ideaof the centrality of theHighCourt and its power,
b. Sanh. 89a establishes that the rebellious sage must be put to death in the
most public of areas and at the most visible of times—before the High Court
in Jerusalem during the Festivals, when Jews crowded in to worship in the
Temple—underscoring the enormity of theHighCourt’s ability to compel Jews
to follow the Sages’ interpretations of the Torah.
The storied departure of the Sanhedrin from the Temple Mount to Yavneh in
the days before the destruction of the second Temple raised the question as to
whether the authority to compel given to the High Court ceases to exist once
the Court no longer sits in the Temple. At the heart of this question lies the
Torah’s repetitive emphasis on the term םוקמה (hamakom), translated as “the
place.” The term appears first in Deuteronomy 17:8, instructing the petitioner
to go up to hamakom, “the place, which Adonai your God has chosen.” One sen-
tence later, God commands us to act in accordance with the High Court’s deci-
sion, “from the place which Adonai has chosen.” The repetition of hamakom is
unnecessary becausewe already knowwhere the decision emanates from, hav-
ing been told to go up to and seek clarification in that place.We also know that
God chose that place. Does the redundant use of the term “hamakom,” thereby
emphasizing the singular place God has chosen, limit rabbinic authority and
the power to compel to the Temple Mount?16
Legal Authority After the Destruction of the Temple
Exercising midrashic artistry, the Sages extended their legal authority even
though the location to which it was tied systemically lay in ruins. The High
Court’s power would continue elsewhere, albeit in a limited manner.
To extend their authority to another place, the Sages limited their judicial
power. They determined that the insistence on “the place” in verses 8 and 10,
which recognized only the court seated at the Chamber of Hewn Stone as
authoritative, applied only to matters of capital punishment,17 allowing the
High Court to exercise its general authority in a place other than the Temple
Mount.
16 In the language of the Bavli (Soṭah 45a; Sanh. 14b, 87a; ʿAbod. Zar. 8b), םרוגםוקמהשדמלמ ,
that is, that the emphasis in the biblical dispensation on “the place” teaches that the place
has an essential bearing.
17 Thus in the instant case the rebellious sage could only be put to death if hewere rebellious
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With the scope of their authority truncated, the Sages, as recorded in the
Sifre, expanded the locus of their judicial seat to include Yavneh, the legendary
site of the Sanhedrin from the eve of the destruction of the secondTemple until
the Bar Kokhba rebellion in 132CE. On verse 8 Sifre states what seems to be the
intent of the verse, identifying the TempleMount, the place chosen by Adonai,
as the source from which Torah would emanate. Sifre says of the Chamber of
the Hewn Stone that “from there Torah flows to Israel.” Yet, in the next verse,
Sifre expands the location of judicial authority to include Yavneh by declaring
the words, “and you shall approach,” to be extraneous and the basis of their
midrashic expansion.
הנביבשןידתיבתוברל—תאבו
“and [you shall] approach”—this comes to include the [High] Court in
Yavneh. (Sifre Deut, Šoftim, #153)
The midrashic transfer of the High Court’s authority from Jerusalem to Yavneh
raises significant questions. If hamakom (“the place”) of the Temple Mount is
no longer required to exercise judicial authority, does the requirement of the
High Court fall by the wayside as well? What did the Sages intend by extend-
ing the authority of theHigh Court to Yavneh?WasYavneh the only place other
than theTempleMount fromwhich theHighCourt could exercise its authority,
or was Yavneh simply the successor of Jerusalem and current seat of the High
Court? Could other places become the new seat of judicial authority?Was their
intent, perhaps, to extend authority beyond the High Court to any court?
Maimonides’ Construct
In his Mishneh Torah, Maimonides (known as Rambam) appears to claim that
the authority of theHighCourt cannot be exercised in a location other than the
Temple Mount. In the chapter concerning those who are rebellious (Hilkhot
Mamrim) Rambam opens by specifying that:
against the High Court sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone (b. Soṭah 45a; b. Sanh. 14b
and y. Hor. 1:1 [45d]), and that was the case with regard to all capital punishment (Sifre
Shoftim #154, Midrash LekaḥTov to Deut 17:10). Indeed, it is reported that when they were
unwilling to rule in capital cases, the Sanhedrin left the Chamber of Hewn Stone so as not
to be called upon to do so (b. ʿAbod. Zar. 8b).
rabbinic authority and personal freedom 287
The High Court in Jerusalem are (sic) the basis of the Oral Torah ( ןידתיב
הפלעבשהרותרקיעםהםילשוריבשלודגה ). They are the pillars of instruc-
tion from whom law and judgment flow to all Israel, and it is upon them
that the Torah relied, saying “in accordance with the instruction that they
teach you”—this is a positive commandment.Whoever believes inMoses
our teacher and his Torah is required to base religious activities upon
them and rely on them.18
This statement of law identifies theHighCourt as sitting in Jerusalem.However,
in hisMinyanhaMitzvot at the beginning of MishnehTorah,Mitzvat Aseh # 174,
Maimonides identifies the mitzvah as “to heed any High Court that shall arise
in Israel ( ךלורמאירשאטפשמהלעו׳נשלארשילםהלודמעישלודגהןידתיבלכמעומשל
השעת ),” restricting this exclusively to a High Court, but without restricting its
locus to Jerusalem (or only to Jerusalem and Yavneh). Fleshing this out, Ram-
bam writes in Sefer haMitzvot:
The 174th mitzvah is that [God] commanded us to heed the High Court
anddowhatever they command inmatters of thatwhich is forbidden and
that which is permitted. And there is no difference in this regard between
a thing… that they agree is a hidden element of the Torah or an issue that
they believe to be proper and a bolstering of the Torah. In every case we
are required toheedanddo it and tomaintain their position andnot cease
to do it. That is themeaning of His saying, “in accordancewith the instruc-
tion that they teach you.” As the Sifre says: “You shall act in accordance
with … the judgment that they have spoken to you”—this is a positive
commandment.19
In the sixth chapter of Mishnat Ya’avetz, section 4, Jacob Emden (18th c. Ger-











Both citations are from Deut 17:11. The Sifre referenced is Sifre Shoftim #154.
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Mishne Torah and Sefer HaMitzvot, and points to what he sees as an inten-
tional midrashic expansion of the law in Sifre #153 (cited above) as Rambam’s
source.20 Emden, following the Sifre, reconciles Rambam’s two statements as
allowing the transfer of legal authority beyond the Temple Court. Despite the
destruction of theTemple, Jewish religious sovereignty continued, butwas lim-
ited to the court at Yavneh and its successors—to a High Court, or Sanhedrin,
and not to any court. Rambam apparently believed that only such a national
court fits the context of this Torah passage and deserves this level of regard.21
We should note that the Talmud itself considers whether rabbinic authority
has biblical basis. In b. Šabb. 23a (also b. Sukkah 46a), the Babylonian Talmud
asks how one could say the blessing “who has sanctified us with His command-
ments” regarding religious obligations enacted by the Sages such as the light-
ing of Ḥanukkah candles. The act does not arise from God’s command, since
Ḥanukkah was enacted long after the days of Moses. The Talmud records:
Said Rabbi Ḥiyya son of Ashi in the name of Rav: One who lights Ḥanuk-
kah candles must recite a blessing … What blessing does he recite? He





21 Ramban (Naḥmanides) rejects this understanding in his comments to Rambam’s Mitz-
vah # 153, claiming that the authority of the Sanhedrin lapsed when it left its seat in the
Chamber of Hewn Stone, and there was no High Court functioning as such in the period
thereafter. Emden reconstructs his thinking to match that of Sefer haḤinnukh, that the
authority that previously resided in the High Court devolved at that point into the more
generalized authority claimed by the Ḥinnukh to be granted to the greatest sage of every
generation, but nowhere in his writings that we have been able to find does Ramban
address this question of the authority of individual sages absent a national court. More
on the thinking of the Ḥinnukh follows.
Ramban’s claim that there was no functioning High Court at Yavneh and thereafter
appears gainsaid by the tradition reported on b. RošHaš. 31a that the Sanhedrinwas exiled
“from the Chamber of Hewn Stone to Ḥanut, and from Ḥanut to Jerusalem, and from
Jerusalem to Yavneh, and from Yavneh to Usha, etc.,” and by the edicts that are associated
with the courts at Yavneh and Usha that have the earmarks of an authoritative national
assembly.Theold JewishEncyclopedia entry concerning ‘Jabneh’ states, “After thedestruc-
tion of Jerusalem the Great Sanhedrin removed to Jabneh, where it was presided over by
Joḥanan b. Zakkai (R.H. 31a) … Jabneh took the place of Jerusalem; it became the religious
and national center of the Jews; and the most important functions of the Sanhedrin …
were observed there.” The newer Encyclopedia Judaica entry on “Sanhedrin” concludes,
“After the destruction of the Temple the religious Sanhedrin was reconvened in Jabneh …
When Judea was destroyed … the Sanhedrin moved to Galilee.”
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us to light the Ḥanukah light.” And where did [God] command us? Rav
Ivya said: “Do not veer (Deut 17:11).” Rav Neḥemiah (other versions: Rav
Naḥman bar Isaac) says: “Ask your father and he will tell you; your elders
and they will speak to you” (Deut 32:7).22
Rav Ivya (in the fourth generation) seems to read Moses’ provision for the
future, “do not veer,” as the source by which to understand the authority of
later enactments. His interlocutor avoids that verse, perhaps because he lim-
ited its authority to interpretation and not to new enactments. Be this as itmay,
Emdenpoints out thatMaimonides rules expressly in accordancewithRav Ivya
in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Berakhot 11:3:
All mitzvot that derive from the words of the Sages … such as reading
Megillah and lighting a candle for Shabbat and Ḥanukkah …, eruv and
handwashing, for each of them, before performing them, one blesses:
“whohas sanctifieduswithHis commandments by commandingus” todo
[themitzvah]. Andwhere has this been commanded in theTorah? For it is
written there: “You shall act in accordance with that … [which] they have
spoken to you”. (Deut. 17:11) Thus the meaning of the words, that which
they set forth, is: whohas sanctified uswithHis commandments, inwhich
He commanded that we listen to those who have commanded us to light








Kesef Mishneh ad locum explains that this is according to the position of Rav Ivya, just
citing a different clause from the same verse in order to set out positive language, rather
than choosing the negative formulation of lo tasur.
The stance of RavNeḥemiah, here, is unclear.Washe simply proposing adifferent verse
by which to support the use of “who has sanctified us with His commandments by com-
manding us” (as seems to be the simple reading of the text) or was he objecting to the use
of that phrase by arguing that the authority that derives from “do not veer” does not apply
to rabbinic decrees, but only the lesser exhortation to heed the sages that might derive
from the context of Moses’ speech at the end of his life.
Amiddle groundmight be that hewas agreeing that a blessing is appropriate, but imag-
ined amore appropriate blessing, see y. Sukkah 3:4 [53d]which considers a berakhahof “al
mitzvat zekenim” (on a commandment of the elders) as a possible blessing in such cases.
290 reisner and singerman
These rabbinic mitzvot, though we do not have a clear history in every case,
were clearly arrived at before the time of the Mishnah, a time when the High
Court still functioned.24
What about legislative authority after the cessation of the High Court?
In several sugyot, the amoraim of the BabylonianTalmud express the notion
that the biblical authority granted to theHigh Court would not apply, but some
lesser rabbinic authority would remain.
A sugya in b. Ber. 19b rejects the notion that rabbinic rules have biblical
authority. The sugya begins by stating that a person’s honor cannot override a
biblical command because “there is neither wisdom, understanding, nor coun-
sel against the Lord” (Prov 21:30). It then notes two cases where concern for a
person’s honor seems to allowoverriding a biblical prohibition. In each case the
Talmud concludes that the infraction that was permitted was not of a biblical
rule but of a rabbinic one. Apparently contradicting that conclusion, a baraita
is then cited that specifies: “ הרותבשהשעתאלהחודשתוירבהדובכלודג ”—“A per-
son’s honor is so great that it overrides a prohibition of the Torah.” This baraita,
too, is neutralized by Rav bar Shaba (fifth generation), who explains that k’vod
habriot overrides only one biblical prohibition, the prohibition of “do not veer.”
He argues that “do not veer,” although it is a biblical prohibition, relates only
to the rabbinic proscriptions which follow from it and may be overridden for a
person’s honor, as in the previous cases. Anonymous students seek to insist that
the biblical prohibition of “do not veer” is no less weighty than any other bib-
lical command, but they are shot down by Rav Kahana (also fifth generation),
who argues that “they associated allmatters of the sageswith the prohibition of
‘do not veer’ ” ( רוסתאלדואללעוהניכמסאןנברדילימלכ ), though their prohibition
remains on the level of a prohibition of the Sages.25
24 See Megillah reading—m. Meg. 1:1; Shabbat candle—m. Šabb. 2:1; Ḥanukkah candle—
Baraita found in b. Šabb. 21b which includes the schools of Shammai andHillel, Eruv—m.






Ramban points to the verb “associated with” ( והניכמסא ) in the language of Rav Kahana as
indicating that this was not a true derivation, but simply an exegetical association carry-
ing no legal ramifications. [Comments to Maimonides’ Sefer Mitzvot, Shoresh 1]. Be this
as it may, the sugya itself indicates that this was his intent, for it is made up of things that
appear to be d’oraita and are found to be d’rabbanan, with Rav Kahana’s dictum playing
the role of downgrading an apparent d’oraita to “just” a d’rabbanan.
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Elsewhere, inb.Ḥul. 106a,Abaye (fourth generation) justifies reciting abless-
ing over hand-washing outside the context of Temple purity because “it is a
mitzvah to heed the words of the Sages” ( םימכחירבדעומשלהוצמ ). On its face
this appears to give biblical status (mitzvah) to heeding the Sages, but else-
where Abaye uses the phrase to specifically distinguish a mitzvah of rabbinic
provenance from one having biblical status. In b. Yebam. 20a and b. Sanh. 53b
he identifies the “shniyot,” secondary prohibited relationships, as rabbinically
restricted, not biblically restricted, and associates the term “mitzvah” with that
status.
The term “mitzvah” also has a softer, non-technicalmeaning of “appropriate,
best practice,” as in the dicta in Berakhot, “even if one has recited Sh’ma in the
synagogue, it is a mitzvah to read it at bedtime” ( עמשתאירקםדאארקשיפלעףא
ותטמלעותורקלהוצמ,תסנכהתיבב ) (b. Ber. 4b) and “it is a mitzvah to pray as the
light wanes” ( המחימודמדםעללפתהלהוצמ ) (b. Ber. 29b). The other sage opines
that “it is amitzvah to listen to thewords of Elazar ben Arakh” ( ירבדעומשלהוצמ
ךרעןבא״ר ) where the matter of rabbinic or biblical command is not apropos,
clearly using the term “mitzvah” to indicate preferable practice. The phrase, “it
is a mitzvah to heed the words of the sages,” appears again, used in this softer
sense, in b. B. Bat. 48a and b. Qidd. 50a, concerning the coercion of a man into
giving aGet. In b. Hor. 2b fidelity to the “mitzvah to heed thewords of the sages”
is even judged an error!
In all these cases the biblical injunction is not imputed to the work of the
Sages. Indeed, the later anonymous layer of the Talmud uses the phrase “it is a
mitzvah to heed the words of the Sages” exclusively in its softer sense, suggest-
ing that, whatever was the case with early rabbinic enactments, to heed the
words of the sages was merely considered highly desirable behavior.
Maimonides:Was There a National Court in the Talmudic Period?
In the Introduction toMishnehTorah,Maimonides sets forth the devolution of
halakhic authority across the ages. In it he expands on the well-known chain of
tradition from Sinai to the Mishnah, naming forty links from Sinai through the
Mishnah to the completion of the Gemara in the days of Rav Ashi. He stresses
that the Gemara includes “things that were newly established by each court,
generation after generation, from the time of our Holy Rebbe until the compo-
sition of the Gemara,”26 and he says of these that “it is forbidden to veer from
26 .ארמגהרוביחדעושודקהוניברתומימןידתיבוןידתיבלכבושדחתנשםירבד
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them, as it says: ‘Do not veer from that which they tell you neither right nor
left.” ’27 Were the courts throughout the period of the Talmud to be considered
High Courts, so as to be granted that authority? Apparently, Maimonides felt
that that was the case, forMaimonides writes, “The High Court of Seventy-One
became defunct a few years before the composition of theGemara.”28 He expli-
cates that which, in his view, is the virtue of a national court that allows it to
continue in place of the High Court in Jerusalem:
Ravina and Rav Ashi and their colleagues are the end of the great sages
in Israel who transmitted the Oral Torah; who decreed decrees, enacted
enactments andpromulgated customswhose edicts, enactments and cus-
toms spread to all Israel wherever they were domiciled. After the court of
Rav Ashi, who composed the Gemara (finishing it in the days of his son),
Israel was dispersed in all lands, an exceeding dispersal …All those courts
that arose after the days of the Gemara in each and every place, who
decreed or enacted or promulgated custom for their own constituents,
or even for those of many nations—their actions did not spread to all of
Israel … and one does not instruct one court to decree a decree that was
decreed by another court in its place …
But all those things that are in the Babylonian Talmud, all Israel are
responsible to follow those … since all of those things were accepted by
all of Israel.29
Without granting that the court of Rav Ashi and Ravina was in fact an exten-
sion of the High Court of antiquity, one can concede Maimonides’ reasoning
that a national court, being similar to the High Court in Jerusalem or Yavneh,
is empowered by the Torah to interpret the law for all Israel. Such a national
27 .לאמשוןימיךלודיגירשארבדהןמרוסתאלרמאנשםהמרוסלרוסא
28 ארמגהרוביחםדוקםינשהמכמלטבדחאוםיעבשלשלודגהןידתיבו . This could be read to
mean ‘many’ or ‘several’ but the context is one of explaining why the provisions of the
Gemara are valid and authoritative upon all Israel, and that seems to suggest that the for-
mal court continued to exist, in the understanding of Rambam, until “a few years before
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court no longer exists “after the days of the Gemara.” According to Rambam,
contemporaneous with the redaction of the Talmud, judicial authority and the
right to compel as a biblical command ceased.
Sefer haḤinnukh: “The Greatest Sage” Replaces the National Court
Standing alone among traditional commentaries, the Medieval classic of Jew-
ish thought about the mitzvot known as Sefer haḤinnukh30 sets forth the
broadest biblical basis for rabbinic authority. Ḥinnukh recognizes the author-
ity of the High Court, yet, even in the absence of that court, he grants biblically
commanded authority to the greatest sage in each generation, relying upon a
different verse than the verse “do not veer.” Addressing this question inMitzvah
#495, he begins with distinctly Maimonidean language:
To heed theHigh Court and dowhatever they command uswith regard to
the ways of Torah, that which is forbidden and that which is permitted …
Having stated the basic mitzvah, he continues to reflect upon it:
What those of blessed memory said, that when the High Court is in
Jerusalem, every dispute … they ask it of the High Court and do as they
instruct. Now,whendue to our sins there is noHighCourt there, every dis-
pute that should arise between sages in our generation, if the disputants
are equally wise and we are unable to decide among them and do not
know how the law should go, if it is amatter of Torah, follow the stringent
one; and if a matter of rabbinic law, follow the lenient one …31
Included in thismitzvah is also to heed and act in every age as the judge
instructs, that is, the greatest sage who is among us in our time, as those
30 Dating to the middle or late thirteenth century, the author of Sefer haḤinnukh remains
a matter of speculation. He identifies himself as a Levi from Barcelona, which led to the
erroneous attribution to R. Aaron haLevi of Barcelona, who was active at that time, but
the author’s halakhic positions differ from those or R. Aaron’s published texts. It has been
argued that, by thatmeasure, he should be seen as a disciple of Rashba (Shimon benAvra-
hamAderet, Spain, 1235–1310). In an article in 1980, however, Israel Ta-Shma identifies the
author as R. Pinḥas, older brother of R. Aaron (“Meḥab’ro haAmiti shel Sefer haḤinnukh,”
Kiryat Sefer 55, no. 4 (Elul 5740/ September 1980): 787–790). That is the opinion, as well,
of CharlesWengrov, editor of an edition of Sefer haḤinnukh in 1984.
31 This refers to a Talmudic principle enunciated in b. ʿAbod. Zar. 7a.
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of blessed memory expounded “the judge who shall exist in those days,
Jephthah (Yiftaḥ) in his generation is like Samuel in his generation.”32
Whoever transgresses this and does not heed the greatest in the wis-
dom of Torah of that generation in all that they instruct, nullifies this
positive commandment, and his punishment is very great, for this is the
strong pillar upon which the Torah rests.33
According to his presentation, this Torah passage, which dictates and directs
how theTorah shall be propagated in future generations, addresses the absence
of aHighCourt. Even though the Sifre limited its extension to the nationalHigh
Court at Yavneh, and not to any court or sage, the Ḥinnukh chose to read it as
extending the authority broadly to the greatest sage of every generation.
But as creative as the presentation of Sefer haḤinnukh is, his Talmudic
source in b. Roš Haš. 25a–b does not support his interpretation. To begin, the
citation “Jephthah (Yiftaḥ) in his generation is like Samuel in his generation”
is not associated with an exposition of the verses in Deuteronomy 17, rather,
it is part of a complex of interpretations of Exodus 24:1 asking why the sev-
enty elders of Israel referred to in that verse are not named. The conclusion
is that their names are omitted in order to signal that any judge, even a lesser
one, should be accepted by litigants, without demanding a judge as eminent as
Moses, Aaron or Samuel. This primary teaching is then supported by two addi-
tional verses—Deuteronomy 17:8 and Ecclesiastes 7:10. A litigant must accept
the ruling of the judge whom he encounters ( טפוש and not טפושה , a judge and
not the judge) even if the judge involved is not, as Sefer haḤinnukh claims, “the
greatest sage who is among us in our time.” The discussion neither requires a
litigant to seek the “the greatest sage” of the day to interpret religious law nor
does it empower each generation’s rabbis with the authority and power of the
High Court.
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The author of Sefer haḤinnukh clearly felt the apparent vacuum of rabbinic
authority after the close of the Talmud, but his attempted solution fails, andwe
could find no other rishonim addressing the question.
The Status of Halakhic Rulings in Our Day
With the cessation of judicial authority, is there any basis apart from voluntary
consent that provides the power of compulsion for rabbis when rendering a
decision? After the demise of the Sanhedrin, or after the consensus achieved
by the reception of the Talmud, is all judicial authority consensual, requiring
the questioner to first obligate himself or herself to the rabbi’s authority and
then seek his or her teaching, much as participants do in a secular arbitration?
And if the questioner desires, may he or she, the onewhowill live with the out-
come of the P’saq, make the final decision based upon the rabbi’s guidance and
explication of the legal positions and precedent, even if ultimately not follow-
ing the rabbi’s ruling?
Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh Chajes, a nineteeth century Galician Talmudist,34 wrote
two essayswhich considered this question:Ma’amarLoTasur, the third chapter
of the thirdmonograph in his book Torat Nevi’im, and the longer work Mishpat
haHora’ah. He concludes that there is no continuing biblical authority vested in
the rabbis of our day. The appearance of halakhic rules preferring the opinion
of one sage over another, he says, indeed the very preference for the opinion
of the majority over the minority, are, in our day, purely consensual, for all rul-
ings are subject to the arguments even of an individual sage.What is necessary
for a binding ruling, and is absent in our day, is an assembly representing the
sages of the nation, what we have characterized as a national court, wherein
the full spectrum of views is presented for all to consider. In particular he rests
on the view expressed by R. Solomon ben Abraham (Rashba) Aderet that “one
does not rely on amajority unless that majority arose … from a give and take of
them all.”35
Chajes writes:
34 The only classic commentator on the Babylonian Talmud to have earned a PhD in Liberal
Arts and Philosophy, as required by the government of Austria of rabbinical candidates in
1846.
35 םלכלשןתמואשמךותמ…וברשכאלאבורהרחאםיכלוהןיא
Rashba, Toldot Adam 104 cited in Beit Yosef, Ḥoshen Mishpat 13:9.
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Every sage who in his time and place rules for his people … according
to his reasoning …, he does not know that another sage has developed
through his reasoning … the opposite of what he has taught, therefore
those rules are not obligatory upon us under the biblical command of “do
not veer,” since the sages differ amongst themselves and we ourselves do
not know which one of them should be given priority so that we should
listen to him.36
Once Chajes clarifies that in the historical period that arose after the sealing
of the Talmud (continuing until today) there exists no biblical commandment
or laterTalmudic ruling tomake rabbinic rulings authoritative and compulsory,
the final decision how to behavemust fall somewhere. If, as we assume, all Jews
are םיווצמ , commanded by God to observe His commandments, then we must
find a way to determine how to fulfill those commandments. If there is no rab-
binic compulsory authority, then there is no escaping the conclusion thatwe as
individuals, alone, hold the ultimate authority over our own behavior and the
final decision ( השעמלהכלה ). Subtly, though, Chajes betrays he is still looking
for authority (“which one should be given priority”), rather than staking out a
more radical position such as that held by R. Solomon Luria in the introduction
to Yam Shel Shlomo (printed at the front of the second volume).
In introducing Yam Shel Shlomo, composed in Poland in the sixteenth cen-
tury, Luria notes that Joseph Karo (16th century Spain/Israel), in his introduc-
tion to Beit Yosef, explained that he ruled based on themajority opinion of the
three primary “pillars of instruction,” Rif, Rambam and Rosh.37 Luria, however,




[Torat Nevi’im, Zolkiew edition, 1836, third monograph, p. 12b].
37 Rif = R. Isaac Alfasi, 11th century Algeria; Rambam = R. Moses Maimonides, 12th century
Egypt; Rosh = R. Asher ben Yeḥiel, late 13th / early 14th century Germany and Spain. Real-
izing that there would be occasions when opinions of all three are not to be discovered,
Karo set himself as a tie-breaker a similar preponderance of the opinions of five lesser
sages—Ramban, Rashba, Ran, Mordechai and Semag. (Ramban = R. Moses ben Naḥman,
13th century Spain; Rashba = R. Solomon ben AvrahamAderet, 13th c. Spain; Ran = R. Nis-
simbenReubenGerondi, 14th century Spain;Mordechai =Mordechai benHillel haKohen,
13th century Germany; Semag = SeferMitzvot Gadol, a work byMoses ben Jacob of Coucy,
13th century France.) Note that in each case the Sephardic influence outweighs theAshke-
nazic. Moses Isserles (16th century Poland) took note of this, and in his introduction to
DarkheiMosheproposed that the sourceof authority shouldnotbe a Sephard-heavypanel,
but the greatest and most recent local sage, relying on the principal that the law is best
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Since the days of Ravina and Rav Ashi there is no tradition to rule like one
of the geonim or one of the aḥaronim, rather [we rule according to] who-
sever’s words are deemed appropriate, based on an unambiguous proof
according to the Talmud …
Indeed, Luria continues to excoriate what he saw as the tendency to rule on the
basis of people, gedolim, and not on the basis of argumentation.
Even though the generation that came before us, at this moment, in their
weakness cannot fathom that any individual great sage (gadol) among
the codifiers might err in his understanding, so they imagine that any-
thing written in an ancient text should not be questioned … Whatever
comes from a man’s mouth, even though … his mouth [generally] pro-
duces pearls, still we say “a man is a man.” Do we not also have, like him,
a learned tongue and a reputation in [the study of] Talmud?…Therefore,
I will not believe in any one codifier over another, though there may be a
great difference in their stature … Rather, the Talmud determines. Clear
proofs should be dispositive and [be allowed to] give their testimony.38
Luria’s language is strong, and does not easily apply to those of us who cannot
hope to approach his “reputation in [the study of] Talmud,” but it does expose
the fact, as Chajes did, that substance should prevail. Without the High Court,
public acceptance and a great sage’s stature alone are not enough to demand
compliance, requiring instead substantive proof.
determined by the latest authoritative opinion, that it should be assumed took all the
material that preceded it into account (hilkheta k’vatraei). Of course, it is the failure of








Solomon Luria, Introduction to Yam Shel Shlomo, vol. II.
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Judicial Discretion
Luria’s point is seconded by Dr. Joel Roth in the fourth chapter of Halakhic Pro-
cess: A Systemic Analysis, titled, “On Judicial Discretion and Precedent.” He lifts
up a Talmudic dictum, ein lo la-dayyan ella mah she-einav ro’ot ( אלאןיידלולןיא
תואורויניעשהמ( —a judge has only that which he sees—as an essential element
of post Talmudic halakhic jurisprudence. According to this dictum, no prece-
dent is authoritative, but only serves as guidance for the determination of the
current poseq or decisor. Obviously, this strong judicial discretion cannot have
been operativewhen therewas aHigh Court rendering authoritative decisions,
but Roth is clear that it was operative in later generations, noting that “only the
systemic principle ‘ein lo la-dayyan ella mah she-einav ro’ot stands as the ulti-
mate judicial guide”.39
Menaḥem Elon reflects a similar understanding:
In the early period, a final ruling given by the national High Court …
served as authoritative precedent … [However,] differences of opinion
in [matters of] halakhah grew and, over time … became not just a legiti-
mate phenomenon, but a desirable phenomenon … The measure which
determines anddiscriminates betweenopinions inhalakhah is the appro-
priateness of each opinion according to the Talmud that was edited by
Rav Ashi and Ravina, based on “an unambiguous proof according to the
Talmud …” That is why Jewish law accepted the principle that ‘the law is
according to the latter [sages]’ … which comes to assure the freedom of
decision to later [decisors].40
Chajes, Luria, Roth, and Elon converge on one point: the radical freedomof the
current poseq, the current decisor, to judge in thematter before him or her, but
none addresses the question of what grants the poseq the authority to decide
for an individual.








Menaḥem Elon, HaMishpat haIvri II, p. 802, with the internal citation from the Luria pas-
sage cited above.
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Rabbi Dikhovsky: Consent Grants Authority
Rabbi Shlomo Dikhovsky, a member of the Supreme Rabbinical Court of Jeru-
salem, considered this problem regarding the source of the authority of mod-
ern poseqim in an article in the journal K’vodah shel Torah in 1995.41 He, too,
notes Rambam’s inability to extend the chain of authority beyond Ravina and
Rav Ashi, and records Chajes’ conclusion that indeed there is no such authority
in our day; but he is unwilling to concede that conclusion.42
Dikhovsky argues that the authority of any court always rested not just on
the sage’s credentials but on the acceptance by the public of his authority. He
argues that what made a national court, the High Court of antiquity, authori-
tative was public acceptance, and that is what confirmed the authority of the
Talmud. He brings as proof the following Talmudic colloquy from b. Sanh. 14a.
When the Talmud reports that R. Judah ben Bava ordained R. Meir, the Tal-
mud asks: “Did R. Judah ben Bava [really] ordain R. Meir? Didn’t Rabbah bar
Ḥannah say in the name of R. Yoḥanan: Whoever says that R. Meir was not
ordained by R. Akiva is mistaken?! R. Akiva ordained him but they [the pub-
lic] did not accept it. R. Judah ben Bava [subsequently] ordained him and they
did accept it.”43 Public approbation was required for an ordination to be recog-
nized. Dikhovsky argues, therefore, that even though there is no national court
after theTalmudandnopossibility of rulings for thewhole of Israel, local courts
continue to exist and to have local authority, because they have the approba-
tion of the local community, even according to Maimonides. Thus, while the
specific structure of the Court at the Chamber of Hewn Stone which the Torah
foresaw no longer exists, we can extrapolate authority into our own day.44
Rabbi Dikhovsky even extends this to the individual, recommending that
every person should have a single rabbi whose authority he or she accepts. In
this regard he cites a dictum of Avot of Rabbi Nathan:
41 Rabbi Shlomo Dikhovsky, “Ḥiyyuv haTziyyut L’Ḥakhmei haTorah b’Yameinu,”K’vodah shel
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Take a master for yourself— … Rabbi Meir would say: One who learns
Torah from one teacher (rav), to what is he likened? To one who had one
field and planted part wheat and part barley, part olive and part [other
fruit] trees. That person is replete with goodness and blessing. But when
he learns from two or three, he is like onewhohasmany fields, onewheat,
one barley, one olives and one trees. That person is scattered among the
lands, without goodness or blessing.45
Dikhovsky’s reliance on Avot of Rabbi Nathanmay offer homiletic, but not nor-
mative, legal authority. Even more significant is that Rabbi Dikhovsky, seeking
a solution with respect to authority, admits there is no textual authority. Every-
thing, even perhaps the very authority of the classic sages after Talmudic times,
rests on the consent of the governed. Perhaps this should come as no sur-
prise. The very notion of covenant—of God not wanting to be an autocratic
sovereign, but rather wishing to be our God by our assent—suggests that the
very structures set up by theTorah tomaintain the law should continue to func-
tion by our consent. Dikhovsky’s argument fails, also, because it is not clear,
reading the story as does Rabbi Dikhovsky, that R. Meir received the public’s
consent for the rabbinic authority of a posek, or simply the approval to be their
teacher (hora’ah).
Answering Halakhic Questions Today
Citing Deuteronomy 14:1, while giving it a midrashic meaning generally under-
stood to be far from its p’shat, b. Yebam. 13b establishes that communities
should not foster internal divisions ( ודדוגתתאל ). Communal harmony, more
than anything else, is the justification for the existence of a poseq or a mara
d’atra (a local authority). When many autonomous people live together, they
must have a procedure of decision for the commons in order to attain unanim-
ity in communal practice.
If, however, we recognize each individual as the locus of autonomy, deci-
sions of individual behavior are not subject to authority. Luria was right, of
course, that he had a “reputation inTalmud” and the requisite skill and intellect
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to weigh the options and precedents before him to make an halakhic decision
in the matters he faced. He did not need to turn to any other authority except
as guideposts. This is not the case for any of us.
For us, poshute yiddin, common Jews, humility recommends we seek our
betters in knowledge of Torah to lay out the halakhic debate in order to fully
understand what precedent establishes and what options it allows. Setting out
that survey should be the role of the rabbi. Then, to the extent that the indi-
vidual understands the issues and wishes to resolve them within the range of
halakhic debate, though not as proposed by a particular rabbinic authority, the
individual should possess the prerogative to choose, for it is his or her own reli-
gious commitment and articulation in action of which we speak. If we value
the religious commitment and intelligence of our laity and recognize their
autonomous right of decision, this suggests that rabbis today adopt this new
model of dispensing halakhic advice.46 As souls who stood with our ancestors
at Sinai and freely pledged to observe God’s law, we can, each of us, choose to
be active partners in the covenant with our God. Just as God chose to offer His
covenant to each soul at Sinai,47 that offer remains alive for each and every one
of us at each and every moment in every act that we undertake.
46 The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement [the Law
Committee]’s self-understanding that it is purely an advisory committee within the Rab-
binical Assembly, and not a High Court, thus fits well in this model.
47 A well-known midrash asserts that the Revelation at Sinai was tailored to each recip-




“All the people saw the voices …”—How many sounds were there? Rather, [the voices]
would teach each person according to his ability [koḥo], as it says (Ps 29:4): God’s voice is
powerful [bakoaḥ].







When the Holy One was speaking, each and every person in Israel said: The command-
ment is spoken to me … Said R. Yose son of R. Ḥanina: The commandment would speak
to each one according to his ability. Do not be astonished by this, for the manna would
fall for Israel, each one according to his taste … If with regard to the manna, each tasted
according to his palate, so with regard to the commandment, each heard according to his
ability. Said David: “God’s voice is powerful”—it does not say, God’s voice exhibits its own
quality, rather God’s voice exhibits a quality—that of each and every one.
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When congregants seek out a rabbi for personal halakhic guidance, for
example the young couple described in the opening of this article, the rabbi
should help the parents understand the fundamental halakhah and the sides
of debate, then leave it to them to determine their final behavior, rather than
present the rabbi’s own judicial discretion as the ruling of an authority towhom
they are bound. For in the time after the Gemara, when a Jewish High Court
no longer exists, all Jews should strive to fulfill the Torah in line with modern
notions of autonomy as independent actors servingGod aswe best understand
based upon halakhic options.With the direction and advice of our authorities,
every Jew should have the option to take a more active role in fulfilling his or
her responsibilities, more engaged in the process of Torah, struggling, if he or
she so desires, to reach the right, legal, ethical, andGod-affirming decision. God
is indeed our God, and we are continually standing at Sinai, and, through our
engagement in our own halakhic behavior, we continually show our consent to
the Covenant of our Creator.
Rabbi Avram Israel Reisner, amember of the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee of
Jewish Law and Standards, is Rabbi Emeritus of Chevrei Tzedek Congregation in
Baltimore, MD. Rabbi Murray Singerman, ordained at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan
Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University, served previously as rabbi of Beth
Sholom Congregation of Frederick, MD and currently practices law in Maryland.
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chapter 12
The Death of Rabbi Eliezer: Bavli Sanhedrin 68a
Jeffrey L. Rubenstein
It is most fitting that a volume in honor of Rabbi Joel Roth includes the study
of a story about masters and disciples. Rabbi Roth has been the consummate
teacher and rabbinic master at the Jewish Theological Seminary for decades.
He taught me Talmud during my first year of study at JTS, and it is from Rabbi
Roth that I learned many of the skills necessary for scholarship of rabbinic lit-
erature. To be counted among his disciples is a great honor.
The story of the death of R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanos in b. Sanh. 68a provides an
instructive case of the literary artistry, cultural world, and compositional tech-
niques of the late Bavli storytellers. The content addresses a tension between
the merit of Torah and the punishment due to dissidents, and also grapples
with issues of master-disciple relationships and the transmission of tradition
through the generations. Comparison with an earlier version of the account
in y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b provides a fascinating example of the methods of the Bavli’s
reworking of earlier sources to create new narratives. The story has received
considerable scholarly attention: apart from the older biographical-historical
oriented scholarship, there are detailed literary analyses by Alon Goshen-
Gottstein1 andDevora Steinmetz,2 and studies byYonah Fraenkel, Daniel Boya-
rin, Ruth Calderon, Shamma Friedman, Joshua Levinson, and others.3 Jacob
1 Alon Goshen-Gottstein, “A Lonely Sage on His Death-Bed: The Story of Rabbi Eli’ezer (San-
hedrin 68a), an Ideological Analysis” [in Hebrew], in Mehkarim batalmud uvamidrash: Sefer
zikkaron letirzah lifshitz, ed. Moshe Bar-Asher, Joshua Levinson, and Berachyahu Lifshitz
(Jerusalem: Bialik, 2005), 79–112.
2 Devora Steinmetz, “ ‘Like Torah Scrolls That Are Rolled Up’: The Story of the Death of Rabbi
Eliezer in Sanhedrin 68a,” in Tiferet Leyisrael: Jubilee Volume in Honor of Israel Francus, ed.
J. Roth, M. Schmelzer, and Y. Francus (NewYork: Jewish Theological Seminary, 2010), 153–179.
3 Yonah Fraenkel, “Time and Its Shaping in Aggadic Narratives” [in Hebrew], in Studies in
Aggadah, Targum and Jewish Liturgy in Memory of Joseph Heinemann, ed. J.J. Petuchowski
and E. Fleischer (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), 147–152; Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Par-
tition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 171–180;
idem, Dying for God (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 36–41; Ruth Calderon, “Lit-
erary Tropes in the Aggadic Narratives of the Babylonian Talmud” [in Hebrew] (Ph.D. diss.,
Hebrew University, 2006), 135–149; Joshua Levinson, “Enchanting Rabbis: Contest Narratives
between Rabbis andMagicians in Late Antiquity,” JQR 100 (2010): 54–94; Shamma Friedman,
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Neusner’s biographical work and Yitsḥaq Gilat’s comprehensive study of
R. Eliezer’s halakhah are also helpful, especially regarding the halakhic ele-
ments of the story.4 All of thiswork has informed this study, although Imake no
attempt at comprehensive engagement with every scholarly study. My reading
differs from these previous studies both in its general emphasis and on vari-
ous interpretive points, and I also devote particular attention to the reworking
of sources, dating, and Talmudic context. I begin with the literary analysis of
the Bavli story and then proceed to a comparison with the Yerushalmi account
in order to identify and assess the nature and sources of the Bavli’s rework-
ing. The last section considers the redactional context in Tractate Sanhedrin.



















“Now You See it, Now You Don’t: Can Source-Criticism Perform Magic on Talmudic Passages
about Sorcery?,” in Rabbinic Traditions between Palestine and Babylonia, ed. R. Nikolsky and
T. Ilan (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 43–61. For additional studies, see Inbar Raveh, Me’at meharbeh
(Or Yehudah: Devir, 2008), 160–166; Azaria Baitner, Yavneh Stories [in Hebrew] (Ramat Gan;
Bar-Ilan University Press, 2011), 56–100.
4 Jacob Neusner, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: The Tradition and the Man, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1973),
1:408–415; 2:222–223; Y. Gilat, R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: A Scholar Outcast, trans. E.J. Frank
(Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1984).











[A1] When R. Eliezer became sick, the Sages entered his [abode]. He was
sitting on his canopied bed, and they were sitting in his receiving room.
[A2] That day was the eve of the Sabbath, and Hyrcanos, his son, entered
to remove his tefillin. He [R. Eliezer] rebuked him [Hyrcanos] and he left
in disgrace.
[A3] He [Hyrcanos] said to them, “Colleagues of my father. It seems that
my father’s mind is confused.” He [R. Eliezer] said to him, “Your5 mind
and your mother’s mind are confused. How can one neglect a prohibi-
tion [punishable by] stoning, and busy oneself with a prohibition [that is
merely a matter] of Sabbath rest [shevut]?”
[B1] When the Sages saw that his mind was lucid, they entered and sat
before him at a distance of four cubits.
(a) He said to them, “Why have you come?” They said, “We have come
to learn Torah.”
(b) [He said to them,] “Why have you not come until now?” They said
to him, “We had no free time.”
(c) He said to them, “I will be amazed if you all6 die natural deaths.”
R. Akiba said to him, “What about my [death]?” He said to him,
“Yours will be more severe than theirs.”
5 Literally, “His mind and his mother’s mind,” using the third person for the second. Cf. the
manuscript variants in the appendix.
6 Literally, “if they die,” using the third person for the second.
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[B2]
(a) He took his two arms and placed them on his chest. He said, “Woe
to you, my two arms, which are like two rolled Torah scrolls. I have
learned a great amount of Torah and I have taught a great amount of
Torah. I have learned a great amount of Torah—and I did not take
away from my masters even as much as a dog laps up from the sea.
I have taught a great amount of Torah—yet my students have not
taken away from me even as much as a painting stick [takes out] of
its tube.
(b) “Not only that, but I recite 300 laws about the bright spot7 and no
one ever asked me a question about them.
(c) “Not only that, but I recite 300 laws—and some say 3000 laws—
about the planting of cucumbers, and no one ever askedme a ques-
tion about them, except for Akiba b. Yosef: Once he and I were walk-
ing on our way, and he said to me, ‘My master. Teach me one thing
about the planting of cucumbers.’ I said one thing, and the whole
field filled upwith cucumbers. He said tome, ‘Mymaster: You taught
me about their planting. Teachme about their uprooting.’ I said one
thing and they all gathered in one place.”
[B3]
(a) They [the Sages] said to him: “Master: A ball, a shoemaker’s last, an
amulet, a bag for pearls and a small weight—what is the law?” He
said to them, “They are susceptible to impurity, and they are made
pure [by immersion] as they are.”8
(b) [They said to him,] “A shoe on the last—what is the law?” He said to
them, “It is pure.”9
(c) And his soul departed with “Pure.”10 R. Yehoshua stood on his feet
and said, “The vow is annulled. The vow is annulled.”
7 A potential sign of leprosy (nega’im). See Lev 13:4–56; m. Neg. 1:1.
8 That is, they may be immersed in their present state, without removing the inside filling;
see n. 47.
9 I.e., it is not susceptible to impurity, as it is not yet complete, hence it does not have the
status of a vessel (keli).
10 Or “his soul departed in purity.” I prefer to take this as a reference to R. Eliezer’s last word;
see the analysis below. The phrasing probably derives from the end of Mishnah Kelim (m.
Kelim 30:4): “Happy are you Kelim, that you entered in impurity and departed in purity.”
In the parallel use of this phrase in b. B. Meṣ. 86a, it is clear that the reference is to the last
words of Rabbah bar Naḥmani.
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[C] After the Sabbath, R. Akiba encountered him [= R. Eliezer’s funeral
procession]11 between Caeserea and Lod. He [Akiba]12 was striking his
flesh until his blood gushed upon the earth. In the row [of mourners] he
[Akiba] opened [his eulogy, and said]: “My father! My father! Israel’s char-
iot and horsemen (2Kgs 2:12).13 I have many coins and no moneychanger
to sort them.”
Literary Analysis
The story can be divided into three parts.14 In the first part, R. Eliezer’s sonHyr-
canos approaches his father when close to death. From their interchange, the
Sages learn that R. Eliezer is in command of his faculties and therefore can be
engaged in serious discussion. The second part narrates that discussion, which
culminates in the annulment of the ban. In the third part R. Akiba expresses
his grief and pronounces a eulogy.
The second and longest part, the heart of the story, itself exhibits a tri-
partite structure (B1, B2, B3), each third of which can be further subdivided
into three sections. In the first third R. Eliezer interrogates the Sages with two
questions (B1a, B1b) and thenmakes a pronouncement relating to their deaths
(B1c). In the second third R. Eliezer makes three laments (B2a, B2b, B2c). In
the final third the Sages interrogate Eliezer with two questions (B3a, B3b), and
then R. Yehoshua makes a pronouncement related to his death (B3c). Thus
the first and third sections of this part reverse the direction of the question-
ing while corresponding almost perfectly in their pattern, two questions and a
pronouncement.15
11 The identities of the subject and object of this line are difficult to determine. One could
interpret that R. Akiba encountered R. Yehoshua between Caeserea and Lod, and that
R. Yehoshua was striking his flesh and then pronounced the eulogy. In the PT R. Yehoshua
indeed articulates the eulogy, but since R. Akiba appears nowhere in the PT, it is question-
able whether that version should influence our understanding of the Bavli (see below). In
light of R. Akiba’s prominent role in the narrative, I take him to be the subject here.
12 See the previous note.
13 This phrase also appears in 2Kgs 13:14.
14 Cf. the five part chiastic structure in Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 81–82. In fact our
structures are quite similar, as he considers my B1, B2 and B3 as independent units, result-
ing in the same five divisions (A, B1, B2, B3, C).
15 I say “almost” because section B1c actually contains two statements of R. Eliezer, while B3c
contains the narrated datum that his soul departed prior to R. Yehoshua’s statement. So
the structure is not perfectly symmetrical, but close enough, in my opinion, to facilitate
memorization and highlight the relationship between the parts, which I believe are the
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Shifts in time, the changing location of the Sages, and changes in the status
of R. Eliezer contribute to the tripartite structure. The first part takes place at
“the eve of the Sabbath,” at dusk. The third part takes place “after the Sabbath.”
It is not stated exactly when the second part takes place. Since it comes after
the first part, it is reasonable to assume that it takes place once the Sabbath has
begun, i.e., on the Sabbath. In the first part the Sages wait in R. Eliezer’s receiv-
ing room. In the second part they enter his bedroom. In the third part they—or
at least R. Akiba—comeuponR. Eliezer’s funeral procession betweenCaeserea
and Lod.16 In the first part R. Eliezer is sick, but alive. The second part narrates
his death. The third part takes place after his death. Thus the story exhibits a
finely crafted tripartite structure, as is characteristic of manyother Bavli stories.
This story may be designated a “deathbed scene” a loose narrative type
attested several other times in the Bavli (withmore examples in other rabbinic
documents), in which the dying sage bids his final farewell to his disciples. In
an attempt to emulate similar studies of such scenes in Christian Scriptures
and to define a narrative form, Anthony Saldarini collected these sources and
listed “ten identifiable elements.”17 But no story has all the elements, and some
are missing so many that hypothesizing such a form yields an analytical tool
of limited utility. Nevertheless, we do gain a sense of the variety of deathbed
scenes by which to compare and contrast our story. The Bavli, in fact, preserves
a more typical deathbed story of R. Eliezer himself in b. Ber. 28b:
When R. Eliezer became sick, his disciples entered to visit him. They said
to him: “Our Master. Teach us the path of life that we may merit thereby
life in the next world.” He said to them: “Be careful about the honor of
your colleagues, and keep your sons from meditation, and seat them in
between the knees of scholars, and when you pray, know before whom
you stand. And thus you will merit life in the next world.”18
main functions of such structures. It should also be noted that both B1c and B3c mention
death (the first, that of the Sages, the second, that of R. Eliezer).
16 In addition, R. Akiba sits before R. Eliezer (at a distance of four cubits) in B1, walks with
R. Eliezer in the flashback in B2c, and mourns the prone corpse of R. Eliezer in C.
17 Anthony J. Saldarini, “Last Words and Deathbed Scenes in Rabbinic Literature,” JQR 68
(1977): 28–45. The elements are: “1. Introductory phrase; 2. the disciples enter (to visit); 3.
a dramatic action or question which provokes a reaction from the disciples and then a
response from the master; 4. a request for teaching; 5. a saying or teaching; 6. instructions
(especially burial instructions); 7. exhortation; 8. prediction; 9. appointment of a succes-
sor; 10. blessing.” Calderon, Literary Tropes, 168, assembles a more coherent corpus.
18 Adifferent account of R. Eliezer’s death appears in y. ‘Abod. Zar. 3:1, 42c: “WhenR.Yoḥanan
b. Zakkai was dying he said: Clear out the house on account of impurity and prepare a
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Other such stories are told of R. Yoḥanan b. Zakkai, R. YehudaHaNasi, R. Ish-
mael and R. Yose b. Kisma.19 But while our story also takes place on R. Eliezer’s
deathbed and begins with the common introduction, “When R. So-and-so
became sick …,”20 the second part inverts themore typical deathbed scene to a
certain extent. For the Sages question Eliezer not in order to learn precious new
traditionsbut rather to ascertainwhetherEliezer’s rulingsnowconform to their
own,while R. Eliezer laments his disciples’ lackof interest in hiswisdom. In this
case the “form” of the deathbed scene has been pressed into service for another
purpose, namely the dramaof the annulment of the banplaceduponR. Eliezer,
which is the true interest of the storytellers. The use of the deathbed scene
rather than another type of story for an account in which R. Eliezer bemoans
his isolation and his failure to transmit traditions creates a powerful irony in
light of the expected content of such stories. The initial dissonance between
form and content, between the audience’s expectations and the dying words of
R. Eliezer, contributes to the narrative tension concerning the ultimate fate of
the banned sage.
An unusual characteristic of the story is its dependence on another tal-
mudic story, namely the banning of R. Eliezer after the controversy of the
legal status of the “Oven of Akhnai.”21 In general rabbinic stories are self-
contained, fictional compositions that should be interpreted on their own
terms—the deathbed scene at b. Ber. 28b, for example, is a separate tradi-
tion which should not be reconciled with our story.22 Nevertheless, all stories
assume a certain amount of knowledge, and the banning of R. Eliezer was
apparently so widespread a tradition that the storytellers assumed their audi-
ence would know this element. That the Sages sit at a distance of four cubits
(B1) is clearly due to his banned status, and R. Yehoshua’s declaration “The vow
throne for Hezekiah King of Judah.When R. Eliezer, his disciple, was dying he said: Clear
out the house on account of impurity and prepare a throne for R. Yoḥanan b. Zakkai.” In
b. Sanh. 101a R. Eliezer falls ill and various sages, including R. Akiba, visit him.
19 b. Ber. 28b; b. Ketub. 103a–b; b. Šabb. 15a; b. ‘Abod. Zar. 18a.
20 Of the stories Saldarini collects, those that begin with the introductory word/phrase
“When R. So-and so became sick …” or “When he was dying, R. So-and-so said …” are the
closest to what might be designated a form. On this phrase as a literary trope see Ruth
Calderon, Literary Tropes, 169–173.
21 Steinmetz, “LikeTorahScrolls,” 156.OnBavli stories andaggadic traditions that presuppose
or showawareness of other Bavli stories, see Jeffrey L. Rubenstein,Talmudic Stories: Narra-
tive Art, Composition, and Culture (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999),
254–255; idem, Stories of theBabylonianTalmud (Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press, 2010), 86.
22 Yonah Fraenkel, “Hermeneutical Questions in the Study of the Aggadic Narrative” [in
Hebrew], Tarbiz 47 (1978): 157–161.
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is annulled” (B3c) refers directly to the ban (= vow), although it was not men-
tioned previously in the story. Beyond the general awareness of the tradition of
R. Eliezer’s banning, there are specific literary allusions to the Bavli’s account of
thebanasnarrated inb. B.Meṣ. 59b.Theportrayal of R.Yehoshua’s posture—he
“stood on his feet and said, ‘The vow is annulled’ ”—alludes to the description
of the same R. Yehoshua who “stood on his feet and said, ‘It is not in heaven’
(b. B. Meṣ. 59b).”23 Moreover, as we shall see below, the halakhic questions that
the Sages ask R. Eliezer link to that account, and were evidently chosen delib-
erately to create amental connection. These strong intertextual signsmay have
implications for the dating of the story, and will be considered presently.
The opening of the story is suffused with liminality.24 R. Eliezer lies sick on
his deathbed, poised between life and death.25 The time is the eve of the Sab-
bath, on the threshold between day and night, between profane and sacred
time. R. Eliezer has been banned, confined to themargins of the community of
Sages, neither insider nor outsider. And the Sages initially station themselves
in R. Eliezer’s “receiving room” (traklin), on the threshold between the outside
world and his inner domain.26 The term traklin (triclinium), moreover, may
evoke the famousmaximof m. ʾAbot 4:16: “R.Yaakov stated:Thisworld is similar
to a passageway (prozdor) to the next world. Prepare yourself in the passage-
way so that you can enter into the receiving room (traklin).”27 Of course there is
something inherently liminal about a deathbed scene, the boundary between
life and death. But here the additional liminalmarkers—liminal location, limi-
nal time, liminal social status—are appropriate for the primenarrative tension,
which centers on the question of the ban: will R. Eliezer die while under the
ban, and therefore forever be judged an outcaste: m. ‘Ed. 5:6 directs that “they
stone the coffin of anyonewho dies under the ban”? Or will he be absolved and
reintegrated into the rabbinic fold? His imminent death makes the resolution
23 SeeGoshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 91 n. 37. Likewise, the description of the Sages sitting
at a distance of four cubits uses the same language as describes R. Akiba sitting distant
from R. Eliezer in the “Oven of Akhnai” story.
24 See Calderon, Literary Tropes, 132–133.
25 This is clear from theopening term, kesheḥalah, which introduces several of these rabbinic
deathbed scenes. See Calderon, ibid.
26 See Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi and
the Midrashic Literature (New York, 1893; repr. New York: Judaica Press, 1989), 554; Jacob
Levy,Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim, 4 vols. (Berlin: B. Harz, 1924), 2:191.
Several sources mention the traklin abutting a bedroom, as seems to be the arrangement
here. See y. Roš Haš. 4:2, 59b: “Even [if they moved] from the receiving room (traklin) to
the bedroom (qiton)”; b. Yoma 15b: “small rooms (qitoniot) that open to a receiving room
(traklin).”
27 Or “enter the banqueting room.”
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of this question a matter of urgency, as he can no longer remain in the liminal
state of amenudeh. The rabbismust decidewhether it is to be inside or outside.
R. Eliezer is first approached by his son Hyrcanos who wishes to remove
his father’s tefillin. This is ostensibly because tefillin should not be worn on
the Sabbath, as clarified by the ensuing explanation: Hyrcanos should first be
concerned with lighting the Sabbath lamps, for should he delay until after the
Sabbath begins and then light them, he would transgress a primary category of
Sabbath labor and incur a severe punishment. If he delays removing the tefillin
until after the Sabbath begins, on the other hand, it is merely a matter of “Sab-
bath rest” (shevut), a rabbinic stringency.28 Tefillin, however, are also not to be
worn after death, so it may be the imminent death, not the imminent Sabbath,
that calls for their removal.29 This perspective, though apparently not shared
by the characters within the story, creates an interesting irony for the audience,
and contributes to the sense of urgency. At any rate, R. Eliezer’s rebuke of his
son suggests that the old sage is just as irascible as ever. That his rebuke makes
excellent halakhic sense indicates to the Sages that his intellect is intact even as
his bodywithers. Seeing that “hismindwas lucid” the Sages approachR. Eliezer.
Their purpose, as will become clear in due course, is to find a way to annul the
ban.30
That the Sages enter in place of the son is a prelude to the reincorporation
of R. Eliezer into the rabbinic group. Well known are the rabbinic sources that
compare the relationship between master and disciple to that of father and
son, and that give precedence to a disciple’s obligations to his master over his
father.31 To this point the banned R. Eliezer has been isolated from the com-
munity of Sages, as evident from the ensuing dialogue (B1b; “why have you not
come until now?”). Though no longer a rabbinic master of the study house or
academy, he has of course remained a father in his household and an author-
ity for his sons. With the ensuing annulment of the ban his identity returns to
that of a rabbinic master with bonds to disciples surpassing those to his sons.
28 Rashi, s.v. laḥalots, explains the concern is that a manmight leave his house and enter the
public domain while wearing his tefillin, and thus violate the prohibition against carrying
from public to private domains. Hence the Sages forbid wearing them altogether on the
Sabbath.
29 b. Ber. 18a forbids wearing tefillin in a cemetery, and the ensuing discussion limits the rule
to within four cubits of a corpse. And see Fraenkel, “Time and Its Shaping,” 149.
30 Boyarin, Border Lines, 318–319 n. 114, suggests that “clarity of mind is a cipher for ‘ortho-
doxy,’ as it very frequently is in the discourse of the period (in Greek and Latin, at least).”
I cannot find any other example of such a usage in rabbinic literature. The phrase always
means simply that one is in possession of his mental faculties.
31 See m. B. Meṣ. 2:1. And see Boyarin, Carnal Israel, 211 n. 22 and the sources listed there.
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Adumbrating that movement, Hyrcanos is rebuked, baffled, and displaced by
the Sages. At the conclusion of the story Akiba laments “My father, my father,”
explicitly embracing R. Eliezer as his spiritual father.32
Although (or because) R. Eliezer’smind is lucid, he appears none toopleased
at the visit of the Sages, no doubt noticing that they sit “at a distance of four
cubits” as mandated by the ban (B1). Their answer, that they have come “to
learn Torah,” is half-true at best. While they do intend to learn Torah, their real
interest is whether R. Eliezer has renounced his views so that they may annul
the ban. One might say that they have come “to learn [if the] Torah” they will
hear from him now conforms to the majority view. In any case, the real reason
that they have not come previously is on account of the ban.33 R. Eliezer imme-
diately calls them on their dissembling (lucid!): had they truly come “to learn
Torah,” they surely had ample time to approach him previously, and need not
have waited until his deathbed. He responds to their feeble excuse—“we had
no free time”—with predictions of their martyrdom, by which the storytellers
presumably allude to the traditions of persecutions of the Sages following the
Bar Kokhba rebellion. This harsh and hostile prognostication (assuming it is
not meant to be an expression of R. Eliezer’s hopes or prayers—that would
probably be too vicious for even themost bitter of Sages34) continues the char-
acterization of R. Eliezer as quick-tempered and antagonistic that was evident
in the rebuke of his son, and hints that there will be no easy reconciliation,
despite the best intentions of the rabbis.35
This initial dialogue between R. Eliezer and the Sages also introduces
R. Akiba, who will reappear twice more (B2c, C), and whose presence in the
story is partly responsible for the redactional context (see below).36 Akiba thus
constitutes a type of hinge that links the parts of the narrative together. That
32 Cf. Steinmetz, “Like Torah Scrolls,” 163.
33 See Joseph Hayyim b. Elijah al-Hakham, Sefer Ben Yehoyada, 7 vols., ed. Yeshua b. David
Salim (Jerusalem, 1998), ad loc. (4:55): “It seems that just as it is permitted to lie (leshanot)
on account of [preserving peace], so it is permitted to lie to [preserve] honor, since it was
not polite to tell him that they had not come because they had banned him.”
34 Rashi, s.v. shelakh, explains that R. Akiba had the greatest potential, and could have
learned more from R. Eliezer than the other Sages. According to Rashi, then, the harsh
deaths seem to be seen by R. Eliezer as punishment. Neusner, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, 1:41,
suggests that R. Eliezer curses the Sages.
35 Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 84, suggests that the predictions of death are a func-
tion of the quasi-prophetic ability that Sages sometimes display on their deathbeds, and
reflects no animosity or ill-will on his part. To me, this interpretation attempts to white-
wash the hostility entailed in the “prophecy;” see the previous note.
36 Printings beginwith “R. Akiba andhis colleagues entered” in place of “Sages” but this read-
ing is wanting in the MSS.
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his deathwill be “more severe” than those of his colleagues is particularly ironic
in light of R. Eliezer’s own observation that Akiba was the only sage who asked
him questions (B2c) andwho alsomourns Eliezer in a deep and poignantman-
ner (C). The alienation of R. Eliezer from even his most devoted colleagues is
profound.
The second part of the story consists of R. Eliezer’s parting words, but in
place of transmitting traditions he laments the lack of transmission of his
store of knowledge. This conception of Torah entails stasis and decline. The
corpus of Torah is static insofar as he describes a fixed body of tradition, appar-
ently revealed on Sinai and, ideally, passed down from master to disciple in
its entirety. Yet Eliezer seems to concede that such ideal, complete transmis-
sion rarely occurs, as not even he himself succeeded in receiving from his
teachers but a fraction of their body of knowledge, and so too his disciples
from him. The inevitable result is a precipitous reduction in the body of Torah
within amere generation or two.37 This pessimistic model of stasis and decline
contrasts sharply with the conception of Torah portrayed in other late Bavli
narratives. When Resh Laqish dies, for example, R. Yoḥanan laments, “When I
made a statement, the son of Laqish would object with twenty-four objections,
and I would solve them with twenty-four solutions, and thus our traditions
expanded” (b. B.Meṣ. 84a). Here dialectical argumentation opens upnew inter-
pretive possibilities which renderTorah a fertile and productive enterprise. It is
perhaps not accidental that R. Yoḥanan laments the death of the study-partner
withwhomheengaged indebate,whereasR. Eliezer lamentshis owndeath. For
R. Eliezer, the unasked questions were not the “questions and answers, objec-
tions and solutions” of argumentation, but straightforward inquiries of law.
Failure to ask therefore leads to an irremediable loss of knowledge, not the loss
of possibilities of productive interchange, as in the case of R. Yoḥanan andResh
Laqish.When Joshua forgot 1700 traditions after the death of Moses, according
to another Bavli tradition, Othniel ben Kenaz “restored them by means of his
dialectical acumen” (pilpulo; b. Tem. 16a). When R. Eliezer dies, on the other
hand, his traditions would seem to go to the grave with him, with no hope for
restoration.38
37 So Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 87. Cf. Menachem Fisch, Rational Rabbis: Science and
Talmudic Culture (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997), 64.
38 Fisch, Rational Rabbis, discusses these different models at length (which he calls “tradi-
tionalists” and “antitraditionalists”; R. Eliezer is actually an arch-traditionalist, the most
extremeof various traditionalist views.)Cf.Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 100–106,who
emphasizes the contrast between R. Eliezer, characterized in m. ʾAbot 2:8 as a “limed cis-
tern that never loses a drop,” representing themodel of conservative and faithful transmis-
sion of tradition, and R. Eleazar b. Arakh as an “overflowing fountain,” who represents the
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In this respect the comparison of his arms to Torah scrolls is most appro-
priate. R. Eliezer’s conception of the oral Torah he embodies resembles that of
the written Torah—a finite and limited corpus of traditions, which in principle
could be quantified and recorded. It is not the dynamic, growing, fertilemass of
discussions, as pictured in other Talmudic sources.39 In theory, perhaps, it can
be transmitted in complete and identical form such that succeeding genera-
tions possess the very same corpus of oral Torah just as they possess the same
scrolls of written Torah. In practice, even in the best of cases, with the most
attentive disciples such as R. Eliezer himself, a tragic decline ensues. The strik-
ing images of a dog lapping at the sea, removing but an infinitesimal amount of
water relative to thewhole, and an applicator stickwithdrawing a trace of paint
from the tube (used for making up the face), points to rapid deterioration. In
less than optimal circumstances, whendisciples are lazy orwanting, howmuch
the more so! Of R. Eliezer’s 300 laws of the “bright spot,” not one was transmit-
ted to a colleague or disciple, and of his 300 (maybe 3000) laws of (magic and)
cucumbers, only two. Here too we sense his isolation and alienation, presum-
ably a consequence of the same ban responsible for the Sages having kept their
distance, as indicated by the first part (B1). So despite R. Eliezer learning and
teaching “a great amount of Torah,” he cannot prevent its loss.
Why the narrative focuses on the bright spot and “magical” manipulation
of cucumbers as the traditions mastered by R. Eliezer but never transmitted to
his disciples (except for two toR. Akiba) deserves some thought. Froma literary
perspective these examples perhaps illustrate the power and comprehensive-
ness of R. Eliezer’s knowledge, which magnifies the tragic loss of Torah at his
death. To know 300 traditions about a “bright spot,” a minor element of the
field of leprous impurities, demonstrates consummate expertise, as does mas-
tery of 300 (or 3000!) laws of the magic manipulation of cucumbers, clearly
an esoteric field.40 The prominent place given to magic should give us pause
“Akiban” model of creative, generative Torah study that constantly produces novel teach-
ings. It is not clear tome, however, that R. Eleazar b. Arakhwas so identified with R. Akiba
or the Akiban model of Torah study in the worldview of the Bavli, nor even that R. Akiba
himself represented such a model, as most of the sources Goshen-Gottstein cites derive
from elsewhere.While the Bavli storytellers went out of their way to include R. Akiba, who
does not appear at all in the PT (see below), they do not employ him to thematize the con-
trast between these models of Torah study. Other Bavli intertexts of an alternative model
of Torah study based on a different function of the master-disciple relationship therefore
seemmore apposite to me.
39 See e.g. b. Ḥag. 3b: “Just as a plant reproduces andmultiplies, so words of Torah reproduce
and multiply.”
40 A quick check of the concordance reveals that the term “bright spot” (baheret) appears
only about 44 times in the Bavli, on 16 different folios, and “cucumbers” about 13 times.
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here, for the storytellersmeanknowledge of magical performance, of how todo
magic, as the two “laws” of magic that R. Akiba learns from R. Eliezer are quite
clearly magical acts. They do not restrict this magical “law” to, say, traditions
regardingmagicians andmagic performed by others, such as what type of pun-
ishment amagician receives. One possibility is that R. Eliezer’s performance of
the magical harvesting again underscores his uniqueness and non-conformity,
which perhaps hints that R. Eliezer has not changed his ways despite the ban,
anticipating the similar lack of change of his halakhic positions to be revealed
shortly (B3c).41 R. Eliezer alwayshas andalwayswill standapart from themajor-
ity of the sages, both in his problematic halakhic rulings and the problematic
subjects of knowledge. Such a reading assumes that magic, or at least such
magical acts, would have been considered problematic or even forbidden, by
the storytellers and their audience.42 However, recent scholarship has argued
that the rabbis’ attitudes tomagic were ambivalent and conflicted, and numer-
ous Talmudic traditions report rabbis doing magic of various sorts.43 Indeed,
there appears to be a shift from theTannaitic to Amoraic sources, with the Tan-
naim prohibiting magical acts, as does m. Sanh. 7:11, the mishnah with which
the story is juxtaposed, and the Amoraim routinely engaging in magic. In this
respect the story represents R. Eliezer in the manner of some Amoraim, who
display mastery of both Torah and magical praxis.44
41 In this respect I disagree with Boyarin’s interpretation: “We can read this shift within the
narrative at the moment when Rabbi Eli’ezer turns from magic planting and harvesting
of cucumbers to answering the Rabbis’ purity question. He moves, as it were, from one
episteme to another, accepting the terms of the new regime. Thus the story becomes
a mini-historical allegory of the shift in the social status of ongoing dialectic from the
second- and third-century to the fifth- and sixth-century context” (Border Lines, 179). I do
not see a shift here. R. Eliezer had justmentioned laws of the bright spot, amatter of purity
law, before the laws of planting cucumbers. That the Sages ask about purity law, and that
R. Eliezer answers, is unexceptional, and need not indicate an epistemic shift. See below
on the reasons for these specific questions about purity law. And from his answers to the
Sages’ purity questions it is clear that R. Eliezer has not “accepted the terms of the new
regime.”
42 The anonymous Talmud raises this problem in its discussion of the story. See below,
“Redactional Context.”
43 Gideon Bohak, Ancient Jewish Magic: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 351–425, and the references there; Kimberley Stratton, “Imagining Power: Magic,
Miracle, and the Social Context of Rabbinic Self-Representation,” JAAR 73 (2005): 361–393,
and eadem, Naming theWitch: Magic, Ideology, and Stereotype in the AncientWorld (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 143–176.
44 This point only confirms that the narrative, though introduced by the technical term “Was
it not taught” (vehatanya), is a pseudo-baraita, as is commonwith late stories. See Ruben-
stein, Talmudic Stories, 261–262, and Stories of the Babylonian Talmud, 214–215.
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Another possibility emerges from Joshua Levinson’s observation that the
Bavli tends to conceptualize magic differently than the Yerushalmi. For the
Yerushalmi magic is an autonomous realm, a discrete cultural practice, though
one which rabbis may engage in, with varying degrees of success. The Bavli,
by contrast, treats magic as a component of Torah, such that we witness “an
actual transformation of magic into law, into a type of legal tradition that must
be studied and transmitted.”45 Levinson also suggests that the 300 laws of the
bright spot is chosen as “a topic specifically tied to the priesthood. The dis-
course of Torah in the Bavli is appropriating all possible sources of competing
knowledge and authority.”46 If so, the choice of these two legal topics empha-
sizes the breadth of R. Eliezer’s Torah, which included everything, frompriestly
knowledge to magical tradition, from A to Z as it were. In both breadth and
depth (300 laws) his knowledge of Torahwas unparalleled, which enhances the
tension and urgency of the Sages’ task upon his death, as well as the tragedy of
his marginalization throughout his life.
At this point the Sages ask R. Eliezer specific halakhic queries, a poignant
and ironic narrative transition in light of his lament at the lack of questions
for much of his life (B3). Their questioning can be interpreted as a sympathetic
gesture, as a compassionate, if belated, response to his desire for inquiries so
as to offer some consolation before his death. Yet the audience soon learns
from R. Yehoshua’s declaration that these questions are the true purpose of
their visit, an attempt to rehabilitate R. Eliezer by ascertaining whether he
has recanted his views or not. They come not to console R. Eliezer, but to
interrogate him. The first question concerns the susceptibility to impurity and
the processes of purification of five objects that were the subject of disputes
between R. Eliezer and the Sages, as we know from sources found in the Mish-
nah and Tosefta. These are objects covered with leather, and the disputes turn
on whether, from a legal point of view, they are considered receptacles (since
the covering is closed or sealed, and not meant to be opened or removed),
and second, the manner of purification in the event the covering tears open.47
45 Joshua Levinson, “Enchanting Rabbis: Contest Narratives between Rabbis and Magicians
in LateAntiquity,” JQR 100 (2010): 54–94; cf. theHebrew version, “Boundaries andWitches:
Stories of Conflicts between Rabbis and Magicians in Rabbinic Literature” [in Hebrew],
Tarbiz 75 (2006): 295–328. See, however, Shamma Friedman, “Now You See It.”
46 “Enchanting Rabbis,” 73. Cf. Boyarin, Border Lines, 180.
47 Rashi, ad loc., s.v.mahu. Other commentators explain the laws at issue here in slightly dif-
ferent ways. The objects are: (1) a leather ball, filled with stuffing; (2) a shoemaker’s last,
made of leather and stuffed, (3) an amulet with a leather covering, (4) a leather bag hold-
ing pearls (or leather covering a pearl worn as a necklace), (5) a weight, probably made
of lead and covered with leather. If the leather covering tears open then the Sages con-
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One of these objects is a shoemaker’s last, which is mentioned in the Sages’
second question, whether a shoe which has yet to be removed from the last
(but the manufacturing process of which is otherwise finished) is considered
complete, hence susceptible to impurity, or not fully complete, hence not sus-
ceptible to impurity.48 The “shoe on the last” in turn recalls the cause of the ban
of R. Eliezer.49 For this issue is the third of the four objects listed in t. ‘Ed 2:1
as the subjects of debates between R. Eliezer and the Sages, the last of which
is the Oven of Akhnai, the subject of the dispute that caused the banning of
R. Eliezer.50
cede that the objects are susceptible to impurity and rule that the inside stuffing must
be removed before the objects can be immersed for purification, i.e., that the stuffing is
deemed a “separation” (ḥatsitsa). R. Eliezer rules that theymay be immersed “as they are,”
i.e., without removing the stuffing. These five objects do not appear in any singleTannaitic
source. The first three appear together in m. Kelim 23:1 (which only transmits the Sages’
opinion) and t. KelimB. Bat. 2:6, which adds R. Eliezer’s disagreeing opinion (some texts of
t. KelimB. Bat. 2:6 read “R. Eleazar b. Azariah” in place of R. Eliezer; see Gilat, R. Eliezer, 391
n. 168, on this issue). The Sages and R. Eliezer disagree over the bag for pearls in t. Kelim
B. Bat. 4:3. I cannot find a disagreement over a “small weight” in Tannaitic sources, though
the purity of a weight is discussed in m. Kelim 12:8 and 26:6, and t. Kelim B. Bat. 7:12. See
Tosafot, ad loc., s.v. utaharatan. It appears that the storytellers had some other traditions
concerning R. Eliezer’s purity rulings that are not attested in our sources, though the over-
all positions of R. Eliezer and the Sages are consistent. On this issue see Gilat, R. Eliezer,
389–391, and the footnotes there; Hesdai David to t. Kelim B. Bat. 2:6. Alon, “Lonely Sage,”
92–93, argues that the questions cannot be a test, given the lack of explicit disputes over
these exact objects in theTannaitic sources, and considers themaneffort to studyTorah, to
act as the disciples R. Eliezer never had. These understandings are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. It seems too much a coincidence to see these questions about purity, so
close to the issue that led to the ban in b. B.Meṣ. 59b, as randomly selected. And see below
concerning the “shoe on the last” in t. ‘Ed. 2:1.
48 Steinmetz, “LikeTorah Scrolls,” 166–167, argues at length that the objects should be seen as
metaphors for R. Eliezer, as they have some sort of filling, but are closed up, andR. Eliezer’s
lament over his arms like rolled up Torah scrolls means that he “sees himself as a con-
tainer of Torah, Torah that is being rolled up and that never will be able to be accessed
by others—he is a receptacle filled with Torah that will forever be sealed inside.” I think
this suggestion is a little speculative, as the metaphors are not straightforward, and the
motivation for including this source can be explained more simply, but is perhaps worth
considering. (However, Steinmetz’s efforts to include tefillin with this list of objects, as it
is sometimes included in some of the Tannaitic sources, are not convincing to me. This
reading requires that the audience know the relevant Tannaitic sources in Mishnah and
Tosefta, realize that some of those sourcesmention tefillin whereas the Sages’ question in
the story does not, reflect upon that absence, andmake a connection to the earlier scene.
This asks toomuchof the audience.) See tooGoshen-Gottstein’s interpretationof the shoe
on the last as “unfinished” in the same way as R. Eliezer himself is “unfinished” insofar as
the Sages never came to learn his Torah (“Lonely Sage,” 94).
49 See Steinmetz, “Like Torah Scrolls,” 166; Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 93–94.
50 b. B. Meṣ. 59a; y. Moʿed Qaṭ. 3:1, 81c–d.
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Four thingsR. Eliezer rules pure and the Sages rule susceptible to impurity
… (3) The shoe on the last: R. Eliezer declares pure and the Sages rule sus-
ceptible to impurity.51 (4) If one cut it [an oven] into segments and placed
sand between the segments, R. Eliezer rules it pure and the Sages rule that
it is susceptible to impurity. And it was called the Oven of Akhnai, for dis-
putes about it multiplied in Israel.
Thus the story’s first question recalls the general issue that led to the ban (dis-
putes over purity/impurity) and mentions the “shoe on the last” specifically. It
is the perfect segue to the second question, whether a “shoe on the last” is sus-
ceptible to impurity, which in turn triggers the audience to think of theOven of
Akhnai and the ban, although theOven of Akhnai itself is elided. Togetherwith
the intertextual signs mentioned above, the storytellers have placed a signifi-
cant allusion to the account of R. Eliezer’s banning in the mouth of the Sages,
with brilliant effect. From the audience’s perspective, the Sages ask: “After all
these years of the ban that devolved from R. Eliezer’s refusal to adhere to the
majority ruling about the oven cut into segments, will he now accept their
ruling regarding the shoe on the last, which appears in that same list of dis-
agreements?”
R. Eliezer, alas, remains true to his former position, as attested in those same
sources in the Mishnah and Tosefta. His recalcitrance puts the Sages in a bind.
They cannot remove the ban because R. Eliezer has not retracted his opinion.
But time is running out, as R. Eliezer’s death is imminent. The temporal setting
helps communicate this sense of urgency. In the first part the imminent com-
mencement of the Sabbath makes it urgent to act, so urgent that Hyrcanos is
instructed to attend to the Sabbath lamps before removing the tefillin. Action
must be taken now to remove the ban, as R. Eliezer’s death approaches, and
perhaps—although not explicitly stated—we are to imagine that the Sabbath
is drawing to a close as well. That R. Eliezer alsomentions in the first scene that
violation of the imminent Sabbath entails death by stoning reinforces the link
between the Sabbath and death. The sacred life of R. Eliezer is expiring as the
sacred time of the Sabbath inexorably ticks away toward its close. Here the nar-
rative tension builds to a climax. He wants to teach his Torah before his death.
51 The issue here concerns at what point the shoe is complete, as utensils are only suscepti-
ble to impurity when their manufacture is complete. R. Eliezer rules that the shoe is not
finished until removed from the last, hence the shoe is “pure,” i.e. not susceptible to impu-
rity. The Sages rule that the shoe has been completed and is susceptible to impurity. The
debate between R. Eliezer and the Sages also appears inm. Kelim 16:4. See Gilat, R. Eliezer,
52, and notes.
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The Sages want to lift the ban before his death. But the Torah he teaches, his
refusal to retract his former rulings, affords no justification to do so.
No legal justification, that is. So R. Yehoshua turns to a supernatural justifica-
tion. He interprets the fact that R. Eliezer’s last wordwas “pure” as a divine sign,
a revelation of the divine will, indicating that the Sages should make Eliezer
“pure” and rehabilitate him.52 His declaration “the vow (= ban) is annulled”
is appropriately non-legal, i.e. not following standard legal protocol.53 And of
course R. Eliezer’s death makes the whole question non-legal almost by defini-
tion, though there are the posthumous consequences noted above, including
the stoning of his coffin. Nevertheless, in light of the ensuing profound expres-
sions of grief, the rescinding of the ban should not be judged either gratuitous
or moot, but as the long sought resolution to a disturbing estrangement. The
allusion that the storytellers contrived to the story of R. Eliezer’s banning con-
tributes to this sense of closure. Where once “R. Yehoshua stood on his feet
and said, ‘It is not in heaven’ ” (b. B. Meṣ. 59b),54 here the same R. Yehoshua
(who was not mentioned previously in our narrative) makes the same gesture
for quite the opposite purpose. Having formerly rejected an explicit heavenly
voice, which led to the banning of R. Eliezer, he now heeds a heavenly sign and
overturns the ban.
In Part [C], R. Eliezer has died, and the funeral is under way. There is a slight
incongruity in that R. Akiba appears to have been among the Sages present
at R. Eliezer’s death, presumably in the same room, but now encounters the
funeral procession “between Caeserea and Lod,” which seems to imply he was
not present to grieve at the death, unless we are to imagine the Sages all dis-
persed after the death and then returned to the scene of the funeral.55 The
52 Note that the storytellers chose for the Sages’ final question to R. Eliezer one to which he
would answer “pure.” The story would not work if they chose an issue that R. Eliezer ruled
“impure.” See too the reading of MSHaRavHerzog in the appendixwhere a heavenly voice
pronounces R. Eliezer “pure,” making this point abundantly clear.
53 Though it must be conceded that narratives often do not follow halakhic protocol.
54 See Joseph Chaim, Sefer Ben Yehoyada, ad loc., who suggests that R. Yehoshua, “intended
to act in annulling the vow in the same manner he acted on the day of the vow, where he
stood on his feet and said, ‘It is not in heaven.’ ” Of course wewould attribute the intention
to the storyteller, not the character.
55 Shraga Bar-On (oral communication) has suggested to me that R. Akiba’s question (and
R. Eliezer’s vicious answer) in b1(c) is a later addition, and not part of the original story.
Removing that line would obviate this problem of R. Akiba encountering the procession
elsewhere, and has much to recommend it in my opinion, though there is no textual evi-
dence to support the conjecture. (It would alsomake for amore precise structure, as b1(c)
inmy structure in fact contains two questions.) Cf. the discussion of the PT parallel below,
where R. Akiba does not appear at all.
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comparison to the Yerushalmi version below will provide some help in resolv-
ing this question. In any case, R. Akiba’s violent grieving, “striking his flesh until
the blood gushed upon the earth,” is consistent with the violent tenor of Bavli
stories.56Yet it is unprecedentedamongother such stories of rabbinic deathbed
scenes, where disciples typically cry or lament, but do not cause self-inflicted
wounds. That injuring one’s body risks running afoul of a biblical prohibition,
an issue that puzzled the commentators, underscores how unusual this reac-
tion is.57 Here it continues the motif of violence that surfaced in R. Eliezer’s
cruel predictions of the Sages’ death (B1), as well as his rebuke to his son (A3;
an example of verbal, not physical violence). It can also be understood as a
sign of the emotional trauma that resulted from the whole affair. The ban-
ning of a great sage, the suffering that the Sages knew they had caused by the
ostracism and isolation, and then this difficult and ambiguous final encounter
culminating in R. Eliezer’s death causes R. Akiba, and perhaps his colleagues,
a harrowing experience of grief, remorse, frustration, regret, guilt, and anxi-
ety.
And loss: R. Akiba cites Elisha’s words upon seeing his master Elijah carried
away by the whirlwind (2Kgs 2:12), hardly the verse one would expect at the
death of a Sage who had been ostracized for so many years.58 It expresses the
deep loss that R. Akiba, and presumably other Sages too, experiences at the
death of a greatmaster and at the years of lost opportunity to learn his Torah—
the loss of traditions that R. Eliezer lamented earlier. R. Akiba’s reference to
R. Eliezer as his “father,” which returns to the theme of spiritual sons/disciples
and biological sons raised in the first part (A1–A3), contributes to the enormity
of their loss. For R. Eliezer was not just a venerable sage, but the master/spir-
itual father of the Sages, and they his true (spiritual) sons.59 Indeed, rabbinic
sources elsewhere adduce this verse as a prooftext for the common topos that
disciples are as sons and masters as fathers, as Elisha and Elijah serve as a
56 The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2003), 54–66. This type of (real) violence, however, is not exactly the same phenomenon
as the verbal violence of the academy. But that verbal violence sometimes is represented
as physical and spills over into other arenas.
57 See Tosafot, ad loc., s.v. hayah.
58 The same words are pronounced by King Yoash on the deathbed of Elisha (2Kgs 13:14), a
biblical deathbed scene.
59 This point is hinted at by editor of Tractate Semaḥot 9:2–3. He claims that, at the death of
R. Eliezer, R. Akiba bared both of his arms, while at the death of his father he did not bare
his arms. Dov Zlotnick, TheTractate “Mourning” (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1966),
145, notes: “ ‘R. Akiba bared both arms,’ etc.—although he refrained from doing so in the
case of his father.”
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paradigmatic example of themaster-disciple relationship.60ThusR.Akiba con-
fesses that he has “many coins,” i.e. many traditions and questions, and “no
money changer to sort them.”Hehas nomaster to explain the reasoning behind
the traditions and to provide answers for the questions in the same way as a
moneychanger identifies the qualities of the coins and assesses their relative
values.61 From this eulogy too we see that R. Eliezer’s accusation that the Sages
had not learned his myriad traditions was not the deluded ravings of a bitter,
dying sage, but the truth. Those hundreds of traditions about leprous spots and
cucumbers and many other subjects were lost with R. Eliezer, together with
a great many other matters concerning which the Sages lack knowledge. And
that, for the Sages, is tragic.
In the endR. Eliezer receives the appropriate, honorary funeral for a rabbinic
master—with a ritual procession, rowsof mourners, anda eulogy fromapromi-
nent sage. Unlike Akavia b. Meahalalel, his coffin is not stoned; unlike Elisha b.
Abuyah, there is no fire burning upon his grave.62 In death, R. Eliezer has been
successfully reincorporated into the rabbinic fold, though the lost years cannot
be redressed.
Ultimately the story should be seen in terms of several tensions of the rab-
binicworldview, primarily the tension between rabbinic commitments tomas-
ters of Torah and to the integrity of the legal system. For the storytellers, the
60 See Sipre to Deuteronomy #34 (ed. L. Finkelstein [NewYork: Jewish Theological Seminary,
1983], 61): “Your sons (Deut 6:7). These are your disciples, as it says … And just as disciples
are called sons, so the master (rav) is called a father, as it says, Elisha saw it, and he cried
out, ‘My father,My father! Israel’s chariots and horsemen’ (2Kgs 2:12).” According to Sipre to
Deuteronomy #305 (p. 327), Joshua eulogizedMoses, “My father, my father!Mymaster, my
master.” b. Meg. 26a cites this verse as a prooftext for the law that one tears his clothes in
mourning for both parents and masters. On the meaning of the expression in its biblical
context, see M.A. Beek, “The Meaning of the Expression ‘The Chariots and the Horsemen
of Israel’ (2Kings ii 12),” in TheWitness of Tradition: Papers Read at the Joint British-Dutch
Old Testament Conference Held at Woudschoten, 1970, ed. M.A. Beek (Leiden: Brill, 1972),
1–10.
61 See Shlomo Naeh, “On Structures of Memory (and the Forms of Text) in Rabbinic Liter-
ature” [in Hebrew], in Mehqerei Talmud 3, ed. Y. Sussman and D. Rosenthal (Jerusalem:
Magnes, 1990), 545–546 and n. 16, who shows thatmetaphors of money andmoneychang-
ers are strongly associated with memorization of Torah, each and every tradition in the
correct place like money in the moneychanger’s storage box. The metaphor is thus par-
ticularly apt for the type of Torah R. Eliezer embodies. Among the sources Naeh collects,
see especially Sipre to Deuteronomy #13 (p. 22): “What is the difference between a sage
(hakham) and a wiseman (navon)? The sage is similar to a wealthymoneychanger …” and
Sipre to Deuteronomy #48 (pp. 107–108).
62 m. ‘Ed. 5:6; b. Ḥag. 15b; y Ḥag. 2:1, 77b–c.
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incredible merit that ought to accrue to a sage like R. Eliezer on account of
his prodigious knowledge of Torah stands in tension with the account of his
banning, even if they recognize the need to marginalize individual sages who
oppose the decisions of the majority. How can a sage with such a mastery of
Torah be treated as a pariah? How can they allow his vast knowledge of tradi-
tion to be lost? Should they sacrifice the potential answers to many halakhic
problems for the sake of the good of the system? And how can the merit of
R. Eliezer’s Torah fail to be salvific, as it would appear to be should he die under
the ban?
The tension recalls that posed by the story of Elisha b. Abuyah, where the
storytellers contemplate whether Torah and sin can coexist, whether a master
of Torah also can be and die a sinner, with the concomitant posthumous conse-
quences.63 Just as that story explores these questions through the relationship
between Elisha b. Abuyah and his disciple R. Meir, so our story explores them
through the relationship between R. Eliezer and his disciple R. Akiba. Trans-
mission of Torah, including problematic Torah, is a function of the master-
disciple relationship, and is inevitably scrutinized through that prism.The story
of Elisha b. Abuyah posits a posthumous rehabilitationwhere Torah ultimately
prevails over heresy and sin such that Elisha enters the next world. This res-
olution is analogous to R. Eliezer’s quasi-posthumous rehabilitation. Here we
might say that R. Eliezer’s Torah prevailed over his “heresy” of violating of rab-
binic protocols and allowed him to be buried and mourned as a beloved sage
rather than a reviled menudeh. Our story focuses more on the psychological-
emotional dimension of the tension, the story of Elisha b. Abuyah on the the-
ological dimension.64 In both cases the inherent merit of Torah proves to be
inviolable.
The PT Version and the BT Reworking
Aversion of the account of R. Eliezer’s death appears in y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b. (There is
also a version in ʾAbot R. Nat. A 25 which I will not discuss due to the notorious
difficulties in determining the dating and provenance of this text.65)
63 See Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories, 64–104.
64 Several non-narrative comments within the Elisha b. Abuyah narrative pose the theolog-
ical question almost explicitly; see Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories, 79–80.
65 On this version see Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 79–80. There are also parallels to
parts of the story in Song Rab. 1:3; see Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 106–107.
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y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b b. Sanh. 68a
(I) It happened that when R. Eliezer was
dying (goses)
When R. Eliezer became sick, the Sages
entered his [abode].
He was sitting on his canopied bed, and
they were sitting in his receiving room.
At the eve of the Sabbath, at dusk [A2] That day was the eve of the Sabbath,
Hyrcanos, his son, entered to remove
his tefillin. He said to him, “My son.
You neglect the commandment of the
Sabbath-lamp, which is [a matter of]
Sabbath-rest (shevut), and is punishable
by excision, and you come to remove
tefillin, which is merely discretionary
(reshut) and merely amitzvah.”
and Hyrcanos, his son, entered to remove
his tefillin. He [R. Eliezer] rebuked him
[Hyrcanos] and he left in disgrace.
He went out screaming and saying, “Woe
is me, for my father’s mind is confused.”
He [Eliezer] said to him, “Your mind is
confused. My mind is not confused.”
[A3] He [Hyrcanos] said to them, “Col-
leagues of my father. It seems that my
father’s mind is confused.” He [R. Eliezer]
said to him, “Your mind and Your
mother’s mind are confused. How can
one neglect a prohibition [punishable
by] stoning, and busy oneself with a
prohibition [that is merely a matter]
of Sabbath rest [shevut]?”
(II) When his disciples saw that he
[R. Eliezer] had answered him [Hyrca-
nos] intelligently, they entered before
him.
[B1]When the Sages saw that his mind
was lucid, they entered and sat before
him at a distance of four cubits
(a) He said to them, “Why have you
come?” They said, “We have come to
learn Torah.”
(b) [He said to them,] “Why have you not
come until now?” They said to him, “We
had no free time.”
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(cont.)
y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b b. Sanh. 68a
(c) He said to them, “I will be amazed if
you all die natural deaths.” R. Akiba said
to him, “What about my [death]?” He
said to him, “Yours will be more severe
than theirs.”
[B2] (a) He took his two arms and placed
them on his chest. He said, “Woe to you,
my two arms, which are like two rolled
Torah scrolls. I have learned a great
amount of Torah and I have taught a
great amount of Torah. I have learned a
great amount of Torah—and I did not
take away frommymasters even as much
as a dog laps up from the sea. I have
taught a great amount of Torah—yet my
students have not taken away fromme
even as much as a painting stick [takes
out] of its tube.
(b) “Not only that, but I recite 300 laws
about the bright spot and no one ever
asked me a question about them.
(c) “Not only that, but I recite 300 laws—
some say 3000 laws—about the planting
of cucumbers, and no one ever asked me
a question about them, except for Akiba
b. Yosef: Once he and I were walking on
our way, and he said to me, ‘My master.
Teach me one thing about the planting
of cucumbers.’ I said one thing, and the
whole field filled up with cucumbers. He
said to me, ‘My master: You taught me
about their planting. Teach me about
their uprooting.’ I said one thing and they
all gathered in one place.”
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(cont.)
y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b b. Sanh. 68a
They were asking him [questions] and he
was answering them. About that which
was impure he answered “impure” and
about the pure he answered, “pure.”
[B3] (a) They [the Sages] said to him:
“Master: A ball, a shoemaker’s last, an
amulet, a bag for pearls and a small
weight—what is the law?” He said to
them, “They are susceptible to impurity,
and they are made pure [by immersion]
as they are.”
(b) [They said to him] “A shoe on the
last—what is the law?”
In the end he said “Pure.” He said to them, “It is pure.”
And his soul departed. They said, “It is
clear that our master is pure.”
(c) And his soul departed with “Pure.”
R. Mana said, “Even before this it was
clear.”66
(III) R. Yehoshua entered and removed
his tefillin. He was hugging him, and
kissing him, and crying, and saying, “My
master! My master! The vow is annulled.
R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and
said, “The vow is annulled. The vow is
annulled.”
[C] After the Sabbath, R. Akiba encoun-
tered him [R. Eliezer’s funeral proces-
sion] between Caeserea and Lod. He
[Akiba] was striking his flesh until the
blood gushed upon the earth.
My Master! Israel’s chariot and horsemen
(2Kgs 2:12).”
In the row [of mourners] he [Akiba]
began [his eulogy, and said]: “My father!
My father! Israel’s chariot and horsemen”
(2Kgs 2:12).
66 This can also be translated: “Was it not clear before now?”
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(cont.)
y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b b. Sanh. 68a
I have many coins and no moneychanger
to sort them.”
The PT version is briefer and less developed than that of the BT, as is typical.
From the shared elements it is clear that the PT story (or an extremely sim-
ilar version) was the source of the BT story. Thus the first scene of the PT is
extremely close to that of the BT: the dying R. Eliezer is approached first by his
son, who tries to remove the tefillin, but is rebuffed with a complex halakhic
argument that he fails to understand.67 At this point he is approached by a
group of rabbis (in this version, “his disciples,” as opposed to BT’s “Sages”), who
have perceived from R. Eliezer’s words that he is lucid. In the second scene, as
in the BT, the disciples/Sages ask R. Eliezer halakhic questions. His last word
is “Pure,” and, in the third scene, R. Yehoshua declares that the “vow”/ban is
annulled. The eulogy features the same verse from 2Kings 2:12.
Yet it is just as clear, from the differences, that the BT storytellers have
reworked the story in significant ways:
(1) Amajor transformation is the addition of R. Eliezer’s long soliloquy (B2),
lamenting the loss of Torah and the lack of questions, despite his prodigious
knowledge of 300/3000 laws of the bright spot and 300 of (magical) planting
of cucumbers. All this has no trace in the PT, in which the theme of the decline
and loss of Torah, so crucial to the BT, is absent. Consequently, the PT also lacks
the second part of R. Akiba’s eulogy, the figure of the moneychanger, which
mourns the loss of a teacher who could answer questions. The PT story is about
the death of a sage and master, but not about the tragic loss of Torah because
he has failed to transmit it during his life.
(2) R. Akiba appears thrice in the BT (B1c, B2c, C) but nowhere in the PT. The
BT storytellers have added the special (only R. Akiba asked questions of, and
walked with, R. Eliezer) yet strained (R. Akiba’s death will be the most painful)
relationship between R. Akiba and R. Eliezer.68 Thus the theme of the mas-
ter/disciple relationship is specific to the BT.
67 On R. Eliezer’s argument and the use of this halakhic terminology, see Gilat, R. Eliezer,
161–163, 190; Fraenkel, “Time and Its Shaping,” 150–151, and his references to comments by
Lieberman and Epstein in nn. 44, 47.
68 R. Eliezer’s claim that R. Akiba alone asked him questions points to some special relation-
ship, as does R. Akiba’s painful eulogy. See Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 83, 95–97.
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(3) The hostile tenor of the story is new in the BT, including R. Eliezer’s
prophecies of the untimely death of the Sages and the cruel death of Akiba
(B1c), Akiba’s violent mourning (C), and even R. Eliezer’s “rebuke” of Hyrcanos
who leaves “in disgrace” (A2; in the PT R. Eliezer simply explains to Hyrcanos
why the tefillin should not be removed.) The palpable sense of the resentment
expressed by R. Eliezer that pervades the BT story appears nowhere in the PT,
which is told of his “disciples,” not “the Sages.” Indeed, the PT has R. Yehoshua
hugging and kissing R. Eliezer after the death, where the BT has Akiba “striking
his flesh until blood gushed.” This shift from gestures of love and intimacy to
pain and self-mortification is emblematic of the difference in tenor in the two
stories.
(4)TheBT substantively transforms thequestioning of R. Eliezer.The PT sim-
ply relates that the Sages questioned R. Eliezer but does not detail the exact
issues they asked. The BT, in contrast, reports the specific questions which, as
we have seen, directly recall the ban. More significantly, in the PT R. Eliezer’s
answers reveal that he no longer disputes with the majority: “about that which
was impure he answered ‘impure’ and about the pure he answered, ‘pure.’ ”
He therefore deserves to be released from the ban, and we can understand
why R. Yehoshua states that the vow/ban is released. In the BT, by contrast,
R. Eliezer’s answers reveal that he has not changed his mind, hence there are
no legal grounds for removing the ban.
(5) In this respect the BT hasmade the issue of annulling the ban the central
tension of the story. As noted, the purpose of the Sages’ visit is to accomplish
this task, and their questions are to ascertain whether R. Eliezer has retracted.
While the ban is explicitly mentioned in the PT, it is not clear that the rab-
bis visit him on that account, nor how central it is to the storytellers’ message.
There is nomention of the rabbis sitting four cubits distant fromR. Eliezer, nor
of their not having “come until now” (B1; apparently on account of the ban),
nor of all the Torah that has been lost (B2), again due—at least in part—to
the Sages having kept apart from R. Eliezer. Now it is possible to read the PT
along the same lines as the BT: the rabbis (= his disciples) ask questions to see
whether R. Eliezer still rejects the majority view and find that he has indeed
retracted. While they are now justified in removing the ban, he dies before
they can do so. But since he has died saying “Pure,” the rabbis consider this
as evidence that the ban is lifted and state, “Our master is pure,” and the “Vow
is annulled.” With this reading there remains the significant difference in that
R. Eliezer has retracted in the PT, whereas in the BT he has not. In the PT the last
word “Pure” confirms that theban shouldbe lifted,whereas in the BT it provides
themechanism, a type of legal fiction that effects the removal of the ban. In the
PT, in other words, theword “Pure” testifies to R. Eliezer’s “orthodoxy”; in the BT
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it functions as a sign that despite his nonconformist answers God has released
the ban, as it were.
However, I think another reading is plausible, namely that the removal of the
ban is not the purpose of the visit or the questions, and is mentioned almost as
an afterthought following his death. R. Eliezer’s own disciples, not “the Sages,”
visit him in the PT, and there is no evidence they have been keeping apart from
him (whatever the other Sages have been doing.) They presumably visit him
to be present at his death, as in other rabbinic “deathbed” scenes, and as in
the alternative deathbed scene of R. Eliezer himself in b. Ber. 28b mentioned
above. The questions they ask are the typical discussions of Torah that students
have with their masters, and the narrator affirms that R. Eliezer answers cor-
rectly to emphasize that his mind was lucid to the end, and to have his dying
word be “Pure.” This functions simply to indicate how holy and pure R. Eliezer
was at his death. The comment by R. Mana emphasizes that they knew all
along that R. Eliezer was pure, even before this dying word. Note that in the PT
R. Yehoshua does not say that the vow is annulled immediately after R. Eliezer’s
finalword, but only after entering and removing the tefillin, in the third, not the
second, scene. The dying word “Pure,” in other words, does not function either
as expression of conformity or as supernatural sign that the vow is annulled,
but a sign of holiness. In b. B. Meṣ. 86a Rabbah bar Naḥmani also dies with the
word “Pure” on his mouth, and there is no issue of a ban.69 Our awareness of
the BT makes it hard to judge whether this alternative reading is persuasive. In
any case, whatever the force of the annulment of the ban in the PT, in the BT it
takes center stage.
(6) The eulogy of the PT has been greatly expanded in the BT into a discreet
scene that takes place in a different location, with the violent gestures not-
ed above replacing the irenic hugging and kissing. The verse (2Kgs 2:12) is
quoted verbatim in the Bavli (“My father, my father”) rather than paraphrased
(“My master!”). Most significantly, the mourner/eulogizer has shifted from
R. Yehoshua in the PT to R. Akiba in the BT.70 The relentless use of pronouns
renders it ambiguous as to whom R. Akiba encountered such that it is possible
to read that R. Akiba met R. Yehoshua while the latter struck his flesh and pro-
nounced the eulogy. This reading, however, is less plausible, given the focus on
R. Akiba and his relationship with R. Eliezer earlier in the story, and because it
would entail that R. Yehoshua switch from object to subject: “R. Akiba encoun-
tered him [R. Yehoshua] between Caesera and Lod. He [R. Yehoshua] was strik-
69 Cf. b. ‘Abod. Zar. 27b where R. Ishmael says of Ben Dama, “Your soul departed in purity.”
70 See Goshen-Gottstein, “Lonely Sage,” 95.
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ing his flesh”; I have not found any commentators or translators who read
the last scene this way. This switch to R. Akiba as subject—even with the
ambiguity—is a striking example of the transformation that occurs in the pro-
cess of reworking rabbinic sources, and the type of wholesale invention of
biographical anecdotes about sages that can occur in this process.71
TheBT reworking of the scenehelps account for the incongruity noted above
that R. Akiba is among the Sages present at the death of R. Eliezer, but then
strikes his flesh upon encountering the bier, apparently that night or the next
day, as if he had not witnessed the death itself. The BT has reworked the PT nar-
rative, which reads smoothly: the disciples/Sages are present at the death and
the eulogy is immediately pronounced. The BT displaces the eulogy to a later
time and a different place, for reasons that are not completely clear,72 which
produces the problem locating R. Akiba.
(7)There are anumberof otherminordifferences less central to themeaning
of the narrative, though interesting from a compositional perspective, includ-
ing the halakhic argument of R. Eliezer,73 the configuration of R. Eliezer’s
house,74 and the removal of his tefillin after his death.75
71 See e.g. Shamma Friedman, “La’aggada hahistorit batalmud habavli,” in Saul Lieberman
Memorial Volume, ed. Shamma Friedman (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1993),
128, 134. Also Cf. Hippolyte Delehaye, The Legends of the Saints: An Introduction to Hagiog-
raphy, trans. V.M. Crawford (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), 78ff.
72 Perhaps the displacement of the eulogy and dramatic funeral emphasize that R. Eliezer
received an honored burial despite his years of being banned. R. Eliezer is associated with
Lod in various sources, e.g. b. Sanh. 32b; t. Sukkah 2:1. Cf. y. Ketub. 2:5, 26c.
73 See n. 67. The difficult phrasing of the PT perhaps motivated the substitution of a more
straightforward explanation in the BT.
74 This change is particularly instructive. The action depicted in the first scene of the PT is
relatively straightforward. No setting is given, and we should understand that the entire
scene takes place in the same room, evidently R. Eliezer’s bedroomor another roomof his
abode where his deathbed has been placed. Hyrcanos approaches his father to remove
the tefillin, but Eliezer refuses and offers the complicated halakhic explanation. Hyr-
canos does not understand the argument; lamenting that his father has lost his senses, he
begins to weep. R. Eliezer responds that his own faculties are intact and his son (perhaps
because of the distress at seeing his father dying) is confused. Havingwitnessed this inter-
change but understood R. Eliezer’s halakhic demonstration, the disciples then approach
R. Eliezer’s bed, and the story proceeds with their questions. Yet there is a subtle ambigu-
ity in this account in that the storyteller uses the language “entered” (nikhnas) and “went
out” (yatsa) to describe Hyrcanos’s movements, and likewise “entered” to describe that of
the disciples. In this context these terms simplymean “approach” and “move away.”We are
to imagine that the disciples are within the same room, but in the background, at some
distance from the bed, whileHyrcanos stands right next to his father’s bed, and thenwalks
away from it toward the disciples. The BT storytellers seem to have taken the admittedly
ambiguouswordsmore literally in the sense of “entered his room fromanother” and “went
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These transformations encompass themajor themes of theBavli storywhich
emerged from the literary analysis, including the centrality of the ban of
R. Eliezer, resulting in his ostracism and the loss of his Torah, as lamented in
the lack of disciples and the failure of R. Akiba to learn all that he should have.
The Bavli storytellers have thoroughly reworked their source into a completely
different story.
The Sources of the Bavli Reworking and the Dating of the
Composition
The questions then become: can we determine the sources of these BT rework-
ings? And if so, does this help date the composition of the BT story?
(1) R. Eliezer’s lament recalling what R. Akiba learned (B2c), lacking in the
PT, draws on t. Sanh. 11:5:
out of the room.” The more clearly set scene of the BT story accordingly places R. Eliezer
in his “canopied bed,” presumably in his bedroom, and the Sages in the “receiving room”
such that Hyrcanos can really “enter” the bedroom from the receiving room and “leave in
disgrace” back to the receiving room, after which the Sages “enter” the bedroom. It is also
possible, of course, that the BT storytellers altered the scene to conform to their notions of
the realia of the domicile of a leading sage. At all events, the change produces a difficulty
with the sequenceof the BT account. BecauseHyrcanoshas left thebedroomto speakwith
the Sages, R. Eliezer should not respond to him, “Your mind and your mother’s mind are
confused,” as he is no longer in the room. (This forced one commentator to explain that
R. Eliezer had an extremely keen sense of hearing such that he could in fact hear from
the other room; see Joseph Chaim, Sefer Ben Yehoyada, ad loc., s.v. nikhnesu). Moroever,
R. Eliezer does not specifywhich severe commandmentHyrcanoshas neglected; the state-
ment is almost incomprehensiblewithout theYerushalmi’smoredetailed explanation.On
the other hand, the Bavli simplifies the narrative flow to a certain extent, as we have (1)
R. Eliezer’s rebuke, (2) Hyrcanos not understanding why he is rebuked and concluding his
father is confused, and (3) R. Eliezer explaining the halakhic logic. In the PT, by contrast,
we have R. Eliezer explaining the logic first, thenHyrcanos thinking his father is confused,
and then R. Eliezer asserting he is not in fact confused. For this reason we must explain
that Hyrcanos did not understand his father’s explanation, though he heard it. (And per-
haps this too bothered the BT storytellers, who felt that if R. Eliezer explained the halakhic
logic, Hyrcanos should have understood it, and therefore deferred the explanation until
after the exit.) We have here a nice example of how the BT storytellers’ reworking of an
earlier tradition produces slight but telling incongruities.
75 Mention of the tefillin returns full circle to the opening scene, Hyrcanos’s attempt to
remove them, which has a certain aesthetic appeal. It also enhances the theme of sons
and disciples: the son could not serve his father appropriately where the disciple success-
fully performs this service.
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R. Akiba said: R. Eliezer derived 300 interpretations from [the verse], You
shall not tolerate a sorceress (Exod 22:17), yet I only learned two things
from him: Of two collecting cucumbers [by magical methods]—one col-
lecting is culpable, and the other collecting is exempt. The one who
performs a [magical] act is culpable; the one who creates an illusion is
exempt.76
Here thenwe have (a) R. Akiba learning fromR. Eliezer; (b) 300 laws (halakhot)
about magic; (c) R. Akiba only learned two of the 300; (d) the two were about
cucumbers. To be sure, the BT has transformed this source significantly, such
that: (a) in the BT R. Eliezer reports that R. Akiba learned from him as a
flashback, whereas in the Tosefta R. Akiba reports what he himself learned
from R. Eliezer; (b) the 300 traditions are all about (magical manipulation
of) cucumbers, not magic in general. These laws are expounded (doresh) by
R. Eliezer, i.e., interpretations of the verse, whereas in the BT they are “taught”
(shoneh), apparently in Mishnah-form, not as exegesis, hence the verse is not
quoted. The possibility that there were 3000 is added; (c) R. Akiba explicitly
asksR. Eliezer to teachhimabout the cucumbers; (d) R. Eliezer performs amag-
ical act on the cucumbers, rather than teaching a law about those who perform
magic, as noted above. The BT storytellers have liberally reworked the Toseftan
source in much the same way they reworked the PT story.
Most importantly, this source helps account for two of the three major BT
transformations: (1) the interest in R. Akiba as a disciple of R. Eliezer and the
relationship between the two; (2) the loss of Torah, or the failure of R. Eliezer
to transmit his Torah. It seems tome that the storytellers extrapolated from the
fact that R. Akiba reports of the 300 traditions, “I only learned two things from
him” ( םירבדינשאלאונמיהיתדמלאלו ) that the other hundreds of traditions were
lost, and that the same was true of other dimensions of R. Eliezer’s knowledge.
Perhaps, too, if the greatest of sages, R. Akiba, only learned two traditions from
R. Eliezer, the other Sages learned nothing.77 I amnot sure if this tradition com-
pletely accounts for the imageof R. Eliezer in the story and the themeof the loss
of his Torah, which seems to be a larger BT construct, but it provides a partial
explanation. I know of no other source (other than the parallels in ʾAbot R. Nat.
and later midrashim, which derive from the Bavli) that portrays R. Eliezer and
his Torah in this way.
76 Cf. m. Sanh. 7:11, cited below.
77 However, see below, “Redactional Context,” on the relationship between the story and
Mishnah.
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Various Bavli sources mention 300 laws, including Doeg and Aḥitofel teach-
ing 300 laws about a “tower flying in the air” (b. Sanh. 106b = b. Ḥag. 15b), the
300 laws that Joshua forgot after the death of Moses (b. Tem. 16a), and the
300 responses of Yonatan b. Harkinos (b. Yebam. 16a; which also appears in y.
Yebam. 1:6, 3a), although I find no other tradition of 300 laws about the bright
spot specifically.78
(2) The story of the “Oven of Akhnai” as formulated at b. B. Meṣ. 59a–b
played a significant role in the BT’s reworking.79 This account probably shares
responsibility for the prominent role of R. Akiba, as he volunteers to inform
R. Eliezer of the ban, which perhaps points to some sort of special relationship
between the two sages.80 R. Akiba sits at a distance of four cubits, as do the
Sages in our story. As noted, the description of R. Yehoshua “standing on his
feet” and proclaiming the annulment of the ban seems to quote the descrip-
tion of R. Yehoshua in b. B. Meṣ. 59b. Also as noted, the reference to the “shoe
on the last” was apparently chosen to evoke t. ‘Ed. 2:1, the Toseftan passage that
mentions the Oven of Akhnai.
Moreover, the BT’s reversal of the PT plot whereby R. Eliezer does not retract
may be again a product of incorporating aspects of the Bavli’s version of the
account of the ban. The PT version of the “Oven of Akhnai” in fact concludes
with R. Eliezer observing that eventually the Sages will “bring him near,” i.e.
annul the ban. The BT version has no such optimistic ending. Rather, R. Eliezer
essentially causes the death of Rabban Gamaliel, and the alienation between
R. Eliezer and the Sages endures to the end, suggesting that there will be no
retraction of his opinion.
(3) That R. Eliezer predicts R. Akiba’s death probably devolves from b. Pesaḥ.
69a, where R. Eliezer declares to R. Akiba: “You responded to me with [the law
of] slaughtering; by slaughtering you will die.” The phrase “yours will be more
severe than theirs” may draw on an exegetical tradition attributed to R. Sheila
in b. Sanh. 44a, in which God says these same words to Joshua. The BT account
may also draw on the well-known traditions of the martyrdom of R. Akiba (b.
Ber. 61b; y. Ber. 9:5, 14b), and of other sages in the Romanpersecutions following
the second revolt.81
78 See too the parallel PT sugya to m. Sanh. 7:11, which claims that R. Eliezer actually taught
900 teachings (parshiot), three sets of 300, about Exod 22:18.
79 Cf. Steinmetz, “Like Torah Scrolls,” 156, 176.
80 R. Akiba also informs R. Eliezer in the parallel at y. Moʿed Qaṭ. 3:1, 81c–d.
81 See e.g. b. Giṭ. 57a; y. Ta‘an. 4:8, 68d (the death of R. Eleazar of Modiin); y. Sot. 5:7, 20c
(martyrdom of R. Ishmael and R. Shimon). Rabbinic sources generally refer to the “age of
persecution,” which scholars associate with the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba revolts.
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In b. ‘Erub. 63a (= Sipra, Shmini 1:33 [ed. Weiss, p. 45b]), R. Eliezer predicts
the imminent death of a student who “teaches the law before his master,” and
the student dies within a week. Perhaps the predictions of death in our story
draw on a more widespread motif of R. Eliezer predicting the death of sages
who commit offences.82
(4) The image of R. Eliezer’s two arms as rolled up Torah scrolls does not
really have a parallel elsewhere (B2a). Neusner has suggested that the figure
draws on t. Soṭah 15:3: “When R. Eliezer died, the scroll of Torah83 was annulled
(batel) … When R. Akiba died the arms (or ‘strength’; zero’ei) of Torah was
annulled (batel).”84 I.e., whenR. Eliezer died a great deal of traditionwas lost, as
if a Torah scroll is now inaccessible. Thus Rashi, in his comment to the Talmu-
dic citation of this source at b. Soṭah 49a (which reads “hidden away” [nignaz]
for “annulled”), relates it to our story: “He knew a great many laws from tra-
dition, and they were set in order in his mouth as if written in a scroll, as
is said in [Tractate] Sanhedrin, ‘I have learned a great amount of Torah from
my teachers.’ ”85 The disciples actually call R. Eliezer “the Scroll of Torah” in
b. Sanh. 101a, employing this same phrase from t. Soṭah 15:3. In this account
R. Eliezer becomes sick and his disciples, including R. Akiba, visit him. R. Akiba
laughs and the disciples weep, explaining: “Is it possible that Scroll of Torah
lies in pain and we not weep”? Perhaps too the description of R. Akiba as the
“arms” of Torah in t. Soṭah 15:3 relates to the description of R. Eliezer compar-
ing his arms to Torah scrolls. So it is possible we are dealing with a kind of
narrativization of these images, though this explanation does not fully satisfy
me.
Let me note in passing that this account (b. Sanh. 101a) and the immedi-
ately following source also feature R. Akiba and other sages visiting the sick
R. Eliezer, and have R. Akiba stand out from among the other sages in that he
recites a surprising teaching that occasions a question from R. Eliezer. These
accounts too may suggest a special relationship between the two sages.
The similes of the dog lapping from the sea and the painting stick from the
tube for a minimal amount of Torah, to the best of my knowledge, are unique
here.86
82 Cf. b. Ḥag. 3b where R. Eliezer, offended by what R. Yose b. Dormasqit reports to him has
transpired in the house of study, orders the sage to mutilate himself by removing his eye.
83 MS Vienna of t. Soṭah 15:3 reads “the honor of the Torah.”
84 Cf. t. Soṭah 15:3.
85 Rashi, s.v. nignaz.
86 The figure of the dog lapping at the sea is only found here. That of the painting stick and
the tube appears in halakhic contexts related to the consummation of sexual intercourse
among both animals and humans. See e.g. b. Mak. 7a; b. B. Meṣ. 91a. Goshen-Gottstein,
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The general image of R. Eliezer as a sage who served his masters devotedly,
repeating that which he heard but not creatively innovating or deriving new
inferences, draws on various rabbinic sources, though the Bavli here pushes
that image to an extreme.87
(5) The violence and hostility of the account is characteristic of Bavli de-
scriptions of hostile interactions between sages, and of its hyperbolic rhetoric
in general.88
(6)The expanded eulogy (C), as far as I candetermine, does not drawdirectly
on other traditions.
(7) Finally, many phrases and brief expressions in the story have parallels
in other Bavli narratives, such as “That day was the eve of the Sabbath,”89 “He
rebuked him and he left (or “dismissed him”) in disgrace,”90 “He said to them,
‘Why have you come?’ They said, ‘We have come to learn Torah,’ ”91 “We had no
free time,”92 “His blood gushed.”93 But most of these appear to be stock expres-
sions that do not necessarily point to the storytellers here adapting material
from the parallels, as is sometimes found in late Bavli stories.
Elsewhere I have tried to formulate criteria bywhich to distinguish stories of
Amoraic provenance from those that emerge from the Stammaim and betray
evidence of Stammaitic reworking.94 The reworking in this case appears to be
on the borderline. Thematically, there are none of the classic themes of late
Stammaitic narratives, such as the highly populated and hierarchically struc-
tured academy, dialectics, and academic warfare. From a compositional per-
spective, the BT storytellers did not transfer other Bavli passages wholesale,
using the samewordswithminor adaptations to fit the newcontext.While they
clearly drew on, andwere influenced by, other traditions, for themost part they
do not seem to have had access to the redacted sugyot that appear in our BT.95
“Lonely Sage,” 87 and n. 27, attempts to relate these sexual connotations to aspects of the
story.
87 See b. Sukkah 28a, where R. Eliezer declares, “I never spoke a word that I did not receive
frommymasters”; b. Ḥag. 3a–b; b. Yoma 66b; t. Yebam. 3:1; m. ʾAbot 2:8; Gilat, R. Eliezer, 1.
88 See n. 56.
89 b. Šabb. 31a, b. Šabb. 88a, b. Yoma 35b; y. Kil. 9:3, 32c. Palestinian sources typically use the
phrase “the eve of the Sabbath, at dusk” (erev shabbat im ḥasheikhah), as in the PT parallel
here. Cf. m. Šabb. 2:7, m. B. Bat. 5:8.
90 b. Šabb. 31a; Sipre to Deuteronomy #305 (p. 326).
91 b. Ber. 63a.
92 b. Moʿed Qaṭ. 17b (“they did not have time,” in an halakhic, not narrative context); b.
Šabb. 88a (“he did not have time”).
93 m. ʾOhal. 3:5; b. Sanh. 107a.
94 Stories of the Babylonian Talmud, 217–228.
95 For the stages in the process of redaction of the Bavli, see David Weiss Halivni, Meqorot
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Many of the traditions they employ appear inTannaitic sources, not exclusively
in the BT, and would have been available to Amoraim—considerations that
suggest an Amoraic provenance. On the other hand, the dependence on the
story on the Bavli’s version of “the Oven of Akhnai,” which is of Stammaitic
provenance,96 and perhaps on the tradition of R. Eliezer predicting Akiba’s
death, as well as a few of the other parallels, point to Stammaitic composition.
So too does the high degree of narrative artistry and the extensive reworking of
t. Sanh. 11:5.97 This suggests that the composition took place in the early Stam-
maitic period, during the time when the Stammaim were first creating sugyot
out of Amoraic traditions, but prior to the period when those early sugyotwere
fixed in their current locations and later redactors transferred and adapted
material directly from one sugya to another.98 The Stammaitic period was a
lengthy era that included many stages, from the initial composition of sugyot,
to the transposition of materials between proto-sugyot, to their redaction in
specific contexts in the proto-Talmud, to later editing and transpositions.99 The
incorporation of so much unparalleled material points to the earlier stages of
this era.
Redactional Context
The story appears in b. Sanh. 68a, the Talmudic commentary to m. Sanh. 7:11,
which I juxtapose with t. Sanh. 11:5 and the relevant passage of our story.
umesorot: Bava batra (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2007), 126–127; Jay Rovner, “Pseudepigraphic
Invention and Diachronic Stratification in the Stammaitic Component of the Bavli: The
Case of Sukka 28,”HUCA 68 (1997): 53–61. This is therefore not a case such as that which
Shamma Friedman describes wherein the Bavli’s expansions of Palestinian aggadot are
paralleled in another location in theBavli “as if that chapter and that sugya lay openbefore
the composer of the gemara” (“La’aggada hahistorit,” 139 n. 106).
96 Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories, 53–62; Jay Rovner, “Structure and Ideology in the Aher Nar-
rative,” JSIJ 10 (2012): 216 and n. 48.
97 See Jay Rovner, “Rav Assi Had This Old Mother,” in Creation and Composition: The Contri-
bution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggadah, ed. J.L. Rubenstein (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 113–114; and idem, “Structure and Ideology in the Aher Narrative,”
224–225.
98 See DavidWeiss Halivni, The Formation of the Babylonian Talmud, trans. Jeffrey L. Ruben-
stein (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), xxviii, 156–164.
99 SeeHalivni,Meqorotumesorot, 9–10; idem,TheFormationof theBabylonianTalmud, xxvii–
xxx.
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m. Sanh. 7:11100 t. Sanh. 11:5 b. Sanh. 68a (story)
R. Akiba said in the name
of R. Yehoshua:
R. Akiba said: R. Eliezer
derived 300 laws from [the
verse] You shall not tolerate
a sorceress (Exod 22:17), yet
I only learned two things
from him:
[R. Eliezer said …] “Not
only that, but I recite 300
laws—some say 3000
laws—about the planting
of cucumbers, and no one
ever asked me a question
about it, except for Akiba
b. Yosef:
Of two collecting cucum-
bers [by magical meth-
ods]—one collecting is
exempt, and the other col-
lecting is culpable. The one
who performs a [magical]
act is culpable; the one
who creates an illusion is
exempt.
Of two collecting cucum-
bers [by magical meth-
ods]—one collecting is
culpable, and the other
collecting is exempt. The
one who performs a [magi-
cal] act is culpable; the one
who creates an illusion is
exempt.
Once we were walking on
our way, and he said to me,
‘My master. Teach me one
thing about the planting
of cucumbers.’ I taught
him one thing, and the
whole field filled up with
cucumbers. He said to me,
‘My master: You taught me
about their planting. Teach
me about their uprooting.’
I said one thing and they
all gathered in one place.”
After citing the Mishnah, the Talmud queries: “Did R. Akiba learn this from
R. Yehoshua? But did we not learn …,” continues with our story, and then com-
ments, “therefore he learned this from R. Eliezer.” Thus this anonymous BT
sugya is concernedwith a contradiction: theMishnah reports that R. Yehoshua
taught R. Akiba traditions about themagical harvesting of cucumbers, whereas
the story relates that R. Eliezer taught R. Akiba those magical traditions. Now
this contradiction ultimately devolves from the contradiction between m.
Sanh. 7:11 and t. Sanh. 11:5 (which is even more blatant than the contradiction
between m. Sanh. 7:11 and the story, since in the Tosefta R. Akiba attributes to
R. Eliezer the verbatim laws aboutmagic found in theMishnah, whereas in the
100 This tradition also appears in Sipre to Deuteronomy #171 (p. 219).
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story Akiba learns magical acts, though the Bavli evidently did not make this
distinction.) Because the storytellers included a reworked version of t. Sanh.
11:5 into their story about R. Eliezer, the same contradiction resulted.
The BT resolves the contradiction by claiming that “he learned (gamra) from
R. Eliezer, but did not understand it (savra); then he learned from R. Yehoshua,
who explained it (asberah) to him.” This solution employs a common Bavli
distinction between learning, in the sensing of memorizing, a tradition or
law (gmr) and understanding the justification or reasoning behind it (svr).
Hence the story is prior to the Mishnah: because R. Akiba did not understand
R. Eliezer’s pedagogy he ultimately learned these same laws from R. Yehoshua.
On one level, this resolution of the contradiction is extremely ironic in that
it eliminates the two traditions R. Eliezer believed he had transmitted. Where
R. Eliezer lamented how few sages asked him questions, and how many of his
hundreds of traditions would die with him, the Bavli now denies him even the
minor solace he took in in the two traditions he communicated to R. Akiba—
in fact he was not successful!101 Yet from a second point of view the resolution
is true to the narrative insofar as it claims that R. Eliezer lacked disciples and
interlocutors. The BT commentary simply embellishes the degree of his isola-
tion and the extent that he failed to pass on his traditions.
In this way the contextualization enhances a prominent theme of the story.
Yet there is a reciprocal impact of the story on the redactional context.
The lengthy sugya that precedes the story contains traditions about the
nature of magic, including different categories of magic, almost a rudimen-
tary taxonomy, and claims about how different kinds of magic work.102 There
are also stories of sages performing magic of various sorts and of magical
duels between Amoraim and sorcerers/witches. As noted above, descriptions
of Amoraim engaging inmagic are routine in bothTalmuds. R. Eliezer teaching
R. Akiba twomagical acts in the story is therefore of one piece with the preced-
ing sugya. Yet both the sugya and the story ostensibly contradict the Mishnah,
which expresses the Tannaitic prohibition against engaging inmagic. This very
problem is raised by the anonymous sugya that follows the story, and follows
immediately after the resolution of the contradiction about whom R. Akiba
learned from: “How could he [R. Eliezer] do this [magic on the cucumbers]?
Did we not learn (in m. Sanh. 7:11), ‘The one who performs a [magical] act
is culpable?’ ” The Talmud’s solution is to distinguish learning for the sake of
101 See Devora Steinmetz, “Agada Unbound: Inter-Agadic Characterization of Sages in the
Bavli and Implications for Reading Agada,” in Creation and Composition, 332, n. 85. And
see Steinmetz, “Like Torah Scrolls,” 170–171 and n. 51.
102 See Levinson, “Enchanting Rabbis,” 69–75, for analysis of this sugya.
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understanding and teaching, which is permitted, from learning in order to
practice magic for its own sake, which is forbidden. And with that the sugya
concludes. In this respect the story functions as a coda of sorts to the entire
sugya. The question, “How could he do this?,” could be said equally of the other
Amoraim featuring in the sugya, such as R. Hanina and R. Oshaya, who created
a calf ex nihilo and ate it, and R. Yannai, who turned spilled water into snakes.
Rashi in fact was so scandalized by R. Yannai’s performance that he rejected
the reading he received, “Rabbi Yannai,” in favor of “Yannai,” since “he was not
an upright man, as he engaged in magic.”103 The actions of these and other
Amoraim can be justified on the same grounds, that they learned these tech-
niques to teach and understand and not to perform them for their own sake,
as did R. Eliezer (and R. Akiba!). In addition, the story provides a genealogy for
magical praxis, a precedent for the Amoraic “magicians” described throughout
theTalmudic sugya in the greatTannaimof the story.These andotherAmoraim
(and later sages studying the sugya, the intended audience) need feel no com-
punctions about engaging inmagic as the tradition of rabbinicmagic goes back
at least as far as R. Eliezer and R. Akiba, in whose steps they follow.
It is even possible that the redactors attempted to create a segue to the story,
to link itmore closely to theprecedingmaterial. The final tradition of the sugya,
which appears immediately before the story is this:
And the frog came up and covered the whole land of Egypt (Exod 8:2).
R. Eleazar said: It was one frog and it filled the entire Land of Egypt. This
is the matter of a dispute among Tannaim: R. Akiba said: It was one frog
and it filled the entire Land of Egypt. R. Eleazar b. Azariah said to him:
Akiba! What business do you have with aggadah? Cease your words and
go engage inLeprosy (negaim) andTent-Impurity (ohalot). Itwas one frog;
it croaked for others and they came.
The content of this tradition has little to dowith the sugya. It does not focus on
magic, nor really with anything that comes beforehand. There is a weak, formal
connection to a tradition somewhat earlier in the sugya that quotes Exodus
8:15, Then the magicians said to Pharaoh: ‘This is the finger of God,’ about the
plague of lice, on the basis of which R. Eleazar claims that magicians cannot
create creatures less than the size of a barley corn. Here then is another tradi-
103 The same sensibility seems to have led the scribes of the Munich, Florence and Rav Her-
zog manuscripts to omit “R.,” but it is present in the geniza fragment Cambridge T-S F2(1)
169.
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tion of R. Eleazar (b. Pedat) about the plagues, albeit unrelated to magic, and
the Talmud then coordinates it with a Tannaitic dispute. Nevertheless, the tra-
dition seems to be tacked on gratuitously to a coherent andwell-focused sugya
otherwise devoid of digressions.
I would suggest, with all due caution, that what motivated the redactors to
include this tradition was less that it features the same R. Eleazar (b. Pedat)
than the associated Tannaitic dispute that mentions R. Akiba and his studies:
R. Eleazar b. Azariah rebukes R. Akiba for studying aggadah and directs him
to a more appropriate subject, the purity laws of leprosy and tents. There is a
certain parallel between this charge that R. Akiba studied the wrong subject
and R. Eliezer’s rebuke of R. Akiba (and the Sages) for not having studied with
him, that they engaged in the wrong type of study, and also the implication
that R. Akiba failed to learn what he should have (thus the harshest death.104)
Moreover, according to the anonymous sugya that follows the story, R. Akiba
did not even understand what he learned from R. Eliezer, much as R. Eleazar b.
Azariah suggests he does not understand the workings of aggadah. The men-
tion of leprosy (nega’im) also intersects with the story in that R. Eliezer knows
300 laws of the bright spot, which is one of the signs of leprosy.While the form
of this tradition therefore connects to the previous sugya (a dictum attributed
to R. Eleazar b. Pedat), the content connects to the story that follows. The stu-
dent of Talmud, having encountered this tradition, is more prepared for the
portrayal of R. Akiba in the story.
Now it should be noted that the BT redactional context differs from that
of the PT (y. Šabb. 2:5, 5b), where the story is redacted in connection to m.
Šabb. 2:7. That mishnah lists “Three things that one must state in his house on
the eve of the Sabbath at dusk,” the third of which is “Light the Sabbath lamp!”
and then deals with what to do in cases of doubt as to whether it is still dusk.
This law clearly intersects with the first scene of the story, as the setting is “the
eve of the Sabbath at dusk,” and R. Eliezer rebukes his son for neglecting the
pressing concerns at that time. In this context the story serves to reinforce the
Mishnah’s admonition to light lamps at the appropriate time: even the dying
R. Eliezer admonished his son to attend to this task before all others. Indeed,
the previous mishnah claims that women die in childbirth as punishment for
negligence in this ritual. In the BT the story has been redacted in connection
with m. Sanh. 7:11 because of R. Eliezer’s reference to the tradition of cucum-
ber planting, which does not appear in the PT, and is a result of the Babylonian
reworking that draws on t. Sanh. 11:5.
104 See n. 34.
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Consideration of the BT redactional context supports the dating of the story
to the early Stammaitic period. The redactors of this sugya evidently knew of
the completed BT story, which had been composed at some earlier point by
reworking the PT tradition. They realized that the story contradicted theMish-
nah and therefore integrated it as described above: juxtaposing the story with
the Mishnah, resolving the contradiction, and adding the follow-up question
and answer. If the analysis above has merit, they also created a bridge to the
story by including the tradition with R. Akiba’s exegesis of Exodus 8:2. There is
no evidence that these redactors contributed to the composition of the story,
as we sometimes find,105 by reworking it so as to connect it to thematerial with
which it is contextualized. Rather, they included the story not only to resolve
the contradiction with m. Sanh. 7:11, but because the depiction of R. Eliezer
relates to the content of the previous sugya.
Appendix: Manuscript Variants
Only major variants are listed here: Munich 95 = M; Jerusalem, Yad Harav Her-
zog =He; Florence 9 = F2; Karlsruhe (Reuchlin 2) = K. (Thesemanuscript abbre-
viations are from Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic
[Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 2002], 58.) Orthographic variants are not listed. Additional variants
can be found in R.N. Rabbinowicz, Diqduqei sofrim, reprint, 12 vols. (New York,
1960), 9:192–194.
(A3) “His mind and his mother’s mind.” He, F2, K read: “Your mind and your
mother’s mind.”
(B1c) “ ‘What about my [death]?’ He said to him, ‘Yours will be more severe
than theirs.’ ” He, F2 read: “his [death] … Hiswill be …”
(B2a) “even as much (afilu) as a dog”: F2, K omit: “even as much.”
(B2b) “bright spot.” K reads: “bright as snow.”
(B2c) “I said one thing, and the whole field filled up with cucumbers.” K, F2
read: “I taught one thing, and …”
(B3) “They [the Sages] said to him: ‘Master:’ ” He omits “Master.”
(B3a) “They are made pure [by immersion] as they are” (bameh shehen). He,
K, F2 read: “They become pure by any amount” (bemashehu). (This
would seem to be an error in light of the Tannaitic parallels.)
105 See Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories, 255–267; idem, Stories of the Babylonian Talmud, 207–
217.
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(B3c) “And his soul departed with ‘Pure.’ ” He adds: “A heavenly voice went
forth and said: Happy are you, R. Eliezer the Great, that your body is
pure and your soul departed with ‘Pure.’ ”
(B1a) “We have come to learn Torah.” F2 omits “We have come.”
(C) “In the row (shura).” F2 reads “in song” (or “with his eulogy”; shira).
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chapter 13
Ve-Shuv Limlakhah u-Shvut: An Older Theoretical
Framework
Marcus Mordecai Schwartz
Rabbinic tradition has generally divided Shabbat prohibitions into two major
categories:melakhah and shevut.1 Unfortunately the protean vibrancy of these
two terms, particularly the latter, has allowed them to escape clear definition.2
The purpose of this paper is to present a working definition of shevut that
reflects the enormous amount of change and dynamism that have character-
ized these two terms over the course of their existence. To be clear: My pre-
sentation in this paper is far from exhaustive, nor does it represent my final
considered opinion on thematter. This paper ismore of a first attempt to come
to terms with the significance that the continually shifting nature of these two
classifications of Shabbat practice holds for our contemporary context. Down
the road, in later more developed work, I hope to foster an understanding
of these practices that is faithful to precedent while recognizing the need to
develop a 21st-century practice of Shabbat that is both relevant and practical.
The extraordinary cultural disruption that modernity and its aftermath have
imposed upon the people Israel obliges us to recover and restore the practice
of Shabbat in an age when most Jews no longer observe it.
1 Joel Roth divides these prohibitions into three categories in Joel Roth, “Melakhah U’Shevut:
A Theoretical Framework,” Conservative Judaism 35, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 4–34. However, the
first two of his categories are subdivisions of themelakhah prohibition.
2 In addition to Roth, a number of contemporary scholars have made attempts to define these
terms. Though overly credulous of rabbinic legal myth making, Boaz Cohen nicely collects
the major sources in Boaz Cohen, “Sabbath Prohibitions Known as Shebut,” Proceedings of
the Rabbinical Assembly 9 (1949): 123–161. I would not really call his discussion a historical
analysis per se, but it is a coherent conceptualization based upon an exhaustive collection
of the historical sources. Three other excellent discussions of both the origin and definitions
of these terms are: (1) Y.D. Gilat, “On the 39 Shabbat Avot-melakhot” [in Hebrew], Tarbiz 29
(1959): 222–228; (2) Aviad Stollman, Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin X: Critical Edition with Com-
prehensive Commentary [in Hebrew], vol. 7 of Talmud Haiggud (Jerusalem: Society for the
Interpretation of the Talmud, 2006), 164–165; 275 n. 4; 286, n. 8; 357–358; (3) Richard Hidary,
“One May Come to Repair Musical Instruments’: Rabbinic Authority and the History of the
Shevut Laws,” JSIJ 13 (2015): 1–26. Both Gilat and Hidary appear awake to the shifting nature
of the two prohibitions.
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In working up a definition of the two terms, I find it quite difficult to assign
either word a single meaning immediately and without hesitation. As we will
see over the course of our discussion, the two terms are complementary rather
than oppositional. They are a coupled pair and have undergone change as a
coupled pair. The definition of each one rests to a significant degree on the
meaning vested in its companion. When we attempt to define the one, we
return to the other only to find that it has shifted while we were observing the
first.This polysemous syzygy renders all definitionsdependent andprovisional.
Perhaps, for themoment, the best working definition I am able to proposemay
be that shevut (literally “cessation” or “resting”) represents the positive side
of the commandment to rest on Shabbat, while melakhah (literally “craft” or
“task”) represents thenegative side. In otherwords,melakhah is the sort of work
one refrains from on Shabbat, while shevut encompasses the act of resting. See
the appendix at the end of this paper to see the biblical background of these
terms.
Of course the difficulty here is that the manner in which one positively
ceases or rests from an act is to stop doing it. As such, shevut demands that
we avoid behaviors which interfere with the act of resting on Shabbat. Thus,
rather than seeing shevut as a positive commandment, we are captured by the
illusion that it is merely another (perhaps lesser) sort of Shabbat prohibition.
Indeed, we shall see that the positive encouragement to refrain from particu-
lar acts that is embodied in shevut is conceptualized by the Bavli as a series of
rabbinic prohibitions.
I am not the first to define these fields of practice in this complex, yet seem-
ingly binary manner; namely that melakhah directly forms the negative prohi-
bitions of its kind, while shevut is derived from a positive impulse—yet indi-
rectly creates all manner of prohibitions of its own sort. In this paper I will
present two conceptions of shevut that hold fast to this composite scheme,
though in different ways: That of Maimonides and that of Naḥmanides. We
shall see both of them attempting to explain shevut as the positive command-
ment to rest on Shabbat, while simultaneously maintaining the more recent
Amoraic understanding of shevut as a rabbinic prohibition. This puts both of
them under an interpretive strain. The distorting effect of this strain results in
two deeply creative conceptual reworkings of the category.
Maimonides’ definitionof shevut is undoubtedly oneof theoddest descriptions
of any legal concept in the Mishneh Torah:
The Torah states (Exod 23:12), “you shall rest.” Youmust cease even behav-
iors that are not melakhah. And the things that the Sages forbade for the
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sake of rest (shevut) are numerous. Some of them are prohibited because
they are akin tomelakhah, and some of them are prohibited as a circum-
scription to prevent encroachment on prohibitions punishable by ston-
ing.3
Three things in this statement would have had the effect of defamiliarizing
shevut to Maimonides’ audience.4 First, his audience would clearly have been
conditioned to view shevut as nothing more than a rabbinic prohibition. Isaac
Alfasi puts forth this view in his treatment of b. Beṣah 36b.5 Given the currency
and authority of the Hilkhot Rav Alfas in place and time, one can deduce a
widespread view that shevut was seen as nothing more than a rabbinic pro-
hibition. However Maimonides grounds the practice of shevut in the Torah’s
positive commandment to rest. In and of itself, this can be taken as repre-
sentative of one of Maimonides’ typical modes of operation. He often ground
rabbinic rules in Scripture.6 However his attempt to follow this typical pattern
results in a near contradiction of the Bavli’s claim that shevut is not a Torah-
level (de-oraita) law.B. Beṣah36b is themost explicit on this point.Nonetheless,
many passages in the Bavli tally with this understanding. These include—but
are not limited to—b. Šabb. 8b, 97a, 114b, 150a; b. ‘Erub. 30b, 32b, 34b, 98a, 103a,
105a; b. Beṣah 33b. Instead he is quite explicit that shevut has its starting point
in Scripture: “The Torah states (Exod 23:12), ‘you shall rest (tishbot).’ ”
This brings us to the second point of oddness: Maimonides puts forth a
hybrid system in which shevut has its inception in the Torah, but its expression
in the circumscriptions enacted by the Sages. No passage in the Mishnah, nor
3 Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat 21:1 (translation by the author).
4 The term “defamiliarization” was first coined in 1917 by Viktor Shklovsky in his essay “Art as
Device”. See Viktor Shklovskij (sic.), “Art as Technique,” in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed.
Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1998). It is the method of pre-
senting audiences with common things in unfamiliar or strange ways in order to recover and
restore fresh experience of the familiar. This is exactly what Maimonides does here. For a
treatment of the affinity between Shklovsky’s “ostranenie” and Jacques Derrida’s “différance,”
see Lawrence Crawford, “Viktor Shklovskij: Différance in Defamiliarization,” Comparative Lit-
erature 36 (1984): 209–219.
5 Hilkhot Rav Alfas, vol. 1, ed. Nisan Zakash (Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-Rav Kook, 1969), 258. Alfasi
presents the Bavli’s claims that shevut is a rabbinic decree and then presents the Yerushalmi’s
sugya that clapping is only prohibited on Shabbat when it arises from anger. However he fails
to present the Yerushalmi’s discussion that precedes this sugya in the same halakhah. That
sugya roots shevut in the positive commandment to rest.
6 This is a commonplace. See, for instance, Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Prin-
ciples [in Hebrew], vol. 2, pt. 3 (Jerusalem: Magness Press, 1988), 980–997.
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in either Talmud, nor theTosefta, nor in any extant halakhicmidrash of which I
am aware advances such a theory of shevut. This is a new, foundational redraft-
ing of the theory underpinning shevut. However, Maimonides does not make
this new idea of whole cloth. It is a harmonization prompted by the multiple,
differing rabbinic paradigms regarding the nature of shevut that he inherited.
We shall also see that Naḥmanides was prompted from the same motivations
to attempt something similar.
Third, Maimonides makes it clear that there is a deep and abiding con-
nection between melakhah and shevut. However he maintains a somewhat
ambiguous stance, not clarifying the exact relationship between the two fields
of observance. I suggest that this is intentional. It is clear that the two concepts
are intimately linked, but that link was expressed in a variety of different ways
prior to Maimonides. Vidal de Tolosa (1283–1360), one of Maimonides’ closest
readers and the author of theMaggidMishnah, is unusually circumspect about
Maimonides’ meaning. Indeed he appears somewhat confused, and imposes
the system of Naḥmanides (as well as that of the Mekhilta of Rabbi Shimon b.
Yohai) on our passage of the Mishneh Torah, overlaying it with two possible,
contradictory meanings:
Our master’s intention is [to say] that the Torah prohibited the explic-
itly forbidden tasks (melakhot) in detail, in accordance with the general
method in which they have been explicated along with their measures.
However a person could still toil at things that are not melakhot all day
long. Therefore the Torah said, “rest.” This is also as Naḥmanides has writ-
ten in his commentary to the Torah. So the Sages advanced and forbade
many things. Or, perhaps our master’s intent is that the rabbinic require-
ments to rest (shevutin) have support from theTorah: “You shall rest.” This
is the theory of the passages in the Mekhilta.7
De Tolosa’s confusion, along with the multiple explanations he puts forth,
points to the idiosyncrasy of this passage in the Mishneh Torah. The strange-
ness of the Mishneh Torah in this passage is suggestive of the multiple para-
digms and the shifting ground upon which bothmelakhah and shevut rest.
Naḥmanides’ approach to the problem is clarifying, andmakes the dynamics
of the categories come to life before our eyes. He writes:
7 Ad loc. I hope to address the different complex and confusing conceptions of shevut that we
find in the collections of Tannaitic midrash at another time.
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It appears tome that themeaning of themidrash [interpreting the phrase
shabbaton] is that we are commanded on Yom Tov to rest from those
activities that technically do not qualify as melakhah. We should not be
disturbed all day to measure our grain, to weigh our fruit and posses-
sions, to fill our vessels with wine, to move our wares, and even building
stones, from house to house and place to place, and if located in a walled
city, load up our donkeys, and even wine, grapes, figs, and all packages
could indeed be delivered on a festival; and the marketplace would be
filled with ongoing commerce, and the shops would be open and money
changers’ tables strewn with coins, and the workers would arise for their
duties and establish their daily wages, like the rest of the week, and so on.
These and similar activities, whether on Yom Tov or even Shabbat itself,
all these activities do not technically constitutemelakhah. Therefore, the
Torah commands us “shabbaton”—that these should be days of rest and
cessation of work, and not days of labor and toil. And this is a good and
beautiful interpretation.8
Naḥmanides puts forth the theory that work and rest are—by definition—
performative categories: The form that each category takes in practice defines
the nature and character of human toil or leisure, rather than any prior fixed
nature or character that toil or leisure may have possessed determining the
form of their practice. What exhausts us, or refreshes us is largely a function
of whether we conceive of it as work or as rest. One could engage in hard phys-
ical activity for a long time, and feel refreshed by it, if one thinks of it as rest,
and yet be exhausted by several hours of doing little more than talking, if one
conceives of it as work. This is to some degree subjective and temperamental,
but he seems to argue that it is the shared communal perception of acts of work
or rest that imbue them with their toilsome or leisure character.
In his imagined religious context, the result of the performative quality of
work and rest is such that the ambience of Shabbat is the result of human
action and behavior, and only in that action and behavior is Shabbat recog-
nizable and distinct from other days of the week. As the halakhic conception
of work and rest (i.e., melakhah and shevut) change, inevitably, the quality of
that ambiencemay change. By being conscious of the changes in conception of
these acts this midrashic interpretation of shabbaton arms us with sensitivity
to perceive which acts are less thanmelakhah but still violate the aesthetics of
the day.
8 Naḥmanides, Commentary on the Torah, Lev 23:24.
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I hope this also arms us with the foresight to anticipate what those changing
conceptions mean for the future of Shabbat in an age in which digital technol-
ogy is constantly remaking our understanding of the nature of work and rest. I
further pray that we will use that foresight to ensure the restoration of Shabbat
to its rightful role as the guardian of the people Israel’s survival and flourish-
ing.
Appendix: Melakhah and Shevut in Scripture
The verb √ תבש (√ŝbt) appears in the Torah in four passages (Gen 2:1–3; Exod
16:11–36; 23:9–12; 34:21). One is in Genesis, the other three are in Exodus. The
three Exodus passages depict a commandment to rest using this verb.Thenoun
הכאלמ (melakhah) appears in six passages in which Shabbat is addressed (Gen
2:1–3; Exod20:8–11; 31:12–17; 35:1–3; Lev 23:3;Deut 5:12–15).They appear together
only once: Genesis 2:1–3. This passage is not prescriptive, being a creation
narrative. There are five passages in which Shabbat is addressed, yet neither
the verb √ תבש (√ŝbt) nor the noun הכאלמ (melakhah) appears (Lev 19:3, 30;
26:2; Num 15:32–36; 28:9–10). In order to understand what is at play here, and
whether or not there are different conceptions of Shabbat commandments and
prohibitions contained in the two words as they are presented in Scripture, we
must first untangle the relationship between these various verses. There is also
the matter of the multiple voices in which the Torah is written. I refer here to
the strands of tradition or documents that certain critical Bible scholars have
posited since the 19th century.9 Can the multiplicity of voices that we find in
the Torah help us in determining the conception of these two terms and the
extent to which the conception of Shabbat they represent differed historically
in the time of the composition of the Bible? Finally, can we attribute the geo-
graphical, temporal, or ideological differences regarding the nature of Shabbat
from these passages in the Torah?
For the sake of heuristic clarity I have created a chart that depicts the rela-
tionship between these various verses. I have also assigned a voice to each
passage using the letters that Bible scholars have been using for some time
(more than a hundred years) to refer to the documents—or strands of tra-
dition that many claim the Torah contains. The Torah undoubtedly contains
separate voices running the whole of its length that are consistent in vocabu-
9 For a good recent review of the hypothesis see Joel Baden, The Composition of the Pentateuch:
Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 13–33.
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lary; voices that leave off in one passage and then resume at a later point in a
coherent, connecting way. The consistency of style, vocabulary, theology, and
more that one finds in these voices is deeply convincing that they represent
consistent, sustained, coherent, and differing statements submerged below the
Torah’s redactional layer. I think it is clear that this is the way the Torah talks—
in a multiplicity of voices.10 To that extent, considering these voices and how
they present the various commandments of the Torah may give us an insight
into different conceptions that may have been extant at the time of the Torah’s
composition. In any case, in addition to assigning voices to the passages, the
chart below lays out the occurrence of the two terms, or their absence, in every
passage related to Shabbat in the Torah.
םומע תובש הכאלמ לוק השרפ














10 I think it is unduly difficult to attempt to establish an exact date for each of these voices,
nor is it my duty to do so here. I will not be entering into a discussion of which of these
voices preceded the other, or whether they all derive from a simultaneousmoment of rev-
elation. That is beyond the scope of this paper.
ve-shuv limlakhah u-shvut: an older theoretical framework 351
Bibliography
Baden, Joel. The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
Cohen, Boaz. “Sabbath Prohibitions Known as Shebut.” Proceedings of the Rabbinical
Assembly 9 (1949): 123–161.
Crawford, Lawrence. “Viktor Shklovskij: Différance in Defamiliarization.” Comparative
Literature 36 (1984): 209–219.
Elon, Menachem. Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles [in Hebrew]. Vol. 2, pt. 3.
Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988.
Gilat, Y.D. “On the 39 Shabbat Avot-melakhot” [in Hebrew]. Tarbiz 29 (1959): 222–228.
Hidary, Richard. “One May Come to Repair Musical Instruments’: Rabbinic Authority
and the History of the Shevut Laws.” JSIJ 13 (2015): 1–26.
Roth, Joel. “Melakhah U’Shevut”: A Theoretical Framework.” Conservative Judaism 35,
no. 3 (Spring 1982): 4–34.
Shklovskij [Shklovsky], Viktor. “Art as Technique.” In Literary Theory: An Anthology.
Edited by Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, 15–21. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1998.
Stollman, Aviad. BabylonianTalmud, Eruvin X: Critical Editionwith Comprehensive Com-
mentary [in Hebrew]. Vol. 7 of TalmudHaiggud. Jerusalem: Society for the Interpre-
tation of the Talmud, 2006.
Zakash, Nisan, ed. Hilkhot Rav Alfas. Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-Rav Kook, 1969.
© benjamin d. sommer, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004420465_015
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
chapter 14
From Confidence to Confusion: Structure and
Meaning in Psalm 27
Benjamin D. Sommer
At once a song of faith and a song of doubt, Psalm 27 can be seen as a dis-
tillation of the Book of Psalms as a whole.1 Its stanzas move from a com-
plete but perhaps haughty faith in God to a more modest religious sentiment:
hope, a less-than-full trust which aspires to confidence but admits to some
uncertainty. Psalm 27 divides itself into three stanzas, and the relationship
among them provides a key to the meaning of this poem. Each section has
its own mood: in the first section (verses 1–6) the worshiper is confident; in
the second (7–12), the worshiper is distressed; in the third (13–14), we find
expressions of hope along with an implicit acknowledgement that certainty
of salvation is not possible. The sections are stylistically distinct as well: in the
first section, the worshiper speaks of God in the third person; in the second,
the worshiper addresses God in the second person; in the third, God is again
described in the third person. The shift in both mood and grammatical per-
son at verse 7 is extremely abrupt, and this has led some scholars to argue that
our chapter contains two unrelated psalms, a song of confidence in verses 1–
6 and a complaint/plea psalm in verses 7–14. But such a view oversimplifies
our poem. It fails to note the ways each section contains elements that fore-
shadow or echo the others.2 Intimations of distress can be found in the first
stanza, while elements of confidence underlie the worshiper’s plea for help in
the second. The psalm’s movement back and forth between confidence and
need, between believing in God’s reliability andworrying about God’s absence,
1 Abbreviations in thenotes follow the stylesheet of the Society for Biblical Literature. All trans-
lations are my own, unless otherwise noted. It is an honor to dedicate this essay to Professor
Joel Roth as a small token of thanks for all he has taught and for the many תולאש he has
answered for me and my family over the years. My thanks to Rabbi Joyce Newmark for her
careful reading of the galleys.
2 The same situation is found in Psalm 19: each of the two stanzas that many scholars regard
as distinct and unrelated psalms is in fact full of verbal and thematic references to the other,
and it is the dialogue between the two stanzas that is the key to understanding that highly
integrated, unified poem. See Benjamin D. Sommer, “Nature, Revelation, and Grace in Psalm
19: Towards a Theological Reading of Scripture,”HTR 108 (2015): esp. 379–381, 388–390.
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reveals the essence of this psalm.The psalmas awhole defines amature faith in
God as encompassing doubt. This psalm further emphasizes not only intellec-
tual knowledge of God as a savior but the experience of God’s presence, which
comes not only from contemplation but from ritual or ethical action.
Text and Translation
In analyzing this text, I would like to model a method of reading in which we’ll
first attend to local poetic structures; building on these local structures, we’ll
move to broader structural elements; finally, building on the broader struc-
tures, we’ll turn to theological interpretation. So I think it would beworthwhile
to take a look at the text as a whole and to attend to its lineation, because
the first thing we need to do when we are interpreting any biblical poem is to
break it into lines. In most poetic traditions, that work is done for us. When
one picks up The Oxford Book of English Verse or The Penguin Anthology of
Twentieth-Century American Poetry or this week’s copy of The New Yorker, the
conventions of printing tell us how the poet wants the poem to be divided.
Further, in traditions in which poetry scans (that is, in poems that havemeter),
we usually know quite precisely where lines begin and end based on the num-
ber of syllables they contain and on their patterns of stress (in most English
poetry prior to the twentieth century, for example) or vowel length (in Greek,
Arabic, andmedievalHebrewpoetry). But in biblical poetrywehave no author-
itative editions going back to the time of the poems’ composition or evolu-
tion. Because biblical poetry is essentially a form of free verse,3 there is no
3 SeeF.W.Dobbs-Allsopp,OnBiblicalPoetry (NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press, 2015), 9–10, 95–
177, esp. 98–99. Similarly, Benjamin Hrushovski, “Prosody, Hebrew,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica
(Jerusalem: Keter, 1971), 13:1201, refers to the “free rhythm … based on a cluster of changing
principles” of biblical poetry, which he clearly sees as a type of free verse. On earlier literary
critics (esp.GayWilsonAllen)who rightly recognize biblical poetry as a very early formof free
verse, see Dobbs-Allsopp, On Biblical Poetry, 95, 393 n. 3, and 396 n. 32. Dobbs-Allsopp points
out (177 and 395n. 13) thatWaltWhitmanhimself already implied a connectionbetweenwhat
we now call free verse and biblical poetry in his 1888 essay, “The Bible as Poetry.” Whitman
cites the claim of Frederick De Sola Mendes (in Mendes’ lecture “Hebrew Poets”) that “that
rhyming was not a characteristic of Hebrew poetry at all. Metre was not a necessary mark
of poetry. Great poets discarded it; the early Jewish poets knew it not.” Mendes, incidentally,
was one of the founders of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and a graduate of
the older JTS in Breslau, Germany. (He is not to be confused with his brother, Henry Pereira
Mendes, the American JTS’s president from 1897 to 1902.)Whitman’s essay is available inWalt
Whitman, “The Bible as Poetry,” in Complete Prose Works (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1892),
379–382. I have not been able to locate Mendes’ lecture, which (Dobbs-Allsopp suggests to
me) may not exist in print; Whitman may have attended the lecture in Manhattan where he
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scansion to determine where lines begin and end. So the readers have to fig-
ure this out themselves, and it will be helpful for readers of this commentary
to know how I divide the poem into lines and versets. (I will follow Benjamin






















:יררושןעמל רושימחראבינחנו ךכרד׳הינרוה 11
:סמחחפיו רקש־ידעיב־ומקיכ ירצשפנביננתת־לא 12
:םייחץראב ׳ה־בוטבתוארל יתנמאהאלול 13
:׳ה־לאהוקו ךבלץמאיוקזח ׳ה־לאהוק 14
1 Of David.
Yhwh is my light and my salvation— Whom should I fear?
Yhwh is the sure haven of my life— Whom could I dread?
2 When evil-doers draw near To slander me,
My enemies and foes— They’re the ones who stumbled and fell.
lived for some years and whereMendes served as rabbi of the synagogue now known as Tem-
ple Shaarey Tefilla.
4 Hrushovski, “Prosody, Hebrew,” 13:1200–1203.
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3 Should an army encamp against me, My mind will know no fear.
Should war break out around me, I will trust in this.
4 One thing I ask of Yhwh, This do I request:
To dwell in Yhwh’s house All the days of my life,
To gaze upon the marvel that is Yhwh, And to serve in His palace.
5 For He conceals me, inviolable, in His shelter, At times of danger;
He hides me in His hidden tent, High on a rock, He lifts me up.
6 So now, I hold my head high Above my enemies all around.
I should offer up in His tent A celebration-meal—
I should sing and play music to Yhwh!
7 Hear, O Yhwh, My voice, my cry!
And showme grace and answer me!
8 On Your behalf my mind speaks: “Seek Me out!”
It is You I seek, Yhwh— 9 Do not hide Yourself fromme!
Don’t thrust Your servant away in anger— You were my help!
Don’t leave me, don’t abandon me O God of my salvation!
10 Indeed, my father and mother abandoned me, But it is Yhwh who takes me in.
11 Parent me, Yhwh, teaching me Your path, And lead me on a level road
While my foes look on.
12 Don’t feed me to my enemies! Yes, lying witnesses rise against me,
With unfair, violent testimony.
13 Were it not for the fact that I believe That I shall see Yhwh’s goodness
While still alive …
14 Hope that Yhwh will come! Courage! Let your mind be strong!
And hope that Yhwh will come.
Commentary
Verse 1.
The opening verse consists of two lines that are lexically parallel to each other:
each word in the first line of the verse corresponds precisely to a word in the
next. Each line contains two versets in which the second spells out the result
of the first: because God is my salvation and stronghold, there is no reason for
me to fear.
זועמ , Sure haven Literally, “mountain stronghold, place of refuge.” The word
can refer to a fortress or fortified city, but it is also often used as a metaphor
for God, e.g., Psalm 31:5, 37:39, 52:9; Isaiah 25:4; Jeremiah 16:19; Nahum 1:7;
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and, most familiarly to many contemporary Jews, in the opening line of the
medieval hymn, רוצזועמ .
Verse 2.
ברקב , Draw near The verb ברק echoes the noun meaning “battle,” lending it a
secondary sense that hints at “setting out to war” (see ibn Ezra and Radaq to
this verse).
ירשבתאלכאל , To slander me Literally, “to eat my flesh.” This phrase allows
several plausible interpretations. It could be understood as a metaphor for the
actions of theworshiper’s enemies. Themetaphor implicitly compares the ene-
mies to wild animals. This understanding of the phrase works especially well if
we are understanding the enemies to be an army attacking Judah (though this
seems less likely for a psalmwhose speaker is an individual, not the nation), or
if they are individuals who violently attack the speaker. At the same time, how-
ever, similar phrases in Aramaic ( לכאהיצרק ) and Akkadian (qarṣi akālu) are
idioms meaning “slander someone” and (in Akkadian) “initiate legal proceed-
ings against someone, accuse someone.” Thus this speaker of the psalm could
be referring to enemies who are unjustly accusing him of somemisdeed, either
as gossip or in a formal legal setting. This ambiguity need not be resolved by
the modern interpreter; some worshipers reciting this psalm (whether in bib-
lical times or later) might have justifiably intended these words as a metaphor
for violence or warfare, while others intended it, with equal justification, as the
idiom for slander or for unjust legal proceedings.
יליביאוירצ , my enemies and my foes The Hebrew is redundant in adding the
first-person possessive particle יל after the first-person possessive suffixes of
the nouns. Such doubling is a characteristic the elevated language employed
in ancient Hebrew poetry. Cf., e.g., ילשימרכ in Song of Songs 8:12.
ולפנוולשכהמה , They’re the ones who stumbled and fell The Hebrew empha-
sizes “they” by adding the pronoun המה , since the plural form of the Hebrew
verbs already indicates the subject.5
5 In most editions of MT, the word המה has a אחרט (not a אחפט !) as its cantillation mark. In
the cantillation of the ת״מאירפס the אחרט is a conjunctive cantillation mark, and conse-
quently the first letter of ּולְׁשָכ has no לקשגד . But the Rödelheim edition of the MT Psalter
editedby Seeligman IsaacBaer,whichmany siddurim follow, has a שרגומעיבר on המה , which
is disjunctive. In that edition the first letter of ּולְׁשָּכ has a לקשגד . Thus both pronunciations
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ולפנוולשכ , Stumbled and fell Contrary to the NJPS translation (“stumble and
fall”), the suffix verbs in theHebrew text donot have the frequentativemeaning
implied by the English present tense.
The parallelism in the second line of this verse is unusual. Had the poet
employed a more typical pattern, the line would read, ולפניליביאו/ולשכירצ
(“My foes stumbled, / my adversaries fell”). But instead the line clusters nouns
in its first verset and verbs in the second. This phrasing allows uncertainty to
build up in the first verset, finally to be resolved in the second, whereas the
more typical parallelism would have eliminated it immediately.6 The implica-
tions of this intimation of disquiet in the first stanza (which is largely confident
in tone) will be discussed in “Interpretation,” below.
Verse 3.
המחלמילעםוקת־םא…הנחמילעהנחת־םא , Should an army encamp against me …
Should war break out aroundme These two lines pick up the hint of warfare
in the previous verse’s verb ברקב (“draw near”, but from a root that also means
battle), developing the martial metaphor explicitly.
תאזב , In this This could also be rendered, “nevertheless, even so.”7 But the
preposition ־ב , when used with the verb חטב (be confident, or “trust”) reg-
ularly introduces the person or thing that the verb’s subject trusts. In that
case, we must ask what this refers to. It could refer back to the confidence
the speaker expressed in the previous two verses (“Though beset by enemies, I
remain confident, because God who is my light and salvation is more powerful
than encroaching armies”); so Rashi, Radaq, Ḥakham.8Or “this”might refer for-
ward to the requestmade in the next verse to dwell permanently in the Temple
(“Though beset by enemies, I will be safe as long as I remain at the Temple”); so
ibn Ezra. On this final possibility, see the discussion of “Settings” in the section,
“Interpretation,” below.
may be regarded as correct, as are the various siddurim that adopt the one or the other. (The
evidence of Rödelheim editions is of particular import, as they were used already by םדא
ןושארה in ןדעןג , as is evidenced by God’s characterization of Adam in Gen 3:9bβ.)
6 See John Goldingay, Psalms 1–41, Baker Commentary on the Old Testament Wisdom and
Psalms (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 391.
7 Arnold Ehrlich, Psalmen: Neu uebersetzt und erklaert (Berlin: M. Poppelauer, 1905), ad loc.
Hence NJPS: “Still.”
8 AmosHakham,The Book of Psalms, 2 vols. [in Hebrew], Da‘atMikra (Jerusalem:MosadHarav
Kook, 1979), ad loc.
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Verse 4.
שקבא…יתלאש , Ask … request The request here adds an element that will be
developed more in the second stanza. But even with the request, the tone of
this verse remains confident.
םענבתוזחל , To gaze upon themarvel Elsewhere in the ancient Near East, stat-
ues of worshipers were sometimes installed at temples.9 Such statues, which
typically have unusually large eyes, evince the delight of the worshipers who
bask in the presence of their deity.10 In the Babylonian temples, actual wor-
shipers did not come close enough to the statues of the deities to literally have
enjoyed gazing at them.11 The mere experience of seeing the temple building
and spending time in it was enough to produce the joy. Similarly, the phrase
in the psalm here does not mean literally seeing God’s presence in the Holy of
Holies, which was inaccessible to normal worshipers and even most priests.12
Rather, as Craigie and Tate note, the phrase is “not to be interpreted literally,
but as implying the extraordinary experience of God’s beauty and glory as sym-
bolized in the temple, specifically in the Ark.”13 In this verse, the worshiper
expresses a yearning not merely to know something about God but to bask
in the delightful warmth of God’s presence in the building where, Israelites
believed, God actually dwelt on earth. As Martin Cohen astutely notes in his
commentary on this psalm, “Thepoetwants to cultivate the experiential, rather
9 See Shalom Holtz, “God as Refuge and Temple as Refuge in the Psalms,” in The Temple of
Jerusalem: From Moses to the Messiah: Studies in Honor of Professor Louis H. Feldman, ed.
Steven Fine (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 26.
10 On this theme in Psalms and elsewhere in the Bible, see Othmar Keel, The Symbolism of
the Biblical World: Ancient Near Eastern Iconography and the Book of Psalms, trans. Timo-
thy J. Hallett (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 314. For pictures of such statues which give
a clear sense of this delight, see James B. Pritchard, ed., The Ancient Near East in Pictures
Relating to theOldTestament, 2d ed. (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1969), nos. 18–
24.
11 See Ivan Hrůša, AncientMesopotamian Religion: ADescriptive Introduction, trans. Michael
Tait (Münster: Ugarit Verlag, 2015), 73; Michael B. Hundley,Gods in Dwellings: Temples and
Divine Presence in the Ancient Near East (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 48–
75, esp. 68–69 and 75.
12 Theoretically, that presence was in fact visible; but seeing it directly would cause death
instantly (Exod 33:20), though exceptions did occur (e.g., Isa 6:1–2, in which the prophet
is initially dismayed because he expects to die after seeing God’s presence; Exod 24:17, in
which the people at the bottom of Mt. Sinai see God’s presence on top of the mountain,
surroundedby a thick cloudbut apparently still visible through the clouddue to its intense
brightness).
13 Peter Craigie andMarvin Tate, Psalms 1–50, 2d. ed., WBC (N.p.: Thomas Nelson, 2004), 232.
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thanmerely intellectual, knowledge of God… to knowGod through the senses
rather than through the intellect.”14 For another verse that stresses this experi-
ential knowledgeof God through the senses andnot just the intellect, see Psalm
34:9.
רקבל , To serve Contrary to NJPS,15 which translates “to frequent,” in ancient
forms of Hebrew this verb does not mean to visit or to come regularly to a
particular place; that meaning of the verb develops only in modern Hebrew.
Rather, in biblical, Qumran, and rabbinic Hebrew, this verb has a range of
meanings relating to “carrying out important tasks.” It can mean “to examine,
to check,” especially to examine sacrificial offerings so as to ensure that they
are ritually appropriate. It can also mean “to be in charge, to take care of.” Thus
in the Dead Sea Scrolls the רקבמ is the official in charge of the community.16 In
rabbinic Hebrew, the sense of “take care of” appears in reference to the sick, in
the well-known phrase, םילוחרוקיב . In modern Jewish parlance, this phrase is
used to refer to visiting the sick, an ethically commendable action that gener-
ally involves dropping by to cheer up a sick person. But in ancient times, when
therewere no hospitals and few physicians, םילוחרוקיב had a differentmeaning
that fits the basic definition of the verb רקבל noted above: it denoted examining
and taking of a sick person, attending to their needs in the ways that medical
professionals (especially nurses) and hospital staff members do today. Neigh-
bors and relatives who performed the act of םילוחרוקיב in antiquity were not
just coming over to chat. They fed and bathed the patient, applied ointments
and salves to their sores, or prepared medicinal herbs for them. In modern
Hebrew, the meaning of this verb meaning extends much further, to include
social visits, tourism, and vacations (one can רקבמ DisneyWorld, for example,
without providingmedicine forMickeyMouse or drugs for Donald Duck). This
broader sense of the verb developed out of themuchmore specific meaning of
the phrase in older forms of Hebrew.
Thus the worshiper in our verse is not asking to be able to stop in at the tem-
ple on frequent occasions. Theworshiperwants to some responsibility thatwill
keep him there on a long-term basis.17 What emerges from this verb (viz., that
14 Martin Samuel Cohen, Our Haven and Our Strength: The Book of Psalms (New York: Aviv
Press, 2004), 79.
15 Which follows Ehrlich, Psalmen, ad loc.
16 This meaning appears in particular in Seraḥ Hayaḥad (the Community Rule) and in the
Damascus Document.
17 Some scholars attempt to identify the job more specifically. Malul (in Sarna, ʿOlam Hata-
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the speaker wants to remain at the temple permanently, not simply to visit it)
matches what we see earlier in this verse: the speaker wants to dwell in Yhwh’s
house all the days of my life. What circumstances might have led the speaker
of this psalm to want to remain at the temple will be discussed below in “Inter-
pretation.”
Verse 5.
יננפצי , He conceals me, inviolable Throughout the verse, the prefix verbs are
best understood as frequentative. The verb ןפצ refers to hiding something valu-
able. (The passive participle of this verb, ןּופצ [“hidden thing”], is used in the
Passover Haggadah as another name for the ןמוקיפא that is hidden after the
seder meal.) The root of this verb also produces the noun ןֹופצ , which means
“north.” That noun appears frequently in Ugaritic literature as the name of
the mountain where the gods and goddesses live; in other words, it is the
Ugaritic equivalent toMountOlympus of theGreeks.18 Thismythological sense
of the word as connected with heavenly dwellers and with creation occasion-
ally occurs in biblical texts (Isa 14:13; Ps 89:13; Job 26:7). Psalm 48:3 uses this
noun as an appellation for Mount Zion; since ןופצ can mean the hilltop where
a deity lives, and since Yhwh dwells in the Temple on Mount Zion, Psalm 48
can use the term in the course of arguing that Jerusalem, as the city where God
dwells, cannever be conquered.19Our verb יננפצי in Psalm27:5, then,may allude
nakh) maintains that the worshiper wants to be employed examining offerings. Craigie
& Tate as well as Goldingay follow Jon Levenson, “A Technical Meaning for NʿM in the
Hebrew Bible,” VT 35 (1985): 61–67, in surmising that the worshiper wishes to work as
a diviner or temple prophet who seeks out oracles or performs some sort of augury in
the temple. But it is neither possible nor necessary to pin down what job the worshiper
wants in the temple. The verb רקבל suffices to make clear, as Terrien concludes (267),
that “the psalmist favors ardently the holy ambition of ‘serving’ in the temple without
interruption.” Some commentators on this verse (Rashi, ibn Ezra, Ḥakham, and Mitchell
Dahood, Psalms: Introduction, Translation, andNotes, 3 vols., AB [Garden City, NY: Double-
day, 1966–1970]) suggest another possible meaning of רקבל here, based on its similarity
to the noun רקב (morning): to come to the temple each and everymorning. Thismeaning
would give warrant to NJPS’s translation, “to frequent.” But there are no clear attestations
of such a verb, and the normal meanings of the verb in ancient Hebrew (“examine” and
“be in charge”) fit the cultic context of our verse perfectly well, making the recourse to an
otherwise unattested meaning unnecessary.
18 Thewordwas probably pronounced tsapānor tsafān inUgaritic,with a longa sound in the
second syllable. It is not possible to knowwhether themiddle consonantwas pronounced
p or f.
19 Note also the correspondence of ןדעסיוה-יןפצןמו in the fourth-century BCE Aramaic ver-
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to the idea of Zion as inviolable.20 Because the worshiper hopes to remain in
the Temple forever to serve the God dwelling there, the worshiper will be safely
sheltered in the place of God’s assured protection, Zion, which is God’s moun-
tain or ןופצ .
רוצבולהארתס…הֹּכֻסְּב , His shelter … His hidden tent … rock All these terms
can refer to the Temple. In Psalm 76:3 ֹהּכֻס (shelter) refers explicitly refers to
Jerusalem,which there is calledboth “Salem” and “Zion.” (Thisword is related to
themore familiar הָּכֻס , “hut, shelter.” Themore familiarword refers toGod’s hid-
den, heavenly abode amidst dark clouds in Ps 18:12 and Job 36:29.) ולהא (tent)
also can refer to the Temple; see Psalms 15:1 and 61:5. Similarly, Dahood argues
that רוצ , which I translate as rock canmean “mountain.”21 If this is so, that term
might be an additional allusion to the JerusalemTemple, which was located on
the top of the hill known in biblical times as Zion and today as the Temple
Mount. These overtones of the three words strengthen the verse’s allusion to
ןופצ as the mountain where God dwells.
ינממורירוצב , High on a rock, He lifts me up Some commentators regard this
last verset as odd; the previous ones talked about the speaker being hidden and
thus protected; here the speaker is exposed for all to see (though presumably
high on a rock where the enemies cannot get him).22 But sudden shifts in the
imagery of a psalm are not uncommon; the psalmists feel free to use multiple
comparisons in their figurative language, thus yielding an array of impressions
to evoke the situation they have in mind.
sion of Psalm 20 in demotic script from Egypt (Papyrus Amherst 63, column xii, lines 13–
14) with ךדעסיןויצמו in the MT.
20 On the doctrine of Zion's inviolability, see, e.g., John Hayes, “The Tradition of Zion’s Invi-
olability,” JBL 82 (1963): 419–426; Ben Ollenberger, Zion, the City of the Great King: A Theo-
logical Symbol of the Jerusalem Cult, JSOTSupp (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987).
21 Dahood, Psalms, commenting on 18:3.
22 Charles Augustus Briggs and Emilie Grace Briggs, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary
on the Book of Psalms (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1906–1907), ad loc., suggests reading
רַּצַּב , yielding the translation “in distress He lifts me up.” But “lifting up” remains odd in
that it exposes the worshiper where everything else here hides him. Ehrlich emends to




התעו , So now One might even translate this, “So” or “Therefore.” In biblical
Hebrew this word often draws a practical conclusion on the basis of what was
stated immediately before.23
הרמזאו…הרישא…החבזאו , I should offer up … should sing and play music The
verbs are all lengthened prefix forms (cohortatives), which denote a wish or a
hope rather than a fact.
העורתיחבז…החבזאו , I should offer up … a celebration meal This could mean
sacrifices that are offered accompaniedby singing (soRashi), or by joyful shout-
ing, or by blasts of a trumpet or shofar (so ibn Ezra). Numbers 10:10 mentions
sacrifices offered on holidays and NewMoons along with trumpet blasts.
This verse contains two lines. The first, like all the lines before it in the poem,
contains two versets. The second, which is the last line of the first stanza, con-
tains three.
The last lines of the second stanza also has three versets (in verses 11–12). Both
lines of the brief third stanza (verses 13–14) have three versets. Thus the three-
verset line seems to mark the end of a stanza within this poem. For another
case in which alteration between two- and three-verset lines demarcates stan-
zas, see Psalm 19.24
23 See F. Brown, S.R. Driver, and C. Briggs, AHebrew and English Lexicon of the OldTestament
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907), 774a, §2b (hereafter, BDB). Cf. Thomas Lambdin,
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 168–172, who
notes this usage is especially common after הנה . But it can also occur after יכ (which
occurs in verse 5, immediately before our verse) or even without any specific word mean-
ing “since” or “because.”
24 As Robert Gordis, “Psalm 9–10: A Textual and Exegetical Study,” JQR 48 (1957): 119 n. 32,
notes, three-verset lines often are used to end a text or a stanza: “The same stylistic pro-
cedure,” Gordis points out, “is to be found in Ps. 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 37, 47, 53, 55, 63, 73, 90,
94, 103, 104, 111, 119, 125, 129, 140; Job, chaps. 10, 11, 19, 26.” Cf. Wilfred G.E.Watson, Classical
Hebrew Poetry: A Guide to Its Techniques, JSOTSupp (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press,
1984), 168–174, who makes the same claim about the stanza-formational role of what he
calls themonocolon or orphan line—which is identical to what I am calling the third ver-
set of a three-verset line. On this technique in Psalm 19, see Sommer, “Nature, Revelation,
and Grace,” 380.
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Verse 7.
As we enter the second stanza, the tone abruptly changes from serene con-
fidence to profound distress. The mode of referring to God changes as well:
having spoken of God in the third person throughout the first stanza, the wor-
shiper now addresses God in the second.
This verse contains a poetic line that can be divided into versets in more one
way. If we read according to the Masoretic accents,25 it is a three-verset line:
יִנֵֽנֲעַויִנֵּ֥נָחְו/אָ֗רְקֶאיִ֥לֹוק/הָ֖וה־ְי־עַמְׁש —Hear, O Yhwh, / my voice with which I cry!
/ And show grace to me and answer me!26 But one can also read against the
Masoretic accents andunderstands it as a two-verset line: אָרְקֶא/יִלֹוקהָוה־ְי־עַמְׁש
יִנֵנֲעַויִנֵּנָחְו —Hear my voice, Yhwh! / I cry out, and show me grace and answer me!
There is noneed to call one of theseways of dividing the line right and the other
wrong; some ancient Levites or scribes who performed this song probably sang
it one way, while others sang it the other way.27 If we adopt the three-verset
25 Both Aleppo and Leningrad put a אכרמ (which is conjunctive) on ילוק and a עיבר (which
is disjunctive) on ארקא . In someMasoretic editions, such as the Rödelheim Psalter edited
by Seligman Baer (which is followed by Vilna editions of the Miqraʾot Gedolot), we find a
תירוניצ appended to the אכרמ on ילוק . But in all cases ילוק remains conjunctive. For Baer
(thoughnot forVilna) there is a שרגומעיבר rather than aplain עיבר on ארקא , but the עיבר
שרגומ is also disjunctive. Thus all versions of MT read disjunctions at ׳ה־עמש , at ארקא ,
and at יננעו .
26 The absence of a specific word for “with which” in the second verset is perfectly normal in
the terse language of biblical poetry, which often leaves out relative conjunctions. Against
this translation, however, one might argue that the enjambment separating the verb in
the first verset from its object in the second verset is unlikely in biblical poetry. (On the
rarity of strong cases enjambment in biblical poetry, which overwhelmingly prefers end-
stopping, see Dobbs-Allsopp, On Biblical Poetry, 44–48, 135–139; Yaakov Kaduri, “Biblical
Poetry: How Can It Be?” [in Hebrew], in The Literature of the Hebrew Bible: Introductions
and Studies, ed. Zipora Talshir [Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press, 2011], 297–298). But such an
enjambment (in which a verb appears in one verset and its object in the next) is not alto-
gether impossible, as the immediately preceding line of the poem shows. Alternatively,
this three-verset line could be translated as three separate clauses: Listen, O Yhwh! / With
my voice I call out! / And show grace to me and answer me.
27 Variation among performers is a normal phenomenon in performed texts, which is, of
course, what the psalms were (and are). Woody Guthrie used to sing, “This land was
made for you and me”: eight syllables, with stresses on the first, fourth, sixth, and eighth
syllables—in other words, Guthrie sang the line as iambic tetrameter with an inverted
initial foot. Bruce Springsteen performs this line differently: “This land was made for you
a-and me”: nine syllables, sung as free verse rather than following a conventional meter.
Both performance traditions exist (and are available on YouTube), and there is no reason
to think of Springsteen’s revision of Guthrie’s original as somehow invalid, or of Guthrie’s
as not yet meeting its true potential.
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lineation (as I have done in my translation above), the dividing line between
the stanzas is even stronger: not only does the first stanza end with a triplet,
but the second stanza begins that way as well. (This will also be the case at the
divide between the second and third stanzas, as we will see in verses 11–13.)
Verse 8.
A verse withmultiple difficulties. Commentators have been troubled by (1) the
opening word in the Hebrew, ךל (which, following the lead of NJPS, I render
as On Your behalf), (2) the plural form of the imperative verb ושקב (Seek),
and (3) the idea of the worshiper’s בל (mind) speaking. Various interpretations
and emendations have been suggested.28 My rendering follows Rashi and ibn
28 Commentators suggest a variety of renderings and emendations for the first verset (MT’s
ינפושקביבלרמאךל ). The simplest meaning of ךל “To You.” In that case, the worshiper’s
heart is telling God to seek the worshiper. This would make better sense if the impera-
tive verb, ושקב (“Seek”), were in the singular, but the Hebrew has a plural verb, as it the
worshiperwere addressingmore thanonedeity,which is impossible in light of theuncom-
promisinglymonotheism of the Book of Psalms. If we emend the text by dropping the last
letter of ושקב to make it singular, we can translate along with Martin Cohen, Our Haven,
“I heard my heart say, ‘Seek me’ to You”. Here, the worshiper is asking God to meet him
halfway, as it were.
Dahood suggests a very small set of emendations that yield a very sensible text. He
reads, וינפשקביבלרמאְךֵל (which merely alters the vocalization of the first word and
transposes the odd ו at the end of MT’s ושקב to the end of the next word) and trans-
lates, “Come, said my heart, seek His face!” In this case, the worshipers mind or heart
prompts him to seek God’s presence. (Recall that in biblical Hebrew בל means both heart
and mind.) Thus the worshipers avers that he is being reminded that God commanded
us to seek Him (first verset of the line), and so the worshiper is seeking Him (second ver-
set).
L. Delekat, Asylie und Schutzorakel am Zionheiligtum, HF1 (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 103,
suggests a somewhat similar and graphically plausible suggestion: ינפושקבּוכְלרֶמֹאךל —
“Your statement is: come, seek My face!”
Two manuscripts of the LXX (Vaticanus and Alexandrinus) translate the first verset,
“My heart said to You, ‘I have sought Your face.’ Your face, O Lord, I will seek.” This is a sen-
sible meaning, but it seems to reflect a radically different text that has ךינפיתשקב rather
than ינפושקב . No such Hebrew text is known, and it is difficult to understand the errors
in scribal transmission that would have led from such a text to our MT. This version of LXX
may attempt an exegetical revision of the underlying Hebrew. The Sinaiticus manuscript
of LXX translates, “My heart said to you, It/He sought my face.” This seems to read ׂשֵּקִּב
instead of MT’s ּוׂשְּקַּב , a less radical change. This renderingmay intend to say that the wor-
shiper’s heart or mind said about God or on God’s behalf that God was seeking out the
worshiper, and then the worshiper replies in the next verset that he, correspondingly, will
seek out God.
A final possibility has not been noted in the extensive literature on this verse: the last
half of the verse ( שקבאהוה־יךינפ־תא = It is You, Yhwh, that I seek) may be a gloss by
from confidence to confusion 365
Ezra to present a perfectly plausible rendering of MT’s Hebrew without emen-
dation.29 In the first poetic line found in this verse (On Your behalf my mind
speaks: / “SeekMeout!”), the worshiper reports that his ownmind or heart ( בל
has both meanings) spoke on God’s behalf, urging him to seek out God’s םינפ
(presence or face), which betokens especially God’s favor, grace, and availabil-
ity. In the subsequent poetic line (which is found at the end of verse 8 and the
beginning of verse 9) the worshipers responds, declaring that he is seeking out
God’s presence, and begging God not to hide that presence.
This rendering raises a question, at least if it intends to keep the verb seek
( ושקב ) in the plural rather than emending to the singular form. Why does the
worshiper’s heart address the worshiper as a plural entity? Perhaps the plural
imperative recognizes thedividednatureof theworshiper’s psyche: the speaker
of this prayer is supremely confident in the first stanza and deeply nervous in
the second stanza.Wewill return to the dividednature of theworshiper’smood
below, in “Interpretation.” Rashi suggests another answer to this question: The
plural imperative might be directed towards to the people Israel generally. The
worshiper’s heart speaks on God’s behalf, but in doing so, it speaks in the
a later scribe that comments on the previous words and is not intended as a part of the
poemat all.Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation inAncient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon,
1985), 48–50, has pointed out that in biblical texts, the particle תא (which usually intro-
duces a definite direct object or means “with”) introduces an explanatory comment that
identifies or specifies something ambiguous or problematic earlier in the same sentence.
That may be the use of this particle in our verse. In fact poetry tends to use the particle
תא to introduce direct objects infrequently; in none of the cases where itmight have been
used in this psalm does it appear. Thus the word ינפ may have been ambiguous: In 8a, did
the worshiper ask God to seek the worshiper out (which would have been the case if the
imperative verb seek was originally in the singular, שקב )? Or did the worshiper’s heart
command the worshiper to seek God out? A glossator added the explanatory words in
8b, which attempt to make clear that it’s the latter: the worshiper is talking about his own
search for God’s presence in 8a. If so, this reading is the earliest commentary on the Psalm.
But the original intention of the psalmist (contra the reading of the glossator) may have
been to ask God to seek the worshiper out. Such an interpretation fits the desperate tone
of the second stanza quite well.
29 So too NJPS: “In Your behalf my heart says: / ‘Seek My face!’ ” A similar solution is found
in New Jerusalem Bible, which renders, “Of you my heart has said, ‘Seek his face!’ ” The
Hebrew particular ־ל can mean “concerning, about”; this yields the NJB rendering. It can
also “for, on behalf of,” as Rashi, ibn Ezra, Radaq, andMeiri point out; this yields NJPS. For
־ל meaning “of, concerning, regarding,” see BDB 515, column a, §g(b); and Ludwig Koehler
et al., The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, trans. M.E.J. Richardson (Lei-
den: E.J. Brill, 2001), 508, col. b, §6 (= HALOT). For ־ל as “for, on behalf of,” see BDB 514, col.
a, §e; and HALOT 508, col. b, §8.
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plural, as God issues this call not only to the individual worshiper but to all
Israel. John Goldingay follows the same path and notes the significance of the
plural verb: “The suppliant senses an internal voice speaking for Yhwh … This
internal voice is not just one that issues from the suppliant’s individual spiritu-
ality, because the invitation it recalls is one addressed to the people of God,” as
in Psalm 105.4 and Zephaniah 2.3.30
שקבאהוה־יךינפ־תא , It is You I seek, O Yhwh The Hebrew word order empha-
sizes the direct object, ךינפ (literally, “Your face,” “the front part of You”) by
putting it first.
Verse 9.
רתסתלא ,Donothide Thiswording echoes verse 5’s ולהארתסבינרתסי (“Hehides
me in His hidden Tent”). In the first stanza, this verbal root ( ר״תס ) testified to
God’s assured protection and the worshiper’s great confidence. Here, however,
it lays bear the worshiper’s fear that Godmight in fact abandon him.31 Thus the
use of this one verbal root encompasses the core contrast of the whole psalm.
Verse 10.
This verse consists of a single poetic line. The two versets of the line display
phonological parallelism, as they endwith similar consonants: ינובזע and ינפסאי .
ינובזעימאויבא־יכ , Indeed,my father andmother abandonedme This could be
a reference to the most unlikely of events, that a parent will disavow a child;
even in that extreme, God would still be reliable. Alternatively, the speak may
refer to the likelihood of one’s parents’ death before one’s own (so ibn Ezra).32
30 Goldingay, Psalms 1–41, ad loc.
31 On this contrast, see the astute comments of Meir Weiss, Ideas and Beliefs in the Book
of Psalms (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2001), 67. Similarly, Herbert J. Levine, Sing unto God
a New Song: A Contemporary Reading of the Psalms, Indiana Studies in Biblical Literature
(Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1995), 168, states, “The expression of both security
and vulnerability through the root s-t-r indicates the necessary interrelatedness of these
emotions and the pivotal, unifying role played by s-t-r in the psalm.”
32 See further Shalom Paul, “Psalm xxvii 10 and the Babylonian Theodicy,” VT 32 (1982): 489–
492; and Erhard Gerstenberger, Theologies of the Old Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress,
2002), 79 n. 130.
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ינפסאיהוה־יו , But it isYhwhwhotakesme in As is often the case, the prefix form
evident in the verb allows several understandings. It can refer to the future: if
someday my parents have abandoned me, God will take me in. Alternatively,
the prefix form could refer to an ongoing action that began some time ago and
continues in the present: ever since my parents abandoned me, God has been
gatheringme in. Further, it is possible that this verb is a short prefix form (recall
that inmost cases in biblical Hebrew, the regular prefix and the short prefix are
identical; and that in poetry, the short prefix canmean not only the jussive but
a preterite), in which case the verb could refer to an event in the past: whenmy
parents abandonedme,God tookme in. Finally, as a short prefix, the verb could
have a volitive or modal meaning (what many biblical grammars label the jus-
sive), expressing neither a fact about the present or past nor a prediction about
the future, but the speaker’s hope or desire for the future: if my parents aban-
don me, let God gather me in (in formal British English: God shall gather me
in).33
Verse 11.
ינרוה , Parentme… teachingme Literally, “teachme.” The Hebrew term echoes
a word that means “parents” ( םירוה ).34 Thus this word picks up the previous
verse’s assertion that if mother and father abandon theworshiper, Godwill take
over the parental role.
33 For this last possibility, see Goldingay, Psalms 1–41, ad loc., who notes, “In the context
of the urgings of vv. 7–9 and 11–12, the yiqtol in v. 10b is likely jussive.” Against this, one
might point out that ינפסאי is not the first word in its clause, and as Jan Joosten, The Ver-
bal System of Biblical Hebrew: A New Synthesis Elaborated on the Basis of Classical Prose,
Jerusalem Biblical Studies (Jerusalem: Simor Publishing, 2012), 315–317, points out, typ-
ically the jussive (that is, the short prefix forms used with volitive meaning) is in ini-
tial position in a clause. However, Joosten also notes a number of exceptions (ibid.), so
that the possibility that we have jussive here cannot be ruled out. The contrast between
the subjects of the two clauses (parents and God) might account for the placement of
Yhwh at the beginning of the clause. Further, as Joosten points out (414), word order
in poetry tends to be much freer than in prose, so that the placement of the verb is
even less significant for distinguishing between the short and regular forms of the pre-
fix.
34 The imperative verb in this verse ( ינרוה ) is from the root ה״רי , which also provides the
words “teacher” ( הרומ ) and “Torah.” The nounmeaning parent (sg., הֶרוה and הָרוה ) is ety-
mologically unrelated to our verb, since it comes froma different root, ה״רה , whichmeans
to give birth. But our imperative verb in 27:11 lends itself to a punning relationship to the
words for parent because of their nearly identical pronunciation.
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רושימחראב…ךכרד , Your path … a level road A classic case of specifying paral-
lelism:35 there aremany types of ways or roads, but God’s ways are level—Heb.,
רושימ , aword that canmean a smooth roadwithout bumps (rarer in the ancient
world than in our own asphalt-filled one)36 but can also denote righteousness
and honesty.
יררושןעמל , While foes look on Or: “Because of those who watch me insidu-
ously.” My foes hope to see me stumble; indeed, they are trying to knock me
down. So please put me on a smooth, straight road where I will walk with ease.
Verse 12.
ירצשפנביננתתלא ,Don’t feedme tomyenemies Theword שפנ allows for several
translations. It can mean “appetite, desire,” and thus “will,” (thus NJPS: “Do not
subject me to the will of my foes”). It can also mean “throat,” which allows us
to translate the verse, “Do not put me into the throat of my foes.”
סמחחפיו ,Withunfair, violent testimony More literally, “a corrupt witness.” The
word ַחֵפָי was often believed to simply mean “one who breathes,” whose signifi-
cance in this context is not altogether clear. On the basis of Ugaritic attestations
of this word, however, we now know the word also means “witness,” which fits
our context perfectly.37
Our verse picks up on the ambiguity in verse 2’s phrase, ירשבתאלכאל . We saw
above that that phrase canbe an idiommeaning “to slander someone, to accuse
someone unjustly,” but it can also be understood as a portrayal of cannibalism
(“to eat my flesh”) that serves as a metaphor for damage the enemies hope to
wreak on the worshiper. If we understand the opening words of our verse, with
NJPS, asmeaning “Donot subjectme to thewill of my foes,” then our verse picks
up on the idiomatic sense of phrase back in verse 2. Our verse then extends this
sense in the second and third versets of our line, with their references to false
35 On the prevalence of parallelism of specification in biblical poetry, see Robert Alter, The
Art of Biblical Poetry (NewYork: Basic Books, 1985), 19–23, 57–59. Cf. James Kugel,The Idea
of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and Its History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 15–
23.
36 Though the honoree of our Festschrift, like me, knows that many highways in our own
State of New Jersey do an excellent job of teaching motorists what things were like in the
ancient world.
37 See Samuel E. Loewenstamm, “Yāpēaḥ, Yāpīaḥ, Yāpîaḥ” [in Hebrew], Leshonenu 26 (1962):
205–208, andDennis Pardee, “YPḤ ‘Witness’ inHebrew andUgaritic,” VT 63 (2013): 99–108.
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witnesses. But if we understand the opening of our verse to mean, “Do not put
me into the throat of my foes,” then the image of cannibalism from the phrase
in verse 2 returns here, rather than the idiomatic sense (“slander”). Both read-
ings are valid. Some ancient worshipers, suffering due to false accusations or
rumors, understood the phrasing the one way; others, who were in some crisis
involving their enemies (and especially enemies who threaten physical vio-
lence), understood it the other way. Modern readers can legitimately take it
either way as well.
Verse 13.
The first word of this verse, אלול , means “if it were not the case that.” The word
in the Hebrew text appears with dots above and below it. (This is the case
not only in vocalized editions of the MT but also in non-vocalized scrolls of
the Psalter; the dots pre-date the work of the Masoretes.38) The dots proba-
bly indicate that already in late Second-Temple times or during the rabbinic
era there were scribes who doubted that the word should be present.39 Indeed,
ancient translationoftenomit theword אלול ; this is the case, for example, in the
LXX.40 The difference between versions with and without this word is substan-
tial. LXXmakes our verse a statement: “I believe I shall see the LORD’s goodness
in the land of the living.” But when we include this word, our verse is the rel-
ative clause of a sentence that the speaker does not complete; our verse is the
38 See Israel Yeivin, Introduction to the Tiberian Masorah, trans. E.J. Revell, Masoretic Stud-
ies 5 (Missoula, MO: Scholars Press, 1980), 44–46. According to Yeivin, a dot is to be placed
above all four Hebrew letters of theword, but below only the first, third, and fourth letters.
In fact various texts differ widely. Aleppo (followed by Breuer editions) have dots above
and below all four letters; Leningrad (followed by BHS and Koren) has three dots above
and below (and no dots for the letter ;(ו Baer’s edition match Yeivin’s description, with
three dots above and four below.
39 So Yeivin, ibid.; as well as Emanuel Tov,Textual Criticism of theHebrewBible (Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 55–57, both of whom discuss all fifteen occurrences of this phe-
nomenon in scripture. Cf. the discussion of the ten cases in the Torah specifically in Saul
Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York: Feldheim, 1950), 43–46, who notes
that the Rabbis do not always understand them this way.
40 However, the previous verse in LXX ends with the word ἑαυτῇ, which could be understood
to translate the word הל (“to herself, in herself”). No such word appears in the Hebrew
of the verse, leading me to wonder if LXX’s otherwise superfluous ἑαυτῇ might reflect a
Hebrew text that had a (partially erased?) remnant of אלול . Qumran cannot come to our
help here; our one scrap containing the end of Psalm27 (4QPsc) is not extant for thisword,
though it seems tome that the placement of thewords later in the verse in the line, relative
to the presumed beginning of the line, allows room for it.
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“if”-clause of a compound sentencewhose “then”-clause never appears.41 To be
sure, the intention of the implied then-clause is clear: what the speaker was
thinking was something to the effect of, “If not for my faith that I will see God’s
goodness, I would be completely lost.” The absence of the then-clause gives
the impression that the speaker cannot bring himself to finish his sentence; his
utterance brings him perilously close to an emotional place too dangerous to
approach.The verse intends tomake a statement of confidence, but the speaker
cannot quite get the whole thing out.We have in a single verse, then, the whole
back-and-forth of the psalm: the confidence of the first stanza and the anxiety
of the second find are both manifest in this not-quite-complete expression of
faith.
הוה־י־בוטבתוארל , See Yhwh’s goodness This phrase echoes הוה־י־םענבתוזחל ,
“to gaze upon the marvel that is Yhwh,” in verse 4, helping to tie this stanza
with the first stanza.
םייחץראב , while still alive Literally, “in the land of the living.”42 Cf., e.g., Isaiah
38:11, 53:8; Jeremiah 11:19.
Verse 14.
הוה־י־לאהוק , Hope that Yhwh will come The term הוק means to wait expec-
tantly for something, to hope for something. It denotes something beyond
merely desiring but less than being fully confident that the thing or person will
be attained.
Who speaks this line? Does someone else say this line to the worshiper, thus
introducing a second voice into this poem? Or is this line, like every other line
of the poem, said by the worshiper? If so, does he say these words to an audi-
ence at the Temple, or to himself?
41 Both Rashi and ibn Ezra see the then clause as appearing in the previous verse: “False
witnesses would have risen against me if I had not been confident that I would see God’s
goodness.” But thismeans that the then-clausewould beginwith יכ , which seems unlikely,
since יכ canmean “if.” Granted, we could sensibly translate יכ here as “indeed.” But begin-
ning a then-clause with a word that typically introduces an if-clause would have invited
confusion. Further, the clause at the end of the previous verse is the second verset of one
poetic line,while our if-clause in verse 13 is the first verseof anewpoetic line.A single com-
pound sentence spread over the last part of one line and the first part of another would be
highly irregular for biblical poetry, which by and large shuns strong enjambment of that
sort. On biblical poetry’s shunning of strong enjambment, see above, n. 26.
42 SeeWeiss, Ideas, 68–69.
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The great biblical scholar SigmundMowinckel, followedby various commenta-
tors such as Craigie and Tate, argues that this line is said by a prophet, a priest,
or a Levite at the Temple.43 Both Mowinckel and Joachim Begrich argued that
Temple functionaries would regularly issue responses on God’s behalf to the
entreaties of worshipers, though in most cases these responses are not pre-
served in the psalms themselves.44 Our verse at the end of this psalm may be
one of the rare instances where a prophetic or priestly oracle is in fact pre-
served in the biblical text. In this case, the psalm ends with a voice urging the
worshiper to keep faith, rather thanwith a clear statement of belief by thewor-
shiper himself. In other words, it ends with an implicit acknowledgement that
the robust faith of the opening verses has been replacedwith questioninghope,
but not pure confidence.
Alternatively, it is possible that the worshiper recites this line. It is typical of
both psalms of plea and of thanksgiving that the worshiper turns toward an
audience in the temple to urge them to believe in God’s saving power; indeed,
the public acknowledgement of God’s power is the very point of the thanks-
giving song. Similarly, in many hymns of praise the speaker calls on others
to praise God. But in those cases, the audience consists of more than one
bystander, so the worshiper speaks to the audience with plural imperatives
(see, e.g., Ps 30:5; 100:1–4). Here, however, the imperative verbs are all in the
singular, which suggests that if the psalmist utters this verse, he is speaking to
himself. (For a similar case, see the beginning and ending of Psalms 103 and
104, where the worshiper addresses the worshiper’s own soul.) In that case,
it is significant that the worshiper feels the need—and has the strength—to
reassure himself. He is not completely confident, but urges himself to hope
for God’s salvation. (So Radaq.45) This line, presents “an apt summary of the
43 SigmundMowinckel,ThePsalms in Israel’sWorship, 2 vols., trans.D.R.Ap-Thomas (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1962), 2:59.
44 Joachim Begrich, “Das Priesterliche Heilsorakel,”ZAW 52 (1934): 81–92, argued that priests
issued these oracles during Temple worship. Mowinckel, Psalms, 2:53–73, argued that
prophets issued them, but also narrows the difference between his position and Begrich’s
be acknowledging (2:56–58) that in light of the Books of Chronicles it becomes clear that
in the Second Temple period Levites often worked as prophets in the Temple. A whole
literature has developed around this issue; of particular import for confirming Begrich’s
original insight is Jonas Greenfield, “The Zakir Inscription and the Danklied,” in Al Kan-
fei Yonah: Collected Studies of Jonas C. Greenfield on Semitic Philology, ed. Shalom Paul,
Michael Stone, and Avital Pinnick (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2001), 1:75–92.
45 Radaq glosses this verse, “I say to myself all the time, ‘Hope in the Lord. Do not pay atten-
tion to what the enemies say!’ … [and I say it] a second time so that I will constantly have
hope, which will not leave my heart.” Robert Harris writes (personal communication):
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psychology that informs this psalm,”46 because it is “another statement stand-
ing between plea and trust.”47
Interpretation
The Cry of an Asylum-Seeker?
We noted above elements suggesting that the speaker in this psalm is the vic-
tim of unjust accusations (see comments to verses 2 and 12), and also that the
speaker wishes to remain in God’s Temple permanently (comments to 4 and
5, especially on רקבל = to serve in verse 4). The confluence of these elements
led several scholars, including Hans Schmidt and L. Delekat, to suggest that
this psalm originally functioned as a prayer of a person seeking asylum in the
Temple.48 In ancient Israel, the altar at a temple was a place of safe refuge for
a person accused unjustly of a crime. When a person in some ancient Near
Eastern cultures was killed, relatives of the deceased had the right—and some
people likely felt, the obligation—to kill his relative’s killer. A law in Exodus
21:12–14, however, decrees that a person who committed accidental homicide
could receive refuge in a local temple. (The legal collection in which this law is
found, Exodus 20–23, is one of the oldest in the Bible, dating to the era when
“Thus, for this rabbi, hope is a practiced value … One response to a sense of hopeless-
ness is to repeat to oneself as a kind of slogan or mantra, ‘I will remain hopeful, I will
remain hopeful.’ Despite all of the things I confront that make me experience a dreadful
sense of hopelessness, I will set times to remindmyself—verbally and internally—to take
responsibility for changing my own state of mind.”
46 Robert Alter,The Book of Psalms: ATranslation with Commentary (NewYork:W.W. Norton,
2007), ad loc.
47 Goldingay, Psalms 1–41, ad loc.
48 See Hans Schmidt, Das Gebet der Angeklagten im Alten Testament, BZAW (Giessen:
A. Töpelmann, 1928), and, more briefly, Hans Schmidt, “Das Gebet der Angeklagten im
Alten Testament,” OTE 18 (1927): 143–155; and Delekat, Asylie und Schutzorakel am Zion-
heiligtum, 154–258, and esp. the useful summary on 259–269. Other such psalms, accord-
ing to Schmidt, include Ps 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 26, 31, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 94, 140, and 142—a
list far too long to be convincing. Pamela Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World (Cam-
bridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2005), 81, argues that “[Delekat’s] identification of the
speaker of thePsalms as a fugitive killer is incorrect.While it is true that thePsalmspresent
the enemies of the speaker aswanting to kill him and that the Psalms refer toYhwh as pro-
tector and Yhwh’s dwelling as a place a refuge, there is no indication that the refugee has
been accused of homicide.” Barmash is correct that Delekat overreads and spreads his net
much toowidely; the samemay be said of Schmidt. But a few of the psalms they discussed
may in fact been especially relevant to asylumseekers in ancient Israelite temples, and this
seems especially true for Ps 27.
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there were many local temples in ancient Israel, before the centralization of
sacrificial worship in Jerusalem.) The avenging relative could kill the person
who had caused the death of the relative if the relative found the killer before
he arrived at a temple. But once the accidental killer was at the temple, he was
safe. If, however, a court found him guilty of premeditated murder, he could
be removed from the temple to meet his fate.49 Once safely ensconced in the
temple, the accidental killer would be employed in some non-priestly or semi-
priestly capacity; if he was not from a priestly family, he could not officiate at
sacrifices, but he could receive some other important role, and as a member of
the temple staff, he had a ready source of food and shelter.50 He would stay at
the temple either for the rest of his life, or until he received amnesty, probably
from a royal decree, or, following the logic of Numbers 35:9–34, following the
death of a high priest, whereupon the deceased man’s relatives lost their right
to slay him.51 This notion of the temple as a place of asylum may have been
applied even beyond the crime of accidental homicide, as the narrative about
Solomon and Adonijah in 1Kings 1:50–53 indicates.52
It is easy to see howPsalm27might havebeen especiallymeaningful for such
an asylum-seeker.53 The people accusing him are “false witnesses and unjust
accusers” (verse 12); they are committing slander against him (see comment to
2), perhaps by claiming that he committed intentional murder or some other
intentional crime that would not allow him to remain in a temple, outside his
pursuer’s reach. Thus his claim that they want to “eat my flesh” (2) is doubly
apt: as an idiom, this refers to their slander, but as a metaphor, it depicts the
49 Laws related to asylum appear in Num 35:9–29; Deut 19:1–13; and Josh 20:1–9. For an
overview of this legal practice, see S. David Sperling, “Blood, Avenger Of,” in Anchor Bible
Dictionary, 6 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1:763–764; as well as Barmash, Homicide
in the BiblicalWorld, 71–93.
50 On possible roles of the personwho received asylum, see Delekat, Asylie und Schutzorakel
am Zionheiligtum, 194–256. Regarding the seeker in our psalm as a singer or a guardian at
a gate, see 194–207.
51 On the latter phenomenon, see Moshe Greenberg, “The Biblical Concept of Asylum,” in
Studies in the Bible and Jewish Thought (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1995),
43–50.
52 On other unintentional crimes that may have led people to seek asylum, see Delekat,
Asylie und Schutzorakel am Zionheiligtum, 154–193.
53 On Ps 27 as a psalm of the asylum-seeker, see Schmidt,Gebet, 15–16, 27–29; Delekat, Asylie
und Schutzorakel am Zionheiligtum, 103–104, 197–200; as well as the useful overviews in
Jon Levenson, “The Jerusalem Temple in Devotional and Visionary Experience,” in Jewish
Spirituality from theBible to theMiddleAges, ed. ArthurGreen (NewYork: Crossroad, 1988),
39–43; Hans-JoachimKraus, Psalms 1–59: AContinental Commentary, trans. HiltonOswald
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 333.
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violence they hope to do to him. As a result, he hopes to dwell in the temple
“all the days of my life,” which means that he will have a job there as a mem-
ber of its staff (comment to verse 4). The various figures of the temple as safe
haven, then, are intended quite literally, as are his pleas for help in the second
stanza.54
The fact that this song was especially meaningful for asylum-seekers in
ancient times, however, does notmean that only asylum-seekers recited it. The
language of the psalms tends to be open-ended; many phrases psalms use can
be read literally or metaphorically, and the psalms shy away from excessive
specificity. Consequently, people in a variety of situations can adopt a given
psalm as their own. This is the case with Psalm 27. Scholars including Schmidt
and Delekat are right to connect this psalm with those who seek legal haven
in a temple, but other worshipers, both in antiquity and today, also have found
its wording apt for their experiences. For such worshipers, the references to
the safe haven of the temple functionsmetaphorically, whereas for the asylum-
seekers, it functioned literally. For the asylum-seeker, the reference to serving
in an official capacity in the temple at the end of v. 4 ( ולכיהברקבלו , “and to serve
in His palace”) was also literal; since the asylum-seeker would remain there for
years or decades, he needed employment there. Other worshipers would prob-
ably not focus on the specific meaning of the verb רקבל (“to serve, to have a
position of responsibility”), reading it more vaguely as a reference to some sort
of service in the temple rather than literally as a particular job.
Faith and Doubt
A striking element of Psalm 27 is its movement from confidence to need, from
believing in God’s reliability to worrying about God’s absence. How can we
account for the stark contrast between the first stanza (vv. 1–6), in which the
worshiper joyously proclaims trust in God, and the second and third stanzas
(vv. 7–12, 13–14), in which the worshiper betrays the fear that God might be far
off?55
54 It is not possible to be sure whether this psalm functioned as a song of an asylum-seeker
specifically in the Jerusalem temple or also in other temples prior to the centralization of
sacrifical worship in Jerusalem in the late pre-exilic period.We saw that references to the
temple’s location on a hilltop and the allusion to ןופצ in verse 5 fit the Temple on Mount
Zion well, the latter especially in light of Ps 48:3. On the other hand, other temples in
ancient Israel were also located on hilltops (e.g., the temple at Samaria), and insofar as
Yhwh was thought to dwell in other Israelite temples, we can readily imagine that they,
too, might have been referred to as ןופצ .
55 On this extreme nature of this contrast at verse 7, see Jacob (Gerald) Blidstein, “T’hillim
27,” Yavneh Review, Spring 1965, 21–23; Ellen Charry, Psalms 1–50 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
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HermannGunkel provides a simple answer to this question by asserting that
this chapter contains two separate psalms, the first (vv. 1–6) a song of confi-
dence and the second (vv. 7–14) a classic psalm of complaint and plea.56 It is
not outside the range of possibility that a single chapter in the Book of Psalms
might contain more than one composition. After all, there are cases in which
a single psalm takes up more than one chapter: an alphabetic acrostic poem
is spread over Psalms 9–10; Psalms 42–43 are also a single composition with
a repeated refrain at 42:6, 42:12, and 43:5. Thus the converse—that two sepa-
rate songs appear in one chapter—is certainly conceivable. But several scholars
have successfully defended the unity of Psalm 27. Peter Craigie andMarvinTate
point out shared vocabulary that draws together what Gunkel regards as sep-
arate poems: יעשי (vv. 1,9), ירצ (2, 12), בל (3, 8, 14), םוק (3, 12), ש׳׳קב (4,8), and
םייח (4, 13), in addition to the theme of seeing God’s pleasantness or goodness
(4, 13). Further, it is not quite the case that the first stanza is entirely confi-
dent while the second and third completely lack elements of faith.57 The first
stanza contains intimations of the darker themes that appear later in thepoem.
Jacob Blidstein notes “the progressive deterioration of the roof overhead from
‘stronghold (Ma-oz)’ to ‘hut (sukkah)’ and finally ‘tent’—a glimpse into the cri-
sis that is as yet in the distance.”58 AsGoldingay astutely notes regarding v. 1, the
worshiper’s statement that he has no reason to fear draws attention to the fact
that he apparently is worrying about something.59 Harris Birkeland also argues
Publishing Group, 2015), 139–141. Radaq attempts to minimize the contrast by reading
verse 4 as a strictly spiritual request and regarding verse 7 as a referenceback to the request
in verse 4: the worshiper is confident in God’s salvation from physical harm, but asks for
the ability to commune with God in the temple or in heaven.
56 For this response, see Gunkel’s commentary. Cf. Hermann Gunkel and Joachim Begrich,
Introduction to Psalms: The Genres of the Religious Lyric of Israel, trans. James D. Nogal-
ski, Mercer Library of Biblical Studies (Macon, GA:Mercer University Press, 1998), 190–191,
where Gunkel emphasizes the connection of the song of confidence in 27:1–6 to the genre
of the individual complaint. That is the genre we find in 7–12, a circumstance that seems
to move against Gunkel’s view that the chapter contains two different songs. Neverthe-
less, his proposal has been widely accepted. In fact, I spoke imprecisely in note 53 when I
said that Schmidt and Delekat discuss Ps 27 as an asylum psalm; in fact they regard it as
containing two separate asylum psalms, one in verses 1–6, the other in 7–14.
57 Rolf Jacobson captures something crucial about the alleged gulf between the two parts of
the psalm in Nancy deClaissé-Walford, Rolf Jacobson, and Beth LaNeel Tanner, The Book
of Psalms, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2014), 242: The psalm “speaks words of fear. And words of trust. The two are
not as far removed from one another as one might imagine.”
58 Blidstein, “T’hillim 27,” 22.
59 Goldingay, Psalms 1–41, 392. He further points out (391) that the first stanza’s “appearance
of confidence is compromised by the fact that most of its lines have the short second cola
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for the unity of the psalm, pointing to the presence of elements of confidence
in the second and third stanzas.60 In the first versets of the two poetic lines
in v. 9, the worshiper begs God not to abandon the worshiper, but the second
versets of both lines confirm that God is the worshiper’s help and salvation.
Similarly, in v. 13 the third stanza at least attempts to restate the confidence of
the first stanza, albeit in a sentence that never reaches completion.61 These ele-
ments of unity demonstrate that Psalm 27 is a single composition that has to be
interpreted as a whole. Of course, it is not outside the realm of possibility that
each of the two sections once existed on its own, and that an editor, noticing
more characteristic of a lament.” Indeed, the second verset of the first five lines of the
poem are all quite negative.
60 Harris Birkeland, “Die Einheitlichkeit von Ps 27,”ZAW 51 (1933): 218.
61 Gunkel further points out that v. 6 contains a vow, which is a standard way of ending a
complaint song, while v. 7 begins like a classic psalm of complaint and plea. He argues
that all this shows that one poem ends in 6 while another begins in 7; see pp. 114 and
116 of his commentary, and cf. Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 177, 184. But Birkeland,
“Einheitlichkeit,” 219, points out that to define v. 6 as an ending and v. 7 as a beginning
on the basis of this formal criterion puts the cart before the horse. We can agree that v. 7
can only be a new beginning and cannot be a middle, or that 6 must be an ending, only
if we put the psalm into a procrustean form-critical bed. Indeed, Birkeland points out
(220), this is not the only psalm where a vow or a vocative and a plea appear in the mid-
dle: in Ps 9:15 we have a vow in the middle of a psalm, while in Ps 42–43 (a single song)
the plea begins at 43:1, well into the poem. (Indeed, Gunkel himself noted that the voca-
tive and plea that typically begin a complaint/plea do occur, albeit “far less frequently,
in other positions”; see Gunkel and Begrich, Introduction, 152, and see esp. n. 13 there, in
which Gunkel himself refers to Ps 42–43. This observation vitiates his claim in his com-
mentary, p. 116.) Sigmund Mowinckel, Psalmenstudien (Amsterdam: P. Schippers, 1966),
1:148, points out that we can simply regard Ps 27 as an individual complaint/plea that has
an unusually long statement of trust in its first six verses. Such an overdevelopment of
that statement of trust is atypical of biblical psalms but hardly impossible, as the similar
case of Ps 42–43 shows. Such a development is quite typical of Akkadian psalms of plea:
they often begin with invocations and statements of trust that are in effect fairly lengthy
psalms of praise. Thus the first nine lines (out of a total of eighteen) of the plea to Shamash
in Alan Lenzi, ed., Reading Akkadian Prayers and Hymns: An Introduction, SBL Ancient
Near East Monographs (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 197–216, could have
been a self-standing hymn to Shamash, but this does not mean that they are a different
prayer from what follows; the hymn is a lengthy first element of the plea, at once acting
as an extended vocative and an explanation for why the worshipper turns to Shamash.
Similarly, the first nine lines (out of twenty-five) in the prayer to Marduk found in Lenzi,
313–325, are a well-structured hymn to Marduk (as demonstrated by Tzvi Abusch, “The
Form and Meaning of a Babylonian Prayer to Marduk,” JAOS 103 [1983]), but that hymn is
but a section of the longer plea psalm into which it is (Abusch shows) very well integrated
at a literary-rhetorical level. The samemay be said about Psalm 89, a complaint psalm that
begins with a hymn of praise in verses 1–38.
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the elements that link them, deliberately put them together to form the single
composition that is now Psalm 27. Even in that case, however, it behooves us
to ask what the editor was attempting to accomplish by putting them together,
and especially by putting them together in the order they now have rather than
the reverse.
We have seen that the first stanza hints at the source of fear even as it speaks
of trust in God, while the second betrays worry over the possibility of God’s
distance while also asserting that God is a source of salvation. Then the third
stanza’s unfinished opening sentence acknowledges the possibility of life with-
out trust in God while proclaiming that the psalmist indeed has this life-giving
trust. The psalm closes with imperatives that call on the worshiper (and us)
to wait hopefully for God. The fact that these imperatives are deemed nec-
essary points to the existence of doubts that must be overcome. In this one
psalmwehave a beautiful and brief distillation of the entire Psalter as a book of
doubt and faith.As thepsalmmovesback and forthbetweenbelief anddistress,
it “manifests powerful psychological verisimilitude,” Robert Alter points out,
because its emphasis on trust “does not preclude a feeling of fearful urgency in
the speaker’s plea to God.”62
The movement from faith to doubt demands our attention, because the
direction of the journey on which this psalm leads us is the opposite of what
many readers might have expected of a religious text. Our worshiper does not
grow into amore conventional piety over the course of the psalm, casting aside
doubts to take up the armor of faith. Rather, the worshiper sets aside a seem-
ingly ideal faith to take on a more realistic one. In fact Blidstein argues that
the psalm criticizes the simplistic faith of the first stanza, whose God he labels
“an ersatz divinity, a facile projection of [the worshiper] himself.”63 Similarly,
Ellen Charry, maintains that in the first stanza, the worshiper thinks that “he
has God in his pocket.”64 While the faith of that section seems on the surface
to be stronger, the truth is that in that section, the worshiper speaks of God
(always in the third person!) as something he knows about, but not someone
whom he knows. In the second stanza, when the worshiper moves to the sec-
ond person in order to address God directly, the worshiper at last achieves
the experiential contact with God that he yearned for in verse 4 (“One thing
I ask …”). It is precisely when the worshiper speaks directly to God that doubt
becomes prominent. God is no longer something theworshiper claims to know
62 Alter, Psalms, 91.
63 Blidstein, “T’hillim 27,” 23.
64 Charry, Psalms 1–50, 139.
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all about; now God is a partner (though of course the senior partner) in a rela-
tionship, and relationships are slippery and unknowable in a way that does not
conform to the simplistic faith of the first stanza.
The direction of the psalm’s movement is crucial, because it models the
maturing of an authentic relationship with God. A simple faith that asks no
questions and admits no anxieties is not themost religious faith. A relationship
that can articulate anxiety about the beloved’s distance is ultimately stronger.
As Charry writes, this psalm tells us that “unpleasant emotions are not to be
repressed as untoward but to be healed throughmodels that show how to han-
dle them.Here, the psalmist gives permission to his audience to be emotionally
conflicted in relation to God. He does not urge his hearers to ‘grin and bear
it’ or ‘put on a happy face,’ and he does not disparage honest fear of God-
abandonment …”65 A faith that allows no doubt is hubris: when it claims to
know for surewhatGodwill andwill not do, it deniesGod’s freedomand invests
far too much in the believer’s impregnable security. Such a faith is the very
opposite of true piety. The wavering faith of Psalm 27 is more honest, more
humble, and therefore more deeply religious. This faith is neither Pollyannish
nor naive; it is realistic about the fact that God seems absent at times.
It is also quintessentially Jewish in ending neither with fear nor with com-
plete confidence but with hope (v. 14). The final verse of Psalm 27 recalls the
Pentateuch, which does not conclude with entry into the Land of Israel and
the fulfillment of God’s promises. Deuteronomy 34 narrates not the victory
of the hero, Moses, but his death. But that chapter also leaves us with the
expectation that God’s promises toMoses and to the patriarchs before himwill
nevertheless come to fruition in coming years with the victory of Moses’ assis-
tant, Joshua. Moses’ life was a success not because he completed his task but
because he did not desist from it—that is, because he lived up to the teach-
ing of his latter-day disciple, Rabbi Ṭarfon inm. ’Abot 2:16 (“It is not incumbent
upon you to complete the task, but you are not free to desist from it”). It is sig-
nificant for the nature of the Jewish religion that the Torah ends on a note of
hope rather than fulfillment.66 That tendency made it natural that the anthem
65 Charry, Psalms 1–50, 141.
66 Manymodern scholars have suggested the possibility that in antiquity theTorahwas a six-
book unit ending with Joshua. Thus it is vital to realize that all known forms of Judaism
(and indeed, of Samaritanism) accept the five-book Torah ending with Deuteronomy. On
the fateful nature of Judaism’s decision to accord the highest canonical status to the Pen-
tateuch and not to a Hexateuch, see James A. Sanders, Torah and Canon (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1972), 27–28, 52; and David Frankel, The Land of Canaan and the Destiny of
Israel: Theologies of Territory in the Hebrew Bible (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 25–29.
(I am happy to thank Rabbi Joyce Newmark for calling this important passage in Sander’s
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of the Zionist movement and later of the State of Israel is הוקתה , “The Hope,”
rather than a songwith a title like, say, ןוחצינה , “TheVictory.”67 Hope rather than
perfect confidence characterizes the most mature Jewish faith: a readiness to
admit one’s fears, to look toward God expectantly while renouncing the claim
to predict all God’s actions. This faith is well displayed by the Psalm 27’s journey
from simple, trusting piety in its first stanza, through doubt in the second, to
hope in the third.
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chapter 15
Elucidating Talmudic suryaqe—an Exercise in
Talmudic Lexicography
Shamma Friedman
For Joel—friend, poseq, gentleman
∵
The word suryaqe/šuryaqe appears several times in the Babylonian Talmud.*
This paper addresses the meaning and etymology of this term, with reference
to the related entries in lexicons of Babylonian Talmudic Aramaic. In recent
years, Talmudic lexicography has benefitted from Michael Sokoloff ’s magnifi-
cent dictionaries devoted toGalilean and BabylonianAramaic. In keepingwith
his rigorous standards, Sokoloff has ushered in a new era, fromwhich the study
of Talmudic literature has derived much benefit. In the nature of things, how-
ever, there are still basic contributions to be made in this field.
The task of a lexicographer of the Talmudic Aramaic dialects is an awesome
one. Comprehensiveness can come at the expense of original research on dif-
ficult entries, as the lexicographer is at times forced to content himself with
offering a plausible reading that emerges from the contextual occurrences of
the term, without undertaking in-depth original research.1 I maintain that to
the extent that we can engage in self-standing studies of individual lexemes,
their definitions and derivations, through exhaustive investigation into the
individual passages and their literary inter-relationships, a task that does not
fall within the parameters of the routine work of the lexicographer, we may be
able to contribute significant complementary lexicographical clarifications.
* This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 1671/13). Thanks are
due to Elli Fischer for translation from theHebrew, and to Elnatan Chen and ShlomiTsemach
for their assistance.
1 Sokoloff expresses one aspect of these difficulties and the resulting limitations in his intro-
duction to Michael Sokoloff, ADictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic [= DJBA] (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins, 2003), 20, §4.5.1. See ibid., 17, §4.1.1.3.
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I will begin by quoting the relevant entries from the dictionaries by Marcus
Jastrow2 and Michael Sokoloff (in this order).3
אָקיָיְרּוׁש , ׳ס m. ( קרש , v. קַרָס II, cmp. Syr. אקורס P.Sm. 2750) stripe, streak. Pes.
74b אמדד׳ש Ar. (ed. אמדיֵקיָיְרּוׁש ) a streak (streaks) of blood.—Pl. יֵקיָיְרּוׁש .
Ab. Zar. 4b יקמוס׳ש Ms. M. a. Ar. (ed. ׳ס ) red stripes (in the white crest of a
cock); Snh. 105b יֵקָיְרּוס (some ed. יֵקָיְרִס ; Ms.M. יֵקָיְרִׁש ; Ms. O. יקירוש ; v. Rabb.
D. S. a. l. note); Yalk. Is. 300 ׳יירוש . Ḥull. 47b ירויח׳ש white stripes or shreds.
Ib. 93b יקמוס׳ש red veins; B.Mets. 83b יקמוס׳ש (Ms.M. יקירוס ); Yalk. Ps. 668
יקירוס , a. יקרוס .
אָקיָיְרּוׁש , אקיירוס n.m. perh. vein, streak (cf. Sy 焏ܩܝܪ熏ܫ glare of the sun or
fire BBah 1958:14) 1. vein: pl. אמדדיקאמוסיקאירוש red veins of blood Pes
74b(42); אמדדיניטקיקיירוש thin veins of blood HG3 212:78; תיאדאברתלכ
חרסמיקמוסיקירושהיב all fat which has red veins will putrefy BM 83b(51)
[Es: יקיירוס ]; Ḥul 93b(11) [in testicles of a deer]; אתנכדיקירוש veins of the
ileum NDGR 164:7; 2. streak: pl. אתעשאיההויקמוסיקיירושהיבתיאאתעשלכ
יקמוסיקיירושהיבתיל all the time (the rooster’s crest) has red streaks in it.
At that time it does not have red streaks in it AZ 4b(30) // Ber 7a(28; P) [F:
יקיירוס ] // San 105b(29) [K: יקיירוס ]; ירויחיקיירוש white streaksḤul 47b(56)
[in a lung]
In his entry for “šuryaqa,” Sokoloff concedes that “The m[eani]ng of this word
is deduced from context.” As we will see below, the uncertainty regarding the
meaning of the word has serious ramifications for establishing its etymology. A
discussion of the interpretation of the quoted passagesmay result in the deter-
mination of a different base meaning, which in turn may lead to reconsidering
the word’s etymology, anchoring the new meaning among cognates of neigh-
boring dialects, and even determining an unmediated link to a simple Aramaic
and Hebrew root.
The DJBA entry offers two glosses: 1. Vein, and 2. Streak. The suggested ety-
mology is based on the Syriac “šuriqa”—“the glare of the sun or fire.” Note:
prima facie, there is no direct relationship here to veins or streaks.
The word suryaqe appears in seven instances in the Babylonian Talmud,
three of which are in identical contexts. The starting point for my inquiry is
an account regarding R. Elazar b. R. Shimon in b. B. Meṣ. 83b. After R. Elazar
2 Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the
Midrashic Literature (New York: Pardes Publishing House, 1950), 1542.
3 DJBA, 1125.
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was compelled by the authorities to accept a position that required him to
hand criminals over to be punished, he was criticized by others and also felt
the pangs of his own conscience. He sought validation that everyone he turned
over indeed deserved punishment, and divine assurance that his actions were
justified and his righteousness intact.
A
b. B. Meṣ. 83b, cod. Hamburg 165
Thereupon he laid his hands upon his belly and
exclaimed: “Rejoice, my innards, rejoice! If matters
on which you are doubtful are thus, how much
more so those on which you are certain! I am well







Yet in spite of this, his conscience disquieted him.
Thereupon he was given a sleeping draught, taken
into a marble chamber, and had his abdomen
opened, and basketfuls of fat were removed from
him and placed in the sun during Tammuz and Ab,







But no fat putrefies!—Fat which contains red
streaks does putrefy. But here, though it contained





The motif of having faith in one’s rectitude to the point that worms and decay
have no power over the flesh can be found in the earlier Palestinian version of
the story, which appears in Pesiqta de Rab Kahana. In the Babylonian Talmud,
its usage is secondary and greatly expanded.
Pesiqta de Rab Kahana 11:23
As R. Elazar bar R. Shimon was wasting away, his
arm once happened to get exposed, and he saw his
wife both laughing and weeping. He said to her: As






are weeping. You laugh because you said to your-
self, “How happy am I with what has beenmy lot in
this world! How happy am I that I have been able
to cleave to the body of such a righteousman!” And
you weep because you said, “Alas that such a body
is going to the worms!” True, I am about to die, but
worms, God forbid, will have no power over me.
However, one worm is destined to bore behind my
ear for once, as I entered a synagogue, I heard aman
uttering blasphemy and I should have taken legal











The passage from the Babylonian Talmud can be presented as having three lay-
ers. The first segment declares R. Elazar’s confidence in his own righteousness
and the powerlessness of worms and decay over his body. In the formulation of
the Babylonian narrator, this is a brief episode of self-confidence sandwiched
between longer episodes of pangs of conscience.
The second segment introduces the novel contribution of the Babylonian
narrator: It is possible to test one’s immunity to decay and decomposition by
undergoing liposuction.
The third statement is something completely different. Into the smooth-
flowing vibrant narrative jumps Setam Ha-Talmud, the now well-recognized
pedantic, scholastic glossator of the Babylonian Talmud. He is less devoted
to artful narration, and more interested in raising empirical difficulties, thus
demanding that the story not deviate from anatomical facts: “But no fat putre-
fies!” The lack of putrefaction is nomiracle, for, so he claims, fat will not putrefy
evenwhen left in the hot summer sun! There is no excuse for peppering literary
creations—or even if it is historical documentation—with non-factual ‘facts’
that are easily refuted.
The resolution of the problem likewise expresses scientific sensibilities: If
the fat contains red markings, suryaqe sumaqe, it will putrefy, and the fat that
was removed from R. Elazar’s belly did indeed contain suryaqe sumaqe, but it
nevertheless did not putrefy!4 Miracle restored.
What is the glossator’s source for this most technical expression suryaqe
sumaqe that is used here as a substitute for “blood”?Wewill see that the answer
4 The anatomical assertions of this passage reflect the science of the time. See S. Friedman,
“Aristotle in the Babylonian Talmud?—A Scholastic Interpolation by the Talmud’s Anony-
mous Glossator,” And Inscribe the Name of Aaron: Studies in Bible, Epigraphy, Literacy and
History Presented to Aaron Demsky (Maarav 21 [2014, published in 2017], pp. 311–317).
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lies in the hyperlinks connecting passage to passage, invisible to the eye—a lit-
erary phenomenon. The search for the meaning of the elusive suryaqe begins
with animal anatomy or, in Talmudic parlance, with the laws of ritual slaughter
and preparation of koshermeat. Our journey begins with b. Ḥul. 47b, regarding
the halakhic status of the lungs of slaughtered animals and the fluids found in
them.
B
Once when R. Ḥananiah was ill, R. Nathan and all
the great men of that age came to visit him. There
was then brought in to [R. Ḥananiah] a lung whose
substance [had decayed and] was tossing about
within as [water] in a jug, and he declared it to
be permitted. Rava said: Provided, however, the
bronchial tubes within were intact. R. Aḥa, son of
Rava, asked R. Ashi, How would we know it? He
replied:We take a glazed earthen basin, [pierce the
lung] andpour it out into thebasin; if there are seen
anywhite streaks ⟨better: particles⟩ it is trefah, but









Rava limits the permissibility of an animal whose lung was “tossing about” to
a case where the bronchial tubes remained intact. R. Ashi suggests a practical
test to determine whether the fluid that remains in the lung contains pieces
of the bronchial tubes: when the fluid is poured into a bowl, if there are “white
streaks” ⟨better: particles⟩—“suryaqe ḥiwre” in it—the animal is not kosher, but
if not, it is kosher.
Maimonides, The Book of Holiness, Laws of Ritual Slaughter 7:9:
If white threads are visible, then it is clear that the
bronchial tubes dissolved and [the animal] is a tre-
fah. If not, then only the flesh of the lung has disin-





Rashi explains the Talmudic term with an Old French term that means “white
spots.”5 Maimonides defines it as “white threads.” Suryaqe are the bits or rem-
nants of the flesh of the bronchial tubes.
5 See below, n. 42.
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Note that in this Talmudic passage, “ḥiwre” (‘white’) is used to modify
suryaqe, denoting the color of bronchial tubes, and not “sumaqe” (‘red’) as in
the previous passage. If the fluid poured from the lungs contains anywhite par-
ticles, it means that the bronchial tubes had dissolved by the time the animal
was slaughtered, and the animal is not kosher.
Here, suryaqe are not “veins” or “streaks,” and they are not red. This mention
of suryaqe by R. Ashi offers a practical method for applying Rava’s requirement
that it be demonstrated that the bronchial tubes are intact before the animal
can be deemed kosher.
Other instances of the word suryaqe relate to the prohibition against con-
suming blood. Jewish law forbids eating blood, including pieces of meat that
contain blood. The following two laws address the examination of the organs
of a slaughtered animal to determine whether they contain blood. Checking
for suryaqe is suggested in context of the testicles of a kid (b. Ḥul. 93b):
C
Mar son of R. Ashi said: The testicles of a kid that is
not yet thirty days old arepermittedwithout having
to peel off the membrane; thereafter, if they con-
tain semen they are forbidden, if they do not con-





How does one know this? If they contain red
streaks [in the membrane], they are forbidden; if




Mar bar R. Ashi asserts that the testicles of a young kid that was slaughtered
before reaching the age of thirty days may be eaten (even without peeling off
the membrane), because they do not yet contain blood at that point.6 In con-
trast, once a kid ismore than thirty days old, then if the testicles contain semen
they are forbidden (unless the membrane has been peeled off), because they
certainly contain blood. However, if they do not yet contain semen, they do not
contain blood and thus may be eaten.
Maimonides codifies this law as follows (The Book of Holiness, Laws of For-
bidden Foods 7:14):
6 The blood is subsequently found in themembrane, see b. Hul. 93a; Miamonides, Laws of For-
bidden Foods 7:13.
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The testicles of a kid or lamb that is not yet thirty
days old may be cooked without first being peeled;
after thirty days, if fine red threads are visible in
them, it means that blood has reached them, and
one should not cook them until he peels them or
cuts and salts them as we have explained. If red









InMar bar R. Ashi’s law,we once again have a practical ruling that distinguishes
something that may be eaten from something that may not on the basis of a
difference that is not readily discernible. The Stamwished to elucidate the test
asserted by Mar bar R. Ashi, but actually proposes an even clearer sign. To that
end, he repeats R. Ashi’s phraseology as in the previous passage (b. Ḥul. 47b).
R. Ashi said that if there are suryaqe ḥiwre (white suryaqe) in the lung fluid, it
means that the bronchial tubes had dissolved. Here, the Stam says that if there
are suryaqe sumaqe (red suryaqe) on the testicles, itmeans they containblood!7
From this point on, the Stam continued using this formulation in halakhic
rationales and for various empirical tests in aggadic contexts. It appears as an
halakhic justification in b. Pesaḥ. 74b.
D
[With regard to] raw meat, eggs, and the jugular
veins, R. Aḥa and Ravina differ […]
ברהביגילפיקירומויעיבאצמוא
]…[אניברואחא
Rawmeat which turns red, it and its serum are for-
bidden; if it does not turn red, ⟨it and⟩ its serum are
permitted. Ravina said: Even if it does not turn red,
its serum is forbidden, [for] it cannot but contain






The ruling at the beginning of this passage, which is the continuation of a state-
ment by R. Aḥa, suggests that the kosher status of liquid that seeps from a piece
of meat can be ascertained based on its color. If it turned red (ʾasmiq), it is for-
bidden; if it did not turn red (la ʾasmiq), it is permitted. Ravina disagrees, taking
a more stringent position: “Even if it does not turn red its serum is forbidden.”
7 See below, progression within the Talmud.
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The Stam adds an explanation for Ravina’s stringent position: “it cannot but
contain suryaqe d’dema.” It is not possible that this serum contains no traces
of blood. The sweeping prohibition results from the concern that some blood
remains in this serum, even if unseen.
In the first two instances, the white or red color of the suryaqe was men-
tioned. Here, according to the original version of the text, no color is men-
tioned, only “suryaqe d’dema,” ‘traces of blood’. We determined the original
reading based on the following synopsis of primary textual witnesses.8 The
longer secondary reading is “suryaqe sumaqe d’dema”, ‘red traces/streaks of
blood’; tradents regularly add text rather than delete. This reading results from
a conflation of the original readingwith suryaqe sumaqe, found inA andC. The
halakhic concern is clearly about ‘traces of blood’, with no need to say ‘traces
of red blood’.9
אמדד אקירוש היב תיאאלד רשפא יא Ox. Bodl. heb. e. 75/47–54
אמדד אקאירוש היב ת..... ........ … Camb. T-S F2(1).92
אמדד יקיירוש היב תילד רשפיא יא Oxford Opp. Add. fol. 23
המד יקיירוש הב תילד רשפא יא Venice Print
אמדד אקירוש היב תילד רשפא יא Vatican 125
אמרד יקירוש ׳יב תילד רשפא יא Vatican 134
אמדד יקיירוש הב תילד רשפא יא Munich 6
אמדד יקיירוש היב תילד רשפיא יא Munich 95
אמרד יקמוס יקאירוש היב תילד רשפא יא NY—Columbia X 893 T 14a
אמדד יקאמוס יקאירוש היב תילד רשפא יא NY—JTS Rab. 1623/2
אמדד יקמוס יקיירוש היב תילד רשפיא יא Vatican 109
The reason for the absence of color is simple; the other instances describe
visual inspection, for which color is crucial. If one sees white suryaqe, it means
8 http://www.lieberman‑institute.com.
9 One of the outstanding features of DJBA is its controlled use of manuscripts.When necessary,
there is extensive use of manuscripts, but the standard operating procedure is to quote one
select textual witness for each tractate. In some cases, the decision of which MS is chosen
has strong implications for determining the meaning of words, and thus on the etymology
as well. The default witness for b. Pesaḥ. is Cod. New York, JTS Rab. 1623/2 (EMC 271). Despite
the great linguistic value of this manuscript, it should not be relied upon exclusively with
respect to the textual tradition, as the Yemenite manuscripts of this tractate are known for
additions and reworkings of the original text (cf. Shamma Friedman, Tosefta Atiqta: Pesaḥ
Rishon [in Hebrew] [Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002], 87–88, and literature cited
there). Close scrutiny of Talmud text is best served through a thorough review of all primary
textual witnesses, in synopsis format. This can be done far more easily today than in previous
decades.
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the bronchial tubes dissolved; if one sees red suryaqe, it means there is blood in
themeat. Here, however, in Ravina’s ruling, there is no visual inspection, only a
rationale for a sweeping prohibition. Presumably there are traces of blood, even
if they are not seen! Color plays no role. Blood is known to be red, so mention-
ing the color is superfluous.
In the three cases that pertain to the laws of meat consumption, the term
suryaqe either teaches a method of inspection to determine halakhic status
or offers a halakhic rationale. The functional role of suryaqe in these contexts
implies that it refers to non-visible traces, or remnants that can appear as small
pieces or tiny marks.
From this point onward, it was easy for the redactors of theTalmud to export
the same view of reality and the same terminology from animal anatomy to
discussions of the human body and its soft tissue, as in the story of R. Elazar b.
Shimon’s belly—likewise in order to distinguish two eventualities by means of
a visual inspection:
B. Meṣ. 83b Ḥul. 93b
חרסמיקמוסיקירושהיבתיאדאברתלכ ןריסאיקמוסיקיירושוהבתיאיא
חרסמאליקמוסיקאירושהיבתיאדג״עאיאהו ןיירש—יקמוסיקיירושוהבתיל
Any fat that contains red streaks putre-
fies.
If they contain red streaks they are for-
bidden.
But here, though it contained red
streaks, it did not putrefy.
If they contain no red streaks, they are
permitted.
The pedantic glossator dons his scholastic robes here, not only in following
the scientific opinion of his time, but also in reapplying idioms used in other
Talmudic contexts. The term under discussion was borrowed from its precise
meanings in laws of meat consumption and reapplied as part of an adroit effort
to reinstitute a miracle.
According to the science of the day, fat does not putrefy at all, whereas
blood putrefies rapidly. The Stam glossator had to produce blood within the
fat so that the immunity to putrefaction of the fat removed from R. Elazar’s
belly could be attributed to a miracle. The problem is that the same contem-
porary science asserted that no blood is to be found in fat.10 To resolve this, he
10 See above, n. 6.
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enlisted suryaqe sumaqe, as if to say that there is indeed no blood, but there
is something that approximates blood and that putrefies rapidly—yet even
so, R. Elazar’s fat, miraculously, did not putrefy. The language suryaqe sumaqe
and its use in distinguishing two cases by their presence or absence are likely
to have been borrowed from the case of the kid (C), and serve the needs of
the present passage clearly and efficiently. The contention makes sense. The
presence of suryaqe sumaqe in human fat is not asserted on the basis of empir-
ical observation, but results entirely of reuse of literary motifs appearing else-
where.
In a further passage, the Stam applies these words to the context of divina-
tion bymeans of observing fowl. In the well-known passage that appears three
times in the Babylonian Talmud,11 about determining the moment of each day
during which God is angry (for “His anger lasts but a moment;” Ps 30:6), it is
stated (b. Sanh. 105b):
E
Now, when is He angry?—In the first three hours
[of the day], when the comb of the cock is white.
But at all times it is white!—At all other times it has
red streaks, but at that moment [of God’s anger]






This divinatory technique relates to the whiteness of the cock’s comb as the
indicator of the moment of God’s anger. The Stam glossator intervenes with
his challenge: “But at all times it is white!” Again, he supplies his own resolu-
tion. In response, the Stam suggests a manner of examination at the center of
which stand “suryaqe sumaqe.” The resulting discourse resembles that of the
story of R. Elazar b. Shimon:




11 b. Ber. 7b, b. Sanh. 105b, b. ‘Abod. Zar. 4b.
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(cont.)
The Story of R. Elazar b. Shimon The Cock’s Comb (Sanh. 105b et al.)
But no fat putrefies! But at all times it is white!
Any fat that contains red streaks putre-
fies
At all other times it has red streaks
But here, though it contained red streaks,
it did not putrefy.
but at that moment, there are no red
streaks in it.
It is worth noting here that in the cock account, in place of יקמוסיקירוסהיבתיא
“it has red streaks,” some manuscripts read יקמוסיקיירוסהיבישייפ “red streaks
remain in it.” This variant well fits the notion that suryaqe are “remains” or
“traces.”
In this divinatory formula, seeing suryaqe serves a diagnostic purpose. How-
ever, in this case, to see them does not require slaughtering an animal or per-
forming surgery; the suryaqe are visible to all on the comb of the live rooster.
Color-change in roosters’ combs is a real, objective phenomenon, regulated
by testosterone levels, which, when lowered, cause the natural red to pale
towardswhite.12Thedivine anger is a cosmic eventwith ahormonal effect upon
fowls. The scholastic challenge (“But at all times it is white!”) flies in the face of
reality! It would appear that the availability of an excellent, ready-made solu-
tion, by now common stock, prompted the objection in the first place.
The Intra-Talmudic Developmental Path
From a chronological perspective, the first appearance of suryaqe in the Tal-
mudic corpus is in an exchange between two named Amoraim discussion
(B): R. Aḥa asks R. Ashi how one can know whether the bronchial tubes had
12 “Spurs, combs and wattles in birds are, therefore, typical testosterone-dependent sec-
ondary sexual structures. Interestingly, when cocks fight they specifically attack one
another’s combs and wattles. These structures may, therefore, be important signals dur-
ing both male-male fighting and mate choice by females.” (Ian P.F. Owens and Roger
V. Short, “Hormonal Basis of Sexual Dimorphism in Birds: Implications for New Theo-
ries of Sexual Selection,” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 10 [1995]: 46); “Take the time to
look carefully at the colour of their combs … comb might become paler than usual, or
might become a darker red or purple colour, or even blotchy” (http://www.darwinvets
.com/poultry/common‑chicken‑problems‑diseases).
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dissolved, and R. Ashi answers that we spill the fluid from the lung and observe:
if it contains suryaqe ḥiwre it is not kosher, and if not, it is kosher. The remnants
of the bronchial tubes are small white pieces.
Thereafter, this word serves the Stam as a useful term for indicating rem-
nants that are even less solid: traces of blood within a fluid (C), or the pre-
sumption that there may be traces of blood in a fluid, even when they are not
visible at all (D). This exhausts the usage with respect to the kosher laws, but
the usefulness of the termcontinues to serve the literary goals of the Stam, even
in the aggadic contexts of the fat of R. Elazar b. Shimon’s belly and the cock’s
comb. It would appear that the intra-Talmudic lexical development parallels its
functional-literary progression. Of the three uses in context of kosher laws—
suryaqe ḥiwre, suryaqe sumaqe, and suryaqe d’dema—only suryaqe sumaqe
was applied to the aggadic settings: R. Elazar b. Shimon’s fat and the cock’s
comb.
Definition of Talmudic suryaqe
In my opinion, there is no justification for applying the definition “vein” to any
one of the Talmudic instances. Yet the lexical entry in DJBA with which we
began quotes three Talmudic passages under the first gloss, which lists “vein”
as ameaning of suryaqe. The relevant line from the story of R. Elazar b. Shimon
is translated there: “all fat which has red veins will putrefy.” However, “veins”
are not implied in context. Rashi explains: “Red hues (gevanim), comprised of
flesh.” The Soncino translation has “red streaks.”Moreover, we suggested, based
on the science of the time, that the passage in fact implies that there is no blood
in fat, and so certainly there are no veins. There are only suryaqe, some type of
weakly defined red marks.
Regarding Ravina’s statement in b. Pesaḥ. 74b (D), “Even if it does not turn
red, its serum is forbidden, [for] it cannot but contain [red] streaks of blood,”
only the three words “suryaqe sumaqe d’dema” are quoted in the above-
mentioned entry, and they are translated as “red veins of blood.” Even if we
adopt the variant that includes “sumaqe,” which, as noted, is a secondary read-
ing, there is no room to ascribe “vein” as its meaning based on context. The
concern is for the presence of unseen suryaqe in the serum, which is a liq-
uid. The unseen matter in the liquid is blood, not veins. Even the expanded
phrase, as represented by three textual witness, should be translated “red traces
of blood,” and not “veins.”
We may therefore delete the ascription of the meaning “veins” from all Tal-
mudic contexts.
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The second sub-entry in DJBA, bearing the definition “streak,” is comprised
of the remaining two Talmudic occurrences: the cock’s comb (E) and the
bronchial tubes (B). Apparently, it made little sense to locate veins in the cock’s
comb, and “streak” is substituted, resulting in the translation: “all the time, (the
rooster’s crest) has red streaks in it. At that time it does not have red streaks in
it.” Likewise, themeaning of “veins” could not be ascribed to suryaqe ḥiwre, and
the line is therefore translated: “white streaks [in a lung].” In truth, as we have
seen, they are not “white streaks in a lung,” but white pieces of the flesh of the
bronchial tubes found in the fluid poured from the lung.
The meaning “veins” cannot be derived from any of the Talmudic passages
quoted in this entry, nor from their context, from Rashi, or from the Soncino
translation. Every instance of this term in the Talmud can be explained by
ascribing a single generalmeaning: “something tiny,” and in context, something
tiny that is separate from a solid or liquid medium and can either be discerned
by observation or whose presence can be deduced without being seen.
Linguistic Development
Our journey with the term suryaqe is not yet complete. Linguistic develop-
ment will not be stopped by bringing down the gavel; rather, the term suryaqe
sumaqe continued to be applied in the post-Talmudic period, and the Ge’onim
used it in contexts fitting their legal discussions.13 The geonic authors moved
the term suryaqe to a further developmental stage, in order to express their
additional clarification to the Talmudic law.14 Attached to the ileum is an array
of small, hair-like blood vessels that are difficult to remove, and thus led to
the prohibition of the ileum for kosher consumption. Halakhic nomenclature
13 Expanding on b. Ḥul. 113a which discusses whether there is a presumption of blood being
found in intestines, Halakhot Gedolot (largely ascribed to R. Shimon Kayyara, first half
of the ninth century) indicates that the ileum is prohibited, due to אמדדיניטקיקיירוש
הבתיאד —the “narrow suryaqe of blood which are in it” (Hildesheimer, 3, 212–213 [= F]).
The identical phrase is used in an inquiry addressed to Rav Hai Gaon (Simcha Emanuel,
ed., Newly Discovered Geonic Responsa andWritings of Early Provencal Sages [in Hebrew]
[Jerusalem: Ofeq Institute, 1995], 164; below =G)who, in his response, returns verbatim to
the prohibition inHalakhotGedolot, shortens the reference to אתנכדיקירוש , “the suryaqe
of the ileum”. Cf. Raviah (Bnei Brak: Sifriati, 1976), 145–146, par. 1121; and ibid. 4, 170.
14 There is no term for small veins or capillaries (probably meant here) in Talmudic Ara-
maic. Warid is used only in Syriac (see Brockelmann/Sokoloff, 360 and meanings there;
CAL), but not in other Aramaic dialects. For larger blood vessels TB can use circumlocu-
tions, such as simpona (see DJBA, 806); for smaller, אניירוש (ibid., 1124). In this passage the
Gaon manufactures the terminology required for his new halakhic distinction.
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possessed no technical term for these capillaries. R. Sherira Gaon referred
to them as ḥuṭim, “threads,”15 by analogy of similar structure. The author of
Halakhot Gedolot preferred a descriptive tact: the “narrow suryaqe of blood
which are in it,” taking advantage of the traditional term suryaqe for unde-
fined bodies (whose presence may cause halakhic prohibition). In the passage
by R. Hai Gaon16 the first mention of these small blood vessels used the long
phrase as inHalakhotGedolot; the second reference could thenbe abbreviated:
אתנכדיקירוש , “suryaqe of the ileum.”
Once again, literary and lexical development go hand in hand. Each era adds
new linguistic usages, and lexical development never ends. As clearly enunci-
atedbyE.Y.Kutcher,TalmudicHebrew is best analyzedas two successive stages,
TannaiticHebrewandAmoraicHebrew,17with substantial differences between
them. Similarly, in the specific context we are treating here, we note that the
language of the Ge’onim develops a further stage of usage, directly based upon
the Talmudic, and growing out of it.
Progression within the Talmud
DJBA, which suggests for the etymological derivation a Syriac term defined
as the “glare of the sun or fire,” opens the entry with (1) b. Pesaḥ. 74b (= D),
translated there “red veins of blood” (as indicated above, “red” is a secondary
addition to the Talmud text); the second reference (2) is to Halakhot Gedolot
(= F),18 translated “thin veins of blood.” The third (3) b. B. Meṣ. 83b (= A), “…
red veins …”, translation applying also to (4) b. Ḥul. 93b (= C); (5) (= G),19 trans-
lated “veins of the ileum”. (1–2) contain the word “blood;” (1, 3–4) “red.” (1) has
both, “red” and “blood”; (5) has neither word. The progression leads from the
more specified to the less specified: “blood”→ “red”→ “suryaqe” unmodified.The
second sub-entry (“streak”) collects the occurrences where “vein” is impossible
or improbable: (6) the rooster’s crown (= E); (7) b. Ḥul. 47b “suryaqe ḥiwre”—
“white steaks,” farthest possible from red blood.
15 Louis Ginzberg, Geonica II: Genizah Studies (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary,
1909), 26.
16 See n. 13.
17 E. Yechezkel Kutscher, “Some Problems of the Lexicography of Mishnaic Hebrew and
Its Comparison with Biblical Hebrew” [in Hebrew], in Archive of the New Dictionary of
Rabbinical Literature, ed. E. Yechezkel Kutscher (Ramat-Gan: The New Dictionary of Rab-
binical Literature Project, Bar-Ilan University, 1972), 30, 40.
18 See n. 13.
19 See n. 13.
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In order to address the etymological question we undertook first to estab-
lish the primary meaning within the Talmudic corpus. Secondary and tertiary
usages, which stem, inter alia, from the development of additional applications
within theTalmud itself, andare then further adapted tomeet theneedsof writ-
ers from the geonic era, are less useful in arriving at a satisfactory etymology.
Aswe have seen, the first sub-entry in DJBA is devoted to themeaning “vein.”
It is composed of three Talmudic references and two geonic. In our opinion,
only in the geonic passages occur phrases referring to “veins” (better, perhaps,
“capillaries”), or, finally, actually denote “vein.” The Talmudic passages them-
selves touch upon remnants, traces, and the like, and generate a progression
along the lines we have suggested: B, C, D, A, E.
It is R. Ashi who can claim to have first used the term suryaqe. He, and the
Stam after him, needed aword for tiny, insubstantial entities, the traces or rem-
nants of somematerial or substance whose presence can barely be detected by
the naked eye. A language’s lexicon of nouns is initially constituted by words
that refer to substantial, material things; words for abstractions, conceptions,
and even specks and the ethereal are constructed through semantic borrow-
ing, or are borrowed from other dialects that have already reached this level of
development.
Etymology
One final point is in order before ascertaining the etymologyof suryaqe. The let-
ter ש that begins “suryaqe” may in some (all?) occurrences be taken as śin ,(ׂש)
based on the reading with samekh in Talmudic textual witnesses and Geonic
quotations.20 Of the 46 instances of this word in manuscripts and first print
editions of the Talmud, sixteen, including several Genizah fragments and pedi-
greed manuscripts, attest to samekh.21
20 For example, in Ezriel Hildesheimer, ed., Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Mek-
itse Nirdamim, 1987), 147 n. 49. Cf. Rashi to b. Sanh. 105b and b. ‘Abod. Zar. 4b (with further
attestations in the manuscripts of Rashi’s Talmudic commentaries). For Talmudic occur-
rences with samekh see appendix.
21 On rabbinic views of the letter ש and its two pronunciations, see Richard Steiner, “Ketiv-
Kere or Polyphony: The Šin-Śin Distinction According to the Masoretes, the Rabbis,
Jerome, Qirqisānī, and Hai Gaon,” in Studies in Hebrew and Jewish Languages Presented
to Shelomo Morag, ed. Moshe Bar-Asher (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1996), 151–179, and literature
sources indicated there. On the interchangeability of šin, śin and samekh in certain words
in rabbinic texts, see Yechiel Kara, Yemenite Manuscripts of the Babylonian Talmud [in
Hebrew], vol. 10 of Language and Tradition (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1983), 79.
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As to etymology,22 DJBA compares the rare Syriac word 焏ܩܝܪ熏ܫ “šuriqa,”
which is defined there “glare of the sun or fire.” In Payne Smith’s dictionary, it is
rendered “flashing beams of sun or fire light.”23 Both are based on Bar Bahlul’s
Syriac-Arabic dictionary,which preserves the only documentation of thisword:
رانلاواسمشلاواّرحلاجهو—焏ܩܝܪ熏ܫ
[“The burning (wahaj) of heat, the sun, or fire”]
The exact meaning of the word wahaj is pertinent. If wahaj in this quota-
tion does not indicate “flashing” or “light,” but “burning,”24 indeed more fit-
ting to “heat,” the above adaptations of Bar Bahlul are brought into ques-
tion.
The Syriac šuriqa can be associated with our occurrences only through the
implicit association of the glare and flashes with the color “red.” There are of
course rich associations of the root s/šrq in Hebrew and other Semitic lan-
guageswith red,25 although I have not seen it suggested in connectionwith Syr-
iac šuriqa. However, any association with a shining red hue is precisely where
the suggestion fails! Redness is a quality that can describe suryaqe, just aswhite-
ness can, as in the case of suryaqe ḥiwre! Thus, color is not an essential attribute
of suryaqe.
22 The etymologies offered speculatively in Arukh Hashalem, s.v. ]א[ָקיְיַרְׁש (Alexander
Kohut, Aruch completum sive lexicon, vocabula et res, quae in libris Targumicis, Talmudi-
cis et Midraschicis continentur, vol. 8 [NewYork: Pardes Publishing House, 1955], 167–168),
are not convincing.
23 J. Payne Smith, A Compendious Syriac Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), 568;
R. Payne Smith,Thesaurus syriacus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879–1901), 4338, under root
קרש = whistle. Brockelmann/Sokoloff LexSyr does not register this word at all, but in the
entry קרש = whistle (p. 1611) we find a fifth meaning: “to shine”, based on one occurrence
which is marked as doubtful. The nouns associated there with this root do not include the
word under discussion.
24 EdwardWilliamLane, Arabic-English Lexicon (London:Williams andNorgate, 1863–1893),
2970 (“The burning, or heat, of fire”; ‘diffusion’ is a secondarymeaning [ibid.]); HansWehr,
A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J. Milton Cowan, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Spoken
Language Services, 1976), 1102.
25 Zech 1:8; See HALOT, pp. 1361–1362, even “the rising, blood-red sun”. For š/s in the root
ק״רש in Tannaitic Hebrew see: Kara, Yemenite Manuscripts, 79 n. 154. It should be noted
that the shining sun is referred to in Sir 50:7 as תקרשמשמש (Zeev Ben-Ḥayyim, Sefer Ben
Sira [Jerusalem: The Academy of the Hebrew Language, 1973], 62; M.H. Segal, Sefer Ben
Sira ha-Shalem [Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1958], 344. Also notemaśriq instead of mazhir
in the margin to 43:11).
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In Jastrow’s dictionary,26 the word in question is compared to the Syriac
焏ܩܘ犯ܣ “saruqa” with reference to Payne Smith’s Thesaurus,27 which in turn
translates this term as “particula nebulae,” small bits of cloud; Payne SmithDic-
tionary: “a particle of mist.”28 In Sokoloff ’s edition of Brockelmann’s dictionary,
it is translated as “wisp of cloud.”29 Saruqa means simply the “particle,” as the
word “cloud” is also used in context. This meaning fits well with our interpre-
tation of suryaqe as “small traces” of shapeless, indistinct matter of any color.
This is the primary meaning in the Talmudic instances of the word: something
tiny, like the remains of a dissolved bronchial tube in lung fluid, barely visible
traces of blood in a liquid, and red spots on human fat.
The Syriac word saruqa can be illustrated in context from Acta martyrum et
sanctorum Syriacae:30 ܐܪ熏ܥܙ焏ܢܢܥܕ煟ܚ焏ܩܘ犯ܣܝ熟ܚܬܐ “A saruqa of a small
cloud was seen.” The cloud is small, and its saruqa is even smaller.
Developing a word for a “[small] piece” of nebulous stuff is often done
through linguistic analogy. Fromwhere can such ameaning be borrowed? Rea-
sonably, from the realm of threads and fabrics, where we can find something
similar to a small, fluffy cloud, and to the threads mentioned by Sherira and
Maimonides.
The root ק״רס refers to the combing or carding of fiber,31 a basic opera-
tion in the manufacture of textiles. As a major element of the linen-making
process, combing is mentioned in Isaiah 19:9 (NJPS): “The flax-workers, too,
shall be dismayed, both carders (śeriqot) and weavers chagrined.” In an area
where carding is done, small, light, all but worthless bits of fabric—if youwish,
saruqa/suryaqe—can be found. Their name is readily lent to ethereal traces
which interest the halakhist, and the pedantic glossator rejoiced as he further
applied them to the Talmud’s bold, colorful narratives.
Let us return to “the saruqa of a small cloud,” translated above as “a wisp of
cloud.” One meaning of wisp is “a thin, narrow, filmy, or slight piece, fragment
(of something),” as in “wisp after wisp growing, trembling, fleeting, and fading




29 LexSyr, Sokoloff ed., 1044.
30 P. Bedjan, Actamartyrum et sanctorum Syriacae (Lipsiae: Otto Harrassowitz, 1894), 2, 342.
31 See LexSyr, Sokoloff ed., 1050; Payne Smith, Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 392. Jastrow’s




We may thus reasonably hypothesize that the meaning of the Talmudic
“suryaqe” as a small trace of something is based on the small wads of fiber that
are separated from the fabric during the carding process, as described in m.
B. Qam. 10:10: “Wads of fiber that the launderer pulls out belong to him, and
that the carder ( קרוסה/קּורָּסַה ) pulls out belong to the householder.” Even these
fluffy remnants are of some use.
Number




The first twoare clearly plurals,modifiedbyplural adjectives.The third,withno
adjective (in the original, shorter reading),33 is plural in most witnesses. How-
ever, in two geniza fragments we find: אמדדאקאירוש,אמדדאקירוש , almost34
certainly singular: a trace.35
Morphology
A plene orthography with alef in this word appears sporadically in the Ye-
menite manuscripts, and once on Cod. Hamburg 165, e.g.: יקאמוסיקאיירוש ;
יקמוסיקאירוש .36
The above reflect two possible realizations: 1. šuryaqe; 2. šuraiqe.
In the Yemenite reading tradition the following phonological realizations of
the morphological possibilities have been recorded: šuryaqa/e, šuraiqa/e.37
33 See above,D.
34 “Almost,” in light of the possible rare usage of final alef for masculine plural, as in Syriac
(see Shamma Friedman, “Three Studies in Babylonian Aramaic Grammar” [in Hebrew],
Tarbitz 43 [1973]: 61 n. 15).
35 This reading is also registered in the Arukh, s.v. šerayqa (see n. 24): אמדדאקירוש .
36 See textual synopsis (Appendix).
37 Also a third reading has been attested: šuryeqa/e. See Shelomo Morag and Yechiel Kara,
BabylonianAramaic inYemeniteTradition: TheNoun (Jerusalem: HebrewUniversity Press,
2002), 267, 272.
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The form šuryaqe has few exact morphological parallels.38 Furthermore, it
presents the yod as a consonant, yielding an anomalic quatro-literal pattern.
In contrast, šuraiqe (with its /u-ai/ structure) can be analyzed as a diminutive
form, as in the Syriac ʿulayma for “young lad” and BT ʾuzzēla (gazelle) for a small
goat.39
Arabic suryāq
Rashi commented on the word under discussion as follows: 40,שיי״קונ.יקיירוס
קאירוסטוחלארוקלאעמשיןושלו,םיטוח׳יטוחומכ.זעלןושל “Suryaqe; taches [= spots]
in French. Like threads, and in Arabic a thread is called suryāq” (b. ‘Abod. Zar.
4b; Pesaro print). In the only surviving manuscript for this gloss41 the entire
comment consists of only three words: ׳עלב42שקט]![יקריוש . The most rea-
sonable explanation is that the short text is the original form of this gloss, to
which Rashi added at a later time. The addition was subsequently transferred
to some exemplars, while others maintained the original language, without
the addition.43 The original text simply presents the translation of the difficult
word into Old French, exactly as appears in Rashi’s commentary to the paral-
lel passages (b. Ber. 7b and b. Ḥul. 47b). The addition presents the definition
“threads,” as against the original “spots.” The ostensible reason for the addition
is that Rashi received new information, including an explanation of the word
in Arabic.44 This situation is similar to Rashi, b. Beṣah 33b s.v. יקתסומב , where
38 See ibid., 266–268.
39 Z. Har-Zahav, “Diminutive and Augmentative Forms” (“Tsurot Hahaqtanah Vehahag-
dalah”), Lĕšonénu 1, no. 2 (1930): 132; T. Nöldeke, Compendious Syriac Grammar, trans.
J. Crichton (London:Williams & Norgate, 1904), 71, §112; J.N. Epstein, AGrammar of Baby-
lonian Aramaic [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 115; Sokoloff, Jewish Babylonian
Aramaic, 93, etc.
40 See n. 42.
41 Parma 3155 (De-Rossi 1292).
42 This is the correct form of the Old French gloss; see Arsène Darmesteter and D.S. Blond-
heim, Les Gloses Françaises dans les commentaires Talmudiques de Raschi (Paris: Libraire
Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1929), 134, no. 974.
43 In defense of this pattern, see Shamma Friedman, “Rashi’s Talmudic Commentaries and
the Nature of Their Revisions and Recensions” (Hebrew), in Zvi Arie Steinfeld, ed., Rashi
Studies (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1993), 173.
44 Regarding Arabic in Rashi’s commentaries, see AvrahamGrossman, “The Impact of Rabbi
Samuel of Spain and Reuel of Byzantium on Rashi’s School” [in Hebrew],Tarbiẕ 82 (2014):
453–455; idem, “TheTreatment of Lexicon andGrammar inRashi’s Commentaries: Rashi’s
Ties with the Islamic Lands” [in Hebrew], Lĕšonénu 73 (2011): 432–433; idem, “Rashi’s
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an addition (which canbe seen as a later recension) quotesR. Samuel thePious,
the Sefaradi, including an Arabic gloss.45 The similarity of Rashi’s laʿaz to the
Talmudic word suryaqe which he is explaining, is tantalizing! The meaning
“threads” corresponds to the suggestion that the image behind the Talmudic
word is related to combing fibers; the consonants of the Arabic correspond to
srq, suggested above as the root of the Talmudic word.
The root srqwith themeaning “card,” “comb,”whichwehave beendiscussing
in connectionwith suryaqe, has indeed been documented in Judeo-Arabic.46 It
is possible that this word was also in use by speakers of other Arabic dialects.47
Conversely, its not beingmentioned in the general Arabic dictionariesmay sug-
gest its uniqueness to Judeo-Arabic, in essence a loan-word from Aramaic or
Hebrew.48
Even if Rashi’s informant communicated his interpretation in writing, the
reconstruction of the Arabic word’s pronunciation is hazardous, in that we are
relying on a single attestation. Were we able to conclude that the Arabic word
was pronounced suryāq, and were it true that the Arabic word was simply a
borrowing of the Talmudic suryaqe, we would have further confirmation of the
corresponding Yemenite recitation tradition. More significant is the spelling
with samekh, corresponding to the orthography prominent in oriental textual
witnesses of the Bavli.
Most significant is the explanation “threads” (identical with Sherira Gaon’s
andMaimonides’s explanation)which Rashi received from anArabic-speaking
sage, using a noun from the root srq, and belonging to the realm of fibers,
lending much weight to the above suggestion regarding the Talmudic Aramaic
word, which may have been absorbed in Judeo-Arabic directly from the Ara-
maic.
Rejection of Philosophy—Divine andHumanWisdoms Juxtaposed,” SimonDubnow Insti-
tute Yearbook 8 (2009): 103–104.
45 Idem, “The Impact of Rabbi Samuel”, 449–450.
46 Joshua Blau, A Dictionary of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic Texts (Jerusalem: The Academy of
the Hebrew Language and The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2006), 294;
see Mordechai Akiva Friedman, A Dictionary of Medieval Judeo-Arabic in the India Book
Letters from the Geniza and in Other Texts (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2016), 200–201.
47 See S.D. Goitein andM.A. Friedman, India Book, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2009),
76 n. 12.
48 An Arabic noun َقَرس saraq indicating a unit (piece, oblong piece, sheet, bolt?) of silk
recorded in both general Arabic and Judeo-Arabic (EdwardWilliam Lane, Arabic-English
Lexicon [London: Williams and Norgate, 1863–1893], 1352; M.A. Friedman, A Dictionary
of Medieval Judeo-Arabic, 601) is of questionable etymology, would not be connected to
carding, and seems to refer to units much larger than “threads.”
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Conclusion
Exemplary dictionaries, such as Michael Sokoloff ’s Dictionary of Jewish Baby-
lonian Aramaic, present to the careful reader both what is known and what is
not known. Such entries often allow one studying the language to step in, tak-
ing advantage of the outstanding groundwork that has been laid out for him or
her, and carry the investigation a step further. The word “šuryaqa” is one such
entry.
This type of challenge is not infrequent in the field of rabbinic Hebrew and
Aramaic lexicography. One ismoved to emulate the work of early scholars who
devoted in-depth studies to particular lexemes beset with vexing complica-
tions. These studies may by necessity expand the canvas of inquiry,49 but in
the final product serve the ends of lexicography as well.
49 And thus perhaps rile a reviewer; see Yochanan Breuer, review of Studies in the Language




A b. B. Meṣ. 83b
חרסמ יקמוס יקירוש היב תיאד אברת לכ Hamburg 165
חרסמ יקמוס יקיירוס היב תיאד אברת לכ Escorial G-I-3
חירסמ יקמוס יקיירוש חירס אל ׳ברת לכ Soncino Print
חירס היבתיא יקיירוס יקמוס חירס אל יא אברת לכ Vatican 115
חירס יקמוס יקיירוש ]׳יב תיא יא ׳ברת לכ[ Vatican 117
׳ירסד יקמוס יקירוס ׳יב תיא Munich 95
חרסמ אל יקמוס יקירוס היב תיא יכ אברת לכ Florence II-I-8
...... ....... .......... .... ...א יא Spanish Print
חירס יקמוס יקיירוס היב תיא יא ארבת לכ Frankfurt Barth. 107
חרסמ אל יקמוס יקאירוש היב תיאד ג״עא יאהו Hamburg 165
חרסמ אל יקמוס יקירוס היב תיאד ג״עא יאהו Escorial G-I-3
חירסמ אל יקמוס יקיירוש אכיאד בגלעףא אכה Soncino Print
חירס אל ׳קיירוס יקמוס היב תיאד ג״עא אכה Vatican 115
חירס אלו יקמוס יקיירוש היב תיאד ג״עא אכה Vatican 117
׳ירס אל יקמוס יקירוס ׳יב ׳יאד ג״עא ׳כה Munich 95
]חרסמ אל יקמוס יקירוס היב תיאד ג״עא יאה Florence II-I-8
....... … ....... .......... .... תיאד ֯ג״עא י..... Spanish Print
חירס אל יקמוס יקיירוס היב תיאד ג״עא אכה Frankfurt Barth. 107
B b. Ḥul. 47b
הוגב ׳יכפשו אינוקד אעצ ׳יתיימ Hamburg 169
הוגב הל ןניכפשו אינוקד אעצ ןניתיימ Vatican 121
]הו[)א(וגב הל ׳ניכפשו אינוקד א֯עצ ׳ניתיימ Vatican 122
הווגב הל ׳ניכפשו אינוקד אעצ ןניתיימ Vatican 123B
הוגב הל ןניכפשו אינוקד אעצ ןניתיימ Munich 95
היוגב הל ןנ֯י֯כ֯פ֯ש. אינוק֯ד א֯דפ֯נ אניתיימ Or. 1080.15.52
היוגב הל ןניכפשו אינוקד אעצ ןניתיימ Soncino Print
הרישכ אל יאו הפירט ירויח יקירוס הב תיא יא Hamburg 169
׳רישכ אל יאו הפירט ירוויח יקיירוש הב תיא יא Vatican 121
׳ישכ אל יאו ׳רט ירויח יקיירוש היב תיא יא Vatican 122
׳רישכ אל יאו ׳פירט ירויח יקיירוש הב תיא יא Vatican 123B
הרישכ אל יאו הפירט ירויח יקיירוש והב תיא יא Munich 95
הרישכ אל יאו הפירט ירוויח .קיירוש והב תיא יא Or. 1080.15.52
הרשכ אל יאו ׳פרט ירויח יקירוש הב תיא יא Soncino Print
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C b. Ḥul. 93b
ןניעדי אנמו ןיירש ןערזא אל יאו ןריסא ןערזא ךליאו ןאכמ Hamburg 169
׳ניעדי אנמו[ ןיירש אל יאו ןריסא ןערזא יא ךליאו ןאכימ Vatican 121
ןניעדי אנמו ןיירש ןערז אל יאו ןריסא ןערז יא ךליאו ןאכימ Vatican 122
ןניעדי אנמו ןיירש ןערז אל יאו ןריסא ןערז יא ךליאו ןאכמ Munich 95
׳יעדי אנמ ןיירש ןערזא אל יאו ןירוסא ןערזא יא ךליאו ןאכמ Soncino Print
ןיירש אל יאו ןריסא יקמוס יקיירוש והב תיא יא Hamburg 169
]ןיירש אל יאו ןריסא יקמוס יקיירוש ׳יב ׳יא יא Vatican 121
ןיירש אל יאו ןריסא יקמוס יקיירוש והב תיא יא Vatican 122
ןיירש אל יאו ןריסא יקמוס יקיירוס והב תיא יא Munich 95
ןיירש יקמוס יקיירוש והב תיל ןריסא יקמוס יקיירוש והב תיא יא Soncino Print
D b. Pesaḥ. 74b (see above, p. 390)
E b. Sanh. 105b, b. Ber. 7b, b. ‘Abod. Zar. 4b
יקמוס יקירוס היב תיא אתעשואתעש לכ Barko Print
Sanh.
105b
יקמוס יקיירוש הב יחיכש אתעש לכ Vatican 171
יקאמוס יקאירוש הב ישיפ אתעש לכ Yad Harav Herzog 1
יקמוס יקיירוס/ש היב תיא אתעשואתעש לכ London BL Or. 5528
יקמוס יקיירוש הב תיאו ארווח ׳תעש לכ Munich 95
יקמוס יקירוש היב תיא אתעש לכ Florence II-I-9
יקמוס יקיירוס הב תיא אתעש לכ Karlsruhe—Reuchlin 2
יקמוס יקירוס הב ושיפ אתעש לכ 2068.2–3 ENA
Ber.
7b
י]ק[)…(מוס יקירוש הב תיא אתעש לכ ENA 3007.9–12
יקמוס יקירוס היב תיא אתעש לכ Florence II-I-7
יקמוס יקיירוס הב ישייפ אתעש לכ Munich 95
יקמוס יקירוש היב תיא אתעשואתעש לכ Wien O.N. Hebr. Frag. A 33
יקמוס יקירוס הב ווה אתעש לכ Oxford Opp. Add. fol. 23
יקמוס יקיירוש היב ישייפ העש לכ Paris 671
יקרווס יקר֯וש הב ןיווה אתעשו֯אתע֯ש לכ T-S AS 75.22
יקמוס יקירוס הב ושופ אתעש לכ T-S F 1(2).15
יקמוס י֯ק..רוש הב ישייפ אתעש לכ Philadelphia 86
יקמוס יקיירוש ׳יב תיא ׳תעש לכ Soncino Print
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יקמוס יקרוש הב יואה ֯אתעש לכ F1(2).11 T-S
‘Abod. Zar. 4b
יקמוס יקירוש הב ווה אתעש לכ NY—JTS Rab. 15
יקמוס יקיירוש ׳תעשו׳תעש לכ Munich 95
יקמוס יקיירוס היב תיא אתעש לכ Pesaro Print
יקמוס יקיירוש היב תיא אתעש לכ Paris 1337
יקמוס יקירוס הב תיל אתעש איהה Barko Print
Sanh. 105b
יקמוס יקיירוש הב יחיכשאל אתעש איהה Vatican 171
יהלוכירוח אתעש איההו Yad Harav Herzog 1
]…יירוס/ש היב תיל אתעש איהה[ London BL Or. 5528
יקמוס יקירוס היב תיל ]אתעש ׳יהה Munich 95
Florence II-I-9
יקמוס ׳קיירוס הב תיל התעש איהה Karlsruhe—Reuchlin 2
יקמוס יקירוס הב תיל אתעש איהה 2068.2–3 ENA
Ber. 7b
הב יוהאל אתעש איהה לבא ENA 3007.9–12
יקמוס יקיירוס היב תיל אתעש איההב Florence II-I-7
יקמוס יקיירוש הב ישייפאל ׳תעש איההד Munich 95
יקמוס יקירוש היב ..יל אתעש איההו Wien O.N. Hebr. Frag. A 33
הב יוהאל אתעש אוהה Oxford Opp. Add. fol. 23
יקמוס יקיירוש היב ישייפאל אתעש איהה Paris 671
היב .........֯אל אתעש ֯א֯יהה T-S AS 75.22
יקמוס יקירוס הב תיל אתעש איהה T-S F 1(2).15
יקמוס יקירוש הב ושפאל אתעש איהה Philadelphia 86
יקמוס יקיירוש היב תיל אתעש ׳יההב Soncino Print
יקמוס יקרוש הב יוהאל א...... …֯ה֯ה F1(2).11 T-S
‘Abod. Zar. 4b
הב ?]ו[)ה(?והאל אתעש איההו NY—JTS Rab. 15
היב הוהאל ׳תעש ׳יהה Munich 95
יקמוס יקיירוס היב תיל אתעש איהה Pesaro Print
יקמוס יקיירוש היב תיל אתעש איההו Paris 1337
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chapter 16
Open Ye the Gates:
Procedure for Returning the Torah to the Ark
Joseph H. Prouser
She’eilah
Worshippers atTemple Emanuel of North Jersey ask:When returning theTorah
at the conclusion of the Shabbat/Yom Tov Torah service, when is the most
appropriate time to open the Ark?
Teshuvah
Seder Hachnasat Ha-Torah, the service for returning the Torah Scroll to the
Ark following its public reading on Shabbat or YomTov, begins (among Ashke-
nazim) with Ashrei (Ps 145, etc.). This is followed by Psalm 148:13–14 ( תאוללהי
...ץראלעודוה...םש ), and a procession carrying the Torah Scroll through the con-
gregation while reciting either Psalm 29 on Shabbat, or Psalm 24 on weekdays.
Upon approaching the Ark to return the Torah, a collection of biblical verses is
recited: Numbers 10:36 ( ...רמאיהחנבו ), Psalm 132:8–10 ( ךינהכ...ךתחונמל׳ההמוק
...ךדבעדודרובעב...קדצושבלי ),1 Proverbs 4:2 ( ...בוטחקליכ ), Proverbs 3:18,17 ( ץע
...םעוניכרדהיכרד ...איהםייח ), and the concluding verse of Lamentations ( ונבישה
...ךילא׳ה – 5:21).
On ordinary weekdays, the procedure is briefer. Ashrei is recited only after
returning the Torah to the Ark; there is frequently no procession beyond mov-
ing the Torah Scroll directly to the Ark; the weekday Psalm (24) is commonly
read silently.
1 Compare Ps 132:8–10 and the parallel text in 2Chr 6:41–42.
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Historical Development
These procedures are of relatively late development. Ismar Elbogen writes:
“Concerning the Returning ( הסנכה,הסינכ ) of the Torah, we learn nothing from
the ancient sources, nor does Soferimmention it.”2 Similarly, Rabbi JeffreyHoff-
man indicates that Tractate Soferim “gives details of the service for taking out
the Torah only. Discussion of the service to return the Torah is not found until
the early siddurim.”3 The dearth of classical instruction on the liturgical pro-
cedure for returning the Torah to the Ark may reflect the fact that early syn-
agogues generally lacked a permanent Ark as an architectural feature of the
sanctuary.4 The Torah Scroll, at the conclusion of public worship, was removed
to a neighboring home or building for safekeeping.5
Conflicting Instructions
Contemporary siddurim offer conflicting instructions as to when, during Seder
Hachnasat Ha-Torah, the Ark is to be opened in anticipation of receiving the
Torah Scroll. Siddur Sim Shalom6 indicates that the Ark is to be opened follow-
ing Ashrei and before the verses from Psalm 148. The same directive is found
in the High Holiday Prayer Book edited by Rabbi Morris Silverman, Machzor
Hadesh Yameinu, edited by Rabbi Ronald Aigen,7 and the new Koren Siddur,
edited by British Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks.
The Reconstructionist Movement’s Kol Haneshamah Daily Prayerbook, in-
structs that the Ark be opened at Uvnucho Yomar, following the procession
with the Torah. Rabbi Hayim Halevy Donin unambiguously confirms this pro-
cedure for opening the Ark for the return of the Torah: “While the Prayer
Leader is carrying the Torah back to the Ark, the one so honored should step
2 Ismar Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy: A Comprehensive History, trans. Raymond Scheindlein (Phila-
delphia: Jewish Publication Society; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1993), 160.
3 Jeffrey Hoffman, “The Ancient Torah Service in Light of the Realia of the Talmudic Era,” Con-
servative Judaism 42, no.2 (Winter 1989–1990): 47n.
4 See Ruth Langer, “From Study of Scripture to a Reenactment of Sinai: The Emergence of the
Synagogue Torah Service,”Worship 72, no. 1 (1998): 43–67.
5 See b. Soṭah 38b; Shulḥan Arukh, OḤ 149.
6 Siddur Sim Shalom for Shabbat and Festivals, 1998 edition. The 1985 edition edited by Rabbi
Jules Harlow provides no such instruction.
7 Rabbi Aigen’s siddur was published by Congregation Dorshei Emet, the Reconstructionist
Congregation of Montreal.
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up ahead and open the Ark. The precise moment for doing so is when the pas-
sage Uvnocho Yomar is reached.”8
Many siddurim, even those which note the opening of the Ark at the begin-
ningof theTorahService, providenoexplicit instructionas towhen theArk is to
be opened at the service’s conclusion. Among these are the Bokser, Birnbaum,
Silverman, and Artscroll/RCA siddurim, Hertz’s Authorised Daily Prayerbook,
The NewUnion Prayerbook, SiddurMishkan Tefillah, Siddur Rinat Yisrael, Sid-
dur Or L’Yisrael, The New Mahzor, Mahzor Lev Shalem, the Harlow Machzor,
Siddur Hadesh Yameinu, and, as indicated above, Rabbi Jules Harlow’s original
edition of Siddur Sim Shalom. In his Guide to Jewish Religious Practice, Rabbi
Isaac Klein specifies only when the Ark is to be closed—following the pastiche
of verses ending with Lamentations 5:21—but not when the Ark is opened in
the first place.
These conflicting and ambiguous logistical instructions have led to (andper-
haps find their origin in) a variety of local practices. Congregations variously
open the Ark beforeYehallelu, at an unspecified point during the Torah proces-
sion and its accompanying Psalm, upon conclusion of that Psalm irrespective
of where in the Sanctuary the procession has reached, or upon approaching the
Ark prior to Uvnucho Yomar.
Opening the Ark at Yehallelu
Opening the Ark at Yehallelu, as per the SilvermanMachzor, the revised Siddur
Sim Shalom and the Koren Siddur, has an obvious drawback. The individual
leading the service, those carrying any additional Torah Scroll(s), and those
joining the procession (frequently the rabbi and congregational leaders) with
the intention of thereby honoring the Torah, must turn their back on the open
Ark (and any Torah Scrolls it still contains) and walk away! Additionally, it is
proper for worshippers to face the Torah throughout the procession, requir-
ing them, as sanctuary architecture and individual seating dictate, to turn their
backs on the open Ark for much of that procession as well. As Rabbi David
Fine writes of this procedure, “once the processional passes a worshipper, the
worshipper has to choose between turning his/her back on the Torah in the
processional or on the ark.”9
8 Hayim Halevy Donin, To Pray as a Jew (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 49.
9 Personal correspondence, November 26, 2013. Rabbi Fine instructs his congregation, Tem-
ple Israel of Ridgewood, NJ, to open the Ark only when the processional has “made its final
turn and is heading back to the bima”—as this permits worshippers to face both the Torah
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The principle of facing the Torah, and the gravity attached to this expression





It is a Mitzvah to assign a place for the Torah Scroll to be kept, and to
accord it extreme honor and deference. The words on the Tablets of the
Ten Commandments are in every Torah Scroll. One must not spit before
a Torah Scroll, nor indecently expose oneself before it, nor spread one’s
legs before it, nor carry it on one’s head as if it were a burden, nor may
one turn his back to the Torah Scroll, unless it is at an elevation of ten
handbreadths above the person.10
Why do such venerable liturgical authorities as RabbiMorris Silverman (a deci-
sive force in the shaping of non-Orthodox congregational worship in North
America and beyond) and Chief Rabbi Sacks prescribe a procedure with such
obvious spiritual disadvantages?At least threepossibilities present themselves:
a. Perhaps they did not consider opening the Ark in this manner a disad-
vantage at all. Rabbi David Small, Rabbi Silverman’s current successor as
spiritual leader of Emanuel Synagogue in West Hartford, Connecticut,11
reports that his congregation maintains its longstanding practice, indi-
cated in the Silverman Machzor, of opening the Ark at the beginning of
the Torah procession (once the procession has descended the Bimah).
Rabbi Small suggests that the open Ark reinforces the “numinous” nature
of the moment, alerting the congregation to both the destination of the
Torah and the high sanctity of the moment. These stated advantages out-
and the Ark simultaneously. Correspondence from Rabbis Joel Pitkowsky (Congregation
Beth Sholom of Teaneck—home to numerous JTS faculty members), and Randall Mark
(Shomrei Torah:Wayne Conservative Congregation) affirm the same liturgical policy.
10 Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:10. Ten handbreadths is approximately 40 inches.
TheTorah Scrolls in the Ark of Temple Emanuel of North Jersey rest on a surface 77 inches
above the sanctuary floor: less than “ten handbreadths above” anyone exceeding 37 inches
in height!
11 During my 13 years as Rabbi of Congregation B’nai Sholom in Newington, CT, I had fre-
quent occasion to worship at Emanuel Synagogue, especially throughout the year of say-
ing Kaddish for mymother, of blessedmemory. As a youngmember of Kadimah and USY,
I attended many functions at Emanuel and was there honored with my first Hagbah!
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weigh the concern about turning one’s back on the Ark, according to
Rabbi Small. Notwithstanding this choreographic calculus, the congrega-
tion maintains a strict policy prohibiting, e.g., Bar Mitzvah photographs
being taken on the Bimahwith the subjects’ backs turned to the openArk,
as this is, under normal circumstances, deemed an act of disrespect.
b. Rabbi Sacks’ instruction that the Ark be opened at Yehallelu may reflect
an architectural reality more common in Orthodox synagogues: the loca-
tion of the BimahwithTorah Reader’s table in the center of the sanctuary.
For Hachnasat Ha-Torah, the procession with the Torah moves forward,
directly from the centrally located Bimah to the Ark at the front of the
sanctuary. Those in the procession face the openArk throughout this pro-
cess. This rationale does not entirely resolve the issue for those worship-
pers seatedbetween the Bimah and theArk,whomust still turn to face the
Torah as it approaches, thereby turning their backs toward the open Ark.
c. It is very common for the Ark to be opened at Yehallelu during weekday
morning or Shabbat Minchah services. On these occasions, as indicated
above, the process of returning the Torah to the Ark is relatively brief, and
it is common to omit any actual procession through the sanctuary … to
recite Psalm 24 quickly and silently … and to move the Torah directly to
the Ark. At no point during this weekday process is it necessary either for
those accompanying the Torah, nor the congregation, to turn away from
the Ark (unless there is a central Bimah—see IIb, above). A weekday Ark
opening at Yehallelu is thus entirely appropriate. It seems likely that this
featureof theweekday servicewas transferredby some to theShabbat and
Holiday liturgywithout regard for the inadvertent slight to theArk and the
Torah Scrolls which—by virtue of the procession which is added to the
more elaborate Torah Service conducted on those festive occasions—it
entails. Rabbi DavidWise, of Hollis Hills Jewish Center in Queens (where
he shares the pulpit with Cantor Sol Zim, who has had such a profound
impact on themusical expression of synagogue liturgy), thus reports that
his congregation opens the Ark (in a smaller chapel) atYehallelu onweek-
days, and delays the opening (in the main sanctuary) to a later point on
Shabbat and Holidays.
If opening the Ark at Yehallelu (or at the outset of the Torah procession) is
designed to evoke a sense of the “numinous,” such a determination is based
on a subjective judgement regarding both the spiritual impact of an open
Ark and the liturgical moments meriting such a measure. Recitation of the
Shema is certainly a moment rife with the numinous (though it is our custom
to remain seated, with the Ark, accordingly, shut). The silent Amidah—both
its prescribed text and the private prayers and personal petitions we add—
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demand a particular awareness of God’s presence … and the congregation is
already standing. Similarly, Barchu, Yizkor, Shochen Ad, etc … all partake of
the “numinous.” Invoking this justification for opening the Ark for the Torah
procession, to the exclusion of these other impactful moments of prayer, is
unconvincing… particularly since it compromises customary standards of def-
erence to the Torah Scroll.
If Rabbi Sacks’ prescription of anArk opening atYehallelu assumes, as a con-
dition of its permissibility, a centrally located Bimah, obviating (or, at least,
minimizing) the need to turn one’s back on either the Torah or the open Ark,
such a liturgical policy should be abandoned when these conditions to not
obtain.
If opening the Ark at Yehallelu is a practice inadvertently imported from
the weekday service (when there is nothing in the liturgical choreography to
contraindicate this timing), the distinctive Torah procession of Shabbat and
YomTov demand that we reassess the timing of the Ark opening. Following the
weekday procedure on Shabbat results in an entirely avoidable affront to the
honor of the Ark. It is a practice grounded in error.
Aggadic Perspective
Though halachic texts governing the ceremonial return of the Torah to the Ark
are few, a “charming Talmudic legend”12 suggests an early link between open-
ing Ark doors and the recitation of Psalm 24 (as during the Torah procession







When Solomon built the Holy Temple, he wanted to bring the Ark into
the Holy of Holies, but the doors of the sacred chamber clung to each
other and remained closed. Solomon recited twenty-four expressions of
12 Max Arzt, Justice and Mercy: Commentary on the Liturgy of the New Year and the Day of
Atonement (New York: Burning Bush Press, 1963), 157.
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praise,13 but he was not answered. He then recited ‘O gates, lift up your
heads! Up high, you everlasting doors, so the King of Glory may come
in!’14 They pursued him to swallow him up,15 saying, ‘Who is the King
of Glory?’16 He answered them, ‘The Lord, mighty and valiant!’17 He then
said further: ‘O gates, lift up your heads! Lift themup high, you everlasting
doors, so the King of Glory may come in! Who is the King of Glory? The
Lord of Hosts, He is the King of Glory,’18 and still hewas not answered. But
when he said, ‘O Lord God, do not reject19 Your anointed ones; remember
the loyalty of Your servant David,’20 he was answered immediately.21
The parallels between this Aggadic text and Seder Hachnasat Ha-Torah are
striking. Both involve a ceremonious process by which a ritual object of ulti-
mate holiness and covenantal significance (the Ark of the Covenant; the Torah
Scroll) is brought to its sanctified depository (The Temple’s Holy of Holies; the
Synagogue’s Holy Ark). Each involves recitation of Psalm 24, following an ear-
lier liturgy. Solomon’s introduction of the Ark to the Holy of Holies culminates
in recitation of 2Chronicles 6:42, while Hachnasat Ha-Torah concludes with
that Scriptural context’s close literary parallel in theBookof Psalms,withwhich
it shares significant, identical phrases:








13 Identified variously as a reference to 1Kgs 8 or to the blessings recited in conjunction with
a fast—See Rashi ad loc. See also Steinsaltz ad loc.
14 Ps 24:7.




19 Literally, “Do not turn away the face of Your anointed ones.”
20 2Chr 6:42.
21 b. Šabb. 30a.
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It is instructive that the doors to the Holy of Holies open for Solomon only
following his recitation of Psalm 24 and only uponhis recitation of 2Chronicles
6:42, invoking ָךְדְבַעדִוָד (God’s servant, David) and asking God, יֵנְּפבֵׁשָּת-לַא
ָךיֶחיִׁשְמ (not to reject His anointed). Themosaic of verses with which our Torah
Service concludes includes the more poetic variants of these very Scriptural
phrases in Psalm 132.TheTalmudic narrative appears to illustrate an early Seder
Hachnasat Ha-Torah of roughly the same form preserved in our own current
practice. Indeed, the aggadic text remains intelligible only if the opening of
the doors to the Holy of Holies directly paralleled the liturgical function of
the Chronicles verse and its psalmodic recension in Psalm 132 as “the precise
moment”22—evenat this early stage in thedevelopmentof theTorahService—
at which the synagogue Ark23 was opened in order to receive the returning
Torah Scroll: following the procession with the Torah and in conjunction with
the concluding Biblical verses—in contemporary practice, that is, beginning
with Uvenucho Yomar.
Conclusion
Opening the Ark for Hachnasat Ha-Torah prior to (or even during) the proces-
sion with the Torah Scroll is to be avoided. It requires those leading the congre-
gation in prayer, together with the worshippers they serve, to turn their backs
either on the open Ark and any remaining Torah Scrolls it contains or on the
Torah being carried in procession itself. This represents a forbidden affront to
theTorah included byMaimonides in the same class as spitting, indecent expo-
sure, coarse or unseemly personal carriage, and rough handling of the Scroll in
the manner of ordinary burdens and baggage. Those contemporary siddurim
that include instructions to open the Ark at Yehallelu either erroneously copy
the weekday procedure—contraindicated by the liturgical changes unique to
the Shabbat/Yom Tov liturgy—or assume specific synagogue architecture that
minimizes but does not entirely avoid this offense … yet which is rarely found
in North American, non-Orthodox sanctuaries. Assertion of a subjective sense
of the “numinous” or efforts to create a heightened spiritual ambience should
not be given precedence over the clear halachic prohibition articulated byMai-
monides … violation of which is so easily avoided.
22 Donin, To Pray as a Jew.
23 As this architectural feature was introduced to the ancient synagogue. See Section I, at
n. 4, above.
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The proper point in Seder Hachnasat Ha-Torah for the opening of the Ark is
only following the Torah procession and the concomitant singing of the pre-
scribed Psalm. This was the practice of the congregation of my youth,24 of the
Jewish Theological Seminary Synagogue25 under the leadership of Rabbi Saul
Lieberman, of blessedmemory, and reflects the precedent of the Talmudic age
suggested in the Aggadah, discussed above, regarding Solomon and the doors
of the Holy of Holies.
RabbiHayimDoninHalevywas correct:26 “Theprecisemoment” for opening
the Ark to return the Torah “is when the passage Uvnocho Yomar is reached.”27
:ֹוֽבּוֹאבָיםיִקיִּדַצ׳הַלרַעַּׁשַה-הֶֽזּה-ָֽיהֶדֹואםָב-ֹאבָֽאקֶדֶצ-יֵרֲעַֽׁשיִל-ּוחְתִּפ
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The“:ןיבור׳נרקוחהךלה reason given for R. Yehudah’s position is that ‘both the command-
ment for the father (to be redeemed) and the commandment of the son (to be redeemed)























































































































…“:אקוודילכלכבצמל we can say that from the question posed by the Tannaim, whether
to redeem oneself or to redeem one’s son where one cannot afford both, that there was
economic hardship, either because the redemption cost was high or because the combi-
nation of the twowas cause for economic hardship…The final decision was only reached
in the days of R. Yirmiya… that according to all the fathermust first redeemhimself while
the son will then redeem himself when he is able to. It is doubtful that such a question
would have been asked had the amount of money beenmerely symbolic. Herewe become
aware of a situation, which may be no more than theoretical, where a second generation
will also suffer economic hardship. The very discussion, even if it is but hypothetical, indi-
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